In the case of ISAGANI YAMBOT and LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC vs. RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT and HON. FRANCISCO R. RANCHES, G.R. No. 172677, September 12, 2008, the Supreme Court reiterated the long-standing doctrine that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
It added that while the resolution of the prosecutorial arm is persuasive, it is not binding on the court. It may therefore grant or deny at its option a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information based on its own assessment of the records of the preliminary investigation submitted to it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative, and not out of subservience to the prosecutor.
Further, it stressed that while it is imperative on the part of a trial judge to state his/her assessment and reasons in resolving the motion before him/her, he/she need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon to arrive at the decision.
I have digested the case below, for purposes of legal research, thus:
X x x.
On account of the publication in the May 2 and 3, 1996 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer of news reports which allegedly imputed to private respondent Armovit the harboring or concealment of a convicted murderer (his client, Rolito Go), Armovit filed on May 15, 1996 with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Ilocos Sur a complaint-affidavit for libel against petitioners Yambot, the publisher, and Jimenez-Magsanoc, the editor-in-chief, and two other correspondents, Teddy Molina and Juliet Pascual, of the said broadsheet. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Nonatus Rojas then issued, on October 31, 1996, a Resolution finding probable cause to indict the petitioners and the reporters for libel. Two criminal informations for libel were consequently filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Sur, Branch 21. [3]
In the meantime, petitioners sought the review of the OPP’s resolution by the Regional State Prosecutor (RSP). Eventually, RSP Constante Caridad reversed the findings of the OPP, prompting the latter to file a motion for the withdrawal of the aforesaid informations on February 12, 1997. [4]
The trial court, however, on July 9, 1997 denied the said motion on the ground that it found probable cause for the filing of the charges. The trial court later denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. [5]
Frustrated with the trial court’s dispositions, petitioners sought the issuance of a certiorari writ by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 54397. But the CA, in the assailed decision and resolution, denied the reliefs prayed for. [6]
Thus, petitioners elevated the matter for review by this Court on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO RULE THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS FOR LIBEL AGAINST PETITIONERS, THUS EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVING THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO RULE THAT THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CHARGE PETITIONERS WITH LIBEL. [7]
Considering that the determination of probable cause to indict an accused is a function of the prosecutor, not of the judge, the petitioners argue in the main that the trial court should have deferred to the RSP’s finding that no prima facie case for libel exists. They further aver that the questioned news reports are not defamatory for they do not impute to private respondent, directly or impliedly, the commission of a crime. Further, they claim that the reports are privileged in character and are constitutionally protected; hence, malice cannot be presumed. [8]
We find no merit in petitioners’ contentions; thus, we deny the petition.
Crespo v. Mogul [9] instructs in a very clear manner that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. While the resolution of the prosecutorial arm is persuasive, it is not binding on the court. [10] It may therefore grant or deny at its option a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information [11] based on its own assessment of the records of the preliminary investigation submitted to it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative, and not out of subservience to the prosecutor. [12] While it is imperative on the part of a trial judge to state his/her assessment and reasons in resolving the motion before him/her, [13] he/she need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon to arrive at the decision. [14]
Applying the foregoing doctrines to the case at bar, the Court finds no error on the part of the appellate court in sustaining the orders of the trial court. The RTC of Ilocos Sur indeed has the prerogative to grant or deny the motion to withdraw the informations. Further, as clearly shown by the July 9, 1997 Order —
[t]hat these defamatory imputations are false is established by all the evidence in the record of preliminary investigation; the accused submitted no evidence to prove the truth of the imputations. x x x [15]
the trial court made its own assessment of the records submitted to it and complied with its bounden duty to determine by itself the merits of the motion. Therefore, its ruling cannot be stigmatized and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
It is well to note at this point that the Court, in this petition for review on certiorari, cannot review the evidence adduced by the parties before the prosecutor on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause. [16] Respect must be accorded to the trial court’s disposition of the motion to withdraw absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion.
The other arguments adduced by the petitioners—that the news reports are not defamatory, privileged in character and constitutionally protected—are all matters of defense which can be properly ventilated during the trial.
X x x.
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Pro se representation vs. law student practice rule
In the case of FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila, G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a litigant’s right to pro se representation under Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court and clarified its distinction in relation to the Law Student Practice Rule under Rule 138-A, Rules of Court.
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, [4] praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. [5]
In an Order [6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. [8] In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration, [9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order [10] dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition.
The core issue raised before the Court was whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. [14] Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, [15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, [16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. [17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado, [18] where we declared that “even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case [19] against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, [20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. [21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
In fine, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition, modified the assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, and directed it to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, [4] praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. [5]
In an Order [6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. [8] In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration, [9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order [10] dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition.
The core issue raised before the Court was whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. [14] Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, [15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, [16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. [17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado, [18] where we declared that “even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case [19] against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, [20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. [21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
In fine, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition, modified the assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, and directed it to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
Reciprocity
In the case of Board of Medicine v. Ota, GR No. 166097, July 14, 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines allowed a foreigner to practice medicine in the Philippines under the specific circumstances of the case.
This ruling should be studied to see if it might have a bearing on the other professions, such as the practice of law.
Holding that our laws allow foreigners to practice medicine in the country upon proof of reciprocity, the Supreme Court upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, of the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Yasayuki Ota, a Japanese citizen, asking that the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission be directed to issue him the requisite Certificate of Registration and license.
Ota had presented during trial a Japanese government publication showing that there are a number of foreigners practicing medicine in Japan and a letter, dated January 28, 1992, from Consul General Jesus I. Yabes stating that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements, including taking the board examination in Japanese.
In a 15-page decision penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, the Court held that “It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get a license and practice [in the country of the foreigner seeking to practice medicine in the Philippines].” It ruled that to require Ota to further prove that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing in Japan “unduly expands” the requirements under RA 2382, the Medical Act of 1959, and PD 223, Creating the Professional Regulation Commission and Prescribing Its Powers and Functions.
