Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.: 2025

Friday, February 28, 2025

The lapses and significant gaps in the chain of custody cast serious doubts and taint the integrity of the corpus delicti.

[ G.R. No. 267265, January 24, 2024 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDWIN CORDOVA Y MANALASTAS, JAYSON TALADUA Y BARBARRA, MARY ANTONETTE DEL ROSARIO Y TAMONDONG, AND JAIME CORDOVA Y MANALASTAS (ACQUITTED), ACCUSED; EDWIN CORDOVA Y MANALASTAS, AND JAYSON TALADUA Y BARBARRA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2024/jan2024/gr_267265_2024.html

"Xxx.

The rule on chain of custody in drugs cases

To sustain a conviction for the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must be able to establish with moral certainty the identity of the confiscated drug.43 To remove any doubt or uncertainty as to the identity and integrity of the seized drug, it must be proven that the substance illegally sold by the accused is the same substance offered and identified in court.44 This requirement is known as the chain of custody rule. Chain of custody has been defined as "the duly recorded, authorized movements, and custody of the seized drugs at each stage, from the moment of confiscation to the receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination until it is presented to the court."45
The chain of custody rule is provided for under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640,46 which was passed on July 15, 2014. Considering that the illegal acts of selling and/or possessing dangerous drugs were allegedly committed by Edwin and Taladua on January 17, 2019, the revised chain of custody rule applies in this case. In this regard, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, provides that:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification[.] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, the following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:

1. The first link is the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;

2. The second link refers to the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;

3. The third link pertains to the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and

4. The fourth link is the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.1aшphi147
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and must not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag, that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.48

The prosecution failed to establish the first link in the chain of custody

The first link in the chain of custody involves the seizure, marking, and conduct of inventory of the seized dangerous drug. In People v. Somira,49 the Court, citing its ruling in People v. Zakaria,50 emphasized the importance of this first link as follows:

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.51

In Nisperos v. People52 (Nisperos), the Court adopted the following guidelines in the marking, inventory, and taking of photographs of seized dangerous drugs:
In order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, particularly our law enforcement officers, the Court hereby adopts the following guidelines:

1. The marking of the seized dangerous drugs must be done:

a. Immediately upon confiscation;

b. At the place of confiscation; and

c. In the presence of the offender (unless the offender eluded the arrest);

2. The conduct of inventory and taking of photographs of the seized dangerous drugs must be done:

a. Immediately after seizure and confiscation;

b. In the presence of the accused, or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; and

c. Also in the presence of the insulating witnesses, as follows:

i. if the seizure occurred during the effectivity of R.A. No. 9165, or from July 4, 2002 until August 6, 2014, the presence of three (3) witnesses, namely, an elected public official; a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative; and a media representative;

ii. if the seizure occurred after the effectivity of R.A. No. 10640, or from August 7, 2014 onward, the presence of two (2) witnesses, namely, an elected public official; and a National Prosecution Service representative or a media representative.

3. In case of any deviation from the foregoing, the prosecution must positively acknowledge the same and prove (1) justifiable ground/s for non-compliance and (2) the proper preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item/s.53 (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, the inventory and taking of photographs of the seized dangerous drugs must be done immediately after their seizure and confiscation. In this regard, the Court ruled in People v. Casa54 (Casa) that "the phrase 'immediately after seizure and confiscation' means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension."55 Consequently, the insulating witnesses are also required "to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs 'immediately after seizure and confiscation."'56

In People v. Bartolini,57 the Court ruled that the failure of the apprehending officers to immediately mark the seized dangerous drug casts doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti, which warrants an acquittal based on reasonable doubt:

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the first link in the chain of custody. There was a failure to mark the drugs immediately after the items were seized from Bartolini. The items were marked only at the police station and the prosecution offered no reasonable explanation as to why the items were not immediately marked after seizure. We have previously held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after seizure from the accused cast doubt on the prosecution's evidence, which warrants an acquittal on reasonable doubt.
. . . .

This Court has been consistent in holding that the failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

There have been cases when the Court relaxed the application of Section 21 and held that the subsequent marking at the police station is valid. However, this non-compliance is not fatal only when there are (1) justifiable grounds and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. And while the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640 now allows the conduct of physical inventory in the nearest police station, the principal concern remains to be the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. In this case, however, the prosecution offered no explanation at all for the non-compliance with Section 21, more particularly that relating to the immediate marking of the seized items. This non-explanation creates doubt on whether the buy-bust team was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized from Bartolini.58 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the CA ruled that the prosecution was able to successfully prove the police officers' compliance with the chain of custody rule.59 Consequently, the CA concluded that the prosecution had established the integrity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.60

The Court disagrees.

