Friday, December 6, 2013

Rule 108 viz. Art. 170, Family Code - impugning legitimacy of a child.

This post contains the legal/jurisprudential parts of a petition our law office has filed with the Supreme Court in re: the legal interplay of Rule 108 (correction entries in a birth certificate) vis-a-vis  Art. 170, Family Code (period to impugn legitimacy of a child). The legal research part thereof may be of help to our readers.



“x x x.

INTRODUCTION

1.      The subject matter of this Rule 45 petition is the ORDER, dated xxx, of public respondent Hon. xxx, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch xxx, of xxx City, a legible duplicate original copy of which, as received on xxx by the petitioner, thru his undersigned counsel, together with its original improvised letter envelope, are marked as Annexes ”A” to “A-2” hereof.

Sec. 1 of Rule 45 allows the petitioner a direct access to this Honorable Court from the RTC if the issue raised is a PURELY LEGAL ONE.


PARTIES

X x x.

MATERIAL DATES

2.    On xxx the petitioner filed a PETITION with the RTC, Branch xxx, xxx City, invoking Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a duplicate original copy of which is attached as Annexes “B” to “B-22” hereof, seeking the following prayers, to wit:


“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:

1.       The relevant paternity-related entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of minor child xxx, registered in the Civil Registry of xxx City on xxx under Registry No. xxx be CORRECTED by:

1.1.            DELETING the following entries therefrom, to wit:  

Entries under “Father”:

X x x.

1.2.          CORRECTING the following entry under the “child”, to wit:

X x x.

2.     The Local Civil Registrar of xxx City be directed to effect the above-mentioned corrections of entries in the birth certificate of the subject minor child.

3.    The paternal surname xxx of the said minor child be corrected by DELETING the said paternal surname xxx and by REPLACING the same with the maiden maternal surname xxx of his  biological mother/respondent xxx.


4.    The petitioner be declared by the Court to be free and liberated from any and all legal responsibilities and liabilities attributable or accruing to, or must be followed and observed by, a legitimate father in relation to a  legitimate child under the Civil Code, Family Code, and other relevant existing laws, including but not limited to the duty of financial support to the minor child.

     Petitioner also prays for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.”

3.    Today, December 5, 2013, the petitioner, by counsel, received a duplicate original copy of the ORDER, dated xxx, of Judge xxx of RTC, Branch xxx, xxx City, a legible duplicate original copy of which, as received on xxx by the petitioner, thru his undersigned counsel, together with its original improvised letter envelope, are marked as Annexes ”A” to “A-2” hereof, supra.  

The questioned Order is quoted in full below, to wit:


O R D E R

Petitioner filed the present case pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court seeking the deletion of all the details on “Father” entered in the Certificate of Live Birth of the minor xxx, alleging that said minor is not his child.

          A perusal of the allegations of the petition shows that it is an action to impugn the legitimacy of the minor child.  Thus, it should have been filed under Articles 166 to 170 of the Family Code which refer to an action directly impugning the legitimacy of a child.

          Even if the court should consider the present petition as filed under the aforementioned provisions of the Family Code, it should not prosper just the same on the ground of prescription.  Article 170 of the Family Code provides, to wit:

“Art. 170.  The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad.  If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery  or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.

          The minor xxx was born on xxx and his facts of birth were registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan on xxx.  Thus, petitioner only had until xxx, at the latest, to file the necessary action to impugn the legitimacy of the minor child.  The present case, however, was filed only on xxx.

          WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for not being the proper remedy and on the ground of prescription.

          SO ORDERED”.


It will be noted that under Sec. 1, Rule 109 (APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), in re: Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken, it is provided that an interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court,  where such order or judgment, inter alia, “(f)  Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.”

The petitioner has 15 days from today, xxx, or until xxx, to file this petition with this Honorable Court. Hence, this petition.


STATEMENT OF THE MATTERS INVOLVED

X x x.

 4.    In the interest of truth and justice, and as allowed by Rule 108, this petition is intended to correct the fake, simulated, illegal and baseless entries in the birth certificate of the minor xxx, whose paternity and filiation have been unlawfully caused to be recorded by the respondent mother, xxx, in the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of xxx City, xxx, to make it appear that the Petitioner is the legitimate father of the said minor child xxx.


THE SOLE AND PURELY LEGAL ISSUE
RAISED IN THE PETITION

5.     The sole purely legal issue raised in this petition is as follows:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER, DATED xxx, OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE UPHELD BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

Otherwise stated, the sole purely legal issue is as follows:

WHETHER OR NOT RULE 108 WAS A PROPER REMEDY WHEN THE PERIOD PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 170 OF THE FAMILY CODE (TO IMPUGN THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD) HAD EXPIRED.


