"x x x.
The consolidation of criminal cases is a matter of judicial discretion, according to Section 22 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
“Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses - Charges of offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the Court.”
Similarly, Section 2 of Rule XII of the SBN Revised Internal Rules[16] reads:
“Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. - Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.
x x x x x x x x x.”
The counterpart rule for civil cases is found in Section 1 of Rule 31[17] of the Rules of Court.
Similarly, jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases. As held in Caños v. Peralta,[18] joint trial is permissible “x x x where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. x x x.”[19]
Querubin v. Palanca[20] has ruled that consolidation is proper in the following instances:
“x x x where the offenses charged are similar, related or connected, or are of the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on each trial.’ ”[21] (Italics supplied)
Expediency was the reason for the consolidation of the criminal cases against the accused in Querubin. As there was only one accused (who himself moved for consolidation) and one offended party, and the 22 separate cases of estafa were committed in substantially the same way over the same period of time and with the same witnesses, the Court deemed the consolidation to be proper.
Sideco v. Paredes[22] allowed a consolidated appeal of 16 cases involving a common question of law. Joint trial was deemed necessary to minimize therein appellant’s expenses in pursuing his appeal.
Other cases were consolidated, as they had sought the same reliefs[23] or involved the same parties and basically the same issues.[24] Another purpose was to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions.[25] These reasons are in line with the object of consolidation, which is to “avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court and save unnecessary costs and expense.”[26]
On the other side of the spectrum were cases in which consolidation was found to be improper. Republic v. Mangrobang[27] struck down the consolidation of an original action for ejectment with an appealed case for eminent domain, because consolidation would have only delayed the resolution of the cases, which had raised dissimilar issues. Moreover, one or both cases had already been partially heard.
Meanwhile, we ruled in Dacanay v. People[28] -- a case in which separate trial was requested -- that the resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the government could not be given preference over the right to a speedy trial; or over the protection of a person’s life, liberty or property. Indeed, the right to a speedy resolution of cases[29] can also be affected by consolidation.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that the SBN did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Consolidate the indirect bribery and the plunder cases. As correctly ruled by the anti-graft court, their consolidation would have unduly exposed herein private respondent to totally unrelated testimonies, delayed the resolution of the indirect bribery case, muddled the issues therein, and exposed him to the inconveniences of a lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case. Consolidation has also been rendered inadvisable by supervening events -- in particular, the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial had already been heard in the plunder case.
Verily, no indiscretion has been shown by the court a quo in refusing to consolidate the cases. There is no showing that it evaded or refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. Neither has it been shown that when the SBN denied the Motion to Consolidate, it exercised its power in a manner that was arbitrary or despotic by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.[30]
x x x."
