JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, G.R.
No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
“x
x x.
The
central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into
between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes
res judicata in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.
The
doctrine of res judicata is a rule
that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon
two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public
policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation, interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.[1]
For
res judicata, to serve as an absolute
bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on
the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.[2]
It
is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before
RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch
24, were both actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation
filed by petitioner against respondent.
Hence, there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action between the two cases.
However, the question arises as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[3] In Estate
of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[4]
the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is
a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that
like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites
in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit:
(a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the
subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is
established. And, like any other
contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to
law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no
obligation for any party. It produces no
legal effect at all.[5]
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls
attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of
persons;
(2) The validity of a
marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal
separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of
courts;
Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously
intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate
child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary
consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her
rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered
by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Advincula v. Advincula[6] has a factual background closely similar to the one
at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela)
filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553
for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case was
dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same
court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case
No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela
of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for
acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil status, which cannot be the subject
of compromise.
It is
settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Public
policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.[7] Paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the
Court to declare its existence or absence.
It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.[8]
Being
contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all. The
void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.[9]
Neither
can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already
made said contract valid and legal.
Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9
to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch
9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that
was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and
submitted for approval by both parties.
RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant
the approval of the said Compromise Agreement.
No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta[10]
is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law
that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a
matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question
is not whether a competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable
before it, but whether the court itself is competent under any circumstances to
adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is want of
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and
consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment
derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision
of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its
people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
X x x.”
[1] Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 385 (2000).
[2] Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, 26 October 2007 , 537 SCRA
513, 537.
[3] Civil Code, Article 2028.
[4] Supra note 17, citing Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239
(2004).
[5] Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, 17 May 2005 , 458 SCRA 714, 735.
[6] 119 Phil. 448 (1964).
[7] Concepcion
[8] De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 515, 522 (1999).
[9] See
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, 366 Phil. 863, 871 (1999).
[10] 61 Phil. 752, 757-758 (1935).
