Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.: April 2021

Thursday, April 29, 2021

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case.

See - https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/jul2018/ac_8962_2018.html

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case.

JILDO A. GUBATON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D.AMADOR, Respondent. A.C. No. 8962, JULY 9, 2018.

“x x x.

Suffice it to say that"[d]enial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit credibility, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence [as in this case] it is negative and self-serving, deserving no greater value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters." 29 In any event, the Court observes that the alleged "accidental" and "innocent" encounters of respondent and Bernadette are much too many for comfort and coincidence. Such encounters actually buttress the allegations of the witnesses that they carried on an illicit affair.

All told, the Court finds that substantial evidence - which only entail "evidence to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise" - exist to prove complainant's accusation of gross immorality against respondent.

Based on jurisprudence, extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as offensive to the sanctity of marriage, the family, and the community. When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment. 30 This is because possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.31 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.1âwphi1

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case. In case of suspension, the period would range from one year 32 to indefinite suspension. 33 Under the given circumstances, the Court sees fit to impose on respondent a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.34

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross immorality. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

“x x x.

Doctrine of independently relevant statements

See - https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/jul2018/ac_8962_2018.html

JILDO A. GUBATON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D.AMADOR, Respondent. A.C. No. 8962, JULY 9, 2018.

“x x x.

Finally, it should be clarified that while the information supplied by complainant and Bernadette's house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary about the alleged illicit affair constitute hearsay, the same should not be completely disregarded. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Accordingly, the hearsay rule does not apply, and hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. 25 Verily, complainant personally attests that the information about the illicit affair between respondent and his wife have been relayed to him by complainant's house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary. Clearly, the making of such statements is circumstantially relevant to this case and therefore, may be considered in evidence against respondent. X x x.

X x x.”

Penalty for homicide

“X x x.

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period – from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower, prision mayor – from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.11

X x x.”

Abuse of superior strength - "To appreciate abuse of superior strength, there must be a deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater number. "

Flight - "The unexplained flight of the accused person may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence having tendency to establish his guilt."

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/dec2002/gr_147649_2002.html

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted), accused. FRANK LOBRIGAS, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 147649, December 17, 2002.

“X x x.

Finally, accused-appellant’s argument that the trial court’s reliance solely on the evidence of flight cannot overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence is not well-taken. In criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of the accused person may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence having tendency to establish his guilt.8

In the case at bar, not only did accused-appellant evade arrest when he went to Cebu under the pretext that he was going to work at Southern Island Hospital, but justice was further frustrated when he escaped from detention with the flimsy excuse that no one was guarding them. These two instances of flight by accused-appellant, taken together with the other circumstances established by the prosecution, support the trial court’s finding of accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Courts go by the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion."9

X x x.”

Doctrine of independently relevant statements

Dying declaration vs. Res gestae - "The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same are nonetheless part of the res gestae."

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/dec2002/gr_147649_2002.html

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted), accused. FRANK LOBRIGAS, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 147649, December 17, 2002.

“X x x.

The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same are nonetheless part of the res gestae. However, only the declaration made to Castor Guden are admissible in evidence as such.

A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.6 All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solarte’s testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.

X x x.”

Circumstantial evidence - "Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the appellant is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others."

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/dec2002/gr_147649_2002.html

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted), accused. FRANK LOBRIGAS, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 147649, December 17, 2002.

“X x x.

In order to warrant a conviction, direct evidence is not always required. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the appellant is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.4 The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.5

The circumstances proved by the prosecution and relied upon by the trial court to convict accused-appellant clearly satisfied the foregoing requirements. First, the victim, accused appellant and others were together having a drinking spree on the day the mauling happened. Second, the victim declared to Castor Guden immediately after the incident that accused-appellant and two others mauled him can be considered as part of the res gestae. Third, the victim told his daughter immediately after the incident, that accused-appellant was one of the persons who mauled him. Fourth, Dr. Tito L. Miranda found that the victim died due to massive hemorrhage in his thoracic cavity caused by severe beating of his breast. Lastly, accused-appellant evaded arrest and subsequently escaped from detention. The foregoing circumstances knitted together proved accused-appellant’s culpability beyond reasonable doubt.

X x x.”

Independently relevant statements are not barred by the hearsay rule.

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_174056_2007.html

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias ROWING and RONTE ABABO (acquitted), Appellants. G.R. No. 174056, [Formerly G.R. No. 138257, February 27, 2007.

“x x x.

Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano and Arañas on what appellant had confessed to or told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The testimonies, it should be conceded, cannot serve as a proof of extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to be in writing, among others, to be admissible in evidence.42 That is why the testimonies are of use in the case as corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be defeated by the hearsay rule. The testimonies covered are independently relevant statements which are not barred by the hearsay rule.

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply. The statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.43

Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit.44

X x x.”

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_174056_2007.html

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias ROWING and RONTE ABABO (acquitted), Appellants. G.R. No. 174056, [Formerly G.R. No. 138257, February 27, 2007.

“x x x.

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.36 Thus, as we have ruled in People v. Derilo:37

While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to remand the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.

Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. x x x x

X x x .”

Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_174056_2007.html

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias ROWING and RONTE ABABO (acquitted), Appellants. G.R. No. 174056, [Formerly G.R. No. 138257, February 27, 2007.

“x x x.

The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the penalty of death at that time.26 Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into play the provisions of Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus -

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.

Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. 27

There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or as to the number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit.28 However, the logic behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.29 An improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea.30 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.31

In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it is evident that the RTC did not strictly observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient.32 Such procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a "searching inquiry," as follows:

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.

(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.

(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.

(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.33

X x x.”