This is a sample urgent motion to inhibit and to re-raffle a pending case prepared by our law office, for the legal research purposes of our readers.
“x
x x.
URGENT MOTION TO
INHIBIT AND TO RE-RAFFLE
THE UNDERSIGNED PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS, namely, xxx, xxx, and xxx, with the conformity of the
Public/Trial Prosecutor, respectfully state:
1. The accused-appellants in Criminal Case No. xxx, namely, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx,
xxx, xxx & xxx, and the accused-appellants in Crim. Case No. xxx, namely,
xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx & xxx, have recently appealed their
conviction by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of xxx, xxx, per its Decision,
dated xxx, 2016 for two (2) counts of Malicious Mischief, to this Honorable
Court, presided by Hon. xxx.
The said pending appeals are docketed as Crim. Case No. xxx and Crim.
Case No. xxx before Honorable Court.
- It will be noted that the undersigned private complainants and
the accused-appellants are the parties in a civil case pending in Branch
67 of this Honorable Court, which is also presided by the Honorable Presiding Judge xxx, docketed
as Civil Case No. xxx and entitled “xxx
vs. xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx,
xxx, xxx AND ALL O THER PERSONS UNDER THEIR EMPLOY, DIRECTION, CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION”, for INJUNCTION with DAMAGES.
- The accused-appellants in the instant appealed criminal cases,
who are named in Par. 1 hereof, are ranking directors/officers of the xxx,
the plaintiff in the aforecited Civil Case No. xxx.
- The undersigned private complainants in the instant appealed
criminal cases are co-defendants in the aforecited Civil Case No. xxx.
The undersigned private complainants are ranking directors/officers of
the xxx SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (xxx).
- There have been a protracted political and socio-economic
conflicts and struggles between the aforementioned two (2) groups for many
years now.
The said conflicts and struggles have escalated to litigations between
and among the herein parties before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLRUB), the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of the Province of Rizal, the Municipal Trial Court of xxx,
xxx, the Manila Water Co., Inc., and others.
- The Honorable Presiding Judge xxx, in the abovecited Civil Case
No. xxx, has issued certain Orders, which are enumerated hereinbelow, favorable
to the plaintiff therein (xxx) and its leaders (i.e., the accused-appellants in these appealed criminal cases).
The said Orders have adversely affected the organizational
effectiveness of the leadership of the undersigned private complainants, as
among the incumbent leaders of xxx, as well as the efficient and prompt
delivery of socio-economic services by the undersigned private complainants to
the homeowners of the Xxx Subdivision, to wit:
(a)
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, dated xxx, 2015;
(b)
ORDER OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, dated xxx, 2015;
(c)
SHOW-CAUSE
ORDER, dated xxx, 2015; and
(d)
ORDER, dated xxx,
2016, denying the special affirmative defenses raised by the undersigned
private complainants in their supplemental responsive pleading as the
co-defendants in the aforecited Civil Case No. xxx.
- It will be recalled that in the Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation filed
by the undersigned private complainants on xxx, 2015, the undersigned
private complainants, together with the their co-defendants in the
aforecited Civil Case No. xxx, had brought to the attention of the Honorable
Judge xxx the xxx, 2015 Newsletter distributed by xxx (a ranking leader of
the xxx, plaintiff in the said civil case).
In the said Newsletter xxx created that impression in the minds of the
homeowners, including the undersigned private complainants, that the Honorable Presiding
Judge had, in a partial and biased manner, prejudged
the guilt of the defendants in the said pending civil case for indirect
contempt, implying that the Honorable Judge was on their side as the movants
for indirect contempt in the said pending civil case.
(Please see
attached manifestation and newsletter, marked as Exhs. “1” and “2”).
8. Lest the undersigned private complainants be misconstrued by this Honorable
Court, the undersigned private complainants most respectfully and humbly wish
to state that, in filing this “motion to inhibit and to re-raffle”, the
undersigned private complainants have no malicious intention of attributing any
ill, unjust or
dishonest motive against the person, name, and reputation of the
Honorable Presiding Judge Xxx.