The Court also found that Ota had sufficiently shown that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to practice medicine, having finished his medical studies from the Bicol Christian College and his internship at Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center as well as passed the 1992 Medical Board Examinations of the Philippines. Below is the full text of the decision, for purposes of legal research of the readers visiting this blog. Thus:
GR No. 166097, Board of Medicine v. Ota, July 14, 2008)
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84945 [2] dated November 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated October 19, 2003. [4]
The facts are as follows:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine. [5] After successfully completing a one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. [6]
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; [7] thus, he was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which he subsequently passed. [8]
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for a license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board “believes that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice there.” [9]
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC through its Chairman. [10]
In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the PRC, in refusing to issue in his favor a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in clear contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession in the Philippines to his great damage and prejudice. [11]
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the practice of medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had substantially complied with the requirements under the law. [12] The RTC then ordered the Board to issue in favor of respondent the corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine in the Philippines. [13]
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while respondent submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus. [14]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. [15]
Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN. [16]
Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent and conclusive evidence that reciprocity in the practice of medicine exists between the Philippines and Japan. While documents state that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant. There is no reciprocity in this case, as the requirements to practice medicine in Japan are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with. There are also ambiguities in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by respondent, i.e., what are the provisions of the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same or better than graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination. Consul General Yabes also stated that there had not been a single Filipino who was issued a license to practice medicine by the Japanese Government. The publication showing that there were foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which respondent presented before the Court, also did not specifically show that Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said profession. [17] Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, [18] the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, which power is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus. [19]
Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004 be reversed and set aside, that a new one be rendered reinstating the Board Order dated March 8, 1993 which disallows respondent to practice medicine in the Philippines, and that respondent's petition before the trial court be dismissed for lack of merit. [20]
In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan and Section 9 of the Philippine Medical Act of 1959 show that reciprocity exists between the Philippines and Japan concerning the practice of medicine. Said laws clearly state that both countries allow foreigners to practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions as long as the applicant meets the educational requirements, training or residency in hospitals and pass the licensure examination given by either country. Consul General Yabes in his letter dated January 28, 1992 stated that “the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements.” The fact that there is no reported Filipino who has successfully penetrated the medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is no reciprocity between the two countries, since it does not follow that no Filipino will ever be granted a medical license by the Japanese Government. It is not the essence of reciprocity that before a citizen of one of the contracting countries can demand its application, it is necessary that the interested citizen’s country has previously granted the same privilege to the citizens of the other contracting country. [21] Respondent further argues that Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 [22] indicates the mandatory character of the statute and an imperative obligation on the part of the Board inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who successfully passes the examination and has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications, is entitled as a matter of right to the issuance of a certificate of registration or a physician’s license, which right is enforceable by mandamus. [23]
Petitioners filed a Reply [24] and both parties filed their respective memoranda [25] reiterating their arguments.
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. [26] It is a right that is earned through years of education and training, and which requires that one must first secure a license from the state through professional board examinations. [27]
Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements – i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school – for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.” [28]
It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body which regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. [29]
R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in Section 9 thereof that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates for Board examinations shall have the following qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who has submitted competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof;
x x x x
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223 [30] also provides in Section (j) thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may, upon the recommendation of the Board concerned, approve the registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That the requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines and that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country: Provided, finally, That the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. The Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the
Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country;
x x x x
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan, which provides in Articles 2 and 11, thus:
Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner must pass the national examination for medical practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health and Welfare.
x x x x
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical Examination except persons who conform to one of the following items:
1. Persons who finished regular medical courses at a university based on the School Education Laws (December 26, 1947) and graduated from said university.
2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination and practiced clinics and public sanitation more than one year after passing the said test.
3. Persons who graduated from a foreign medical school or acquired medical practitioner license in a foreign country, and also are recognized to have the same or more academic ability and techniques as persons stated in item 1 and item 2 of this article. [31]
Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan allows foreigners to practice medicine therein, said document does not show that conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the requirements are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with, there is no reciprocity between the two countries, hence, respondent may not be granted license to practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Court does not agree.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon recommendation of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country, provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated by
the laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession [of medicine] under the [same] rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing therein unduly expands the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.
While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same as or better than that of graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination – respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners are actually practicing in Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded from getting a license to practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese Government publication, Physician-Dentist-Pharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are a number of foreign physicians practicing medicine in Japan. [32] He also presented a letter dated January 28, 1992 from Consul General Yabes, [33] which states:
S i r :
With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993, concerning your request for a Certificate of Confirmation for the purpose of establishing a reciprocity with Japan in the practice of medical profession relative to the case of Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, the Embassy wishes to inform you that inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and Welfare as well as Bureau of Immigration yielded the following information:
1. They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was granted a license by the Japanese Government to practice medicine in Japan;
2. However, the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements such as holding a valid visa for the purpose of taking the medical board exam, checking the applicant's qualifications to take the examination, taking the national board examination in Japanese and filing an application for the issuance of the medical license.
Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single Filipino physician who was issued by the Japanese Government a license to practice medicine, because it is extremely difficult to pass the medical board examination in the Japanese language. Filipino doctors here are only allowed to work in Japanese hospitals as trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On certain occasions, they are allowed to show their medical skills during seminars for demonstration purposes only. (Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours,
Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice medicine therein provided that the local requirements are complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or the prohibition against Filipinos that would account for the absence of Filipino physicians holding licenses and practicing medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of passing the board examination in the Japanese language. Granting that there is still no Filipino who has been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not mean that no Filipino will ever be able to be given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to issue licenses is discretionary, hence, not compellable by mandamus.
The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at bar; hence, the principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In De Guzman, there were doubts about the integrity and validity of the test results of the examinees from a particular school which garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants’ satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements. [34] And as there was no definite showing that the requirements and conditions to be granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court held that the writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will. [35]
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. [36]
In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:
A careful reading of Section 20 [37] of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners [PRC] “shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board.” In statutory construction the term “shall” is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician's license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959. [38]
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.
In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of respondent to prove that there is reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied with the said requirement and the CA has not committed any reversible error in rendering its Decision dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
This ruling should be studied to see if it might have a bearing on the other professions, such as the practice of law.
Holding that our laws allow foreigners to practice medicine in the country upon proof of reciprocity, the Supreme Court upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, of the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Yasayuki Ota, a Japanese citizen, asking that the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission be directed to issue him the requisite Certificate of Registration and license.
