Legislative Bottleneck in the Philippine Senate – Historical and Legal Critique, with Proposed Structural Reforms

I. ISSUE

From 2022 to 2025, the Philippine House of Representatives passed an unprecedented volume of bills. However, a significant number of these legislative measures remain stalled in the Senate, which has failed to act upon them. This memorandum examines whether the Philippine Senate, as presently constituted and functioning, constitutes an institutional surplusage that impedes the efficient operations of government. It proposes constitutional and structural reforms to address the dysfunction, including the potential shift to a unicameral legislature, adoption of a parliamentary system, and the creation of a Constitutional Court to adjudicate impeachment cases.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Rappler investigative report highlights that during the 19th Congress (2022–2025), members of the House of Representatives were prolific in filing and passing legislative measures. However, a substantial portion of these bills remain unacted upon by the Senate. Several landmark bills, including the SOGIE Equality Bill and the Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Act, have languished in the Senate for years despite repeated approval by the House.
Data shows that the Senate has consistently failed to take prompt and decisive action on these bills, effectively preventing their enactment into law. This legislative bottleneck is not isolated to this Congress alone. It has become a recurring institutional issue rooted in the bicameral structure of the Philippine Congress.

III. HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The Philippines has oscillated between unicameral and bicameral legislative systems. The Malolos Congress of 1898 and the early Commonwealth period featured a unicameral legislature. Bicameralism was introduced in 1940 and was reinstated after the 1987 Constitution. Since then, repeated attempts at constitutional reform (so-called “Charter Change” or “Cha-cha”) have proposed a return to a unicameral system, with advocates citing the Senate’s redundancy, expense, and obstructionist tendencies.

The Senate’s procedural framework permits extended debates, interpellations, and indefinite referrals to committees. This often results in legislative inertia. For example, the SOGIE Equality Bill has been stalled in the Senate for over two decades despite consistent public support and repeated passage by the House. Similar delays have plagued other progressive bills, such as those on reproductive health, education reforms, and anti-discrimination.
Comparatively, unlike the U.S. Senate, which possesses distinct functions such as treaty ratification and executive confirmations, the Philippine Senate largely duplicates the legislative work of the House, with no unique institutional advantage. It lacks the federal balancing function that bicameral senates serve in federal states like the United States or Australia.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE SENATE AS AN INSTITUTIONAL SURPLUSAGE

The Senate contributes to redundancy and inefficiency in the legislative process. Most bills originate in the House and are subsequently delayed or shelved in the Senate, causing wasted legislative effort and public resources. The Senate, in this regard, has not proven to be an effective check on executive power, nor has it justified its cost and structural complexity.
Moreover, the Senate’s existence frustrates the principle of popular sovereignty. The House of Representatives, being the chamber directly elected by population-based districts, reflects the people’s democratic will more accurately. When House-passed bills are disregarded or indefinitely delayed in the Senate, the electorate's mandate is effectively thwarted.
Furthermore, the Senate’s composition—nationally elected senators with no direct local accountability—often leads to political elite dominance and detachment from local legislative needs. This undermines the democratic responsiveness that a representative legislature is meant to ensure.

V. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS

• Transition to a Unicameral Legislature.
A unicameral legislature would streamline the lawmaking process, eliminate redundancy, reduce costs, and increase legislative efficiency. Empirical studies and governance models, including those in New Zealand and Norway, demonstrate that unicameral systems can function effectively while maintaining democratic accountability. In these systems, strong committee structures, robust internal rules, and transparent procedures serve as safeguards against majoritarian abuses.

• Shift to a Parliamentary Form of Government.

A parliamentary system aligns executive and legislative functions, enabling more coherent policymaking and faster legislative action. Models in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia illustrate how parliamentary systems allow for more efficient governance, while also maintaining accountability through mechanisms such as votes of no confidence and regular legislative scrutiny.

• Establishment of a Constitutional Court.

Currently, the Senate exercises exclusive jurisdiction over impeachment trials, but political partisanship and institutional inertia have rendered the process ineffective. A Constitutional Court—independent, collegial, and composed of jurists rather than politicians—could adjudicate impeachment cases and other constitutional disputes more credibly. This model is used in countries such as Germany and South Korea, where constitutional courts enhance the rule of law and institutional integrity.

• Reform of the Senate’s Legislative Role (If Retained).

If bicameralism is to be preserved, the Senate’s legislative powers should be confined to specific roles such as treaty ratification, oversight, and confirmation of executive appointments. Budget and appropriations bills should be the exclusive domain of the House, and deadlines must be imposed on Senate action for bills passed by the House. For instance, legislation could be deemed passed if the Senate fails to act within 60 days. These structural constraints would ensure accountability and efficiency.

VI. COMPARATIVE MODELS AND LESSONS FROM OTHER DEMOCRACIES

New Zealand abolished its Senate in 1950 and has since operated as a unicameral legislature. Legislative processes are transparent, efficient, and deliberative. Norway likewise maintains a unicameral parliament with effective committee oversight and strong public engagement mechanisms.
The United Kingdom and Canada utilize parliamentary systems wherein the executive is directly accountable to the legislature. This fosters swift and coherent policy enactment. The German and South Korean models feature Constitutional Courts with jurisdiction over impeachment and constitutional controversies, separating legal adjudication from political processes.
These examples demonstrate that legislative efficiency and constitutional accountability can coexist in a variety of governmental systems, provided they are designed with checks, transparency, and judicial independence.

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Philippine Senate, as it presently functions, operates more as a legislative bottleneck than as a constructive institutional check. The duplication of legislative processes and the unjustified delays in acting upon House-approved measures frustrate democratic governance and waste national resources.
To remedy these defects, the following constitutional reforms are strongly recommended:

• Abolition of the Senate and establishment of a unicameral legislature with a strengthened committee system.
• Transition to a parliamentary system to improve executive-legislative coordination and efficiency.
• Creation of a Constitutional Court to adjudicate impeachment cases and constitutional disputes with independence and neutrality.
• If the Senate is retained, its role should be significantly curtailed, and strict time-bound legislative review mechanisms should be established.

These proposals are grounded in legal doctrine, comparative experience, and a pragmatic analysis of the Philippine political system. Institutional reform is imperative to realize the full potential of Philippine democracy and governance.

SOURCES

• Rappler: “Most prolific congressmen in 19th Congress” – https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/data-documents/congressmen-most-number-bills-filed-congress-2022-2025
• Rolling Stone Philippines: “10 pending Philippine bills that demand legislative action” – January 2025.
• G-Watch: “Revisiting Philippine Bicameralism: Are Two Better Than One?” – https://www.g-watch.org/sites/default/files/resources/revisiting-philippine-bicameralism.pdf
• Wikipedia: SOGIE Equality Bill – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOGIE_Equality_Bill
• Philippine Senate Performance Reports – https://www.senate.gov.ph/publications.asp
• German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) – https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de
• New Zealand Parliament – https://www.parliament.nz
• Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) – https://www.stortinget.no
• UK Parliament – https://www.parliament.uk
• Korean Constitutional Court – https://english.ccourt.go.kr


-----

Generated by ChatGPT AI app, July 2, 2025. Reviewed and edited by Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.

-----

News: 

https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/data-documents/congressmen-most-number-bills-filed-congress-2022-2025/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR6i2nE0IkFhTpgiYoajtw31tBeA9HO7cdfLsemOFNzTCFzYuDFthoCpBfFTAw_aem_ByzBzQDgBlHDYV_vwfHEeA.