Corrupt pork barrel tradition rots from within the foundation of Philippine democracy

The fundamental constitutional duties of congressmen and senators are legislation, congressional oversight, appropriations, state policy formulation, investigation in aid of legislation, and development of the national consciousness on current issues and controversies through collegial deliberations and democratic consultations with the sovereign people.

The legislators malevolently exceed their constitutional boundaries when they meddle, directly or indirectly, in the executive functions of public works, construction, public utilities, and project planning and implementation.

The pork barrel tradition in Congress -- disguised as rural/countryside development funds, "congressional insertions" during the deliberations on the proposed national budget, suggested "hard and soft projects" of all sorts, and the like -- constitutes grave abuse of the "power of the purse" of Congress.

It weakens the constitutional principle of separation of powers of the three independent branches of government.

The corruption that the pork barrel system breeds rots from within the very foundation of our free society.

The ultimate victims of the pork barrel system are the sovereign people and the republic itself.

It impoverishes the poor and the middle class.

It perpetuates the political dynasties of aristocratic feudal warlords and trapos.

It feeds crony capitalism to subjugate the free market economy.

It exacerbates the comatose status of our ailing society.

It kills democracy and the rule of law.

The pork barrel system is an evil that is impossible to eradicate because it is an open criminal conspiracy between the powerful Executive and Legislative branches of government that the nation seems to tolerate.

Manuel J. Laserna Jr.

When writ of execution may not be issued; exceptions to immutability of final judgment.

Although when a judgment or order has become final, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution, there are exceptions thereto, to wit:

(1) When subsequent facts and circumstances transpire which render such execution unjust, or impossible, such as a supervening cause like the act of the Commissioner of Civil Service finding the plaintiff administratively guilty and which constituted a bar to his reinstatement as ordered by the trial court in a civil case; or where the defendant bank was placed under receivership;

(2) On equitable grounds, as when there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable;

(3) Where the judgment has been novated by the parties;

(4) When a petition for relief or an action to enjoin the judgment is filed and a preliminary injunction is prayed for and granted;

(5) Where the judgment has become dormant, the five (5) year period under Rule 39, Section 6 having expired without the judgment having been revived; or

(6) Where the judgment turns out to be incomplete or is conditional since, as a matter of law, such judgment cannot become final.

See: 

Bench Book for Trial Court Judges (Civil Procedure), Supreme Court, Manila, 2002 ed., citing: The City of Butuan v. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636 [1961]. Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, G. R. No. 73884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 257. Vda. de Albar v. De Carandang, 116 Phil. 516 [1962]; Heirs of Guminpin v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34220, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 687; Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. 68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7. Fua Cam Lu v. Yap Fauco, 74 Phil. 287 [1943]; Zapanta v. De Rotaeche, 21 Phil. 154 [1912]; Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236 [1951]. Refer to Rules of Court, Rule 38, Sec. 5. Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-25511, September 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 263. Del Rosario v. Villegas, 49 Phil. 634 [1926]; Ignacio v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 [1946]. Cu Unjieng e Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 380 [1940]. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, G. R. No. 22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637; Sandico, Sr. v. Piguing, No. L-26115, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 322.

Execution - To justify the quashing of a writ of execution, there must, of course, be sufficient ground therefor. A writ may be quashed or recalled only when a) it appears that it has been improvidently issued, b) that the writ is defective in substance, or c) is issued against the wrong party, or d) that the judgment debt has been paid, or e) that the writ has been issued without authority, or f) there is a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable, or g) the controversy was never submitted to the judgment of the court (International School, Inc. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 54243, July 21, 1989).

GERUNDIA IBATAN, by herself and in representation of the minors, CANCIO JUANA, MARILYN, IRENEO EMMA ALEJANDRO AND VERONICA, all surnamed IBATAN, RAYMUNDO IBATAN, ESTELITA IBATAN, ERNESTO IBATAN, AND EDILBERTO IBATAN, petitioners, vs. HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, MARCIAL Z. SERON, Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, GERTRUDES IBATAN, CLARA ARGUELLES EUGENIA ARGUELLES, AND BENIGNO ARGUELLES respondents. G.R. No. L-39125, August 20, 1990. 

“x x x.

