GRACIA R. JOVEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City, Roberto Paguia & Fernando Lasala, respondents. G.R. No. 80739, August 20, 1992.
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The private respondents also assert that the institution of the ejectment case resulted in the splitting of a single cause of action into two, one for the recovery of ownership and possession and the other for recovery of possession de facto.
In Drilon vs. Gaurana, 11 this Court held:
It
is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court) and if two or more complaints
are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the
first may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of
Court). However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has an entirely
different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is
involved in a forcible entry case is merely the issue of material possession or
possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is
the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title
over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it
preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only
issue involved is material possession or possession de facto (De la Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]).
While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the two actions, the issues involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the same. In the annulment suit, the issue is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale whereas the issue in the ejectment case is whether, assuming the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, the private respondents have the right to take possession of the property. In the former case, the relief prayed for is recovery of ownership of the subject land while in the latter it is restoration of possession thereof to the petitioner. Hence, the municipal court had jurisdiction to try the ejectx x ment case while the annulment suit was being litigated in the regional trial court.
The contention that the petitioner was forum-shopping must also be rejected. As an injunction cannot be a substitute for the other suits for recovery of possession, 12 such as an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and accion publiciana, denial of the injunction did not bar the petitioner from availing herself of the more appropriate remedy, to wit, the action for forcible entry. 13
In sum, the respondent court erred when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner. We find that it had.
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