In the case of LIGAYA MANIAGO vs. ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010, the following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court, the same to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
THUS:
X x x.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBC’s reply to an inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.[1] Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the Court’s resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for more than six months. The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession.[2]
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.[3] Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.[4] However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.
X x x.
[1] Letter signed by Atty. James D.V. Navarrete Assistant, Officer-in-Charge, Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator.
[2] See A.C. No. 3066, entitled “J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. Eduardo de Vera, et al.,” and A.C. No. 4438, entitled “Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al.”; Memorandum dated November 14, 2008 addressed to Justice Consuelo Yñares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division.
[3] Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 209, 216.
[4] Hernandez v. Go, A.C. No. 1526, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 1, 9.
