College profs must have master’s degrees, SC rules | Inquirer News

See - College profs must have master’s degrees, SC rules | Inquirer News

"x x x.

The Supreme Court has upheld the policy of the Commission on Higher Education (CHEd) requiring teachers of tertiary schools to acquire postgraduate degrees to become tenured or regular employees.

In an eight-page decision dated Jan. 23, the court’s Third Division junked the suit of two University of the East professors who charged the school with illegal dismissal after their dean repeatedly extended their probationary status as professors for not having master’s degrees.

The justices, pointing out that the operation of educational institutions involved the public interest, said the requirement of a master’s degree for college teachers was “not unreasonable.”

“The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as a prerequisite to employment,” the court said in the decision penned by Justice Roberto Abad.

Concurring with Abad were the division chairman, Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr., and members Diosdado Peralta, Jose Mendoza and Marvic Leonen.

The petitioners, UE professors Analiza Pepanio and Mariti Bueno, who were hired in 2000 and 1997, respectively, filed a labor case against then UE dean Eleanor Javier, contesting the school’s policy that obligated them to acquire master’s degrees as a condition for tenureship.

Pepanio and Bueno said the 1994-1999 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between UE management and its faculty provided that the school shall extend semester-to-semester appointments to college faculty staff like themselves who did not possess the minimum qualifications such as a master’s degree.

In 2001, the new CBA extended probationary full-time appointments to full-time faculty members who did not yet have the required postgraduate degrees provided that the latter complied with the requirement within their probationary period.

In 2003, Javier reminded Pepanio and Bueno of the expiration of their probationary status. The two, however, demanded that they be placed on regular status given the years of service they had rendered.

The labor arbiter, in 2004, ruled in favor of the professors and ordered their reinstatement. UE, however, appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the arbiter’s decision in 2006.

The professors ran to the Court of Appeals and in 2010 secured a reversal of the NLRC decision. The UE management then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that as early as 1992, the then Department of Education, Culture and Sports had issued a revised manual of regulations for private schools which required college faculty members to have a master’s degree as a minimum educational qualification for acquiring regular status. The CHEd, created in 1994 to supervise tertiary schools, upheld the requirement.

x x x."

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Demurrer to evidence; double jeopardy; certiorari as remedy

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, AND FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 191015, August 06, 2014. - The Lawyer's Post.

“x x x.

“Demurrer to the evidence is “an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused.” Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

“The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.”[43] As to effect, “the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.

As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.”

x x x

“As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.

In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of acquittal void.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as “that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.”

In the exercise of the Court’s “superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declares that the CA grossly erred in affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public interest. The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that the banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.”

After adducing the evidence of the prosecution in support of its case, the Supreme Court noted that the case against the accuse may exist, and ruled that the granting of the demurrer to evidence by the RT was improper:

“Finally, it must be borne in mind that “[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should x x x be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench x x x.”

X x x.”





Courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.

FEDERICO D. TOMAS, PETITIONER, VS. ANN G. SANTOS, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 190448, July 26, 2010.  - The Lawyer's Post.

“x x x.

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be simply disregarded as they insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as bases of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be served.⁠2 

Furthermore, inasmuch as this petition raises both questions of fact and law which the Court of Appeals may properly take cognizance of under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, we deem it necessary to reinstate Tomas’ appeal, notwithstanding its improper title. This has assumed a greater measure of necessity because of the allegation of Tomas that he is legally married to Santos, a fact not resolved by the RTC but which may be significant in resolving the question of ownership of the real property subject of the controversy.

X x x.”

Honest mistake in procedures - "The allegations of the pleading prevail over its title in determining the character of the action taken. The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from appellant’s notice of appeal filed with the trial court and in appellant’s brief in the appellate court.

FEDERICO D. TOMAS, PETITIONER, VS. ANN G. SANTOS, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 190448, July 26, 2010.  - The Lawyer's Post.

“x x x.