Ota had presented during trial a Japanese government publication showing that there are a number of foreigners practicing medicine in Japan and a letter, dated January 28, 1992, from Consul General Jesus I. Yabes stating that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements, including taking the board examination in Japanese.
In a 15-page decision penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, the Court held that “It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get a license and practice [in the country of the foreigner seeking to practice medicine in the Philippines].” It ruled that to require Ota to further prove that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing in Japan “unduly expands” the requirements under RA 2382, the Medical Act of 1959, and PD 223, Creating the Professional Regulation Commission and Prescribing Its Powers and Functions.
The Court also found that Ota had sufficiently shown that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to practice medicine, having finished his medical studies from the Bicol Christian College and his internship at Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center as well as passed the 1992 Medical Board Examinations of the Philippines. Below is the full text of the decision, for purposes of legal research of the readers visiting this blog. Thus:
GR No. 166097, Board of Medicine v. Ota, July 14, 2008)
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84945 [2] dated November 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated October 19, 2003. [4]
The facts are as follows:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine. [5] After successfully completing a one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. [6]
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; [7] thus, he was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which he subsequently passed. [8]
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for a license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board “believes that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice there.” [9]
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC through its Chairman. [10]
In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the PRC, in refusing to issue in his favor a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in clear contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession in the Philippines to his great damage and prejudice. [11]
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the practice of medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had substantially complied with the requirements under the law. [12] The RTC then ordered the Board to issue in favor of respondent the corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine in the Philippines. [13]
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while respondent submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus. [14]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. [15]
Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN. [16]
Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent and conclusive evidence that reciprocity in the practice of medicine exists between the Philippines and Japan. While documents state that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant. There is no reciprocity in this case, as the requirements to practice medicine in Japan are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with. There are also ambiguities in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by respondent, i.e., what are the provisions of the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same or better than graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination. Consul General Yabes also stated that there had not been a single Filipino who was issued a license to practice medicine by the Japanese Government. The publication showing that there were foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which respondent presented before the Court, also did not specifically show that Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said profession. [17] Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, [18] the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, which power is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus. [19]
Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004 be reversed and set aside, that a new one be rendered reinstating the Board Order dated March 8, 1993 which disallows respondent to practice medicine in the Philippines, and that respondent's petition before the trial court be dismissed for lack of merit. [20]
In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan and Section 9 of the Philippine Medical Act of 1959 show that reciprocity exists between the Philippines and Japan concerning the practice of medicine. Said laws clearly state that both countries allow foreigners to practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions as long as the applicant meets the educational requirements, training or residency in hospitals and pass the licensure examination given by either country. Consul General Yabes in his letter dated January 28, 1992 stated that “the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements.” The fact that there is no reported Filipino who has successfully penetrated the medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is no reciprocity between the two countries, since it does not follow that no Filipino will ever be granted a medical license by the Japanese Government. It is not the essence of reciprocity that before a citizen of one of the contracting countries can demand its application, it is necessary that the interested citizen’s country has previously granted the same privilege to the citizens of the other contracting country. [21] Respondent further argues that Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 [22] indicates the mandatory character of the statute and an imperative obligation on the part of the Board inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who successfully passes the examination and has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications, is entitled as a matter of right to the issuance of a certificate of registration or a physician’s license, which right is enforceable by mandamus. [23]
Petitioners filed a Reply [24] and both parties filed their respective memoranda [25] reiterating their arguments.
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. [26] It is a right that is earned through years of education and training, and which requires that one must first secure a license from the state through professional board examinations. [27]
Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements – i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school – for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.” [28]
It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body which regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. [29]
R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in Section 9 thereof that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates for Board examinations shall have the following qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who has submitted competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof;
x x x x
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223 [30] also provides in Section (j) thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may, upon the recommendation of the Board concerned, approve the registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That the requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines and that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country: Provided, finally, That the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. The Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the
Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country;
x x x x
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan, which provides in Articles 2 and 11, thus:
Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner must pass the national examination for medical practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health and Welfare.
x x x x
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical Examination except persons who conform to one of the following items:
1. Persons who finished regular medical courses at a university based on the School Education Laws (December 26, 1947) and graduated from said university.
2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination and practiced clinics and public sanitation more than one year after passing the said test.
3. Persons who graduated from a foreign medical school or acquired medical practitioner license in a foreign country, and also are recognized to have the same or more academic ability and techniques as persons stated in item 1 and item 2 of this article. [31]
Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan allows foreigners to practice medicine therein, said document does not show that conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the requirements are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with, there is no reciprocity between the two countries, hence, respondent may not be granted license to practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Court does not agree.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon recommendation of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country, provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated by
the laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession [of medicine] under the [same] rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing therein unduly expands the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.
While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same as or better than that of graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination – respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners are actually practicing in Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded from getting a license to practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese Government publication, Physician-Dentist-Pharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are a number of foreign physicians practicing medicine in Japan. [32] He also presented a letter dated January 28, 1992 from Consul General Yabes, [33] which states:
S i r :
With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993, concerning your request for a Certificate of Confirmation for the purpose of establishing a reciprocity with Japan in the practice of medical profession relative to the case of Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, the Embassy wishes to inform you that inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and Welfare as well as Bureau of Immigration yielded the following information:
1. They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was granted a license by the Japanese Government to practice medicine in Japan;
2. However, the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements such as holding a valid visa for the purpose of taking the medical board exam, checking the applicant's qualifications to take the examination, taking the national board examination in Japanese and filing an application for the issuance of the medical license.
Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single Filipino physician who was issued by the Japanese Government a license to practice medicine, because it is extremely difficult to pass the medical board examination in the Japanese language. Filipino doctors here are only allowed to work in Japanese hospitals as trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On certain occasions, they are allowed to show their medical skills during seminars for demonstration purposes only. (Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours,
Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice medicine therein provided that the local requirements are complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or the prohibition against Filipinos that would account for the absence of Filipino physicians holding licenses and practicing medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of passing the board examination in the Japanese language. Granting that there is still no Filipino who has been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not mean that no Filipino will ever be able to be given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to issue licenses is discretionary, hence, not compellable by mandamus.
