LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
147437, May 8, 2009
D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
The
right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to
other motorists is
mutual, coordinate and
reciprocal.[1] He is bound to anticipate the presence of
other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to his own.[2] Although he is not an insurer against injury
to persons or property,[3] it
is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable
care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others[4] as
well as for his own.[5]
X
x x.
Reckless imprudence
generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.[6]
Imprudence connotes a
deficiency of action. It implies a
failure in precaution or a failure to
take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen.[7] Thus, something more than mere negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of
reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required.[8] Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the
safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held
to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another,
either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person.[9]
Hence, in prosecutions
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of
the drivers of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question
that lies in the manner and circumstances of the operation of the motor
vehicle,[10]
and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely, (a) that the offender has done or failed to do an
act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c) that the same is without malice; (d)
that material damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender.[11]
Among the elements constitutive
of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the
conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act
without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution because it is that which
supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere
negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law.[12]
This, because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is
all that that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the
accused,[13]
that is, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be
considered likewise at fault.
Inasmuch as the Revised
Penal Code, however, does not detail what particular act or acts causing damage
to property may be characterized as reckless imprudence, certainly, as with all
criminal prosecutions, the inquiry as to whether the accused could be held
liable for the offense is a question that must be addressed by the facts and
circumstances unique to a given case. Thus,
if we must determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a conscious
indifference to the consequences of his conduct, our attention must necessarily
drift to the most fundamental factual predicate. And we proceed from
petitioner’s contention that at the time the collision took place, he was
carefully driving the car as he in fact approached the intersection on second
gear and that his speed allegedly was somewhere between 25 and 30 kph which
under normal conditions could be considered so safe and manageable as to enable
him to bring the car to a full stop when necessary.
Aside from the entry in
the TAIR, however, which noted petitioner’s speed to be beyond what is lawful,
the physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner’s contention.
The photographs taken of Arnold
Rate of speed, in
connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in
determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile,[14]
and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show the
force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly
inferred.[15] While an adverse inference may be gathered
with respect to reckless driving[16]
from proof of excessive speed under the circumstances[17]—as
in this case where the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the
intersection in excess of lawful speed—such proof raises the presumption of
imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence,[18]
or, as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the
accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless
or imprudent manner.[19]
We
find, however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden
inasmuch as the physical evidence on record is heavy with conviction way more
than his bare assertion that his speed at the time of the incident was well
within what is controllable. Indeed, the
facts of this case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the
junction, was traveling at a speed far greater than that conveniently fixed in
his testimony. Insofar as such facts are
consistent with that finding, their truth must reasonably be admitted.[20]
Speeding,
moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to
exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road. What is reasonable speed, of course, is
necessarily subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case
but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle
under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.[21] This standard of reasonableness is actually
contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136.
It states:
SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on
a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor
less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the
width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and
no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to
endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than
will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear
distance ahead.
Even
apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless
expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with all the conditions encountered [22]
which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever
necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using
the highway. [23]
It
is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance
where the motorist is approaching an intersection. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation
of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution
than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway.[24] A driver approaching an intersection is
generally under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle
under control as to be able to stop at the shortest possible notice,[25] that is, he must look for vehicles that might
be approaching from within the radius that denotes the limit of danger.[26]
Since
compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has
exercised the level of precaution required under the circumstances, then with
more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level of care when the
intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. In other words, where the view at an
intersection is obstructed and an approaching motorist cannot get a good view
to the right or left until he is close to the intersection, prudence would
dictate that he take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the
intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a collision,[27]
which means that he is bound is to move with the utmost caution until it is
determinable that he can proceed safely and at the slowest speed possible[28]
so that the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can see
ahead.[29]
On
this score, what brings certain failure in petitioner’s case is his own
admission that he had not seen Arnold
It
can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short
of the standard of care in a situation which called for more precaution on the
highway in failing to make an observation in the interest at least of his own
safety whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing. Since he is chargeable with what he should
have observed only had he exercised the commensurate care required under the
circumstances of the case, the inescapable conclusion is that he had
inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and
reasonable motorist.
