Effect of a substantive ground for disqualification that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy

Part 1.

VOID CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY  - 

In the 2013 case decided by the Supreme Court en banc entitled CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., docketed as G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 and written by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, which cited the cases of ARATEA V. COMELEC and JALOSJOS V. COMELEC, it was held that A VOID CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (CIC) CANNOT PRODUCE ANY LEGAL EFFECT.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

THAT THE DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE HAS ALREADY BEEN PROCLAIMED AND HAS ASSUMED OFFICE IS OF NO MOMENT. THE SUBSEQUENT DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE GROUND THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY VOIDS NOT ONLY THE COC BUT ALSO THE PROCLAMATION.

The Court cited SECTION 6 of R.A. NO. 6646 which provides:

"Section 6. EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASE. - Any candidate who has been declared by FINAL JUDGMENT to be DISQUALIFIED shall NOT BE VOTED FOR, and the votes cast for him shall NOT BE COUNTED. If for any reason a candidate is NOT declared by final judgment BEFORE AN ELECTION to be DISQUALIFIED and he is VOTED FOR and receives the WINNING NUMBER OF VOTES in such election, the Court or Commission shall CONTINUE WITH THE TRIAL and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, UPON MOTION of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof ORDER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF SUCH CANDIDATE whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Where certificate of candidacy is void ab unitio

Part 2.

WHERE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IS VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT, THE ELIGIBILE CANDIDATE WHO GARNERED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL BE PROCLAIMED THE WINNER -

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that with Arnado (winning candidate for mayor) being BARRED from even becoming a candidate, his CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY was thus rendered VOID FROM THE BEGINNING. It could NOT have produced any other LEGAL EFFECT. His proclamation was VOID ab initio.

To hold that such proclamation was valid would negate the prohibitory character of the DISQUALIFICATION which Arnado possessed EVEN PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. The affirmation of Arnado's DISQUALIFICATION, although made long AFTER THE ELECTION, REACHED BACK TO THE FILING OF HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Arnado was declared to be NOT A CANDIDATE AT ALL in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a NON-CANDIDATE, the VOTES cast in his favor SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COUNTED. This left MAQUILING as the QUALIFIED CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES.

Therefore, the RULE ON SUCCESSION under the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WILL NOT APPLY.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Failure to quality as a candidate

Part 3.

NOTHING SHOULD STOP THE COURT FROM ADJUDGING ANOTHER ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES AS THE WINNER -

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that when the issue being decided upon by the Court was the ELIGIBILITY of the candidate receiving a PLURALITY OF THE LEGALLY CAST BALLOTS and his INELIGIBILITY was THEREAFTER ESTABLISHED, nothing should stop the Court from ADJUDGING ANOTHER ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES AS THE WINNER.

An INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE candidate who received the highest number of votes is a WRONGFUL WINNER. By express legal mandate, HE COULD NOT EVEN HAVE BEEN A CANDIDATE IN THE FIRST PLACE, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might NOT have been passed upon PRIOR TO ELECTION DATE. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his INELIGIBILITY as a candidate REMAINS UNCHANGED. INELIGIBILITY does not only pertain to his QUALIFICATIONS as a candidate but necessarily affects his RIGHT TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE. The number of ballots cast in his favor CANNOT CURE THE DEFECT OF FAILURE TO QUALIFY with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

POPULAR VOTE CANNOT CURE THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE.

Part 4.

POPULAR VOTE CANNOT CURE THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE. -

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that the POPULAR VOTE CANNOT CURE THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate.

When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.

To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.

We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC when the Court pronounced:

"x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state." (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC5, where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."

The Court has ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements." (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Void certificate of candidacy

Part 5

THE AFFIRMATION OF A CANDIDATE'S DISQUALIFICATION, ALTHOUGH MADE LONG AFTER THE ELECTION, REACHES BACK TO THE TIME OF FILING OF HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. THE RULE ON SUCCESSION DOES NOT APPLY . THE QUALIFIED OR ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE (THE SECOND-RANKING CANDIDATE) WHO GARNERED THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS DEEMED THE WINNER.

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that with Arnado’s DISQUALIFICATION, Maquiling then became the WINNER in the election as he obtained the HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES FROM AMONG THE QUALIFIED CANDIDATES.