A review of the records of this case reveals that the first link in the chain of custody rule was not complied with. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that the insulating witnesses were not at or near the place of arrest at the time of apprehension.

PO1 Torres, the buy-bust team's poseur buyer, admitted that the buy-bust team only contacted the insulating witnesses, Barangay Captain Garra of Barangay Greater Lagro and media representative Yu, after Edwin's and Taladua's arrest, thus:

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, who were present during the markings of these specimens?

A: During the Inventory, we called the barangay officials and the barangay captain arrived at the area, Barangay Captain Leo B. Garra, and the media representative, Christopher Yu. We also called the DOJ representative but there [was] no available DOJ [representative] at that time.61 (Underscoring supplied)

Additionally, during PO1 Torres' cross-examination, the defense counsel was able to elicit an admission proving that the marking and inventory of the seized items were conducted at least 25 minutes after the arrest of Edwin and Taladua. As shown in Edwin's and Taladua's Arrest and Booking Sheet,62 they were arrested at about 11:20 p.m. of January 17, 2019.63 On the other hand, PO1 Torres testified that Barangay Captain Garra and Yu arrived at the place of arrest at 11:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m., respectively:

Q: And, Mr. Witness, you mentioned a while ago that during the Inventory[,] you called the barangay captain and a media representative, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So, these witnesses whom you called went to the place of arrest after you have arrested the four (4) accused, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After you have allegedly confiscated the items from them, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who arrived first, the barangay captain or the media representative?

A: The barangay captain.

Q: And what time did the barangay captain arrive?

A: At around 11:30.

Q: How about the media representative?

A: 11:45.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The above testimony of PO1 Torres about the time of the arrival of the insulating witnesses was corroborated by PO1 Ty during his own cross-examination:

Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that when you were conducting the Inventory, a barangay captain and a reporter arrived at the place?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did the barangay captain and the reporter arrive simultaneously?

A: No, sir.

Q: Who came first?

A: It was Captain Leo Garra who arrived first.

Q: What time did the barangay captain arrive, if you remember?

A: At 11:30 in the evening, sir.

Q: How about the reporter?

A: At 11:45 in the evening, sir.65 (Emphasis supplied)

As uniformly found by the CA and the RTC, the marking and the inventory of the seized items were conducted only after the arrival of Barangay Captain Garra and Yu, at least 25 minutes from the arrest of Edwin and Taladua. Notably, in Nisperos, the Court ruled that an interval of 30 minutes between seizure of the dangerous drugs and the conduct of the inventory amounts to an unjustifiable deviation from the chain of custody rule, thus:

Here, while the purported sale transpired at 11:30 [a.m.] of June 30, 2015, the inventory took place half an hour later. While Barangay Captain Taguinod was already present at the place of transaction, DOJ representative Gangan arrived only at 12 noon. Without his presence, the inventory could not be conducted for lack of one required witness. Given that the inventory was done at the place of seizure and did not need to be performed at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team, the buy-bust team should have been able to conduct the same immediately after the seizure, were it not for the tardy arrival of the DOJ representative. Certainly, his late arrival is not a justifiable ground for the delay. The buy-bust team only had itself to blame for not ensuring that all required witnesses were readily available for them to be able to immediately conduct the inventory.

We find, therefore, that the buy-bust team unjustifiably deviated from the chain of custody rule when only one of the mandatory witnesses was readily available at the place of transaction, thus constraining the buy-bust team to conduct the inventory only half an hour after the seizure and confiscation of the drugs. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the Court rules that the 25-minute interval between Edwin's and Taladua's arrest and seizure of the dangerous drugs, on the one hand, and the marking and inventory of the seized items, on the other, is unreasonable. Considering that the inventory was done at the place of seizure and did not need to be performed at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team, the buy-bust team should have been able to conduct the same immediately after the seizure, were it not for the late arrival of the insulating witnesses. Thus, the buy-bust team unjustifiably deviated from the chain of custody rule as it is clear that the marking of the seized dangerous drugs was not done immediately upon confiscation. Additionally, the inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items were not conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation. Thus, the totality of the prosecution's evidence actually revealed that the guidelines prevailing in jurisprudence, as consolidated in Casa and Nisperos, have been violated by the buy-bust team.