With the RTC deciding against him, Tomas would necessarily resort to an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Tomas filed his Notice of Appeal and correspondingly paid the required fees on July 21, 2009, or 12 days from July 9, 2009, the date of his receipt of a copy of the RTC Decision. The following day, July 22, 2009, Tomas filed his appellate pleading with the Court of Appeals, but it was mistakenly entitled “Petition for Review.” Because of this improper title, his appeal was docketed not as an ordinary appeal but as a special civil action for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 109646. However, a perusal of the allegations in his “Petition for Review” would readily show that what was filed was actually an ordinary appeal from the RTC Decision. There was no allegation whatsoever of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, but rather merely a recitation of what Tomas perceived as a reversible error committed by the RTC based on the issues raised and the discussions made in his appeal.

It is true that the Court of Appeals dismissed Tomas’ “Petition for Review” on three grounds, namely: improper remedy, lack of certification on non-forum shopping, and failure to append important documents in support of his allegations. It is, however, observed that the Court of Appeals, after considering Tomas’ motion for reconsideration of the July 29, 2009 Resolution, ruled in its November 26, 2009 Resolution that Tomas was able to rectify two of the defects of his “Petition for Review”; but maintained that the same was still an inappropriate remedy and, thus, denied the motion. To our mind, if the Court of Appeals accepted the rectification of these two procedural defects after Tomas moved to reconsider the July 29, 2009 Resolution, it should have also treated the “Petition for Review” as an ordinary appeal from the RTC Decision, especially considering that the required Notice of Appeal and the appellate pleading were timely filed. The allegations of the pleading prevail over its title in determining the character of the action taken. The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from appellant’s notice of appeal filed with the trial court and in appellant’s brief in the appellate court.⁠1 

X x x.”

Compromise; execution of judgment; finality of judgment; res judicata; bar by prior judgment

NESTOR T. GADRINAB, PETITIONER, VS. NORA T. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO, AND ELENA LOPEZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014.
 - See – The Lawyer’s Post.

“x x x.

In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. “[A] judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits”[1] of the case. It has the effect of res judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.

Thus, Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

In Spouses Romero v. Tan[2], this court said:

It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the compromise agreement][3].

There is res judicata when the following concur:

1. Previous final judgment;

2. By a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;

3. On the merits of the case;

4. Between identical parties, on the same subject matter, and cause of action[4]

There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to “bar by prior judgment[5],” which means that actions on the same claim or cause of action cannot be relitigated.[6] This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.]

The second rule refers to “conclusiveness of judgment.”[7] This means that facts already tried and determined in another action involving a different claim or cause of action cannot anymore be relitigated.[8] This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

. . . .

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (49a)

This case involves “bar by prior judgment.” Respondents cannot file another action for partition after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous action for partition involving the same parties and property.

This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court[9] the doctrine of finality of judgment:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.[10]

This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:

1. “The correction of clerical errors;

2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;

3. void judgments; and

4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.”[11]

Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court.1

Because a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the parties and a judgment on the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code provisions on contracts. It can be avoided on grounds that may avoid an ordinary contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the law[12]; lack of consent by a party; and existence of fraud or duress. Further, the pertinent Civil Code provisions on compromise agreements provide:

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.

Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.

Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.

In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement’s terms.

This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves.

Likewise, respondents’ argument that a supervening event, i.e. disagreement among the parties, was present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on compromise fails to persuade. A supervening event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on compromise if it “brought about a material change in [the] situation[13]” between the parties. The material change contemplated must render the execution of the final judgment unjust and inequitable. Otherwise, a party to the compromise agreement has a “right to have the compromise agreement executed, according to its terms.”[14]

The subsequent disagreement among the partie1s did not cause any material change in the situation or in the relations among the parties. The situation and relations among the parties remained the same as the situation and their relations prior to the compromise agreement. They remained co-owners of the property, which they desired to partition.

Moreover, the parties voluntarily agreed to the compromise agreement, which was already stamped with judicial approval. The agreement’s execution would bring about the effects desired by all parties and the most just and equitable situation for all. On the other hand, the judgment granting the second action for partition filed by respondent Salamanca was obtained with opposition.