In
general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular
case in exercising reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the
light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be commensurate
with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely
to result from the use of the vehicle.[30]
In other words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution
and the peculiar risks attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road[31]
which are open to ordinary observation.[32] The ultimate test, in other words, is to be
found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if commensurate
care is not exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually
foresee the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted
was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an ordinary
prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of
a general nature as that suffered was to materialize.[33] The evidence in this case is teeming with
suggestion that petitioner had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision
that was about to happen as he entered the junction in question especially
considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the
structures on the road. In the same way,
he failed to solidly establish that such failure to foresee the danger lurking
on the road could be deemed excusable as indeed his contention that he was
running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the
physical facts of the case.
Yet,
petitioner clings to a chance of acquittal.
In his petition, he theorizes that the negligence of Arnold Arnold
In traffic law parlance,
the term “right of way” is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in
a lawful manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such
circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to a danger of
collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other.[34]
Although there is authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of
statutory creation and exists only according to express statutory provision,[35]
it is generally recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter,
that the vehicle first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of
way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise approaching the
intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such
right without danger of collisions.[36]
In our setting, the
right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136,[37] which materially provides:
Section
42. Right of Way.
(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an
intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the
left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as
otherwise hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an
unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise have hereunder.
(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but
not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of a way to a vehicle
within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of
travel of such first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle
turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as
required in this Act. x x x.
The provision governs
the situation when two vehicles approach the intersection from the same
direction and one of them intends make a turn on either side of the road. But
the rule embodied in the said provision, also prevalent in traffic statutes in
the United States, has also been liberally applied to a situation in which two
vehicles approach an intersection from directly opposite directions at
approximately the same time on the same street and one of them attempts to make
a left-hand turn into the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his
right, the vehicle making the turn being under the duty of yielding to the
other.[38]
Nevertheless, the right
of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in
terms. It is actually subject to and is
affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of
intersection.[39] Thus, whether one of the drivers has the
right of way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the
highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the vehicles approach
the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed that if
either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to
occur.[40]
Otherwise stated, the statutory right of way rule under Section 42 of our
traffic law applies only where the vehicles are approaching the intersection at
approximately the same time and not where one of the vehicles enter the
junction substantially in advance of the other.
Whether two vehicles are
approaching the intersection at the same time does not necessarily depend on
which of the vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it is determined by the imminence of
collision when the relative distances and speeds of the two vehicles are
considered.[41] It is said that two vehicles are approaching
the intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a
reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver
approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued
on their courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the
driver of the vehicle approaching from the left must give the right of
precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.[42]
Nevertheless, the rule
requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the
right on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the
left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to approach the
intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of
way to a vehicle within the danger zone on his right.[43] He is not bound to wait until there is no
other vehicle on his right in sight
before proceeding to the intersection but only until it is reasonably safe to
proceed.[44] Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,[45] it was established
that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one
making a turn; but if the person making the turn has already negotiated half of
the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the
person on the thru-street, he is bound to give way to the former.
Moreover,
in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the
person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which
the accused’s vehicle collided does not constitute a defense.[46] In fact, even where such driver is said to be
guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case of
the accused.[47] In other words, proof that the offended party
was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little
weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accused’s
culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent
in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he took a left turn at the
intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioner’s contention, will
nevertheless not support an acquittal.
At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules
governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the
purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of the award of damages in favor of
the private offended party.
But
it must be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold Arnold Arnold
Finally,
on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to present countervailing
evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained by Arnold
All
told, it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorist’s duty is
such care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries
which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle, and in proportion to or
commensurate with the peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and
conditions in the particular case,[48]
the driver being under the duty to know and to take into consideration those
circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the vehicle which
would be open to ordinary observation.[49]
X x x.