Admittedly, the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, contains a saving proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over the said items." However, in order for the saving proviso to apply, the prosecution must first recognize and explain the lapse or lapses in procedure committed by the arresting officers.66 That did not happen in this case. Neither the prosecution nor the apprehending officers offered any justification for the non-compliance with the procedure required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640. This unjustified departure from the chain of custody rule casts doubt on the prosecution's evidence.
The lapses committed by the prosecution and the apprehending officers are not minor. Indeed, establishing every link in the chain of custody is crucial to the preservation of the integrity, identity, and evidentiary value of the seized items. Failure to demonstrate compliance with even just one of these links creates reasonable doubt that the items confiscated from the accused are the same items offered in evidence,67 as in this case.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Edwin and Taladua had not been adequately preserved. The lapses and significant gaps in the chain of custody cast serious doubts and taint the integrity of the corpus delicti. Consequently, the Court acquits Edwin and Taladua of the crimes charged against them.
Del Rosario should benefit from the acquittal of Edwin and Taladua.

Xxx."

The Court rules that notwithstanding the finality of Del Rosario's conviction, she must benefit from the subsequent acquittal of her co-accused pursuant to Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;

Based on the above provision, a favorable judgment such as an acquittal "shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory."70 This is in line with the principle earlier stated that an appeal of a criminal case throws the entire case open for review by the higher tribunal.

In Fuentes v. People,71 the Court applied the above rule to a similar criminal proceeding involving violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In the said case, although two (2) Informations were separately filed against petitioner Edwin Fuentes (Fuentes) and his co-accused, the acquittal of Fuentes during appeal was used as basis in acquitting his co-accused who did not appeal his conviction, considering that the criminal case against said co-accused arose from the same set of facts as the case against Fuentes.

The same rule was applied by the Court in People v. Dy.72 In the said case, accused-appellant Loren Dy (Dy) and her co-accused William Cepeda (Cepeda), were jointly charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Additionally, a separate Information was filed against Cepeda for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Only Dy appealed her conviction to the Court. When the Court acquitted Dy due to the failure of the prosecution to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the dangerous drugs, the Court likewise acquitted Cepeda, including his conviction of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, notwithstanding his failure to perfect an appeal. According to the Court, Dy's conviction rested on the same set of facts and circumstances as the conviction of Cepeda.

In People v. Fulgado,73 the Court also acquitted the accused-appellant's co-accused who did not appeal her conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, thus:
All told, Fulgado must be and is so acquitted for failure of the prosecution to justify the arresting officers' non-compliance with the three-witness rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

In view of this, Tamayo, Fulgado's co-accused in this case, must perforce be acquitted as well considering that (1) under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a favorable judgment shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal; and (2) the evidence against and the conviction of Tamayo and Fulgado are inextricably linked. Hence, the acquittal of Fulgado based on reasonable doubt should likewise apply to her co-accused Tamayo albeit no appeal was filed by the latter.74 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, Edwin, Taladua, and Del Rosario were simultaneously arrested by the buy-bust team.
Additionally, the marking and inventory of dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Edwin, Taladua, and Del Rosario were conducted only after the arrival of the insulating witnesses. As such, the acquittal of Edwin and Taladua on the basis of non-observance of the chain of custody rule squarely applies to Del Rosario. The evidence against and the conviction of Edwin, Taladua, and Del Rosario are inextricably linked."

To emphasize, what governs the prescription of Cyber Libel is paragraph 4, not paragraph 2, of Article 90 of the RPC. Hence, the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year.

[ G.R. No. 258524. October 11, 2023 ]

BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND REPRESENTATIVE FERDINAND LEDESMA HERNANDEZ OF THE SECOND DISTRICT OF SOUTH COTABATO, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/oct2023/gr_258524_2023.html

"Xxx.

The Court now rules on the merits of the Petition.

II.A. RA 10175 did not create a new crime but merely implements the RPC's provisions on libel when written defamatory remarks are published through a computer system.

The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined and penalized under the RPC are found in Articles 90 and 91 of the same Code; for those penalized by special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive period, Act No. 3326 applies.56 Thus, for the Court to resolve the issue of whether Act No. 3326 or the RPC applies to Cyber Libel, it must first determine whether Cyber Libel is a crime defined and penalized by the RPC or by RA 10175, which is a special law.

The RTC concluded that Cyber Libel is penalized by RA 10175, a special law and thus, applied Act No. 3326. Causing disagrees with the RTC and submits that Cyber Libel is a crime defined by the RPC; hence, the provisions of the RPC govern its prescriptive period.

The Court rules in favor of Causing. Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 merely implements the RPC's provisions on Libel under Articles 353 and 355 thereof when it is committed through a computer system. Thus, in determining the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, the RPC, not Act No. 3326, should be applied.

