“x x x.
The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on the principal ground that a question of ownership was involved therein. This view does not jibe with the following observations from Chief Justice Moran based on a consistent line of decisions from this Court: 4
It
would be a mistake to suppose that an action involves a question of title
merely because the plaintiff may allege in his complaint that he is the owner
of the land. Just as the plaintiff may introduce proof of his title in order to
show the character of his (sic) prior possession, so be may allege
ownership in himself as a material and relevant fact in the case, and the
insertion of such an allegation in the complaint cannot by any possibility
place the cause beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court, provided it
otherwise sufficiently appears that what the plaintiff really seeks is the
restoration of possession as against an intruder who has seized the property
within the period of one year. Much less can the defendant in such an action
defeat the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court by setting up title in
himself. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the factor which
defeats the jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace is the
necessity to adjudicate the question of title. The circumstance that proof of
title is introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownership is made by
either or both of the parties is not material
This ruling is embodied in Sec. 33, (2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which vests municipal courts with:
Exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; Provided,
that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership should be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible entry in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc, the case for annulment of the mortgage and foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves recovery of ownership, was already being litigated in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Even so, the municipal court could, pending final adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the right of possession (only) over the subject properties in the ejectment case.
The private respondents also contend that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry because; a) under Section 19 par. (2) of BP 129, as amended, the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein; and b) under Section 1, par. A (1) of the Rule on Summary Procedure, cases of forcible entry and detainer involving the question of ownership are expressly excluded from the summary jurisdiction of the municipal court.
Curiously, however, they also insist that an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129 and that the petitioner is now estopped from assailing the applicability of that Rule.
There is no question that under Section 1, par. A (1), of the said Rule, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer except where the question of ownership is involved or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint. *
However, it is incorrect to say that the question of ownership was involved in the ejectment case filed by the petitioner simply because she alleged in her complaint that she was the original owner of the subject properties. That the petitioner instituted a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage is not a valid reason either for defeating the summary remedy of ejectment. On the contrary, it only bolsters the conclusion that the ejectment case did not involve the question of title as this was the subject of the annulment case before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The Rule on Summary Procedure was clearly applicable because the ejectment case involved only the restoration of possession of the subject land and not its ownership.
X x x.”
