FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002].
“x x x.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the peoples right to information on matters of public concern in this manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials at all times x x x accountable to the people,[i] for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.[ii]
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[iii] that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains the right does not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
Mr. Suarez. And when we say transactions which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The transactions used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you.[iv] (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no official acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government. From this moment, the publics right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,[v] the Court ruled as follows:
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARIs contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
The right covers three categories of information which are matters of public concern, namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.[vi] The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.[vii]
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers.[viii] The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential.[ix] The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress,[x] are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.[xi] This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.[xii] Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.[xiii]
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[i] Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states as follows: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
[ii] 170 SCRA 256 (1989).
[iii] See note 22.
[iv] Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, pp. 24-25, (1986).
[v] Supra, Note 22.
[vii] Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987).
[viii] Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995).
[ix] See Note 22.
[x] Chavez v. PCGG, see note 22; Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515 (1991).
[xi] Almonte v. Vasquez, see note 36.
[xii] Peoples Movement for Press Freedom, et al. v. Hon. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 84642, En Banc Resolution dated April 13, 1988; Chavez v. PCGG, see note 22.
[xiii] Section 270 of the National Internal Revenue Code punishes any officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue who divulges to any person, except as allowed by law, information regarding the business, income, or estate of any taxpayer, the secrets, operation, style of work, or apparatus of any manufacturer or producer, or confidential information regarding the business of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the discharge of his official duties. Section 14 of R.A. No. 8800 (Safeguard Measures Act) prohibits the release to the public of confidential information submitted in evidence to the Tariff Commission. Section 3 (n) of R.A. No. 8504 (Philippine AIDS Prevention and Control Act) classifies as confidential the medical records of HIV patients. Section 6 (j) of R.A. No. 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act) classifies as confidential the records of the adopted child, adopting parents, and natural parents. Section 94 (f) of R.A. No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) requires the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to maintain the confidentiality of confidential information supplied by contractors who are parties to mineral agreements or financial and technical assistance agreements.