First, a textual analysis of Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 readily reveals that the special law did not create any new crime. Instead, it merely enforces Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the RPC on Libel when committed "through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future." Verily, in defining the act to be punished, RA 10175 itself refers to Article 355 of the RPC, viz.:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

x x x x

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. (Italics supplied)

Second, the Court could not have been more categorical in its Disini Decision: Cyber Libel is not a new crime because Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, already punishes it. The offense under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and felony under Article 355 of the RPC are one and the same crime with the same elements. RA 10175 simply recognizes a computer system as "similar means" of publication and makes the use of information and communications technology (ICT) in the commission of Libel as a qualifying circumstance:

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

x x x x

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the Internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

x x x x

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.57

In resolving the motion for reconsideration of the Disini Decision,58 the Court reiterated that Cyber Libel is not a new crime for it is "essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace."59

Finally, even the lawmakers recognized that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of cyber or online Libel because it is already defined by the RPC. In passing Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, they acknowledged that the RPC is a very old law dating back to the Spanish occupation, where the legislators could not have contemplated the use of technologies not yet existing at that time, such as a computer system, to publish libelous statements.60 With RA 10175, the law recognizes computer systems and ICT as novel means of committing Libel.61 Thus, by including a specific RPC provision in RA 10175, the legislators intended to implement existing laws on Libel when the defamatory remarks are made online, which are "just online versions of actual criminal activities in the real world."62

The foregoing irrefragably shows that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of Cyber Libel but merely enforces the felony of Libel as already defined and penalized by Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, when it is committed with the use of a computer system. Otherwise stated, RA I 0175 simply identifies a computer system as a means of publishing libelous statements and increases the penalty for Libel by one degree higher than that prescribed by the RPC when the crime is committed with the use of ICT. Cyber Libel is therefore a crime defined and penalized by the RPC.

II.B. Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC, not Section 1 of Act No. 3326, define the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

Considering that Cyber Libel is a crime defined and penalized by the RPC, the latter governs in determining the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

Act No. 3326 is not controlling because Section 1,63 in relation to Section 364 thereof, makes the said law applicable only if the offense is defined and penalized by a special law without its own prescriptive period, and not when the crime is already defined and penalized by the RPC.

Even assuming arguendo that Cyber Libel is considered as an offense that is defined and penalized by Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, a special law without its own prescriptive period, the law's direct reference to Article 355 of the RPC precludes the automatic application of Act No. 3326 to define its prescriptive period. Instead, the Court must examine both Section 1, Act No. 3326 and Article 90 of the RPC, determine which statutory provision has the shortest prescriptive period and is most favorable to the accused, and apply the latter in setting the prescription of Cyber Libel. This is based on the settled rule that statutory provisions on the prescription of crimes must be construed in favor of the accused.65

People v. Terrado66 (Terrado) is apropos. In that case, the accused were charged with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 of the RPC because they supposedly submitted false affidavits to the Bureau of Lands in support of a claim regarding lands of the public domain sometime in 1952 and 1953. The Informations were filed in 1962, or more than eight years from the date of the alleged commission of the crimes. The accused in Terrado argued that the charges against them have prescribed because they constituted violations of Section 12967 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, as amended, which states that any person who submits such false affidavits "shall be deemed guilty of perjury and punished as such." They contended that Section 1 of Act No. 3326 must therefore be applied, which would make the charges against them prescribe in eight years from the alleged commission of the offense.

In resolving Terrado and holding that the crimes charged against therein accused have prescribed, the Court was guided by the well-established rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Because the charges in Terrado were covered by both the RPC and Section 129 of CA 141, a special law without its own prescriptive period for the crimes charged, the Court had to examine the provisions on prescription of both the RPC and Act No. 3326, identify which provisions of law provided the shortest prescriptive period, and apply the latter because it was the most favorable to the accused, viz.:

Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. Prision mayor is an afflictive penalty, and hence, prescribes in 15 years. Perjury, upon the other hand, is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months, which is correctional in nature, and prescribes in ten (10) years. However, Public Act No. 3326, as amended by Act 3585 and Act 3763, provides that "violations penalized by special laws shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; x x x", so that perjury which is punishable by imprisonment of from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months prescribes after eight years.

Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act 3326, as amended, in connection with the prescriptive period of the offenses charged, the same should be applied. Considering, therefore, that the offenses were alleged to have been committed during the period from May 15, 1952 to February 2, 1953, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7613; from May 28, 1952 to August 18, 1952, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7614; and from November 16, 1951 to February 21, 1952, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7615, and the informations were filed only on March 13, 1962, or more than eight (8) years after the said offenses were allegedly committed, the lower court correctly ruled that the crimes in question had already prescribed.68 (Italics ours)

Here, Cyber Libel is penalized under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, but the same section of the law also refers to Article 355 of the RPC to define the prohibited act. Following Terrado, either Section 1, Act No. 3326 or Article 90 of the RPC may be applied to determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel; as between the two, the law that sets the shorter period for prescription and the more favorable to the accused must be applied. Considering that Article 90 of the RPC provides the shorter prescriptive period at only one year and is therefore more favorable to the accused, it should prevail over the application of Act No. 3326, which would make Cyber Libel prescribe in 12 years.