- This motion is being filed by the undersigned private
complainants, with all humility and with all due respect to the
Honorable Presiding Judge, solely as an honest exercise by the private
complainants of their constitutional right to substantive and procedural
due process of law.
The two (2) basic dimensions of due process of law are (a) the right
of a litigant to a state of peace of mind while his case is being litigated by
a trial court, and (b) the right of a litigant to assert the duty of a trial
court to maintain a public image that meets the strict perception-based
standard of “the cold neutrality or an impartial judge” or the “Caesar’s Wife
Doctrine” in Legal and Judicial Ethics.
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In the aforecited case, the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed
with the Supreme Court sought to nullify and set aside the resolutions issued
by public respondent Gregory S. Ong, Associate Justice and Chairperson of
the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291,
19225 and 22867 to 22870, specifically:
(a) The Resolution dated October 15, 2003 denying
the motion for inhibition filed by petitioner People of the Philippines; and,
(b) The Resolution dated December 30, 2003 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES likewise prayed in its petition
to the Supreme Court that the said public respondent (Justice Ong) be
permanently enjoined from presiding over the trial and sitting in judgment in
these ten consolidated cases against private
respondent Ms. Imelda R. Marcos for violation of Section 3(h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The Supreme Court noted in the said case that the aforecited case related
intimately to Civil Case No. 0141 (forfeiture case) arising from the petition
for forfeiture filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to recover from former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and herein private respondent (collectively,
respondents) funds alleged to be ill-gotten and deposited under different Swiss
bank accounts in the name of several foreign foundations.
Disposing of the aforecited case, the Supreme Court cited Sec. 7, Rule
137 (inhibition and disqualification of judges) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION
1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested
as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Supreme Court held therein that (a) due process necessarily
requires that a hearing is conducted before an “impartial and disinterested
tribunal” because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” and (b) that “all the
other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if
the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.”
THUS:
“X x x .
This rule enumerates
the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified from participating
in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is
rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which
guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law. Due process necessarily requires that a
hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the
ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.
Relevant to the
present case is the second paragraph governing voluntary inhibition.
Based on this provision, judges have been given the exclusive prerogative
to recuse themselves from hearing cases for reasons other than those
pertaining to their pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or
previous rulings or decisions. The issue of voluntary inhibition in this
instance becomes primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge. It is a subjective test the result of which the
reviewing tribunal will generally not disturb in the absence of any manifest
finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality.
This discretion
granted to trial judges takes cognizance of the fact that these judges are in a
better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition as they are the
ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. Nevertheless,
it must be emphasized that the authority for voluntary inhibition does not give
judges unlimited discretion to decide whether or not they will desist from
hearing a case. The decision on whether or not judges should inhibit
themselves must be based on their rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the cases brought before them.
X x x.”
FINALLY, the Supreme Court, in the aforecited case, held that (a) judges
should avoid “not just impropriety” in their conduct but even the “mere
appearance” of impropriety for appearance is an essential manifestation of
reality”; (b) that it is essential that judges be “above suspicion”; and (c)
that a judge has the avowed duty to promote “confidence in the judicial
system”.
THUS:
“X x x.
Public respondent is
reminded of the principle that judges should avoid not just impropriety
in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety for appearance
is an essential manifestation of reality. In insulating the Bench from
unwarranted criticism, thus preserving a democratic way of life, it is
essential that judges be above suspicion. It bears stressing that the
duty of judges is not only to administer justice but also to conduct themselves
in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. This
arises from the avowed duty of members of the bench to promote confidence in
the judicial system. Occupying as they do an exalted position in the
administration of justice, judges must pay a high price for the honor bestowed
upon them. Hence, any act which would give the appearance of
impropriety becomes, of itself, reprehensible.
X x x.”
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Hon. Xxx, Presiding
Judge of this Honorable Court voluntarily INHIBIT himself from adjudicating the
instant appealed criminal cases and that the same be RE-RAFFLED to another Branch
of the Honorable Court.
FURTHER,
the movants respectfully pray for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises.
Xxx, xxx, March 21, 2016.
X x x.”
