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The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
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An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law.
Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.”
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local offi cial may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.
As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing rules.
Verily, the clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial prerogative is patent from the deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows:
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Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can suspend or remove an elective official.
Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase “PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN” simply by “COURTS”. Kasi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.
Senator Pimentel. “OR THE PROPER COURT.”
Senator Saguisag. “OR THE PROPER COURT.”
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President.
Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that will craft to capture the other ideas that have been elevated.
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It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. As explained by the Court in Lacson v. Roque:
“…the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective mayor is not without its own justification, and was, we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils resulting from a restricted authority to suspend or remove must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interests which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove.”
EN BANC, G.R. No. 147870, July 31, 2002, RAMIR R. PABLICO, PETITIONER,VS. ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, RESPONDENT.
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