Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases - G.R. No. 151800

See - G.R. No. 151800





"x x x.

The crux of the matter is whether the CA has jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.  This issue has been directly addressed in Kuizon v. Desierto[9] and reiterated in the more recent Golangco v. Fung,[10] wherein the Court declared, thus:

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only.  It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

In Kuizon v. Desierto, this Court clarified:

The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.  In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.  It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action.  It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.

x  x  x    It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.  Since the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the same is void.[11]

        

The question that arises next is what remedy should an aggrieved party avail of to assail the Ombudsman’s finding of the existence or lack of probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases.  In Estrada v. Desierto,[12] the Court emphasized that parties seeking to question the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, may file an original action forcertiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is believed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Respondents originally filed a petition for certiorari before this Court but the same was referred to the CA.  It, thus, behooves this Court to now look into whether the Ombudsman indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charge of Falsification of Public Documents and provisionally dismissing the charge of Violation of Section 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against Zenaida H. Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang.

A close examination of the records will reveal that the Ombudsman acted properly in dismissing the charge for falsification of public documents because herein respondents utterly failed to identify the supposedly falsified documents and submit certified true copies thereof. In fact, respondents admitted in their petition for certiorari, originally filed with this Court but referred to the CA, that they had not yet submitted documents in support of the charge for falsification of documents as they intended to present the same in a formal preliminary investigation, which they expected to be conducted by the Ombudsman.[13]  However, it has long been acknowledged that in administrative proceedings, even those before the Ombudsman, a formal hearing is not required and cases may be submitted for resolution based only on affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings.  Such procedure has been held to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of procedural due process as all that is needed is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[14]  In this case, records show that respondents had been afforded such opportunities.

As to the provisional dismissal of the charge for Violation of Section 3 par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, the Court likewise finds no reason to overturn the ruling of the Ombudsman.  The hornbook doctrine emphasized in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto[15] must be borne in mind, to wit:

x   x   x   the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by theOmbudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[16]

Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute.  However, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman’s findings by this Court.[17]

In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[18] the Court defined “grave abuse of discretion” as follows:

x   x   x   grave abuse of discretion is such “capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.”

Here, the Ombudsman based its provisional dismissal on the ground that the case between the same parties before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), DARAB Case No. 0040, had not yet reached finality, as there was a pending Motion for Relief from Judgment that was yet to be resolved.  The Ombudsman reasoned out that since what Section 3, par. (e), R.A. No. 3019 penalized was the giving of unwarranted advantage or preference to a private party, it was only prudent to await the final resolution in DARAB Case No. 0040, which would show if the favorable recommendation given by Celerina Darang benefiting her husband Edilberto was, indeed, unjustified, unwarranted or unfounded.

   

The Ombudsman’s reasoning was not unfounded.  Note that the elements of the offense in Section 3(e) are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers have committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they have caused undue injury to a party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury was caused by giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[19]  From the foregoing, it can be seen that the complainants must show that the benefits, advantage or preference given to a party is unwarranted.  Since the main issue in DARAB Case No. 0040 is whether the disputed parcel of land should be awarded to Edilberto Darang, then it is true that a final resolution of the aforementioned DARAB case would establish whether the benefit or advantage given to him was indeed unwarranted.

Verily, the action of the Ombudsman in provisionally dismissing the complaint for violation of Section 3(e), without prejudice to its re-opening upon final resolution of DARAB Case No. 0040, is not whimsical or arbitrary.  Such action finds support in the Court’s rulings that a trial court, or in this case a quasi-judicial tribunal, has the inherent power to control the disposition of cases by holding in abeyance the proceedings before it in the exercise of its sound discretion to await the outcome of another case pending in another court or body, especially where the parties and the issues are the same.   This is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, and ensuring economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.  Where the rights of parties to the second action (in this case, the criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) before the Ombudsman) cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action (DARAB Case No. 0040) are settled, the second action should be stayed.[20]

  

The reason behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may also be applied here by analogy.  The objective of said doctrine is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency, which has special knowledge, experience and tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, has determined some question or a particular aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.[21]  This is not to say that the Ombudsman cannot acquire jurisdiction or take cognizance of a criminal complaint until after the administrative agency has decided on a particular issue that is also involved in the complaint before it.  Rather, using the same reasoning behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is only prudent and practical for the Ombudsman to refrain from proceeding with the criminal action until after the DARAB, which is the administrative agency with special knowledge and experience over agrarian matters, has arrived at a final resolution on the issue of whether Edilberto Darang is indeed entitled under the law to be awarded the land in dispute.   This would establish whether the benefits or advantages given to him by the public officials charged under the complaint, are truly unwarranted.