REASONS AND ARGUMENTS RELIED UPON
FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

6.    There is no question that Art. 170 of the Family Code provides that “he action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded”; that “if the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad”; that “if the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery  or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.”

7.     Rule 108 is a special remedy or proceeding allowed by the Supreme Court to remedy an INJUSTICE and to promote NATURAL JUSTICE AND EQUITY, as  in the case of Art. 170, supra, where the period allowed to impugn the legitimacy of a child had expired. Rule 108 is NOT INCOMPATIBLE with Art. 170 insofar as available procedural remedies under the Rules of Court are concerned. Otherwise, the Petitioner would be denied of his basic rights to DUE PROCESS OF LAW,  EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, and ACCESS TO THE COURTS to seek a judicial remedy for an injustice he has suffered and continues to suffer. If we follow the logic of the trial court, the petitioner is now forced and indeed has no other fair and equitable choice and option but to honor and recognize a child who is not his biological child, per the initial DNA test conducted for the purpose, the same to be maintained by him as a part of his genetic, hereditary and historical bloodline and his very own future, with all its adverse biological, economic, and sociological consequences.

8.     Rule 108 provides that “any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located” (Sec.1) ; that  “entries subject to cancellation or correction.—Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)   judgments   declaring   marriages   void   from   the   beginning; (g)  legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizen­ship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name” (Sec. 2); that “when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding” (Sec. 3); that “upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition” and that ”the court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province” (Sec.4); that “the civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto” (Sec. 5); that “the court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preserva­tion of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings” (Sec. 6); and that “after hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for” and that “in either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record”. (Sec. 7).

9.   The 2001 case of “MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitionersvs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, et. al., G.R. No. 118387,  October 11, 2001” is instructive.
In the said case, the Petitioners contended that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court was improper since private respondents sought to have the entry for the name of petitioners’ mother changed from “Keh Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who was a completely different
person.  What private respondents therefore sought was not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a “bastardization of petitioners.”[16] Petitioners thus label private respondents’ suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners’ above contention, the Court of Appeals observed that the proceedings were simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right.  Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.
The Court held: “It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’ records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.  Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children.  There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.”
Further sanctioning private respondents’ resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to a ruling of the Supreme Court in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 (1986), where the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner’s minor children as stated in their records of birth from “Chinese” to “Filipino”, and “legitimate” to “illegitimate”, respectively.  Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected were not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, the Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, the Supreme Court also laid down the rule “that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.”  
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by
Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.[24] The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,[25] which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,[26] where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,[27] starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,[28]prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,[29] allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
The Supreme Court pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,[30] the reason it declared null and void the portion of the lower court’s order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe’s petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.
Far from petitioners’ theory, the Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[32] “did not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register.”  The Court added that “the only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.”  
The Court held that while it is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion.  But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides.[34] Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary, the Court stated.  One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se.  It held that: “Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3).  The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5).  Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).”
The Court added: “It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous.  This interpretation has the effect of isolating
Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.[46].”
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048[47] which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.”
The above law speaks clearly.  Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general.  The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register.  Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.  This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.”

The Court also held that: “It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind.  For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is.  Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding.  Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application.  Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.”
On another point, the Court in the abovecited case held that Article 171 of the Family Code showed  that it applied to instances in which the father impugned the legitimacy of his wife’s child.  The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.  It added: “The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner.  In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all. x x x.[51]
Similarly, in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals[52], the Court held that Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code were inapplicable. 
It stated that: “A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.  Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.  Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.  Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.  Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.  For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.”  
The Court’s ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457, was apropos, viz:  “Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken.  This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy.  It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.  They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all.  Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.’”[53]

 On a final point, the Court said the Petitioners claimed that private respondents’ cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.[54]. The Court disagreed
The Court held: “As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies: “Art. 1149.  All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.”
The Court stated: “The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.  It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.[55].”
The Court continued: “It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action.  The last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners’ birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago.  Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents’ right of action or right to sue accrued.  However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.”
The Court stressed: “Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date.  This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate.  It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents’ suspicions were aroused and confirmed.  From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.”

 The Court added: “Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners’ birth records in 1989.  Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry. We cannot agree with petitioners’ thinking on that point. It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.[56] Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world.  Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water.  Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage cannot be acquired by prescription.  One is either born of a particular mother or not.  It is that simple.”


RELIEF


WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the questioned Order, dated xxx, of the trial court be reversed and set aside and that the original case below be revived to proceed on the merits thereof following the procedures set by Rule 108.

FURTHER, the petitioner prays for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.

          Las Pinas City, x  x  x.




LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER
& ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES
Counsel for the Petitioner
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C. V. Starr Avenue
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City
Tel. Nos. 872-5443; 846-2539

Fax No. 846-2539

x x x."