Corrupt practices of public officers - G.R. NO. 184537

See -  G.R. NO. 184537





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Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads:

                   Section 3.  Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be 0unlawful:

           

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                   (e)  Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.  This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

                             The essential elements of the offense are as follows:

         

1.       The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2.      He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3.      That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[14]

In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:

R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.  The use of the disjunctive term “or” connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense.  This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.[15]

The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory construction that “The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.”[16]

 Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information.  The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.  Only the mode of commission was modified.  While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[17] provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense.  An accused may be charged under either mode[18] or under both should both modes concur.[19]

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