Judges “have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce [a compromise agreement[15]].” Absent appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify, impose terms different from the terms of a compromise agreement, or set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their discretion.[16]

“[They cannot] relieve parties from [their] obligations . . . simply because [the agreements are] . . . unwise.”[17] Further, “[t]he mere fact that the Compromise Agreement favors one party does not render it invalid.”[18] Courts do not have power to “alter contracts in order to save [one party] from [the effects of] adverse stipulations. . . .”[[19]

Respondents have remedies if

parties to the compromise agreement 

refuse to abide by its terms

The issue in this case involves the non-compliance of some of the parties with the terms of the compromise agreement. The law affords complying parties with remedies in case one of the parties to an agreement fails to abide by its terms.

A party may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right on final judgments. Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (n)

If a party refuses to comply with the terms of the judgment or resists the enforcement of a lawful writ issued, an action for indirect contempt may be filed in accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt;

. . .

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto[.]

Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a judgment on the case, proper remedies against ordinary judgments may be used against judgments on a compromise agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds exist, remedies may include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b) motion for new trial; c) appeal; d) petition for relief from judgment; e) petition for certiorari; and f) petition for annulment of judgment.[20]

Respondent Salamanca knew that the only reason for the failed compromise agreement was the non-compliance with the agreement’s terms of some of her co-heirs. Particularly, it was stipulated that petitioner’s removal from the property was conditioned upon payment of an amount equivalent to his share. Respondent Talao refused to abide by his own undertaking to shoulder respondent Salamanca’s share. He also refused to acknowledge the appraisal of the appraiser appointed in the compromise agreement. This refusal caused the failure of the compromise agreement.

Instead of availing herself of the proper remedies so the compromise could be enforced and the partition could be effected, respondent Salamanca chose to move again for the partition of the property and set aside a valid and final judgment on compromise. This court cannot allow such motion to prosper without going against law and established jurisprudence on judgments.

X x x.”

Big kill of small fry, puny drugs haul, defies PNP rules | Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

See - Big kill of small fry, puny drugs haul, defies PNP rules | Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

"x x x.

Yet even worse, under Duterte, police operations against illegal drugs have been marked with apparent token compliance with — or even open defiance of — the rules and protocols enrolled in the 200-page Philippine National Police Handbook PNPM-Do-Ds-3-2-13 or Revised PNP Manual on Operational Procedures published in December 2013.

Under PNP’s Handbook, Rule 7 on the “Use of Non-Lethal Weapon” prescribes a calibration of force that should be designed only to immobilize and not kill suspects all at once. “When suspect is violent or threatening, and that less physical measures have been tried and deemed inappropriate, a more extreme, but non-deadly measure can be used such as baton/truncheon, pepper spray, stun gun, and other non-lethal weapon to bring the suspect under control, or effect an arrest,” the manual states.

Even when faced with an armed suspect, the PNP Handbook says the “Application of Necessary and Reasonable Force” should mean this: “During confrontation with an armed offender, only such necessary and reasonable force should be applied as would be sufficient to overcome the resistance put up by the offender; subdue the clear and imminent danger posed by him; or to justify the force/act under the principles of self-defense, defense of relative, or defense of stranger.”

The police, the Handbook says, should pay attention to certain factors to discern “the reasonableness of the force employed.” The Handbook states: “The reasonableness of the force employed will depend upon the number of aggressors, nature and characteristic of the weapon used, physical condition, size and other circumstances to include the place and occasion of the assault. The police officer is given the sound discretion to consider these factors in employing reasonable force.”

Still and all, President Duterte himself has assured policemen and soldiers that if they should face legal suits for killing suspects, they would not have to go to jail for it because “akin ‘yun, ako mauuna sa inyo.” Presumably, he means he is ultimately responsible and he will be the first to take the blame.

x x x.

Project Tokhang under Duterte falls far behind the PNP’s prior campaign in terms of drugs seized by value and volume. In 78 months of the war on drugs before Duterte, the PNP said it had confiscated various drugs (shabu, marijuana, ecstacy, cocaine, ephedrine, as well as acetone, chloroform, rugby, etc.) worth a grand total of P24.89 billion. In contrast, Tokhang has so far netted only 230 kilos of shabu, 5,815 sachets of shabu, 13,413 marijuana plants, 138 sachets of marijuana, one tablet of Ecstasy, and no cocaine at all, among others.

