Friday, July 25, 2025

The doctrine of SEPARATION OF POWERS under the 1987 Philippine CONSTITUTION and its Supreme Court JURISPRUDENCE, including IMPEACHMENT-RELATED cases.




I. The Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers

Under Article I, II and III of the 1987 Constitution, power is constitutionally allocated among three co‑equal branches:

Legislative power resides in Congress (Article VI);

Executive power is vested in the President (Article VII);

Judicial power is granted to the Judiciary (Article VIII).

Justice Laurel of the Philippine Supreme Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission famously observed that “the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments,” and further that “each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” This statement succinctly encapsulates the doctrine. 

Separation of powers is reinforced by checks and balances, permitting each branch to constrain the powers of the others constitutionally. Thus, Congress confirms appointments, enacts laws subject to presidential veto and judicial review; the President executes law but must respect legislative enactments and judicial orders; and the Judiciary interprets laws yet cannot legislate or execute. 

Encroachment occurs either when one branch interferes with another’s constitutional domain or assumes a function outside its proper sphere. When Congress partakes in executive duties (e.g. budget release) it exceeds oversight; conversely, courts must avoid policy-making reserved to the legislature. 

II. Landmark Supreme Court Decisions on Separation of Powers

The Supreme Court of the Philippines has elaborated separation doctrine through pivotal decisions:

1. Angara v. Electoral Commission (G.R. No. L‑45081, July 15, 1936): foundational ruling declaring that “each department… is supreme within its own sphere,” and reinforcing that the Judiciary cannot encroach upon legislative or executive domains—and vice versa. 

2. Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211, Sept. 15, 1989): in national security disputes, the Court deferred to the President’s discretion, holding that judicial intervention must be minimal where executive prerogatives are constitutionally assigned. 

3. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, Nov. 19, 2001): the Court upheld that granting of executive clemency (pardon) was solely the prerogative of the President, not subject to judicial review, thereby preserving the separation between Judiciary and Executive. 

4. Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014): in reviewing the Reproductive Health Law, the Court emphasized that policy-making remains in the legislative domain and judicial intervention is proper only where a clear constitutional violation exists. 

5. Additionally, Guingona Jr. v. Carague and Abakada cases set limits on congressional involvement in executive functions such as budget execution, ruling that Congress may only exercise oversight—not execution. 

III. Separation of Powers in Impeachment Cases

Article XI of the Constitution establishes the exclusive power of Congress to impeach, and the Senate as the sole impeachment court. The Supreme Court has been cautious in its role, respecting the political question nature of impeachment. 

Three landmark impeachment cases illustrate how the doctrine operates in practice:

1. Impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona (2011–2012)

House impeached Chief Justice Corona for betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The Senate, sitting as impeachment court, convicted him on May 29, 2012.—the first removal and disqualification under the 1987 Constitution. 

In this case, the Judiciary respected the Legislature’s constitutional role by allowing Congress to initiate and try the impeachment: the Court did not declare motions void or intervene with the House and Senate proceedings.

2. Impeachment complaint vs. Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez (2010–2011)

Gutierrez sought a status quo ante order from the SC to suspend impeachment proceedings, arguing breaches of due process and the constitutional prohibition on multiple complaints within one year. The Court granted a temporary status quo ante but later dismissed it, permitting the House to proceed with hearings. Importantly, the Court emphasized the constitutional separation of powers by acknowledging that only Congress may promulgate its own impeachment rules. 

3. Impeachment proceedings vs. Vice‑President Sara Duterte‑Carpio (2025)

The House impeached Vice‑President Sara Duterte in February 2025. She filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking to void the complaint as procedurally defective and politically motivated. The SC has not ruled the impeachment null or void; though it ordered Congress to respond to the petition and allowed preliminary procedural review. Implicitly, the Court recognized limits on its interference in impeachment as a political question, preserving the separation of powers. 

These cases together underscore that the Judiciary will not supplant the constitutional functions of the Legislative branch in impeachments, except to review grave abuse of discretion or jurisdiction—and even then, only minimally—thus safeguarding the separation of powers and avoiding usurpation.

IV. Analysis and Inter-Branch Equilibrium

The Legislative branch holds the sole authority to initiate and try impeachment. It may not be judicially coerced in its internal rules, as Gutierrez illustrates.

The Judiciary may intervene only when Congress or the Senate acts with grave abuse of discretion or violates jurisdiction—but exercises restraint out of respect for political questions.

The Executive branch involvement in impeachments is indirect: cabinet officials sometimes testify, but forums remain constitutionally separate.

These boundaries uphold the doctrine that no branch may perform duties of another, nor hinder the legitimate exercise of constitutional functions.

V. Conclusion

In sum, the Philippine doctrine of separation of powers forms the constitutional architecture for preventing concentration of governmental authority. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence—from Angara to Imbong—clarifies each branch’s exclusive domain and the boundaries of inter-branch checks. In the context of impeachment, landmark examples such as Renato Corona, Merceditas Gutierrez, and Sara Duterte‑Carpio illustrate how the Supreme Court defers to Congress—ensuring the political process plays out within constitutional bounds.

📚 Sources & Citations

Angara v. Electoral Commission; separation doctrine articulation. 

Marcos v. Manglapus; judicial restraint in national‑security matters. 

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan; exclusive executive pardon power. 

Imbong v. Ochoa; legislative policy‑making vs judicial interpretation. 

Guingona Jr. and Abakada decisions on budget and congressional oversight vs implementation. 

Impeachment in the Philippines; constitutional provisions and process. 

Impeachment of Renato Corona; conviction and disqualification. 

Impeachment of Merceditas Gutierrez; status quo ante and court’s limited intervention. 

Impeachment of Sara Duterte‑Carpio; current Supreme Court petitions and procedural posture. 

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●  Written with the assistance of ChatGPT AI app, July 25, 2025.