II.C. Paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is controlling, making the crime of Cyber Libel prescribe in one year; thus, the ruling in Tolentino must be abandoned.

Article 90 of the RPC provides the prescriptive period for the crimes covered thereby. It states:

ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusión perpetua or reclusión temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.

The parties in the present case disagree on which provision of Article 90 of the RPC must be applied in setting the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

On the one hand, the OSG posits that paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC governs because the penalty for Cyber Libel is afflictive under Article 2569 of the RPC in relation to Section 6 of RA 10175, which increased the penalty for Cyber Libel by one degree than that prescribed by the RPC, or to prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. Significantly, the Court reached the same conclusion in Tolentino when it declared that Cyber Libel prescribes in 15 years.

On the other hand, Causing argues that paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC must be applied because it clearly states that the "crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." He insists that Cyber Libel, being the same crime of Libel under Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, is covered by the foregoing provision.

The Court agrees with Causing and abandons the Tolentino doctrine on the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. To emphasize, what governs the prescription of Cyber Libel is paragraph 4, not paragraph 2, of Article 90 of the RPC. Hence, the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year.

First, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC must be given its literal and plain meaning: the crime of Libel shall prescribe in one year. This provision must therefore determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, consistent with the Court's finding that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 is the same crime of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC when it is committed through a computer system.

Indeed, laws are presumed to have been passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all statutes existing on the subject.70 By referencing Article 355 of the RPC in RA 10175, the lawmakers are presumed to know all laws bearing on Libel, including the applicable provisions of the RPC on the period for its prescription. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to exclude Cyber Libel from the crime of "libel" in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, it would have used the appropriate language to do so, but it did not.71 The absence of any such amendatory or exclusionary clause warrants the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to create a prescriptive period for Cyber Libel that is different from what is already provided in Article 90 of the RPC for Libel under Article 355 of the same Code.72

Second, it is an elementary rule in statutory construction that a special and specific provision of law prevails over a general provision of the same law irrespective of their relative position in the statute (Generalia specialibus non derogant).73 Where there is, in the same statute, a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.74 This rule has been applied by the Court in fixing the prescriptive period for an action for breach of warranty,75 for a response to be filed in deficiency tax assessment cases,76 and for the duration of a contract.77

In the present case, a perusal of Article 90 of the RPC readily shows that paragraph 2 thereof is a general provision on prescription of crimes punishable by afflictive penalties, while paragraph 4 specifically governs Libel or other similar offenses. Applying the foregoing rule on statutory construction, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC indisputably prevails over paragraph 2 thereof in setting the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

Third, the history of the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 90 of the RPC discloses the Legislature's intent to set it apart from other crimes punishable with a correctional penalty. When the RPC was passed, the prescriptive period of Libel was two years. Congress further reduced the period by passing RA 4661,78 which amended Article 90 of the RPC to specifically shorten the prescriptive period of Libel and other similar offenses from two years to one year.

Significantly, the Court has held that the prescription of a crime is intimately connected with and depends upon the gravity of the offense.79 Hence, a reduction or shortening of the prescriptive period "implies an acknowledgment on the part of the sovereign power that the greater severity of the former statute relative to the substances of the criminal action is unjust."80 Excepting Libel from the general 10-year prescriptive period for other crimes with correctional penalties may therefore be taken as an acknowledgment by the Legislature that it is "less grave" compared to other crimes at the same penal scale.81

In addition, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, RA 4661, which originated from House Bill No. 1037 (HB 1037), was enacted by the Legislature to synchronize the prescriptive period of Libel with the one-year prescriptive period of civil actions for defamation under Article 114782 of the Civil Code.83 Apart from this, Senator Lorenzo Tañada, who sponsored HB 1037, mentioned that a shorter prescriptive period for Libel will especially benefit the members of the press by allowing them to "discharge their functions better."84 These very same rationales remain true to this day and equally apply to the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

Given the foregoing, the Court cannot subscribe to the classification of Cyber Libel as a crime punishable with an afflictive penalty under paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC that would increase its prescriptive period to 15 years. Such interpretation disregards the clear intent of the lawmakers to set Libel apart from the general class of crimes punishable with afflictive or correctional penalties. Absent any amendment of the statute clearly raising the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, or an enactment on the prescription of said crime that is different from that provided in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, the Court must apply the latter.