Before Duterte’s war, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency said that from January 2010 to June 2016, it had filed a total of 19,843 drug cases in court, while other law-enforcement agencies contributed another 81,422 cases — or a total of 101,265 cases.

Project Tokhang, according to the PNP Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM) has reportedly triggered the filing of 3,477 court cases from May 10 to July 10, 2016. The PNP’s later reports on Tokhang that starts on the first of day of Duterte’s term as Commander-in-Chief of PNP do not show any updated data on cases filed.

x x x.

MEL STA.MARIA | EO on the Freedom of Information: the devil is in the details

See - MEL STA.MARIA | EO on the Freedom of Information: the devil is in the details

"x x x.

By: MEL STA.MARIA

July 24, 2016 10:46 PM

President Rodrigo Duterte has signed the Executive Order (EO) on the Freedom of Information. For many, it is a laudable act, but the rejoicing may be dampened once the EO is implemented. As they say, “the devil is in the details.” A close scrutiny of the EO provides its own causes for ineffectivity.

Section 7 of the Executive Order provides:

Section 7. Protection of Privacy. While providing access to information, public records and official records, responsible officials shall afford full protection to the right to privacy of the individuals as follows:

(a) Each government office per Section 2 shall ensure that personal information in its custody or under its control is disclosed or released only if it is material or relevant to the subject matter of the request and its disclosure is permissible under this order, or existing law, rules or regulations;

The pertinent “existing law”, or at least one of them, in relation to personal information is Republic Act 10173, otherwise known as the Data Privacy Act of 2012. It essentially provides that, as a general rule, the personal information of individuals shall not be revealed and cannot be printed, recorded, used and disseminated by others. This is applicable both to private people and government officials except that, in case of the latter, information can be obtained relating to their positions and functions in the government.

If the disclosure of the personal information has been claimed by any citizen to be important to the country and therefore should be allowed disclosure, a government sub-agency, the National Privacy Commission (NPC), can determine whether the release of the information will be harmful to the public interest or national security. In short, the NPC can control what can and what cannot be revealed, and how small or expansive can be revealed. In effect, the Data Privacy Act limits freedom of thought and information. It also curtails a citizen’s freedom of speech and expression in matters of national concern involving government officials. 

And so, pursuant to the unnamed “existing law” ( which inevitably includes the Data Privacy Act of 2012) referred to by the EO, secrecy, not transparency is the governing and general rule when it comes to the private lives of government officials. And this “existing law” can always be used as a scapegoat for non-disclosure by executive officials. It can always say that their hands are tied by the “existing law.”

This is disconcerting for obvious reasons. Government people become corrupt because they put their private interest above the public welfare. While, ostensibly, they will show that their activities serve the people, they may, in fact, be serving their private bank accounts. Let us take for example a public official, X, tasked with handling the transportation mess. He or she orders the change of 15-year old buses contributing to air pollution. The bus companies obey, and order new buses from Y company, a private entity, upon subtle overtures of X because Y company is owned by X’s Family where Z, the brother of X, is X’s corporate-dummy.

Clearly, this scheme creates a serious conflict of interest - the conflict relating to X’s public life as a government official and X’s private life as a transportation mogul. The bus companies consummate their purchases of new buses from Y company hoping for future favorable concessions from X, consequently making Y Company very profitable and also X’s family correspondingly rich. This is corruption in its most scheming form. It is dishonesty.

In matters involving public accountability, the private lives of government officials are not separable from their official public duties. They can be inquired into because their very honesty is a principal consideration for tenure. Thus, our Supreme Court said as early as 1960:

The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression, and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. (Nera vs. Garcia G.R. No. L-13160 106 Phil 1031)

As a result, under the Data Privacy Act of 2012, the private life of a government official, even if it is important in determining his or her honesty and capability, cannot easily be processed, collected, stored, used or disseminated as a general rule. Worse, penal sanctions can even be imposed for any violation of such privacy. This is one “existing law” which President Duterte’s EO on freedom of information is subordinated to. Significantly, the EO not only refers to “existing law” but also to “rules or regulations” which are still to be researched by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Textually, it is a “layered” EO potentially subjected to further limitations and contingencies by other (to be discovered) issuances.

