🧠Dissent in Defense of Democracy: Why the Supreme Court Erred in Striking Down the Impeachment Complaint Against VP Sara Duterte
Introduction: Judicial Overreach in a Time of Political Reckoning
On July 25, 2025, the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in Sara Z. Duterte v. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 278353), ruled that the fourth impeachment complaint filed against Vice President Sara Duterte was unconstitutional. The Court held that the filing violated the one-year bar rule under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution and failed to afford the Vice President due process before the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In a nation where accountability mechanisms are already fragile, this decision delivers a powerful blow to constitutional checks and balances. It sets a precedent that unduly insulates high-ranking officials from political responsibility and judicially rewrites the carefully calibrated impeachment process under our fundamental law.
This article offers a comprehensive critique and dissent from the majority opinion, urging a reexamination of the legal principles that govern impeachment, judicial review, and constitutional interpretation.
I. Constitutional Allocation of Powers: Congress Alone Initiates and Tries Impeachment
The Constitution is explicit and unequivocal:
- Article XI, Section 3(1): “The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.”
- Article XI, Section 3(6): “The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.”
The use of the terms “exclusive” and “sole” reflects a deliberate constitutional design. Impeachment is a political process, rooted in democratic legitimacy. It is not an ordinary judicial proceeding. The role of the courts is extremely limited.
While the Court's expanded power of judicial review under Article VIII, Section 1 allows it to determine grave abuse of discretion, such power must not be interpreted to permit judicial interference in matters that are inherently political and constitutionally assigned to Congress. The proper balance was recognized in Francisco v. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003), where the Court held:
"Judicial review does not authorize the courts to question the wisdom of a co-equal branch's exercise of constitutional discretion."
By nullifying the impeachment complaint filed by one-third of the House—a power explicitly permitted by Article XI, Section 3(4)—the Court has overridden Congress's express constitutional prerogative. This is nothing short of judicial usurpation of legislative power.
II. The Misreading of the One-Year Bar Rule: From Shield to Sword
The Supreme Court held that the first three complaints filed against VP Duterte in December 2024, though never referred to the House Committee on Justice, were already “initiated” and thus triggered the one-year bar under Article XI, Section 3(5).
This interpretation is flawed and dangerously expansive.
In Francisco, the Court carefully defined "initiation" as the act of both filing and referral to the Committee on Justice. It held:
"An impeachment proceeding is not deemed initiated until the complaint is referred by the Speaker to the House Committee on Justice."
The first three complaints against VP Duterte were:
- Merely filed and endorsed,
- Entered into the Order of Business,
- But never referred to the Committee,
- And ultimately archived without plenary or committee action.
To consider such dormant and procedurally incomplete complaints as “initiated” is to reward inaction and elevate form over substance. Worse, it creates a perverse incentive: any impeachable officer could escape scrutiny for a year simply because nuisance or defective complaints were prematurely filed and then deliberately left unresolved.
The one-year bar rule was meant to prevent harassment, not to provide constitutional impunity. As such, the Court's ruling enables strategic manipulation of the impeachment calendar and creates an almost insurmountable procedural shield for erring officials.
III. Premature Application of Due Process: No Constitutional Basis at the Initiation Stage
The Majority's invocation of due process rights—as grounds to invalidate the impeachment complaint—is legally untenable.
Impeachment is not a criminal trial; it is a political mechanism for removing public officers for betrayal of public trust, among other offenses. The Constitution mandates that the trial takes place in the Senate. It is there—and only there—where the respondent enjoys full procedural guarantees: notice, confrontation, and the right to be heard.
By contrast, the initiation stage in the House of Representatives is not adjudicative but investigative and political in nature. The Vice President, at that stage, is not an accused party in a criminal case but a subject of congressional scrutiny.
The Court, however, ruled that her due process rights were violated because:
- She was not furnished a copy of the fourth complaint;
- She had no opportunity to respond before transmittal to the Senate;
- She was deprived of access to evidence.
Such requirements are absent from the text of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the one-third rule under Article XI, Section 3(4) to be an exceptional tool for political action—one that bypasses committee procedures and plenary debates. It is an act of sovereign assertion by the representatives of the people.
To judicially inject a requirement that the impeached officer be served, heard, or allowed to respond before transmission is to frustrate the very design of an expedited process.
IV. Consequences of the Ruling: Judicial Overreach and Institutional Paralysis
The Supreme Court’s decision has far-reaching and deleterious consequences for democratic governance:
-
Undue Judicial Interference in Political Questions:
The ruling invites impeached officials to run to the Supreme Court as a first line of defense, turning impeachment into a game of legal technicalities rather than a process of political accountability. -
Weaponization of the One-Year Bar Rule:
It enables strategic filing and shelving of weak complaints to create a one-year “safe harbor” for powerful officials. -
Chilling Effect on Citizen Participation:
The ruling discourages civil society and legislators from filing complaints due to the fear of technical dismissal and judicial nullification. -
Erosion of Congressional Autonomy:
It judicially rewrites the House rules on impeachment, violating Article VI, Section 16(3), which grants each chamber autonomy to determine its own rules of proceedings.
V. Conclusion: Let Congress and the People Decide
This case was not about guilt or innocence. The fourth impeachment complaint against Vice President Duterte should have been allowed to proceed to trial in the Senate. That is the proper venue for the determination of her accountability—not the chambers of the Supreme Court.
When the Court intervenes prematurely and nullifies political accountability tools, it sends a dangerous message: that no matter how serious the allegations, high officials may find shelter behind procedural technicalities enforced by unelected magistrates.
Let the rule of law, and not the rule of privilege, prevail.
Postscript: A Call to Constitutional Humility
The judiciary must be ever mindful of its limits. Judicial power is not the only form of constitutional power. In a democratic republic, it is Congress that represents the sovereign people. Impeachment is a blunt but necessary instrument in the political arsenal to ensure that public officials remain servants—not masters—of the people.
We must resist all efforts to blunt that instrument, especially from within the very branch tasked with guarding liberty and justice.
Let the Senate sit as an impeachment court. Let the facts be examined. Let truth, not judicial fiat, have the final word.
Sources and Authorities:
- 1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Secs. 3(1), 3(4), 3(5), 3(6)
- Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (2003)
- Bautista v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 243745 (2019)
- Funa v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 192791 (2013)
- Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153 (2006)
- Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199034 (2013)
● Written with the assistance of ChatGPT AI app, July 25, 2025.