[1]Richards v. Begenstos, 21 N.W.2d 23; Hodges v. Smith, 298 S.W. 1023; Lawson v. Fordyce, 12 N.W.2d 301.
[2]Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101
S.W.2d 354.
[3]Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lyon , 107 F.2d 157; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. McKee, 121 F.2d 583.
[4]Burdick v. Powell Bros. Truck Lines, 124
F.2d 694; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Lane,
116 F.2d 264; Shipley v. Komer, 154
F.2d 861.
[5]Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101
S.W.2d 354.
[6]The REvised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B., 15th ed.
(2001) p. 995.
[7]The Revised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B.,
15th ed. (2001) pp. 994-995.
[8]People v. Paarlberg, 612 N.E.2d 106
(1933); People v. Crawford, 467
N.W.2d 818 (1991); Wood v. City of Casper
[9]Wofford v. State, 395 S.E.2d 630 (1990);
Shorter v. State, 122 N.E.2d 847
(1954); White v. State, 647 S.W.2d
751 (1983).
[10]7A
Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 861-862.
[11]The Revised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B.,
15th ed. (2001) p. 995.
[12]White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751 (1983).
[13]People v. Ackroyd, 543 N.Y.S.2d 848
(1989).
[14]52
A.L.R.2d 1343.
[15]Knuth v. Murphy, 54 N.W.2d 771. This case held that
evidence of the extent of personal injuries is competent to show the force of
the impact as a basis for an inference of the rate of speed of the vehicle.
[17]People v. Devoe, 159 N.E. 682; People v. Whitby
[18]People v. Carrie, 204 N.Y.S. 759.
[19]People v. Herman, 20 N.Y.S.2d 149.
[20]See
Woodson v. Germas, 104 S.E.2d 739.
[21]Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128474, 6 October 2004 ,
440 SCRA 136, 148-149.
[22]Foster v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 670 So.2d
471.
[23]Nunn v. Financial Indem. Co. ,
694 So.2d 630. Duty of reasonable care includes duty to keep the vehicle under
control and to maintain proper lookout for hazards.
[24]Roberts v. Leahy, 214 P.2d 673.
[25]Reppert v. White Star Lines, 106 A.L.R.
413; Riccio
v. Ginsberg, 62 A.L.R. 967.
[26]Stauffer v. School District of Tecumseh
[27]Kane v. Locke, 12 N.W.2d 495; Shelton
[28]Matthews v. Patton, 123 A.2d 667.
[29]Henthorn v. M.G.C.Corp., 83 N.W.2d 759.
[30]Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829; Butcher v. Thornhill, 58 P.2d 179.
[31]Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829; Tucker v. Ragland-Potter Co., 148 S.W.2d
691.
[32]Webb v. Smith, 10 S.E. 2d 503; Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 142
S.W.2d 908.
[33]Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645.
[34]Burrows v. Jacobsen, 311 N.W.2d 880
(1981).
[35]Betchkal v. Willis, 378 N.W.2d 684
(1985).
[36]Creech v. Blackwell, 298 S.W.2d 394.
[37]
Entitled “An Act to Compile the Laws
Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, To Create a Land
Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes.” The law was approved on 20 June 1964 .
[38]McCarthy v. Beckwith, 141 N.E. 126; Arvo v. Delta Hardware Co., 204 N.W.
134; Cohen v. Silverman, 190 N.W.
795; Webber v. Park Auto Transp. Co.,
47 A.L.R. 590.
[39]Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 57 A.2d 792.
[40]Reynolds v. Madison Bus Co., 26 N.W. 2d
653.
[41]Wilmes v. Mihelich, 25 N.W.2d 833.
[42]Moore
[43]Moore
[44]Metzger v. Cushman’s Sons, 152 N.E. 695.
[45]G.R.
No. 125134, 22 January 1999 ,
301 SCRA 657.
[46]State v. Blake, 255 N.W. 108.
[47]State v. Sullivan, 277 N.W. 230.
[48]Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829.
[49] Webb v. Smith, 10 S.E. 2d 503; Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 142
S.W.2d 908.