For President Duterte’s EO to be effective, there is a need to amend, if not repeal, Republic Act 10173 otherwise known as the Data Privacy Act of 2012, in so far as government officials are concerned. This is the “existing law” that will effectively negate President Duterte’s move towards transparency. If the President’s policy and legal advisers will not see this, they will be doing the President a great disservice. 

I hate to think that this EO is only a window-dressing issued to satisfy the public’s desire for accessing information, but, in reality, a toothless “show-off” useless in effecting the citizen’s freedom of information.

x x x."

Diagram of Transmissions in a Reserva Troncal – as drawn by Atty. Alvin T. Claridades | Atty. Alvin Claridades

See - Diagram of Transmissions in a Reserva Troncal – as drawn by Atty. Alvin T. Claridades | Atty. Alvin Claridades

The war against illegal drugs: Real or propaganda?

See - The war against illegal drugs: Real or propaganda?

"x x x.

Raissa Robles

Quoting Yvonne's commentary

The war against illegal drugs resonates strongly with the Filipino people hence there is a tendency amongst us to accept the government news reports on this matter – hook, line, and sinker – often blurring the lines between reality and what might be plain government propaganda.

Is the war against illegal drugs by President Duterte for real or just illusionary government propaganda to create the appearance that he is making good on his election promise to solve the country’s drug problem within 3 to 6 months of his presidency?

Let us ask some probing questions to find out. First, let us consider the following events:

The media have been blanketed with news about thousands and thousands of alleged drug users and pushers or dealers who ‘surrendered’ to police authorities, suggesting that the war against illegal drugs are gaining strong traction.

Thousands surrendered, really? People surrender when they are accused of wrongdoing and the police are going after them. Have those people been accused of drug-related crimes and are the authorities looking for them that they have to ‘surrender’?

Drug users usually fit their profile – they manifest fragile personality and emotional deprivation, typically incoherent or unresponsive, depressed, unkempt, disorganized, prone to violence, eyes dilated, etc. But not these thousands and thousands of surrenderee – they behaved, they follow orders, they are neatly dressed by our local standard, they look socially integrated, etc. Many are smiling and some are even waving into the cameras. It is also a big contrast to photos or video clips of arrested drug pushers who would normally hide their face in shame or to cover their identities from the press. So, are those people really drug users and pushers, or are they ordinary people who might have been misled into joining “a gathering” or “meeting” to show their support in the war against drugs, not knowing that they are being labeled as drug users or pushers?

Those people supposedly ‘surrendered’ because they fear for their lives. But didn’t Duterte say they would be killed only if they resisted arrest and fought back? So why fear for their lives if they were not under arrest, much less if they had no intention of fighting back if arrested? Are we now in a frightening police state that the mere appearance or suspicion of wrongdoing is enough to require your surrender, or risk getting killed by the authorities?

Duterte made a very public and well publicized threat that Peter Lim, a notorious top drug kingpin who was then believed to be abroad, will be killed the moment he set his foot at the airport. Well, surely he was not killed when he set his foot in Malacanang, instead of the airport. What he got was a well-publicized audience with Duterte, and what looked like an offer for him to help the president in the war against drugs. Is Duterte really serious? Isn’t this a clear double-standard in the fight against drugs? A different set of rules for the poor and powerless and another set of rules for the rich and powerful? Isn’t this sending mixed, if not conflicting, signals to the drug lords and the general public?

Consider also Duterte’s public declaration that five high ranking PNP officials, three in active service and two retired officials, are deeply involved and are major players in illegal drugs. Did any of those PNP officials get shot and killed just like the lowly drug traffickers and pushers that we read in the newspapers almost every day? Obviously, the answer is no, not by a long shot (no pun intended). Instead the three active ranking PNP officials got an emotional audience with Gen. Ronald “Bala” Dela Rosa where it was reported that the PNP Chief cried with them during their face-to-face confrontation at his office.

Why did Dela Rosa become emotional and cry with them? Is it because the PNP officials are innocent and are wrongly accused? Did he cry in pity with them because of their destroyed career and reputation? Why cry with them if they are really into illegal drugs as Duterte disclosed? Shouldn’t Dela Rosa be angry with them and arrest them on the spot? Could it be that he could not arrest them for lack of evidence? And if there was lack of evidence, why name and shame them publicly in the first place? Was the turn of events for real, or was it just a side show for public consumption?