To justify the quashing of a writ of execution, there must, of course, be sufficient ground therefor. A writ may be quashed or recalled only when a) it appears that it has been improvidently issued, b) that the writ is defective in substance, or c) is issued against the wrong party, or d) that the judgment debt has been paid, or e) that the writ has been issued without authority, or f) there is a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable, or g) the controversy was never submitted to the judgment of the court (International School, Inc. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 54243, July 21, 1989). Clearly, petitioners failed herein to allege or to sufficiently show in their petition the existence of any ground to justify the setting aside of the writ. We find that the order of execution of the trial court on January 20, 1970 is valid where it merely enforces the dispositive portion of the final and executory judgment in the partition case. Consequently, the levy made on the real properties of the judgment debtor Ibatan on March 13, 1970 should also be considered valid and regular in the absence of any showing that the requisities therefor had not been complied with.

Petitioners submit that the trial court acted whimsically in refusing to set aside the alias writ of execution and levy on execution for having been issued after the death of the deceased defendant Quiterio Ibatan. Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Execution in case of death of party. — Where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order, execution thereon may issue, or one already issued may be enforced in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

c) In case of the death of the judgment debtor after execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the officer making the sale shall account to the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.

If the levy had been made before the death of the judgment debtor, the sale on execution could be carried to completion in accordance with the aforequoted rule which provides that in case the judgment debtor dies after execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of judgment. (Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-31299, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 130). In the instant case, the order of execution was issued on January 20, 1970 and the levy on the properties was made on March 13, 1970, prior to the death of Quiterio Ibatan on June 6, 1971. Hence, the properties levied upon by the sheriff may be sold for the satisfaction of the money judgment. The subsequent issuance of the alias writ of execution and levy after the death of Ibatan did not affect the validity of the first writ and levy thereon. It has been held that the issuance of subsequent writ of execution does not operate as abandonment or waiver of a prior writ of execution (Government v. Echaus and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318).

Finally, with respect to the partition of the parcels of land subject of the decision in Civil Case No. 839, We believe that the repartition made by the court on January 13, 1973 (p. 67, Rollo) approving the commissioner's report by the sheriff upon the instance of petitioners herein and without objection from private respondents has cured whatever defects or irregularities attended the execution and delivery of the parcels of land to the prevailing parties. With respect to the levy and execution sale held on June 28, 1973 for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the judgment debtor, petitioners have not clearly and sufficiently shown to this Court legal and justifiable grounds upon which the foregoing incidents should be nullified and set aside.

X x x.”

Execution - Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.

NESTOR T. GADRINAB, Petitioner, vs. NORA T. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA LOPEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014

“x x x.

This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court60 the doctrine of finality of judgment:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.61

This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:

1. "The correction of clerical errors;

2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;

3. void judgments; and

4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable."62

Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court.

Because a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the parties and a judgment on the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code provisions on contracts. It can be avoided on grounds that may avoid an ordinary contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the law;63 lack of consent by a party; and existence of fraud or duress. Further, the pertinent Civil Code provisions on compromise agreements provide:

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.

Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.

Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.

In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement’s terms.

This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves.

Likewise, respondents’ argument that a supervening event, i.e. disagreement among the parties, was present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on compromise fails to persuade. A supervening event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on compromise if it "brought about a material change in [the] situation"64 between the parties. The material change contemplated must render the execution of the final judgment unjust and inequitable. Otherwise, a party to the compromise agreement has a "right to have the compromise agreement executed, according to its terms."65

The subsequent disagreement among the parties did not cause any material change in the situation or in the relations among the parties. The situation and relations among the parties remained the same as the situation and their relations prior to the compromise agreement. They remained co-owners of the property, which they desired to partition.

Moreover, the parties voluntarily agreed to the compromise agreement, which was already stamped with judicial approval. The agreement’s execution would bring about the effects desired by all parties and the most just and equitable situation for all. On the other hand, the judgment granting the second action for partition filed by respondent Salamanca was obtained with opposition.

Judges "have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce [a compromise agreement]."66 Absent appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify, impose terms different from the terms of a compromise agreement, or set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their discretion.67

"[They cannot] relieve parties from [their] obligations . . . simply because [the agreements are] . . . unwise."68Further, "[t]he mere fact that the Compromise Agreement favors one party does not render it invalid."69 Courts do not have power to "alter contracts in order to save [one party]

from [the effects of] adverse stipulations. . . ."70

X x x.”

Execution - This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.

SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO, Petitioners, vs. JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO FLORES, BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR. FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F. FLORES, JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY, MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA VDA. DE FAYLONA, Respondents. G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013.

“x x x.

The legal issue is whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final judgment against petitioners inequitable.