The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at bar; hence, the principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In De Guzman, there were doubts about the integrity and validity of the test results of the examinees from a particular school which garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants’ satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements. [34] And as there was no definite showing that the requirements and conditions to be granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court held that the writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will. [35]
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. [36]
In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:
A careful reading of Section 20 [37] of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners [PRC] “shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board.” In statutory construction the term “shall” is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician's license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959. [38]
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.
In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of respondent to prove that there is reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied with the said requirement and the CA has not committed any reversible error in rendering its Decision dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Warrantless arrest
In the recent case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO ALUNDAY, G.R. No. 181546, September 3, 2008, which involved a violation of Section 9, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”, the accused assails his conviction for being improper and illegal and asserts that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over his person because he was arrested without a warrant and that his warrantless arrest was not done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
He insists that the arresting officers had three months within which to secure a warrant from the time they received the information about an existing marijuana plantation in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, in May 2000, until they effected his arrest on 3 August 2000. Also, accused maintains that the arresting officers’ failure to secure a warrant can never be justified by the urgency of the situation.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means caught in the act of committing a crime. This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person without warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a crime, or is committing it, or is about to commit an offense, in the presence or within view of the arresting officer.
In this case, the Intelligence Section of the Provincial Office of the Mountain Province received the information sometime in May 2000, and accused-appellant was arrested during the police raid at the plantation at Mount Churyon, Sadanga, only on 3 August 2000. This is so because the arrest was effected only after a series of validations conducted by the team to verify or confirm the report that indeed a marijuana plantation existed at the area and after an operation plan was formed. As admitted by the accused in his supplemental brief, the information about the existing marijuana plantation was finally confirmed only on 2 August 2000. On 3 August 2000, the arresting team proceeded to the marijuana plantation. It saw the accused personally cutting and gathering marijuana plants. Thus, accused’s arrest on 3 August 2000 was legal, because he was caught in flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested were committing a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.
The Court held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught in the act of committing a crime.
The Court held that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
In this case, the accused went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his arraignment.
The Court stated that it was much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.
Accused was not denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, because of his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.
As to the issue of credibility of the police witnesses, the Court stated that credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit. In this case, the records are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on the part of the police officers. The Court supported the following observations of the trial court, thus:
Absent as it is in the record indications of personal interest or improper motive on their part to testify against the accused, the witnesses for the prosecution being government law enforcers and/or officials, actually present during the incident in question in the performance of their duties, are trustworthy sources. And the recollections in open court of such witnesses of the events that transpired on the occasion, given in clear and direct manner, corroborating and complimenting each other on material points, and highly probable in the natural order of things, are easy to believe and thus accorded full credence.
In contrast, the accused himself, his aunt, and his daughter who testified in behalf of the former are obviously biased and unreliable witnesses on account of self-interest and blood kinship. Situated as they are, their inclination to be truthful is highly suspect. And quite aside from being self-serving and dubious, their testimonies are inconsistent, and manifestly concocted or improbable to be seriously considered.
The Court also affirmed the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, thus:
It is jurisprudential that factual findings of trial courts especially those which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions, can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses’ deportment, demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
We have carefully scrutinized the record and found no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
x x x x
Indeed, in the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish the following with conviction:
(1) On 3 August 2000, a police continent raided a marijuana plantation located in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province.
(2) In the course thereof, appellant was seen cutting and gathering marijuana plants from the premises.
(3) There were no other plants except marijuana which were growing in the said area.
(4) There was a hut apparently used by appellant and an old woman as a camp or temporary dwelling which existed alone within the area of the subject plantation.
(5) The samples taken from the said plantation were all found to be positive for marijuana.
On the face of these positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s bare denials must necessarily fail. Moreover, it is interesting to note that appellant never mentioned his aunt, Wayto Alunday, in his testimony. In fact, she contradicted appellant’s testimony when she said that he ate and slept in her hut. This only bolsters the conclusion that Wayto Alunday was not present when appellant was captured by the police.
X x x.
The Court stated that the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. It did not deviate from the Court of Appeals’ valid observation, thus:
Aside from appellant’s preposterous claim that he was looking for squash in the subject area where only marijuana plants were planted, he did not advance any explanation for his presence thereat. Besides, prosecution witness Saipen categorically stated that he caught appellant red-handed harvesting marijuana plants. Thus, We find it facetious that appellant did not even know what a marijuana plant looked like.
Appellant asserts that the plantation in question was maintained by the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army which witness Cayad confirmed likewise. Thus, appellant theorizes that he could not have been the perpetrator of the crime charged.
We find appellant’s assertion specious. A perusal of Section 9, Art. II of R.A. No. 6425 shows that a violation exists when a person shall cultivate, plant or culture on any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum) or any other plant which may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug. Indeed, ownership of the land where the marijuana seedlings are planted, cultivated and cultured is not a requisite of the offense.
X x x.
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
lcmlaw@gmail.com
He insists that the arresting officers had three months within which to secure a warrant from the time they received the information about an existing marijuana plantation in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, in May 2000, until they effected his arrest on 3 August 2000. Also, accused maintains that the arresting officers’ failure to secure a warrant can never be justified by the urgency of the situation.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means caught in the act of committing a crime. This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person without warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a crime, or is committing it, or is about to commit an offense, in the presence or within view of the arresting officer.
In this case, the Intelligence Section of the Provincial Office of the Mountain Province received the information sometime in May 2000, and accused-appellant was arrested during the police raid at the plantation at Mount Churyon, Sadanga, only on 3 August 2000. This is so because the arrest was effected only after a series of validations conducted by the team to verify or confirm the report that indeed a marijuana plantation existed at the area and after an operation plan was formed. As admitted by the accused in his supplemental brief, the information about the existing marijuana plantation was finally confirmed only on 2 August 2000. On 3 August 2000, the arresting team proceeded to the marijuana plantation. It saw the accused personally cutting and gathering marijuana plants. Thus, accused’s arrest on 3 August 2000 was legal, because he was caught in flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested were committing a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.
The Court held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught in the act of committing a crime.
The Court held that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
In this case, the accused went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his arraignment.
The Court stated that it was much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.
Accused was not denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, because of his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.
