In the case of CONRADO QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR., A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009, the Supreme Court found the respondent liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and DISBARRED him from the practice of law. Thus:
X x x.
The Court’s Ruling
x x x.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[1] we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months.[2]
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondent’s petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.[3]
Second, notwithstanding the CA’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTC’s and the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[4]
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainant’s title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both dismissed “for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs” to file the petition.[5]
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainant’s title because the property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in several courts – the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainant’s title and the petition for declaratory relief – reveal the respondent’s persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to “observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.” By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[6]
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[7] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure;[8] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[9]
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts’ jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondent’s subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,
intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration … thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) …[10]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed “that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.”[11] These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands[12] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the “plaintiffs.” In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD.[13][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondent’s application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse party’s motion to dismiss.[14] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondent’s application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party.[15] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
… how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [16]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyer’s duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer “never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”[17] The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice,[18] and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.[19] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be.[20] In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[21]
In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor.[22] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.[23] The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to “conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues.” He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan’s finding that the respondent twice represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.[24]
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondent’s off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously associated.[25] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondent’s explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs – his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latter’s representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.[26] The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[27]
The Respondent’s Defenses
We find no merit in the respondent’s defenses.
“Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious."[28] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.[29] As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondent’s allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.[30] As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyer’s discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client’s case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he ‘will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same’; and that he ‘will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.’ Needless to state, the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[31]
We cannot give credence to the respondent’s claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice – an issue where the complainant’s personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
x x x
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[32]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
X x x.
[3] Rollo, p. 6.
[4] Id. at 12.
[5] Id. at 7-8.
[6] See: Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct, p. 104 (2004 edition).
[7] Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court processes.
[8] Supra note 20 at 104.
[9] Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, 454; see: Agpalo. supra note 20 at 121, citing Chempil Export & Export Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil 619 (1995); and Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil 503 (1998).
[10] Petition for Annulment of Judgment, p. 25; rollo, p. 11.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Id., pp. 30-31; PUBLIC LAND ACT, Section 101.
[13] Id. at 13.
[14] Id. at 13-14.
[15] Id. at 12.
[16] Id. at 155.
[17] RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 20 (d).
[18] Agpalo, supra note 20 at 99.
[19] Id. at 100.
[20] Id. at102.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Id. at 226.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Rollo, pp. 155-156.
[25] Id. at 26.
[26] RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 21.
[27] Id., Sections 21 and 27.
[28] Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar and Deogracias Militar, G.R. Nos. 164801 & 165165, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 308, 318; citing University of the East v. Jader, 382 Phil. 697, 705 (2000).
[29] Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127440, January 27, 2007, 513 SCRA 69, 83.
[30] Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., supra note 15.
[31] Ibid., citing Choa v. Chiongson, 329 Phil 270, 275-276 (1996).
[32] G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 600-601.