Ruling

We deny the petition for review, and rule that the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari. Indeed, the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in issuing its order of May 13, 1998 denying petitioners’ motion to defer resolution on the motion for demolition, and its order dated June 10, 1998 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the November 20, 1989 decision directed the partition of the 402-square meter parcel of land between the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona, with the former getting the western half and the latter the eastern half; and ordered the latter to remove their improvements encroaching the western portion adjudicated to the former. The decision became final after its affirmance by the CA through its decision promulgated on December 28, 1995 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 25347 modifying the decision only by deleting the award of rentals. There being no further appellate proceedings after the affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of judgment on June 3, 1996.

Thereafter, the RTC issued several writs of execution to enforce the judgment. The execution of the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, followed as a matter of course, because the prevailing parties were entitled to its execution as a matter of right, and a writ of execution should issue to enforce the dispositions therein.7

The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed of sale dated March 4, 1998 was a supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable is devoid of merit.

Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.8 This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.9

Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis their demand for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores.

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.10 A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.11 In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution,12 or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event.13 The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.

Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself.

The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not constitute an abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such issuance would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision. According to Section 10( d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court, when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With the special order being designed to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to their respective owners, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be upheld.

It irritates the Court to know that petitioners have delayed for nearly 17 years now the full implementation of the final and immutable decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by the CA. It is high time, then, that the Court puts a firm stop to the long delay in order to finally enable the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona as the winning parties to deservedly enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.14

X x x.”

Execution - Although when a judgment or order has become final, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution, there are exceptions thereto.

Although when a judgment or order has become final, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution, there are exceptions thereto, to wit:

(1) When subsequent facts and circumstances transpire which render such execution unjust, or impossible, such as a supervening cause like the act of the Commissioner of Civil Service finding the plaintiff administratively guilty and which constituted a bar to his reinstatement as ordered by the trial court in a civil case; or where the defendant bank was placed under receivership;

(2) On equitable grounds, as when there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable;

(3) Where the judgment has been novated by the parties;

(4) When a petition for relief or an action to enjoin the judgment is filed and a preliminary injunction is prayed for and granted;

(5) Where the judgment has become dormant, the five (5) year period under Rule 39, Section 6 having expired without the judgment having been revived; or

(6) Where the judgment turns out to be incomplete or is conditional since, as a matter of law, such judgment cannot become final.

See: 

Bench Book for Trial Court Judges (Civil Procedure), Supreme Court, Manila, 2002 ed., citing: The City of Butuan v. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636 [1961]. Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, G. R. No. 73884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 257. Vda. de Albar v. De Carandang, 116 Phil. 516 [1962]; Heirs of Guminpin v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34220, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 687; Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. 68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7. Fua Cam Lu v. Yap Fauco, 74 Phil. 287 [1943]; Zapanta v. De Rotaeche, 21 Phil. 154 [1912]; Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236 [1951]. Refer to Rules of Court, Rule 38, Sec. 5. Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-25511, September 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 263. Del Rosario v. Villegas, 49 Phil. 634 [1926]; Ignacio v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 [1946]. Cu Unjieng e Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 380 [1940]. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, G. R. No. 22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637; Sandico, Sr. v. Piguing, No. L-26115, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 322.

Execution - In computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise.

ESTEBAN YAU vs. RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008; with companion case: ARTURO MACAPAGAL vs. HON. IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., et. al., G.R. No. 171994, February 4, 2008

“x x x.

The principal and common issue in both petitions is whether the Decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 may no longer be enforced against Silverio and Macapagal since more than five (5) years have already lapsed from its finality. 

X x x. 

Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended provides:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. 

It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the statute of limitations, by action. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. 

In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[1] this Court held that in computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. 

There had been many instances where this Court allowed the execution by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.[2]

Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be enforced for the full satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial court’s judgment and the writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ. 

X x x.

Every litigation must come to an end. While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, however, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice.[3]

Let it be stressed that with respect to Macapagal and Silverio the Decision of the trial court has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.

In Lim v. Jabalde,[4] this Court further explained the necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, thus:

“Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.”

Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the law.” Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down.[5] The statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their control.[6]

X x x.”

[1] G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8, citing Lancita v. Magbanua, 7 SCRA 42 (1963). 

[2] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118339, March 19, 1998, 287 SCRA 611, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344 (1996). 

[3] Id. 

[4] G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211 cited in Seven Brother Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, supra. 

[5] Seven Brother Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, supra, citing In Re: Petition for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court, G.R. No. 123780, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 493. 

[6] Lancita v. Magbanua, supra at footnote 9.

Execution - In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also attained finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed land.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Heirs of Manuel Abella, G.R. No. 143510, November 23, 2005. 

“X x x.

