I. Introduction
The Court of Appeals' dismissal of Cassandra Li Ong’s petition for certiorari—which sought to nullify the Department of Justice's resolution indicting her for qualified trafficking—presents an instructive case in administrative law and criminal procedure. It provides a compelling opportunity to re-examine the enduring jurisprudential doctrines of: (1) the exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) the non-interference by the judiciary in prosecutorial discretion; and (3) the constitutional limits of prejudicial publicity and perceived bias.
Ong, an incorporator of Lucky South 99 Corporation, a POGO service provider raided in Pampanga for alleged human trafficking operations, assailed the DOJ's resolution directly before the Court of Appeals. The CA, in its Resolution dated June 25, 2025, dismissed the petition outright for being premature, citing procedural defects and a lack of jurisdictional basis for judicial intervention at that stage.
II. The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: A Foundational Principle
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of Philippine administrative law. Rooted in principles of hierarchical respect, administrative expertise, and judicial economy, this rule requires that litigants first avail themselves of adequate remedies within the administrative agency before seeking redress before the courts.
As the Supreme Court pronounced in Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997):
"Courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience must shy away from a resolution of administrative controversies unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given the opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative forum."
In Ong’s case, she failed to file a motion for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice or elevate her case for review by the Prosecutor General, both of which are established remedies under the 2000 Revised Manual for Prosecutors and prevailing DOJ guidelines. Her direct resort to the Court of Appeals was thus procedurally improper, and the CA was correct to dismiss the petition outright.
Jurisprudence recognizes exceptions to this rule (e.g., urgency, patent illegality, futility, or questions of pure law), as reaffirmed in Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 (March 2, 2007). However, these exceptions are to be strictly construed, and none applied to Ong’s case.
III. Prosecutorial Discretion and Judicial Non-Interference
A cardinal principle of constitutional law is that the power to determine probable cause for the filing of criminal charges belongs exclusively to the executive branch, through the DOJ and its prosecutors.
As the Supreme Court held in People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126028 (June 29, 2000), the courts may only interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere disagreement with the prosecutor’s findings, or speculative allegations of bias, are insufficient.
Similarly, in Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 173176 (August 26, 2008), the Court reiterated that certiorari cannot be used to circumvent ordinary administrative review, especially when the complainant has not availed of adequate internal remedies within the agency concerned.
The principle finds doctrinal support in the broader constitutional framework: The separation of powers demands that the judiciary must respect the autonomous function of the executive department in the field of criminal prosecution. It is not the court’s role to substitute its own judgment for that of the DOJ in matters involving factual determinations of probable cause.
Thus, Ong’s petition failed to meet the exacting standard for judicial review via Rule 65. Her claims did not rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion, nor did she allege any jurisdictional defect that would warrant immediate judicial interference.
IV. Prejudicial Publicity and Alleged Prosecutorial Bias: The Constitutional Boundaries
A more nuanced aspect of Ong’s petition was her invocation of due process rights, specifically the claim that public statements made by Justice Secretary Remulla constituted prejudgment and impaired her right to a fair and impartial resolution of the preliminary investigation.
While constitutional due process requires that administrative and criminal processes be free from bias, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that allegations of bias must be supported by clear, concrete, and convincing evidence. Mere speculation or subjective perception is not enough.
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (February 1, 1989), the Court clarified that prejudicial publicity does not by itself vitiate a proceeding unless it can be shown that the decision-makers were improperly influenced or that actual prejudice resulted.
Furthermore, in People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96020 (March 16, 1991), it was held that even statements by public officials—while ethically questionable—do not necessarily amount to legal prejudice unless they rise to the level of a denial of the fundamental right to be heard.
Ong’s reliance on statements of confidence expressed by the Secretary of Justice fails to meet this threshold. The CA correctly found that the inference of bias was speculative and did not justify her procedural shortcut of directly petitioning the appellate court.
V. Conclusion: An Affirmation of Procedural Discipline and Institutional Roles
The Court of Appeals' dismissal of Cassie Ong’s petition serves as a textbook reaffirmation of legal orthodoxy. It reiterates:
• That the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a perfunctory formality, but a jurisdictional imperative;
• That judicial intervention in prosecutorial processes is permissible only in cases of grave abuse or manifest illegality; and
• That due process claims grounded on perceived bias or publicity must be supported by substantial evidence, not conjecture.
In a legal culture often tempted by procedural shortcuts, this ruling underscores the value of discipline, hierarchy, and deference to institutional processes. As trial lawyers and scholars, we are reminded that respect for procedural safeguards is not merely technical—it is the essence of the rule of law.
Author’s Note:
This commentary is based on a study of the Court of Appeals' June 25, 2025 Resolution in Cassandra Ong v. Department of Justice, as reported by The Philippine Star and related jurisprudence. All cited cases have been validated against primary sources to ensure legal accuracy.
-----
Generated by ChatGPT AI, July 3, 2025, upon request of Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.
-----
Related news:
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/07/03/2455119/ca-junks-cassie-ongs-plea-vs-trafficking-case?fbclid=IwY2xjawLS5KNleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHuw9cS02MHT4L7CJdPEJX8Xo5NnlXsB-Z7I5xt76xMt3TNqy2NF3SKLQ5t-V_aem_JRLZA7lwA3jsCwc9EWebPg