Finally, it bears repeating that in interpreting statutory provisions on the prescription of crimes, what is more favorable to the accused must be adopted.85 Hence, when there are several conflicting provisions of the RPC in classifying the penalty for a felony as light, correctional, or afflictive, in relation to Article 90 of the same Code, the Court must adopt the interpretation of the law that sets the shortest prescriptive period.86 In the present case, consistent with the foregoing principle of liberality in favor of the accused, there is no doubt that paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC prevails over paragraph 2 thereof as the latter would make Cyber Libel prescribe in 15 years instead of just one.

II.D. Pursuant to Article 91 of the RPC, the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year from its discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.

In determining when the one-year prescriptive period of Cyber Libel should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the RPC,87 which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive period of offenses:

ART. 91. Computation of Prescription of Offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Despite the foregoing provision of law, a review of jurisprudence reveals conflicting decisions on when the prescriptive period of Libel is to be reckoned.

In earlier cases, the discovery rule was adopted by the Court. In Alcantara v. Amoranto88 (Alcantara), it was held that the period to file a civil action for written defamation commences on the date that the crime is discovered, as provided in the RPC. The Court explained that "the libelous matter must first be exhibited to the person libeled before the action could be brought"89 because the person defamed "could hardly be expected to institute the proceedings for damages arising from libel when he has no knowledge of the said libel."90 In Alcantara, the libelous letter was published on October 23, 1955, but the contents thereof came to the knowledge of the offended party only on January 6, 1956. Hence, the action for Libel therein was timely filed on January 5, 1957, within the one-year prescriptive period counted from discovery of the crime.

The prescriptive period was also reckoned from discovery in Inciong v. Tolentino,91 where the criminal action for Libel filed on May 23, 1954 was held to have been filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period because the offended party received the purportedly libelous material on October 8, 1952.92

Subsequently, several cases were decided by the Court where the prescriptive period of Libel commenced on the date of the publication of the libelous remarks. In People v. Hon. Gines93 (Gines), the period was counted from the date of the publication of the allegedly libelous newspaper, although the Court ruled that based on Article 91 of the RPC, "the prescriptive period commences to run from the day following the commission of the offense or discovery by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information." In Gines, the criminal complaint filed on September 25, 1987 was deemed time-barred as it was filed more than one year from the date of the publication of the purportedly libelous newspaper on August 3, 1986.

Similarly, in Syhunliong v. Rivera94 (Syhunliong), prescription was counted on the date when the allegedly libelous text message was sent to a third party. In that case, the criminal complaint for libel was dismissed on the ground of prescription because it was filed only on April 16, 2007, or more than one-year from the date when the supposed libelous text message was sent on April 6, 2006.

Other cases decided by the Court counted the one-year prescriptive period of Libel from the date of publication in holding that the criminal proceedings therein were not time-barred. In Hon. Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162,95 prescription was deemed to commence from the date of the publication of the allegedly libelous newspaper. In Sr. Arambulo v. Hon. Laqui,96 the period of prescription for a criminal action for Libel started to run on the date when the accused circulated the letter containing the malicious imputations against the private complainant.

Upon a careful evaluation of the foregoing cases, the Court holds that the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC and Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, must be counted from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The Court affirms its ruling in Alcantara that prescription is counted from discovery of the published libelous matter by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, because they could hardly be expected to institute criminal proceedings for Libel without prior knowledge of the same. This is more in keeping with Article 91 of the RPC.

The prescriptive period may be reckoned from the publication of the libelous matter only when it coincides with the date of discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Verily, although Gines and Syhunliong reckoned prescription from the date of publication, the offended parties in the said cases did not allege a later date of discovery different from the publication date. It thus appears that in these two cases, the publication and discovery dates are one and the same, or, at the very least, have been impliedly admitted to be the same by the offended parties therein.

III. The prescription of the Cyber Libel charges against Causing is a question of fact to be determined by the RTC after hearing the parties thereon.

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With the foregoing disquisition, the Court holds that despite the RTC's erroneous application of the laws to determine the period of prescription of Cyber Libel, it was nevertheless correct in denying the Motion to Quash.