As to the issue of credibility of the police witnesses, the Court stated that credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit. In this case, the records are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on the part of the police officers. The Court supported the following observations of the trial court, thus:
Absent as it is in the record indications of personal interest or improper motive on their part to testify against the accused, the witnesses for the prosecution being government law enforcers and/or officials, actually present during the incident in question in the performance of their duties, are trustworthy sources. And the recollections in open court of such witnesses of the events that transpired on the occasion, given in clear and direct manner, corroborating and complimenting each other on material points, and highly probable in the natural order of things, are easy to believe and thus accorded full credence.
In contrast, the accused himself, his aunt, and his daughter who testified in behalf of the former are obviously biased and unreliable witnesses on account of self-interest and blood kinship. Situated as they are, their inclination to be truthful is highly suspect. And quite aside from being self-serving and dubious, their testimonies are inconsistent, and manifestly concocted or improbable to be seriously considered.
The Court also affirmed the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, thus:
It is jurisprudential that factual findings of trial courts especially those which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions, can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses’ deportment, demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
We have carefully scrutinized the record and found no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
x x x x
Indeed, in the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish the following with conviction:
(1) On 3 August 2000, a police continent raided a marijuana plantation located in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province.
(2) In the course thereof, appellant was seen cutting and gathering marijuana plants from the premises.
(3) There were no other plants except marijuana which were growing in the said area.
(4) There was a hut apparently used by appellant and an old woman as a camp or temporary dwelling which existed alone within the area of the subject plantation.
(5) The samples taken from the said plantation were all found to be positive for marijuana.
On the face of these positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s bare denials must necessarily fail. Moreover, it is interesting to note that appellant never mentioned his aunt, Wayto Alunday, in his testimony. In fact, she contradicted appellant’s testimony when she said that he ate and slept in her hut. This only bolsters the conclusion that Wayto Alunday was not present when appellant was captured by the police.
X x x.
The Court stated that the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. It did not deviate from the Court of Appeals’ valid observation, thus:
Aside from appellant’s preposterous claim that he was looking for squash in the subject area where only marijuana plants were planted, he did not advance any explanation for his presence thereat. Besides, prosecution witness Saipen categorically stated that he caught appellant red-handed harvesting marijuana plants. Thus, We find it facetious that appellant did not even know what a marijuana plant looked like.
Appellant asserts that the plantation in question was maintained by the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army which witness Cayad confirmed likewise. Thus, appellant theorizes that he could not have been the perpetrator of the crime charged.
We find appellant’s assertion specious. A perusal of Section 9, Art. II of R.A. No. 6425 shows that a violation exists when a person shall cultivate, plant or culture on any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum) or any other plant which may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug. Indeed, ownership of the land where the marijuana seedlings are planted, cultivated and cultured is not a requisite of the offense.
X x x.
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
lcmlaw@gmail.com
Free legal aid
For the benefit of the visitors of this blog who might be researching on the possible sources of free legal aid for indigent litigants residing in Las Pinas City, Philippines, please see the list that I have prepared below. Thus:
LIST OF FREE LEGAL AID SOURCES FOR LAS PINAS CITY INDIGENT RESIDENTS:
1. Atty. Rogel Jimenez
Head
Public Attorneys Office
Hall of Justice
Las Pinas City
Tel. No. 8739886
2. Atty. Antonio MANZANO
Chairman,
Las Pinas City Bar Association
E. Pascual St. corner M. Yllana St.
BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City
Cell No.0920-6033777
Tel. No.8729149
Fax No.8716008
3. Committee on Free Legal Aid
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Pasay Paranaque Las Pinas
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter
2nd Flr., Pasay City Hall
Harrison St., Pasay City
Tel/Fax No. 831-1477, 832-7993
4. Free Legal Aid Clinic
Office of the Dean
College of Law
University of Perpetual Help Rizal
Pamplona, Las Pinas City
(See PLDT Directory for contact numbers)
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Founder and Board Consultant
Las Pinas City Bar Association
LIST OF FREE LEGAL AID SOURCES FOR LAS PINAS CITY INDIGENT RESIDENTS:
1. Atty. Rogel Jimenez
Head
Public Attorneys Office
Hall of Justice
Las Pinas City
Tel. No. 8739886
2. Atty. Antonio MANZANO
Chairman,
Las Pinas City Bar Association
E. Pascual St. corner M. Yllana St.
BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City
Cell No.0920-6033777
Tel. No.8729149
Fax No.8716008
3. Committee on Free Legal Aid
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Pasay Paranaque Las Pinas
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter
2nd Flr., Pasay City Hall
Harrison St., Pasay City
Tel/Fax No. 831-1477, 832-7993
4. Free Legal Aid Clinic
Office of the Dean
College of Law
University of Perpetual Help Rizal
Pamplona, Las Pinas City
(See PLDT Directory for contact numbers)
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Founder and Board Consultant
Las Pinas City Bar Association
Judge Erlinda N. Alvaro
Yesterday I was tasked by the Las Pinas City Bar Association to introduce Judge Erlinda N. Alvaro during a testimonial dinner in her honor. She received two (2)great awards two weeks ago from the Supreme Court of the Philippines -- one for judicial excellence and the other one for best decision in civil case. Below is the introduction that I gave. Thus:
Introduction of Judge Erlinda Nicolas Alvaro Testimonial Dinner Sponsored by the Las Pinas City Bar Association on September 26, 2008 at 6:00PM at Cecille’s Restaurant, Las Pinas City.
Our distinguished guest and honoree for tonight is the 2008 Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano awardee and the 2008 Special Awardee for Best Decision in Civil Case under the auspices of the Annual Judicial Excellence Awards Program of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
These two great awards are rarely granted to one and the same judge.
Our honoree received the two awards on September 17, 2008 at the Session Hall of the Supreme Court.
The annual search for the Judicial Excellence Awards Program of the Supreme Court is administered by the Board of Trustees of the Society for Judicial Excellence, which is headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Bernardo Pardo as chairperson, retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez as chairperson emeritus, and Court of Appeals Justice Portia Alino Hormachuelos as vice chairperson.
For the year 2008, the final selection of the awardees was done by the Board of Judges composed of Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio, Supreme Court Justice Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez, retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez, retired Supreme Court Justice Carolina Griño Aquino, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez, Integrated Bar of the Philippines national president Atty. Feliciano Bautista, Dean Amado Dimayuga of the Judicial and Bar Council, and Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo Law School.