Thus, aside from the fact that the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, it was also incorrect to hold that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.  The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman.

 x x x."

Consolidation of criminal cases - People vs Sandiganbayan : 149495 : August 21, 2003 : J. Panganiban : Third Division : Decision

See - People vs Sandiganbayan : 149495 : August 21, 2003 : J. Panganiban : Third Division : Decision





"x x x.

The consolidation of criminal cases is a matter of judicial discretion, according to Section 22 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

“Sec. 22.  Consolidation of trials of related offenses - Charges of offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the Court.”

Similarly, Section 2 of Rule XII of the SBN Revised Internal Rules[16] reads:

“Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. - Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.

x x x                                         x x x                                  x x x.”

The counterpart rule for civil cases is found in Section 1 of Rule 31[17] of the Rules of Court.

Similarly, jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases.  As held in Caños v. Peralta,[18] joint trial is permissible “x x x where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. x x x.”[19]

Querubin v. Palanca[20] has ruled that consolidation is proper in the following instances:

“x x x where the offenses charged are similar, related or connected, or are of the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on each trial.’ ”[21] (Italics supplied)

Expediency was the reason for the consolidation of the criminal cases against the accused in Querubin. As there was only one accused (who himself moved for consolidation) and one offended party, and the 22 separate cases of estafa were committed in substantially the same way over the same period of time and with the same witnesses, the Court deemed the consolidation to be proper.

Sideco v. Paredes[22] allowed a consolidated appeal of 16 cases involving a common question of law.  Joint trial was deemed necessary to minimize therein appellant’s expenses in pursuing his appeal.

Other cases were consolidated, as they had sought the same reliefs[23] or involved the same parties and basically the same issues.[24] Another purpose was to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions.[25] These reasons are in line with the object of consolidation, which is to “avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court and save unnecessary costs and expense.”[26]

On the other side of the spectrum were cases in which consolidation was found to be improper. Republic v. Mangrobang[27] struck down the consolidation of an original action for ejectment with an appealed case for eminent domain, because consolidation would have only delayed the resolution of the cases, which had raised dissimilar issues.  Moreover, one or both cases had already been partially heard.

Meanwhile, we ruled in Dacanay v. People[28] -- a case in which separate trial was requested -- that the resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the government could not be given preference over the right to a speedy trial; or over the protection of a person’s life, liberty or property. Indeed, the right to a speedy resolution of cases[29] can also be affected by consolidation.

After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that the SBN did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Consolidate the indirect bribery and the plunder cases.  As correctly ruled by the anti-graft court, their consolidation would have unduly exposed herein private respondent to totally unrelated testimonies, delayed the resolution of the indirect bribery case, muddled the issues therein, and exposed him to the inconveniences of a lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case. Consolidation has also been rendered inadvisable by supervening events -- in particular, the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial had already been heard in the plunder case.

Verily, no indiscretion has been shown by the court a quo in refusing to consolidate the cases. There is no showing that it evaded or refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.  Neither has it been shown that when the SBN denied the Motion to Consolidate, it exercised its power in a manner that was arbitrary or despotic by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.[30]

x x x."

Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019; causing undue injury; bad faith defined. - Sidro vs People : 149685 : April 28, 2004 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division : Decision

See - Sidro vs People : 149685 : April 28, 2004 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division : Decision





"x x x.

Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 under which the petitioner is charged states, thus:

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers.— In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared  to be unlawful:

…

e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

To warrant the conviction of the accused, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following essential elements of the crime:

The elements of the offense defined in this provision are that: (1) The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action has caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[44]

In Marcelo vs. Sandigabayan,[45] the Court defined evident bad faith, viz:

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2^nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.  (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[46]

In this case, the petitioner was the presiding judge of the MCTC of San Roque-Mondragon, Northern Samar and acted in that capacity when he received the P1,000.00 from Castillo and Cardenas. The petitioner acted with evident bad faith from the time he received Vicario’s P1,000.00 cash bail on June 4 and June 5, 1990, and refused to have the amount deposited either with the nearest collector of internal revenue, the municipal treasurer of Mondragon, or provincial treasurer of Northern Samar as provided for in Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Even after the provisional dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5671 on September 14, 1990, the petitioner refused to return the amount despite the demands of Vicario, Castillo and Cardenas that the money be returned. Vicario suffered undue injury when the petitioner retained the P1,000.00 for his personal use.

x x x."

Double jeopardy - Condrada vs People : 141646 : February 28, 2003 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division

See - Condrada vs People : 141646 : February 28, 2003 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division





"x x x.

The proscription against double jeopardy[10] presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent.  As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach:  (1)  a  valid  indictment, (2)  before  a  court  of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent.   However, there are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. [11]

Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 because as earlier stated, said case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court upon his motion.  Thus, the requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforecited exceptions.   The prosecution had not yet presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed on May 31, 1999.  Moreover, as previously explained, said dismissal was temporary in nature, as the case was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of dismissal.  Hence, the Court finds no error on the part of the trial court in allowing the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770.

x x x."

Writ of habeas corpus obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. - UDK-14071

See - UDK-14071





"x x x.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.⁷ The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom.⁸

Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpusremedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.⁹

Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the writ.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.¹⁰ However, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.¹¹

It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995.¹² On June 24, 1996, he was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of P102,235.56.¹³

x x x."

A temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. - G.R. No. 177486

See - G.R. No. 177486





"x x x.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.⁸ It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome.⁹ It is not a cause of action in itself.¹⁰Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.

The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.¹¹

It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve thestatus quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.¹²

Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon respondent’s showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement, hence, the writ was lifted.1avvphi1

The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding.

Unionbank v. Court of Appeals¹³ enlightens:

"x x x a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction," regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits,the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action." (italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The lower court’s citation of Lee v. Court of Appeals¹⁴ is misplaced. In Lee, unlike in the present case, the original complaint for specific performance and cancellation of real estate mortgage was not yet decided on the merits by the lower court. Thus, the preliminary injunction therein issued subsisted pending appeal of an incident.

There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondent’s favor, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on December 1, 1999 by the trial court was automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. 26015.

x x x."

Judge lacks proper monitoring of cases. - A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183

See - A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183





"x x x.

THE COURT’S FINDINGS:

The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of corruption and immorality, and accordingly finds the OCA recommendation to dismiss well-taken.

The burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative proceeding against court officials and employees falls on the complainant, who must be able to prove the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that respondent regularly performed her duties will prevail. Moreover, in the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. In fact, an administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent stands to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. The Court does not thus give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation.⁸

The Court, however, finds well-taken the audit team’s observation that Branch 10 lacks proper monitoring of cases.

While respondent provided the Court the latest issued orders in all but one (Criminal Case No. 1385-M-2004) of the listed cases, she failed to justify her failure to act on the incidents thereon despite the lapse of a considerable period. Respondent offered no explanation for the delay in the resolution of the incidents in the cases. She simply furnished their status, some of which involve decisions or orders issued after the conduct of the judicial audit and mostly beyond the prescribed 90-day period,⁹ without her having requested extension for the purpose. Notably, respondent failed to explain her inaction for allowing a hiatus of at least one year in Civil Case No. 714-M-2002 and eight months in Civil Case No. 195-M-2006, she appearing to have merely waited for the submission of a comment on/opposition to a motion for reconsideration, and a reply, if any.

Moreover, respecting the orders or decisions purportedly dated before July 31, 2007, the start of the judicial audit, respondent gave no reason why those issuances were not presented or made available to the audit team during the four-day judicial audit ending on August 3, 2007.