The Court has ruled in the cases of ARATEA v. COMELEC54 and JALOSJOS v. COMELEC that A VOID CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) CANNOT PRODUCE ANY LEGAL EFFECT.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE are NOT CONSIDERED at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE do NOT constitute the SOLE AND TOTAL EXPRESSION OF THE SOVEREIGN VOICE. The votes cast in favor of ELIGIBLE AND LEGITIMATE CANDIDATES form part of that voice and must also BE RESPECTED.

As in any contest, elections are GOVERNED BY RULES that determine the QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be INELIGIBLE, their VICTORY IS VOIDED and the laurel is AWARDED to the NEXT IN RANK WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS NOR LACKS ANY OF THE QUALIFICATIONS set in the rules TO BE ELIGIBLE as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in LABOR V. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor of said candidate, then the ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE obtaining the NEXT HIGHER number of votes may be DEEMED ELECTED. That rule is also a MERE ORBITER that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is NOT a prerequisite for the DISQUALIFICATION to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The SECOND-PLACER in the vote count is ACTUALLY THE FIRST-PLACER among the QUALIFIED CANDIDATES.

That the DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE has already been PROCLAIMED and has ASSUMED OFFICE is of NO MOMENT. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that EXISTED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY VOIDS NOT ONLY THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) BUT ALSO THE PROCLAMATION.

SECTION 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

"SECTION 6. EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASE. - Any candidate who has been DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT to be DISQUALIFIED shall NOT be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall NOT BE COUNTED. If for any reason a candidate is NOT DECLARED by final judgment BEFORE AN ELECTION to be disqualified and he is VOTED FOR and receives the WINNING NUMBER of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall CONTINUE WITH THE TRIAL and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, UPON MOTION of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof ORDER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, LONG AFTER the ELECTIONS and after he was ALREADY PROCLAIMED as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his CITIZENSHIP. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY is thus rendered VOID FROM THE BEGINNING. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such PROCLAMATION is valid is to NEGATE the PROHIBITORY CHARACTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION which Arnado POSSESSED EVEN PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made LONG AFTER THE ELECTIONS, REACHES BACK TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Arnado is declared to be NOT A CANDIDATE AT ALL in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a NON-CANDIDATE, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves MAQUILING as the QUALIFIED CANDIDATE who obtained the HIGHEST number of votes. Therefore, the RULE ON SUCCESSION under the Local Government Code WILL NOT APPLY.



LAWS AND CASES CITED:

Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

Sec. 39, Sec. 40(d) and Sec. 44, Local Government Code

Commonwealth Act No. 63

Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574 [2000];

Santos v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 628 [1981];

Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 [1961];

Reyes v. COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 [1980].

Mercado vs. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999).

Sinsuat vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 105919, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 309.

AASJS v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 108.

Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.

Fivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934, 944 (1989).

Velasco vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614-615.

Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 635, Saya-ang v. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373 (2003).

Aratea vs. Comelec, G. R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.

Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012.

Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 3 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 312.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45

Disqualification cases; rule of succession applies (Sec. 44, Local Government Code)

In DISQUALIFICATION CASES, if the winning candidate is INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED, the COMELEC is NOT EMPOWERED by law and jurisprudence TO PROCLAIM AS WINNER the candidate who obtained THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES.

(The doctrine applies to the DISQUALIFICATION CASE against Marcos Jr. pending in the Supreme Court, assuming the Court disqualifies him) -

JURISPRUDENCE:

In the 2006 case decided by the Supreme Court en banc in the case of DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT, ET. AL. VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., docketed as GR NO. 169106, June 23, 2006, 525 Phil. 473 and written by Justice Leonardo Quisumbing, the Court held that it was a SETTLED DOCTRINE that the COMELEC was NOT empowered by law and jurisprudence TO PROCLAIM as winner the candidate who obtained the SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES in case the winning candidate was INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED.

According to the Court, there were two requisites for the EXCEPTION to the above-mentioned general rule, to wit:

(1) the candidate who OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WAS DISQUALIFIED; and

(2) the ELECTORATE WAS FULLY AWARE in fact and in law of the CANDIDATE'S DISQUALIFICATION, so as to bring such awareness within the realm of NOTORIETY, but WOULD NONETHELESS CAST THEIR VOTES IN FAVOR OF THE INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE.

