Sunday, March 8, 2015

Inhibition of Judges - G.R. Nos. 162144-54

See - G.R. Nos. 162144-54





"x x x.

3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. – A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
x x x x
(e) the judge knows the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.

The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his duties according to law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12

Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadao’s dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao’s statement that a very close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondents. But this statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can this constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration when she said in her comment to the administrative complaint against her that such motion was merely the prosecution’s stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the respondents. The comment could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order holding that the complainant’s evidence failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.
x x x."