Together with our honoree, there were 3 other RTC judges who were recognized by the Supreme Court for their outstanding performance in the judiciary, namely:
1. RTC Judge Lorifel Pahimna, of Pasig City, who was given the Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos Award;
2. RTC Judge Henry Aries, of Negros Occidental, who was given the Chief Justice Ramon Avancena Award; and
3. RTC Judge Leonor Gerona Romeo, of Sorsogon, who was given the Special Award for Best Decision in Criminal Case.
In its recent press statement announcing the Awarding Ceremonies, the Supreme Court described our distinguished honoree as “no stranger to excellence” and as a “consistent academic achiever”.
Former Las Pinas Executive Judge Joselito DJ Vibandor describes our honoree as straightforward, honest, and “romantically frank”. He says that he has learned many things from the direct-to-the-point advice and suggestions of our honoree during his tenure as Executive Judge of our City on how to improve Court Management and the administration of justice in our City, for which he was truly happy and indebted.
Former Las Pinas City Executive Judge Bonifacio Maceda, who hails from the same province as our honoree, that is, the island province of Leyte, fondly recalls that, prior to the appointment of our honoree as a Trial Prosecutor in Manila and later as RTC Judge in our City, she was proudly described by the Leytenos as one the “bright girls” of Former Commission on Audit Chairman Francisco Tantuico, who was known for screening and maintaining an excellent core of high-caliber lawyers and management executives during his tenure as COA Chairman.
To stress the fact that the Supreme Court, the Society for Judicial Excellence, and the Board of Judges of the 2008 Judicial Excellence Awards Program of the Supreme Court did not commit a reversible error or a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing our distinguished honoree, and to stress the fact that the Las Pinas City Bar Association did not commit a patent misappreciation of evidence in endorsing the honoree to the Supreme Court, allow me to give you a brief description of her academic and professional credentials.
The father of our honoree, Serafin Nicolas, served as a mayor of the municipality of Dagami, Leyte, and her mother, Teresa Callera Nicolas, served as a vice mayor of the same municipality. It was her early exposure to governance, accountability and transparency, as exemplified by her parents that inspired her to take the path of the administration of justice as a profession.
Our honoree is married to retired RTC Judge Victorino Alvaro. The couple has a common denominator: the love of the rule of law and the administration of justice.
After finishing her primary education in her municipality in Dagami, Leyte, which she completed as the class valedictorian, our honoree proceeded to St. Paul’s College in Tacloban City to finish her secondary education.
Upon graduation from high school in Tacloban City, she enrolled at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she finished the degree of Bachelor of Science, Major in Home Economics, in 1966.
She has completed all academic requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Education at the University of Manila.
In her desire to expand her intellectual horizon, she took further studies at the Pamantasan ng Maynila, where, in 1977, she finished the degree of Bachelor of Business Management.
She has completed 51 units for the degree of Master of Business Administration at the same University.
From the Pamantasan ng Maynila, she moved to the University of the East where she finished the degree of Bachelor of Laws, as the Class Valedictorian, in 1986. She was admitted to the Bar in 1987.
In her desire to seek a global study of law and the justice system, she moved to the University to of San Diego in California, USA, where, in 1990, she completed the degree of Master of Comparative Law.
Our honoree is an educator, having served as a college instructor of the University of Manila from 1969 to 1975.
She is a tax law expert, having served as a Senior Tax Researcher at the National Tax Research Center from 1975 to 1982.
Her work at the Commission on Audit from 1982 to 1989 gave her the expertise in human resource development, training, and research, having served in various capacities therein, namely, Head Executive Assistant of the Chairman, Chief of the Research Division of the Manpower Development Office, Chief of the Training Division, and Staff Officer II of a Commissioner.
From the Commission on Audit, she moved to the Department of Justice where she served as State Counsel III of the Technical Staff from 1991 to 1993 and later as an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila from 1993 to 2001.
From the Department of Justice, she moved to the Judiciary, where she was appointed as the Presiding Judge of Branch 198 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City In 2001.
Fluent in the German language, our honoree has attended various foreign seminars and conferences, notable among which were a Judicial Colloquium on International Human Rights Law in Vienna, Austria in 1999; a Seminar on Comparative Law and Development held in Sweden in 1995; and a Seminar on Tax Administration held in Germany in 1978, in addition to the local seminars, conventions, and workshops sponsored by the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, the Philippine Judges Association, and other related government agencies from 1980 to 2007
Our honoree is the incumbent deputy vice president for administration of the Philippine Judges Association and the incumbent treasurer of the Las Piñas City Judges Association. She is a member of the UP Delta Lambda Sigma Sorority, the Soroptimist International, Manila Chapter, and the Zonta Club, Las Pinas Chapter.
Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome our distinguished guest and honoree for tonight, future Court of Appeals Associate Justice, Hon. Erlinda Nicolas Alvaro.
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Founder, Las Pinas City Bar Association
(LPBA), Inc.
Introduction of Judge Erlinda Nicolas Alvaro Testimonial Dinner Sponsored by the Las Pinas City Bar Association on September 26, 2008 at 6:00PM at Cecille’s Restaurant, Las Pinas City.
Our distinguished guest and honoree for tonight is the 2008 Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano awardee and the 2008 Special Awardee for Best Decision in Civil Case under the auspices of the Annual Judicial Excellence Awards Program of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
These two great awards are rarely granted to one and the same judge.
Our honoree received the two awards on September 17, 2008 at the Session Hall of the Supreme Court.
The annual search for the Judicial Excellence Awards Program of the Supreme Court is administered by the Board of Trustees of the Society for Judicial Excellence, which is headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Bernardo Pardo as chairperson, retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez as chairperson emeritus, and Court of Appeals Justice Portia Alino Hormachuelos as vice chairperson.
For the year 2008, the final selection of the awardees was done by the Board of Judges composed of Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio, Supreme Court Justice Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez, retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez, retired Supreme Court Justice Carolina Griño Aquino, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez, Integrated Bar of the Philippines national president Atty. Feliciano Bautista, Dean Amado Dimayuga of the Judicial and Bar Council, and Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo Law School.