The Court's conclusion is based on the rule that prescription is a matter of defense and the Prosecution need not even anticipate or meet it in the Informations.97 Unless prescription is apparent on the face of the Information, the accused bears the burden to prove that the crime has prescribed.98 Thus, the matter of prescription requires the presentation of evidence and when necessary, the trial court must set a hearing thereon.99

In the present case, Causing sought the quashal100 of the Informations by computing prescription from the date of publication or posting of the allegedly libelous remarks on Facebook as alleged in the Informations, i.e., on February 4, 2019 and April 29, 2019, respectively. Notably, he did not attach any affidavit, document, or other evidence in support of his allegation that the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against him have prescribed. Instead, the Motion to Quash relied solely on the date of publication of the allegedly libelous Facebook posts as provided in the Informations, in relation to the filing date of the Complaint-Affidavit of Hernandez with the OCP Quezon City.

However, as earlier discussed, the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel commences from the day when the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. In this regard, the records bear that the prescription of the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against Causing is not apparent on the face of the Informations because the dates of discovery are not stated therein.

Given the situation, Causing bore the burden to prove that the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against him have prescribed. Thus, he should have attached evidence in support of this defense in his Motion to Quash to prove prescription. Absent such evidence, the Court must affirm the RTC's denial of the Motion to Quash, as the trial court could not have determined the prescription of the crimes charged based only on the Informations that are bereft of any statement on the date of discovery of the purportedly libelous Facebook posts. Neither could it have simply presumed that the dates of discovery coincided with the dates of publication without any proof thereon.101

It would have been different had Causing attached the supporting evidence to his Motion to Quash. In such a case, given that the discovery date and prescription do not appear of record, the trial court could have set the Motion to Quash for hearing so that the evidence may be examined and the parties heard thereon, in accordance with Section 8,102 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.103 Considering that this is not the case, the RTC did not commit any error in denying the Motion to Quash, setting the Cyber Libel Cases for arraignment and pre-trial, and proceeding with trial.

Notably, in denying the Motion to Quash, the RTC ruled that Hernandez filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the OCP Quezon City on December 17, 2020,104 just a few weeks from the alleged date of discovery of Causing's defamatory Facebook posts.105 The RTC's findings are based on: first, the statements of Hernandez in his Complaint-Affidavit, wherein he asserted that he only "recently discovered" the purportedly libelous remarks of Causing in Facebook at the time of filing of the case;106 and second, the printouts of the Facebook posts attached to Causing's Complaint-Affidavit, which were allegedly "last accessed" on October 5, 2020,107 or a little over two (2) months before the case was filed with the OCP Quezon City.

Significantly, Causing has been arraigned on November 24, 2021.108 Considering that the accused in a criminal case does not waive the defense of prescription despite arraignment in light of Article 89 109 of the RPC, which expressly states that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the prescription of the crime,110 Causing may continue to prove that the crimes charged against him have prescribed by presenting his evidence thereon during trial on the merits with the RTC. To emphasize, whether the Cyber Libel charges against Causing have prescribed is a factual matter to be resolved by RTC and on which, the Court makes no conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, to resolve this issue, the RTC must compute the prescriptive period of the charges of Cyber Libel against Causing based on the Court's pronouncements in the present case by applying paragraph 4, Article 90 and Article 91 of the RPC, i.e., within one year from discovery of the allegedly libelous Facebook posts by Hernandez, the authorities, or their agents.

As a final point, the Court is aware of its earlier dictum in Disini,111 where it recognized the greater perversity of crimes committed through or with the use of ICT, given that such technology allows offenders to perpetrate their crimes across national boundaries, with a larger audience and far more victims, all with the advantage of anonymity. Because of substantial distinctions between traditional crimes and cybercrimes, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 6 of RA 10175, which makes the use of ICT a qualifying circumstance in the commission of a crime punished under the RPC, including Libel.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is nothing in RA 10175 or any other enactment by the Legislature that amends the prescriptive period of Libel through or with the use of a computer system or ICT. Without the same, the Court can only apply and interpret the existing laws on the subject. A prescriptive period of Cyber Libel longer than what is provided in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is something for the Legislature, not this Court, to address.

It is also not amiss to point out that the present case has again brought to the fore the continuing debate against criminal libel vis-à-vis a basic principle of criminal law, i.e., that a crime is an offense against the State concerning matters of public - not of private - interests.112 Indeed, many have lobbied for the limitation of actions for libel and defamation to civil actions only, upon the argument that these crimes concern only the private interest of an individual over his or her reputation. Verily, while libel was initially criminalized due to its tendency to breach the peace, the modem view has ignored this aspect altogether and made "a libelous publication criminal if its tendency is to injure the person defamed, regardless of its effect upon the public."113 Changing societal mores have thus forwarded the decriminalization of libel because penal sanctions must be reserved for "harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community’s sense of security," and personal calumny does not fall into this category.114