And most recently news of the turnover of police control at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) from the regular PNP police to the PNP-SAP was all over the mass media. The news included footage of Gen. Dela Rosa confronting the three drug kingpins – Golangco, Co, and Sebastian – who are incarcerated at the NBP, and news of the confiscated contraband – drugs, weapons, signal boosters, money, etc. – found in their prison cells.

Ok, here are some simple questions: why didn’t the PNP-SAF punish the drug kingpins for keeping the contraband? Why are those drug kingpins not placed in isolation cells, or held incommunicado, as their punishment for breaking the rules at the NBP? Surely, they do not need a court order to do that. Why do they seem to receive special treatment even at the NBP? Are those drug kingpins still untouchable?

Let me be clear. I’m all in favor of an honest war against illegal drugs and I’m hoping President Duterte will be successful on this front. But let us all be vigilant that this “war” is for real and not a pretext to impose a police state reminiscent of the Martial law era during the Marcos dictatorship.

x x x."

A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE NGO CHUA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.

“x x x.

Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta⁠12 is relevant herein:

It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself is competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)

A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.⁠13 

In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.

X x x.”

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE NGO CHUA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.

“x x x.

Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced in full below:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.⁠15 

The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.⁠16 

X x x.”

Substantial justice must prevail

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE NGO CHUA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.

“x x x.

It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.⁠17

X x x.”

Invalid compromise

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE NGO CHUA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.

“x x x.

The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.⁠3 

For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.⁠4 

It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases. However, the question arises as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.

The court rules in the negative.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.⁠5 In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,⁠6 the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.

It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.⁠7 

In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

Advincula v. Advincula⁠8 has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.⁠9Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.⁠10 

Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties’ alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.⁠11 

X x x.”

A party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law.

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE NGO CHUA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.

“x x x.

At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.⁠2 

X x x.”

Settlement of Boundary Disputes Governed By Local Government Code of 1991

PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE AND MUNICIPALITY OF CALUYA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RECTO A. CALABOCAL, JUDGE-DESIGNATE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, PROVINCE OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, AND MUNICIPALITY OF BULALACAO, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 209146, June 08, 2016.

“x x x.

A boundary dispute involving different local government units is defined in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)⁠1 of the Local Government Code.⁠2 Specifically, Rule III, Article 15 states:

RULE III

Settlement of Boundary Disputes

ARTICLE 15. Definition and Policy. — There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. (Emphasis supplied)

Based on this definition, a boundary dispute may involve “a portion or the whole” of a local government unit’s territorial area. Nothing in this provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the island is being claimed by different local government units, there exists a boundary dispute.

The allegations in the complaint filed before the RTC point to a boundary dispute, as defined under the Local Government Code.

Respondents are asserting their lawful jurisdiction over Liwagao Island as against another local government unit that currently has jurisdiction over the same. Therefore, whether the case is denominated as recovery of possession or claim of ownership, respondents’ objective is the same: for respondents to regain their alleged territorial jurisdiction over Liwagao Island.

Respondent Province of Oriental Mindoro itself acknowledges that the conflict is a “boundary row” between itself and the Province of Antique.⁠3 As stated in Resolution No. 1454-2012, the Province of Oriental Mindoro claims to “adhere to the basic principle of amicably settling said boundary dispute, as laid down in the provision of the Local Government Code of 1991[.]”⁠4 

Thus, they are bound by their own assertions and cannot now claim that the conflict does not involve a boundary dispute.

Settlement of Boundary Disputes 

Governed By Local Government Code of 1991

Having established that the case involves a boundary dispute, the procedure to resolve the same is that established under the Local Government Code. Under the said law, “the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their boundary disputes.⁠5“ Sections 118 and 119 of the Local Government Code state:

SECTION 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary 

Dispute. – Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more Barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned.

(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned.

(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. 

Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.