It bears emphasis that the responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases primarily rests on the presiding judge, even as he/she is provided with a court staff, and a branch clerk of court who shall take steps to meet the requirements of the directives on docket inventory.¹⁰ Why respondent failed to make a complete report to the audit team, the court cannot fathom, despite the clear mandate of Administrative Circular No. 10-94¹¹ for the performance of a semestral physical inventory of the court’s docket which, for the first semester of 2007, should have been conducted by June 30, a full month prior to the start on July 31, 2007 of the judicial audit. What was instead presented to the audit team was a docket inventory of cases for the period from July 2006 to December 2006.

Judges are mandated to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."¹² Prompt disposition of the court’s business is attained through proper and efficient court management, and a judge is remiss in his duty as court manager if he fails to adopt a system of record management.¹³

Respondent defied the duties to "dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods," to "diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel," and to "organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity."¹⁴

A judge being expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly without undue delay, it is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. As the judge is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of official functions, he/she is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his/her custody are intact. Hence, the necessity of adopting a system of record management and of organization of dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.¹⁵

Oblivious to the telling condition – res ipsa loquitor, respondent asserts that she efficiently manages her court. If respondent’s declarations are, by any measure, reflective of her level of satisfaction with court management, it is unfortunate to find her standard of professional competence in court administration below par. It is disquieting that she, even while acknowledging that she does not have a full complement of court personnel,¹⁶ has not been bothered by the prevailing human resource predicament in her court. She finds comfort in maintaining a limited number of staff for years without actively seeking additional staff, and in detailing her clerk-in-charge of civil cases and legal researcher to other offices for alleged misconduct without initiating the appropriate disciplinary measures.

If respondent became aware of any unprofessional conduct on the part of any of her court personnel, she should have, as a rule of judicial canon,¹⁷ taken or initiated appropriate disciplinary measures against them. By simply detailing them and omitting to initiate an administrative proceeding, she has not only tolerated the misdeed but also paid no heed to finding suitable and qualified replacements who could assist her. Respondent had only to request the Executive Judge of the RTC of Malolos City or the Office of the Court Administrator for the detail of needed personnel in order not to deprive the public of vital services. In previous cases, the Court rejected the lame excuse that a trial court had no legal researcher¹⁸ or branch clerk of court.¹⁹ Adhering to what she personally perceives to be the best way of managing her court, respondent has only herself to blame for any gaffe plaguing her court.

It bears reiteration that proper court management for the effective discharge of official functions is the direct responsibility of judges who, therefore, cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of the court personnel. The inability of a judge to control and discipline the staff demonstrates weakness in administrative supervision, an undesirable trait frowned upon by this Court.²⁰ A judge should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.²¹

Indeed, a judge’s duties and responsibilities are not strictly confined to judicial functions. A judge is also an administrator who must organize the court with a view to prompt and convenient dispatch of its business.²²

x xx."

Determining the existence of conspiracy - G.R. No. 135204

See - G.R. No. 135204





"x x x.

We are not persuaded by appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy among the accused. She vigorously contends that she did not participate in the killing of the victim.

In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim.⁷ The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. There must be a showing that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.⁸

The series of events in this case convincingly show that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison and cooperated with each other in killing William Lomida. Appellant was the one who opened the door and allowed the other accused to enter the house. She joined them in bringing the victim to the residence of Narciso Ramos, her brother-in-law. While her co-accused dragged the helpless victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant merely watched intensely. She even "turned her back" as the lifeless body of the victim was being burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled with the other accused.

The above circumstances clearly show the common purpose and concerted efforts on the part of appellant and her co-accused. We agree with the trial court in concluding that their acts were indications of a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime of murder.

x x x."

Process server - A.M. No. P-06-2109

See - A.M. No. P-06-2109





"x x x.

According to the Manual for Clerks of Court, the process server —

x x x serves court processes such as subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, summons, court order and notices; prepares and submits returns of service of court process; monitors messages and/or delivers court mail matters received and dispatched by him; and performs such other duties as may be assigned to him.²³

The role of the process server is indispensable in the machinery of the justice system, where the constitutional mandate of the speedy disposition of cases entails an efficient means of communication between the courts and the litigants. Due to respondent’s failure to observe his duties diligently, the trial court encountered problems in the service of its court processes, the most obvious consequence of which is the delay in the progress of cases. Complainant’s evidence adequately established that proceedings in several cases heard before the trial court, such as hearings for the taking of witnesses’ testimony and for promulgation of judgment, were postponed because the parties did not appear for lack of notice.

