ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., GR No. 193902, June 1, 2011 (with companion cases).
x x x.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the RTC’s, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CA’s separate factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[19]
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts—acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.[20]
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.[21]
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[22]
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a “more enlightened and substantial justice”;[23] (d) to promote public welfare and public policy;[24] and (e) when the cases “have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.”[25] The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos’ motion to quash.
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari’a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[26]
The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Shari’a Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Shari’a Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Shari’a Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Shari’a Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office equipments of the Shari’a Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may serve.
2. Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzman’s divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usman’s affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharia’s Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;
2. The first time that a Sharia’s Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharia’s Circuit Court;
3. The Sharia’s Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;
4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharia’s Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharia’s Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy.
Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.[30]
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos’ Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to “promote the advancement and effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies.”
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the former shall prevail.
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon:
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized “in accordance with” the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.[31]
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Article 13. Application. –
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
x x x x
Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.
x x x x
Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
x x x x
Article 29. By divorcee.
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an ‘idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.
x x x x
Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
Section 1. Nature and Form
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
x x x x
Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed ‘idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed ‘idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).
x x x x
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with
Article 78 of this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated.
For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.[32]
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.[33]
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Sr. and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 194075), pp. 34-62.
[2] Issued by Judge Oscar V. Badelles; id. at 176-177.
[3] Id. at 343-344.
[4] Id. at 38.
[5] Id. at 39.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 39-40.
[8] Id. at 43.
[9] Id.
[11] Id. at 43-44.
[12] Id. at 44.
[13] Id. at 48-50.
[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 193902), p. 245.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 194075), p. 51.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 52.
[18] Id. at 58-60.
[19] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
[20] Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 225 Phil. 459, 471-472 (1986).
[21] RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Sec. 1.
[22] Madarang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143044, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 318, 327.
[23] Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 361, citing Mead v. Hon. Argel, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 650, 656 (1982).
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 158642, September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 142, 150.
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 193902), p. 215.
[28] Id. at 213.
[29] Id. at 214.
[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 194075), p. 176.
[31] 1984 ed., Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., pp. 53-54.
[32] Id. at 98.
[33] Id. at 175.
