"x x x.
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 under which the petitioner is charged states, thus:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers.— In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
…
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
To warrant the conviction of the accused, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following essential elements of the crime:
The elements of the offense defined in this provision are that: (1) The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action has caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[44]
In Marcelo vs. Sandigabayan,[45] the Court defined evident bad faith, viz:
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[46]
In this case, the petitioner was the presiding judge of the MCTC of San Roque-Mondragon, Northern Samar and acted in that capacity when he received the P1,000.00 from Castillo and Cardenas. The petitioner acted with evident bad faith from the time he received Vicario’s P1,000.00 cash bail on June 4 and June 5, 1990, and refused to have the amount deposited either with the nearest collector of internal revenue, the municipal treasurer of Mondragon, or provincial treasurer of Northern Samar as provided for in Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Even after the provisional dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5671 on September 14, 1990, the petitioner refused to return the amount despite the demands of Vicario, Castillo and Cardenas that the money be returned. Vicario suffered undue injury when the petitioner retained the P1,000.00 for his personal use.
x x x."