Together with our honoree, there were 3 other RTC judges who were recognized by the Supreme Court for their outstanding performance in the judiciary, namely:
1. RTC Judge Lorifel Pahimna, of Pasig City, who was given the Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos Award;
2. RTC Judge Henry Aries, of Negros Occidental, who was given the Chief Justice Ramon Avancena Award; and
3. RTC Judge Leonor Gerona Romeo, of Sorsogon, who was given the Special Award for Best Decision in Criminal Case.
In its recent press statement announcing the Awarding Ceremonies, the Supreme Court described our distinguished honoree as “no stranger to excellence” and as a “consistent academic achiever”.
Former Las Pinas Executive Judge Joselito DJ Vibandor describes our honoree as straightforward, honest, and “romantically frank”. He says that he has learned many things from the direct-to-the-point advice and suggestions of our honoree during his tenure as Executive Judge of our City on how to improve Court Management and the administration of justice in our City, for which he was truly happy and indebted.
Former Las Pinas City Executive Judge Bonifacio Maceda, who hails from the same province as our honoree, that is, the island province of Leyte, fondly recalls that, prior to the appointment of our honoree as a Trial Prosecutor in Manila and later as RTC Judge in our City, she was proudly described by the Leytenos as one the “bright girls” of Former Commission on Audit Chairman Francisco Tantuico, who was known for screening and maintaining an excellent core of high-caliber lawyers and management executives during his tenure as COA Chairman.
To stress the fact that the Supreme Court, the Society for Judicial Excellence, and the Board of Judges of the 2008 Judicial Excellence Awards Program of the Supreme Court did not commit a reversible error or a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing our distinguished honoree, and to stress the fact that the Las Pinas City Bar Association did not commit a patent misappreciation of evidence in endorsing the honoree to the Supreme Court, allow me to give you a brief description of her academic and professional credentials.
The father of our honoree, Serafin Nicolas, served as a mayor of the municipality of Dagami, Leyte, and her mother, Teresa Callera Nicolas, served as a vice mayor of the same municipality. It was her early exposure to governance, accountability and transparency, as exemplified by her parents that inspired her to take the path of the administration of justice as a profession.
Our honoree is married to retired RTC Judge Victorino Alvaro. The couple has a common denominator: the love of the rule of law and the administration of justice.
After finishing her primary education in her municipality in Dagami, Leyte, which she completed as the class valedictorian, our honoree proceeded to St. Paul’s College in Tacloban City to finish her secondary education.
Upon graduation from high school in Tacloban City, she enrolled at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she finished the degree of Bachelor of Science, Major in Home Economics, in 1966.
She has completed all academic requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Education at the University of Manila.
In her desire to expand her intellectual horizon, she took further studies at the Pamantasan ng Maynila, where, in 1977, she finished the degree of Bachelor of Business Management.
She has completed 51 units for the degree of Master of Business Administration at the same University.
From the Pamantasan ng Maynila, she moved to the University of the East where she finished the degree of Bachelor of Laws, as the Class Valedictorian, in 1986. She was admitted to the Bar in 1987.
In her desire to seek a global study of law and the justice system, she moved to the University to of San Diego in California, USA, where, in 1990, she completed the degree of Master of Comparative Law.
Our honoree is an educator, having served as a college instructor of the University of Manila from 1969 to 1975.
She is a tax law expert, having served as a Senior Tax Researcher at the National Tax Research Center from 1975 to 1982.
Her work at the Commission on Audit from 1982 to 1989 gave her the expertise in human resource development, training, and research, having served in various capacities therein, namely, Head Executive Assistant of the Chairman, Chief of the Research Division of the Manpower Development Office, Chief of the Training Division, and Staff Officer II of a Commissioner.
From the Commission on Audit, she moved to the Department of Justice where she served as State Counsel III of the Technical Staff from 1991 to 1993 and later as an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila from 1993 to 2001.
From the Department of Justice, she moved to the Judiciary, where she was appointed as the Presiding Judge of Branch 198 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City In 2001.
Fluent in the German language, our honoree has attended various foreign seminars and conferences, notable among which were a Judicial Colloquium on International Human Rights Law in Vienna, Austria in 1999; a Seminar on Comparative Law and Development held in Sweden in 1995; and a Seminar on Tax Administration held in Germany in 1978, in addition to the local seminars, conventions, and workshops sponsored by the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, the Philippine Judges Association, and other related government agencies from 1980 to 2007
Our honoree is the incumbent deputy vice president for administration of the Philippine Judges Association and the incumbent treasurer of the Las Piñas City Judges Association. She is a member of the UP Delta Lambda Sigma Sorority, the Soroptimist International, Manila Chapter, and the Zonta Club, Las Pinas Chapter.
Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome our distinguished guest and honoree for tonight, future Court of Appeals Associate Justice, Hon. Erlinda Nicolas Alvaro.
By:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Founder, Las Pinas City Bar Association
(LPBA), Inc.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Judicial shock
In a per curiam decision in the very recent case of “RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.], A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, September 9, 2008, the Philippine Supreme Court resolved as follows:
“(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations;
(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.
(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio’s act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;
(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.’s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.”
The doctrinal pronouncements in the decision are digested hereinbelow, for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog, to wit:
X x x.
This is the first time a controversy of such a destabilizing magnitude has ever shocked the Philippine Court of Appeals. It resulted in a complete distrust of the Filipino people in the Philippine Judiciary, which is supposed to be the last hope of the Filipino people to restore decency and good governance in the country in the midst of endemic corruption and dishonesty in the Executive and Legislative branches of the Philippine Government since time immemorial.
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the country’s second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Court’s bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the performance of official functions.
X x x.
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:
(a) The “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle” filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).
b) GSIS’ “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit” Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008. As the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).
(c) GSIS’ Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS’ Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralco’s “Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to Repondent SEC’s Comment” filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).
(f) Meralco’s “Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case,” which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274). (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that “by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court.” The pertinent portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. – x x x
x x x
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas’ proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panel’s finding that “Justice Roxas’ failure to act on the other motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:
“Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.”