In addition, criminal libel is historically rooted in the State's concern with the prevention of sedition and the avoidance of speech that "engender hatred of the king or his government."115 While a monarch indisputably had the absolute power to suppress political speech for being "libelous," many have raised doubts if the same could withstand our present democratic and liberal system of governance, where power is lodged in the people and public discussion is not merely encouraged but considered a political duty of the populace.116 Certainly, in a democracy, "it is as much [the people's] duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer."117

Thus, when it comes to political speech and the criticism of those who occupy public office, repression cannot be justified even when the utterance may include half-truths and misinformation, unless the regulation passes the clear and present danger test and the utterer acted with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of its probable falsity.118 Also, both criminal and civil actions for libel were considered impermissible repression, for whether by fear of imprisonment in a criminal case or fear of pecuniary loss arising from liability for damages in a civil case, the resulting self-censorship and repression of political speech is equally achieved.119 Libertarians further insist that political speech of the populace must enjoy the same immunities from suit enjoyed by members of the Congress and the President during their tenure.120 To these advocates, withholding a fair equivalent of such immunity to the political speech of the citizenry would result in an absurd situation where public servants are granted unjustified preference over the very public whom they must serve.121

Still, the Court reiterates its ruling in Disini that "libel is not a protected speech."122 While an honest utterance, even when inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, a lie that is knowingly and deliberately published about a public official does not enjoy immunity.123 Such calculated falsehoods or statements in reckless disregard of their probable falsity "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."124

Ultimately, the continuing recognition of criminal libel is a prerogative of the Legislature.125 Just like with the prescriptive period of Libel and Cyber Libel, only Congress can lift the continuing recognition of criminal libel, and as long as it operates within the bounds of the Constitution, the Court's duty is to apply it.126

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Thus, the Court has given due course to petitions for certiorari directly filed with the Court because the issues raised therein are purely legal, even though the assailed orders were rendered by the trial courts and the CA is ordinarily the more appropriate forum for such petitions.

[ G.R. No. 258524. October 11, 2023 ]

BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND REPRESENTATIVE FERDINAND LEDESMA HERNANDEZ OF THE SECOND DISTRICT OF SOUTH COTABATO, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/oct2023/gr_258524_2023.html

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Nevertheless, the principle of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule and there are well-recognized exceptions to its application.50 Thus, the Court has given due course to petitions for certiorari directly filed with the Court because the issues raised therein are purely legal, even though the assailed orders were rendered by the trial courts and the CA is ordinarily the more appropriate forum for such petitions.51 Direct resort to the Court has likewise been recognized when the writ of certiorari prayed for relates to the Supreme Court's role in promulgating doctrinal devices and leading the judiciary, by either overturning or reiterating prior rulings, taking into consideration new circumstances or confusions of bench or bar.52

The Petition presents exceptional circumstances that justify its direct filing with the Court.

First, the Petition raises issues on prescription of a crime that are purely legal in nature. Relevantly, the Court has held that prescription may be a question of law if it involves doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a given state of facts and there is no need to determine the veracity of factual matters as regards the date when the period to bring the action commenced to run.53

Here, the Petition does not pray for the Court to review factual matters by re-examining or re-evaluating evidence in the proceedings a quo. Instead, it raises issues on the correct interpretation of Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and the law that should apply in setting the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel – be it paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC where the prescriptive period is one year, as argued by Causing; Section 1, Act No. 3326 where the prescriptive period is 12 years, as determined by the RTC; or paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC where the prescriptive period is 15 years, as held in Tolentino. The interpretation and application of these laws is purely legal.54

Second, the Petition behooves the Court to either break new ground or reiterate its ruling in Tolentino. To recall, the Court in Tolentino held that a criminal complaint for Cyber Libel filed on August 8, 2017 based on a Facebook post dated April 29, 2015, or more than two (2) years from publication, was filed within the prescriptive period because Section 6 of RA 10175 made the penalty for Cyber Libel afflictive, making the said crime prescribe in 15 years under paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC.

Causing argues that Tolentino is not a binding precedent because it is an unsigned resolution. This is wrong. As pointed out by the OSG, Eizmendi, Jr. already settles this issue by holding that an unsigned resolution, like Tolentino, constitutes a binding precedent if it states clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based and is not a mere dismissal of a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive requirements.55

Hence, the Court's ruling on the present Petition will resolve with finality the stream of conflicting opinions of the bench and bar on the provisions of laws that must be applied in setting the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel – by either reiterating Tolentino or overturning it based on the Court's evaluation and interpretation of the relevant statutes. Because it is only the Court that has the power to overturn its prior rulings, Causing's direct resort to the Court is justified.

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