Thursday, February 12, 2015

Judicial review - GR 209287.pdf

See - 209287.pdf





"x x x.

xxx. Indeed, the interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive. As clarified in Endencia and Jugo v. David:

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Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. 



x x x x



We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the

interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the

Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a

subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental,

principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.

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The respondents cannot also ignore the glaring fact that the petitions primarily and significantly alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive in the implementation of the DAP. The resolution of the petitions thus demanded the exercise by the Court of its aforedescribed power of judicial review as mandated by the Constitution.



x x x."