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.” Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas’ inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the “Transcript of Final Decision,” which is supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true “transcript” of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a “transcript from memory” because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed “from my recollection” to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that “minutes of the meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept.” The so-called “transcript” is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance – when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the “transcript” that it was a “recap from our previous deliberations” was another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the “transcript” to a “Final Report of Justice Roxas” was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a “report” as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The “Final Report” which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The “Final Report” was merely the title of the page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes’ supposed closing statement in the “transcript” that -- “We have covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas extensively” is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the investigation that he had not seen the “transcript” until the copy in the rollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.
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(e) Justice Roxas’ testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to her office for her to sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision.
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Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:
…dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.
Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of Appeals.
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:
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(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been “reorganized out” of the Special Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were “comfortable”.
(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his “Interpleader Petition” he sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.’s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes’ and Roxas’ lack of courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.
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There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are expected to “carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.”
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.
Justice Roxas’ questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his undue interest therein.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties’ memoranda. As discussed in the Report:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:
On July 7, 2008 – GSIS’s 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 – SEC’s 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 – MERALCO’s 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with memorandum of authorities
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His “rush to judgment” was indicative of “undue interest and unseemly haste,” according to J.Romero.
He cheated the parties’ counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(underscoring supplied)
We agree with Mme. Justice Romero’s observation that the “rush to judgment” (even before the filing of the parties’ memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas’ undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas’ failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his “rushing” of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties’ memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned cases.
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas’ multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the “rightness” of the GSIS’ cause and asked him “to help GSIS” and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
“A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.”
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilo’s effort to influence his younger brother’s action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that –
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators’ mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brother’s advice, Justice Sabio’s “unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case,” seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced by his brother “to help GSIS.” In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralco’s “Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9th Division,” which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabio’s designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes’ leave of absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabio’s conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borja’s profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of Meralco’s prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to “chit chat” about the Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.’s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: “Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.”
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was “not comfortable” with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe offer because he “could not in conscience accept it.”
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop “pestering” him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borja’s calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, “saying lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo.” He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.’s call was “deadma” or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a “lapse in judgment” on his part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.’s story about De Borja’s P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borja’s denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day – a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offeror’s name in both his verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media as the person alluded to.
Third, De Borja’s allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralco’s reply to his counter-offer.
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Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latter’s rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabio’s indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes’) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals – the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes’ Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, “Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him.”
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties’ memoranda and without the deliberation among members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 – some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 – yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas’ misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.
Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives – two daughters – employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act “on any matter” involving the Court and its members? That Rule provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the “protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes” of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) x x x
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his “lapses in judgment.”
In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the IRCA.
Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court “the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned” in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.
With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a “whistle blower” and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.
“(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations;
(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.
(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio’s act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;
(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.’s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.”
The doctrinal pronouncements in the decision are digested hereinbelow, for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog, to wit:
X x x.
This is the first time a controversy of such a destabilizing magnitude has ever shocked the Philippine Court of Appeals. It resulted in a complete distrust of the Filipino people in the Philippine Judiciary, which is supposed to be the last hope of the Filipino people to restore decency and good governance in the country in the midst of endemic corruption and dishonesty in the Executive and Legislative branches of the Philippine Government since time immemorial.
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the country’s second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Court’s bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the performance of official functions.
X x x.
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:
(a) The “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle” filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).
b) GSIS’ “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit” Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008. As the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).
(c) GSIS’ Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS’ Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralco’s “Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to Repondent SEC’s Comment” filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).
(f) Meralco’s “Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case,” which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274). (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that “by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court.” The pertinent portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. – x x x
x x x
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas’ proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panel’s finding that “Justice Roxas’ failure to act on the other motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:
“Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.”
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.” Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas’ inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the “Transcript of Final Decision,” which is supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true “transcript” of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a “transcript from memory” because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed “from my recollection” to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that “minutes of the meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept.” The so-called “transcript” is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance – when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the “transcript” that it was a “recap from our previous deliberations” was another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the “transcript” to a “Final Report of Justice Roxas” was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a “report” as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The “Final Report” which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The “Final Report” was merely the title of the page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes’ supposed closing statement in the “transcript” that -- “We have covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas extensively” is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the investigation that he had not seen the “transcript” until the copy in the rollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.
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(e) Justice Roxas’ testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to her office for her to sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision.
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Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:
…dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.
Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of Appeals.
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:
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(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been “reorganized out” of the Special Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were “comfortable”.
(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his “Interpleader Petition” he sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.’s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes’ and Roxas’ lack of courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.
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There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are expected to “carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.”
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.
Justice Roxas’ questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his undue interest therein.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties’ memoranda. As discussed in the Report:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:
On July 7, 2008 – GSIS’s 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 – SEC’s 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 – MERALCO’s 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with memorandum of authorities
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His “rush to judgment” was indicative of “undue interest and unseemly haste,” according to J.Romero.
He cheated the parties’ counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(underscoring supplied)
We agree with Mme. Justice Romero’s observation that the “rush to judgment” (even before the filing of the parties’ memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas’ undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas’ failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his “rushing” of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties’ memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned cases.
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas’ multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the “rightness” of the GSIS’ cause and asked him “to help GSIS” and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
“A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.”
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilo’s effort to influence his younger brother’s action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that –
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
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Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators’ mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brother’s advice, Justice Sabio’s “unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case,” seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced by his brother “to help GSIS.” In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralco’s “Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9th Division,” which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabio’s designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes’ leave of absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabio’s conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borja’s profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of Meralco’s prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to “chit chat” about the Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.’s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: “Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.”
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was “not comfortable” with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe offer because he “could not in conscience accept it.”
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop “pestering” him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borja’s calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, “saying lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo.” He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.’s call was “deadma” or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a “lapse in judgment” on his part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.’s story about De Borja’s P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borja’s denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day – a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offeror’s name in both his verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media as the person alluded to.
Third, De Borja’s allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralco’s reply to his counter-offer.
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Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latter’s rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabio’s indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes’) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals – the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes’ Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, “Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him.”
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties’ memoranda and without the deliberation among members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 – some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 – yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas’ misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.
Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives – two daughters – employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act “on any matter” involving the Court and its members? That Rule provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the “protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes” of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) x x x
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his “lapses in judgment.”
In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the IRCA.
Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court “the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned” in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.
With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a “whistle blower” and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.
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