SECTION 119. Appeal. – Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

The specific procedure in settling boundary disputes is outlined in Rule III of the IRR of the Local Government Code:

RULE III

Settlement of Boundary Disputes

x x x x

ARTICLE 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. — The following procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary disputes:

(a) Filing of petition — The sanggunian concerned may initiate action by filing a petition, in the form of a resolution, with the sanggunian having jurisdiction over the dispute.

x x x

(g) Failure to settle — In the event the sanggunian fails to amicably settle the dispute within sixty (60) days from the date such dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect and copies thereof shall be furnished the parties concerned.

(h) Decision — Within sixty (60) days from the date the certification was issued, the dispute shall be formally tried and decided by the sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision shall, within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation thereof, be furnished the parties concerned, DILG, local assessor, COMELEC, NSO, and other NGAs concerned.

(i) Appeal — Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the dispute by filing therewith the appropriate pleading, stating among others, the nature of the dispute, the decision of the sanggunian concerned and the reasons for appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Decisions on boundary disputes promulgated jointly by two (2) or more sangguniang panlalawigans shall be heard by the Regional Trial Court of the province which first took cognizance of the dispute.

As the Court has previously ruled, it is “only upon the failure of these intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as specifically provided in Section 119 of the [Local Government Code.]”⁠6 

The RTC has Jurisdiction Over the Case

Respondents’ resort to filing a case before the RTC was warranted under the circumstances of this case.

It must be emphasized that respondents followed the procedure laid down in the Local Government Code. They took all the necessary steps to settle the dispute within the procedure set out in the law, and by all indication, was prepared to see the matter thru in order to lay the issue to rest.

However, petitioners failed to perform their concomitant responsibility under the same law, leaving respondents with no other recourse but to bring the matter to court. Petitioners cannot demand that respondents now follow the procedure when they themselves have made it impossible for any party to follow the same. The Province of Antique’s Resolution No. 142-2012 dated 25 May 2012, stating that the Province of Antique was not amenable to any form of settlement, effectively blocked any way to continue following the steps in the IRR.

As such, respondents’ petition before the RTC must be upheld. Otherwise, they will be left without any recourse or legal remedy to assert their claim over Liwagao Island. Such uncertainty is unacceptable, as the fate of the island’s residents rests in the immediate resolution of the dispute.

X x x.”

Philippines won't sacrifice sea feud victory in China talks - WBOC-TV 16, Delmarvas News Leader, FOX 21 -

See - Philippines won't sacrifice sea feud victory in China talks - WBOC-TV 16, Delmarvas News Leader, FOX 21 -

"x x x.

By JIM GOMEZ

Associated Press

MANILA, Philippines (AP) - The Philippines will fight for its landmark arbitration victory to be upheld when it talks about resolving its South China Sea disputes with China, which has refused to recognize the ruling, the government lawyer said Friday.

The Philippine position disclosed by Solicitor General Jose Calida runs against that of China, which opposes use of the tribunal ruling as basis for any negotiations. New President Rodrigo Duterte has sought talks with China to resolve the territorial row and revive relations, saying Chinese officials have promised to finance railway projects he has envisioned for the country.

In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang told a briefing that China welcomes Duterte's willingness to start talks. "The door to settling the issue through dialogue and negotiation has never been closed," Lu said.

However, he reiterated Beijing's stance that the tribunal ruling should not be the basis for any action between the sides.

Under a 1982 U.N. treaty governing the world's oceans, the Philippines had sought arbitration in 2013 on several issues related to territorial rifts with China. In its ruling Tuesday, the tribunal found China's far-reaching claims to the South China Sea had no legal basis and that Beijing had violated Philippine maritime rights by constructing artificial islands and disrupting Filipino fishing and oil exploration.

Duterte's predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, brought the case against China and bolstered security relations with treaty ally the United States to deter assertive Chinese actions, considerably straining ties.

Duterte, however, has been more reconciliatory to Beijing and has not celebrated the huge victory. He has ordered government lawyers to study the ruling and has not disclosed his plan to secure Chinese compliance.

After being sworn in on June 30, Duterte told members of his Cabinet before the ruling was delivered that it should have a "soft landing" when it comes. "We don't taunt or flaunt it," he said.

Calida, however, praised the Philippine victory as a "historic win" in a forum on the ruling and said the Duterte administration would work to have the widely praised decision upheld when it holds proposed talks with China.