In the case at bar, the COMPLAINT FOR DISQUALIFICATION of the candidate Gunsi was FILED BEFORE THE ELECTION but the COMELEC en banc DISQUALIFIED HIM SUBSEQUENT TO THE ELECTION.

Thus, WHEN THE ELECTORATE VOTED Gunsi for mayor on May 10, 2004, it was UNDER THE BELIEF THAT HE WAS QUALIFIED.

There was NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE ELECTORATE AGREED to the INVALIDATION of their votes as STRAY VOTES IN CASE of Gunsi’s DISQUALIFICATION.

The Court DID NOT adhere to petitioner Israel’s contention that the votes cast in favor of Gunsi were STRAY VOTES.

The Court held that the SUBSEQUENT FINDING of the COMELEC en banc that Gunsi WAS INELIGIBLE DID NOT RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE ELECTION SO AS TO INVALIDATE the votes cast for him.

At the time of the election, he was NOT NOTORIOUSLY KNOWN BY THE PUBLIC TO BE INELIGIBLE to run for mayor.

Conformably then, according to the Supreme Court, the RULES ON SUCCESSION under the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WAS APPLICABLE, thus,

"SECTION 44. PERMANENT VACANCIES in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.—If a PERMANENT VACANCY occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. . . .

x x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a PERMANENT VACANCY arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, FAILS TO QUALIFY, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office."


Considering that Gunsi had FAILED TO QUALIFY as mayor of South Upi, the PROCLAIMED VICE-MAYOR SUCCEEDED HIM AS MAYOR.


LAWS AND CASES CITED:

Omnibus Election Code, Art. XX, Sec. 241.

Local Government Code of the Philippines, SECTION 44.

COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Sec. 13(b).

Chu v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135423, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 482, 491.

Patoray v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125798, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 470, 480.

Lucman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166229, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 299, 308.

Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 358, 367.

Bautista v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 299, 323-324.

Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501.

Domino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 575.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/gr_169106_2006.html#fnt26

Application of RULE ON SUCCESSION in DISQUALIFICATION CASE

TOPIC: A 2010 DISQUALIFICATION CASE decided by the Supreme Court (NOT a case for the CANCELLATION OF A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY) -

In the 2010 decision of the Supreme Court en banc in the case of MOZART P. PANLAQUI VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NARDO M. VELASCO, docketed as G. R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010 and written by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, which involved a DISQUALIFICATION CASE against a mayoralty candidate, the Supreme Court APPLIED THE RULE ON SUCCESSION IN FAVOR OF THE ELECTED VICE MAYOR, considering that AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION there was NO FINAL JUDGMENT YET DISQUALIFYING the winning candidate for mayor, Velasco (WHO WAS EVENTUALLY DISQUALIFIED).

The Supreme Court DID NOT deem the SECOND-PLACER CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR, Panlaqui, who LOST the election, to be the duly elected mayor. The Court instead held that the ELECTED VICE MAYOR should SUCCEED the DISQUALIFIED WINNING CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR.

The Court ruled, thus:

"IN FINE, the Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied Panlaqui’s motion for proclamation. Since Velasco’s DISQUALIFICATION AS A CANDIDATE HAD NOT BECOME FINAL BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, the COMELEC PROPERLY APPLIED THE RULE ON SUCCESSION.

x x x To simplistically assume that the SECOND PLACER would have received the other votes would be TO SUBSTITUTE OUR JUDGMENT for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He LOST the elections. He was REPUDIATED by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are NOT prepared TO EXTRAPOLATE the results under such circumstances.

To allow the DEFEATED AND REPUDIATED CANDIDATE to take over the mayoralty despite his REJECTION by the electorate is TO DISENFRANCHISE them through no fault on their part, and TO UNDERMINE the importance and the meaning of DEMOCRACY and the RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO ELECT OFFICIALS OF THEIR CHOICE.

Theoretically, the SECOND PLACER could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be ABSURD TO PROCLAIM THE TOTALLY REPUDIATED CANDIDATE AS THE VOTERS’ CHOICE. x x x. "

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_188671_2010.html#rnt5