Respondent needs reminding that the conduct of every employee of the judiciary is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.²⁴ The public expect judicial personnel to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of official duties, and to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community.²⁵ Here, respondent failed to live up to the high standards of dedication and efficiency that the public expect from occupants of his office.²⁶

x x x."

Inherent and administrative powers of trial courts to effectively control the conduct of its proceedings - G.R. Nos. 162144-54

See - G.R. Nos. 162144-54





"x x x.

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties but allowed each of the counsels representing the individual respondents to be heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited the prosecution’s use of tape recorders.

But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its proceedings. Thus:

Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:

x x x x

(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;

x x x x

(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;

x x x x

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;

x x x x

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.²⁶ The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.

As for the prohibition against the prosecution’s private recording of the proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official recording of the proceedings by the court’s stenographer has been insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadao’s policy against such extraneous recordings.

x x x."

Private recording of the proceedings. - G.R. Nos. 162144-54

See - G.R. Nos. 162144-54





"x x x.

As for the prohibition against the prosecution’s private recording of the proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official recording of the proceedings by the court’s stenographer has been insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadao’s policy against such extraneous recordings.

x x x."

In case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause - G.R. Nos. 162144-54

See - G.R. Nos. 162144-54





"x x x.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.²⁴

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case here. Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the five days required of the prosecution by the rules.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.²⁵

x x x."

Inhibition of Judges - G.R. Nos. 162144-54

See - G.R. Nos. 162144-54





"x x x.

3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. – A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

x x x x

(e) the judge knows the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.

The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his duties according to law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.¹²

Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadao’s dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao’s statement that a very close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondents. But this statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can this constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration when she said in her comment to the administrative complaint against her that such motion was merely the prosecution’s stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the respondents. The comment could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order holding that the complainant’s evidence failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.

x x x."

Jurisdiction of Family Courts - G.R. Nos. 162144-54

See - G.R. Nos. 162144-54





"x x x.

2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts

The prosecution points out that, although this Court’s October 7, 2003 Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime amended the informations to reflect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. Thus:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases,¹¹ for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.

x x x."

Proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal. - G.R. Nos. 162144-54

See - G.R. Nos. 162144-54





"x x x.

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal.⁸ Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an order issued in the subject cases. But it reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy, and adequate remedy.⁹ In other words, the prosecution’s move was not a case of forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy for the prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy is altogether implausible as to throw out the petition outright.

Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does not give the People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.¹⁰ In any case, the immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length of time that has passed since the crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural lapse.

x x x."

Prosecution of criminal cases under BP 22 - G.R. No. 169889

See - G.R. No. 169889





"x x x.

First, petitioners anchor their position on Supreme Court Circular 57-97, which provides for the rules and guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP 22. Pertinent portions of Circular 57-97 provide:

1. The criminal action for violation of [BP] 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the filing fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefore based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in his complaint or in the information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated. (emphasis supplied)

Circular 57-97 has been institutionalized as Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:¹⁰

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of [BP] 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fee based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (emphasis supplied)

Sad to say, Circular 57-97 (and, it goes without saying, Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court) was not yet in force¹¹ when PDCP sued Sammy for violation of BP 22 and when it filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure on the mortgaged property of petitioners on February 8, 1993 and May 3, 1993, respectively. In Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa,¹² Circular 57-97 was not applied because the collection suit and the criminal complaints for violation of BP 22 were filed prior to the adoption of Circular 57-97. The same principle applies here.

Thus, prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97, the alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP 22 had been filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction had already been rendered in the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable and ordering him to pay the amount of the check(s).¹³

In this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil liability of Sammy) was rendered because Sammy moved for the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, PDCP could have still foreclosed on the mortgage or filed a collection suit.

Nonetheless, records show that, during the pendency of the BP 22 case, Sammy had already paid PDCP the total amount of P1,783,582.¹⁴ Thus, to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the creditor, any foreclosure by PDCP should only be for the unpaid balance.

x x x."

Bouncing checks

"x x x.
The gravamen of the offense punishable by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under the pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as offense against property, but an offense against public order. Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323, 338. (emphasis supplied)
x x x."