"The award is a historic win not only for the Philippines but for the international community because it renews the humanity's faith in a rules-based global order," Calida said in a speech. "The award is a crowning glory of international law."

Calida later told reporters that "the baseline for any negotiation should be the decision," adding "we will not concede any awards given to us."

While prodding China to "respect" the decision, Calida said the government would deal with Beijing diplomatically to foster better relations.

"The Philippines will not sacrifice what we have obtained from this decision but we will also pursue diplomatic means hopefully to convince China that we can co-exist peacefully," he said.

"We will be patient, of course, and hopefully China will also show the same grace that we have shown when we did not, as wanted by some sectors of society, gloat about this victory," he said.

Despite the ruling protecting Filipino fishing rights in the Scarborough Shoal, Chinese coast guard ships blocked Filipino fishermen Thursday from approaching the disputed area that is traditional fishing grounds for Filipinos.

Asked if the Duterte government would help the Filipinos regain access to the Chinese-guarded shoal, Calida said the government would, diplomatically.

The tribunal has no enforcement arm but Calida said its ruling could be used to foster adherence to the rule of law.

"While there is no so-called world sheriff to enforce it, the award can function as a focal point that enables the state and non-state actors to bring countries in line with international law," Calida said.

___

Associated Press writer Gillian Wong in Beijing contributed to this report.

Copyright 2016 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

x x x."

Joint development in EEZ 'prohibited' – Carpio

See - Joint development in EEZ 'prohibited' – Carpio

"x x x.

MANILA, Philippines – Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio of the Philippine Supreme Court on Thursday, July 14, said the Philippine Constitution bans "joint development" within the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

"You cannot enter into joint development within our EEZ. That’s prohibited by the Constitution," Carpio said in an interview with ANC.

The EEZ is an area 200 miles from a coastal state’s baselines within which the state has the exclusive rights to explore and exploit marine resources.

Carpio said this after broadcast journalist Karen Davila cited the start of a "collaboration" under former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo "to exploit, to survey gas and oil in the Reed Bank," which the Philippines calls Recto Bank. Davila asked Carpio, "Should we do that or is it against the Constitution?"

Carpio, one of the Philippines' leading experts on the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea), replied that a case on this "is pending" so he "will not respond."

Carpio, however, reacted in general to the statement of Philippine Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr that the Philippines is willing to share natural resources with China in the West Philippine Sea.

Yasay said in an interview with Agence France-Presse: "We can even have the objective of seeing how we can jointly explore this territory – how we can utilize and benefit mutually from the utilization of the resources in this exclusive economic zone where claims are overlapping."

Carpio said Yasay made this statement "before the ruling" issued by an arbitral tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, on Tuesday, July 12.

Why it's called 'exclusive'

Carpio said the ruling now states that the West Philippine Sea "constitutes the EEZ of the Philippines," and that "there is no overlapping EEZ from China."

The SC justice continued: "The Constitution says the EEZ is part of the national territory of the Philippines… Second, the Constitution says that the state shall protect its marine wealth in the EEZ and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. So whether it's President Duterte, President Arroyo, or any other president in the future, that cannot be compromised."

He added: "What is allowed by the Constitution is, we can attract foreign companies, like Shell, to drill and we will pay them in kind. But it cannot be a joint development state to state because that is our sovereign territory."

He pointed out that Shell, for example, "is lifting the gas in Malampaya," the gas field that provides 40% of electricity in the Philippines’ biggest island group, Luzon.

Carpio said: "Shell is a 90% foreign-owned company. It can be done, but they are doing that as a contractor of the Philippine government. It's not a sovereign agreement between two states."

Asked if he has explained this to Yasay and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Carpio said: "I'm trying to explain this to everybody. I think the President now understands because he has said that when we negotiate with China, we will use the ruling of the tribunal."

Carpio was one of those who explained the ruling in a July 12 Cabinet meeting presided over by Duterte.

Carpio ended his interview on Thursday by saying: "The exclusive economic zone is called 'exclusive' because it is exclusive to the coastal state, to the Philippines. That's why you cannot have joint development with another country because international law and national law have said it's exclusive."

"Why do you want to share what’s exclusively yours?" – Rappler.com

x x x."