Hence, the herein petition where the only issue for resolution is whether or not the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title wherein respondents were adjudged to be the owners of the subject property is a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final judgment in the previous case for forcible entry.

X x x. 

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

The theory advanced by petitioner from the very beginning is that he is entitled to possession of the disputed property as the owner thereof because the property was transferred to him by virtue of an onerous donation made by respondents. Thus, petitioner’s alleged right of possession is premised on his claim of ownership. He cannot change his theory when the case is on review, by presenting another theory that is inconsistent with his allegations during the proceedings below. Petitioner cannot contradict himself by saying first that respondents had agreed to transfer to him the ownership over the property, only to say later that what respondents granted to him was the right to possess the property. Petitioner is bound by the statements he made while the case was being heard in the lower courts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC,[6] to wit:

... The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. ...[7]

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that in a case for ejectment, any finding of the court regarding the issue of ownership is merely provisional and not conclusive. This was stressed in Umpoc vs. Mercado,[8] where the Court stated:

... we emphasize that our disquisition on the issue of ownership in ejectment cases, as in the case at bar, is only provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate case of annulment of title filed by respondent. x x x As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. [9]

Thus, the finding in the forcible entry case that petitioner had become the owner and rightful possessor of the disputed property because respondents had donated the property to petitioner is only provisional. It is the ruling in the case for quieting of title, adjudging herein respondents to be the absolute owners of the subject property, which is conclusive. The finding in the case for quieting of title that respondents never consented to petitioner’s occupation of the subject property has now become final and immutable. X x x.

Necessarily, the finding in the case for quieting of title that respondents never agreed to donate the property or to allow petitioner to occupy the subject land prevails over the ruling in the forcible entry case. 

The foregoing findings totally foreclose petitioner’s belated claim that even if title over the property remained with respondents, he is nevertheless entitled to possession thereof. Since respondents never made the alleged donation, there is absolutely no legal and factual basis for petitioner to claim the right of possession over it.

Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the finality of the decision in the quieting of title case constitutes a supervening event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in the forcible entry case. In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court explained thus:

... The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to only few exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment.

. . . 

One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.[12]

In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also attained finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed land.

X x x.”

Execution in appealed cases - Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.

JAIME TAN, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

“X x x.

On April 18, 1994, this Court issued Circular No. 24-94, viz:

"TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC APPROVING AND PROMULGATING THE REVISED PROVISION ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS. SPECIFICALLY IN APPEALED CASES, AND AMENDING SECTION 1, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT

It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases cannot be promptly enforced because of undue administrative delay in the remand of the records to the court of origin, aggravated at times by misplacement or misdelivery of said records. The Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court has drafted proposals including a provision which can remedy the procedural impasse created by said contingencies.

Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a solution to the aforestated problems, the Court Resolved to approve and promulgate the following section thereof on execution of judgments, amending Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied for in the lower court from which the action originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

This resolution shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1994.

April 18, 1994.

"(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice" 

The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution."

The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:12

"1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the issue of appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is "final" if it disposes of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order which leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case (De la Cruz, et al. vs. Paras, et al., L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of binding effect or whether it can be subject of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal and no appeal has been perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30, 1959; cf. Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla vs. CA, et al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).

2. On the aspect of appealability, these revised Rules use the adjective 'final' with respect to orders and resolutions, since to terminate a case the trial courts issue orders while the appellate courts and most of the quasi-judicial agencies issue resolutions. Judgment are not so qualified since the use of the so-called interlocutory judgments is not favored in this jurisdiction, while the categorization of an order or a resolution for purposes of denoting that it is appealable is to distinguish them from interlocutory orders or resolutions. However, by force of extended usage the phrase 'final and executory judgment' is sometimes used and tolerated, although the use of 'executory' alone would suffice. These observations also apply to the several and separate judgments contemplated in Rule 36, or partial judgments which totally dispose of a particular claim or severable part of the case, subject to the power of the court to suspend or defer action on an appeal from or further proceedings in such special judgment, or as provided by Rule 35 on the matter of partial summary judgments which are not considered as appealable (see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the explanation therein).

The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response to complaints over the delay caused by the former procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal, with notice to the parties. As things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing party had to wait for the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin when and where he could then move for the issuance of a writ of execution. The intervening time could sometimes be substantial, especially if the court a quo is in a remote province, and could also be availed of by the losing party to delay or thwart actual execution.

On these considerations, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 24-94, dated April 18, 1994, approving and promulgating in advance this amended Section 1 of Rule 39 and declaring the same effective as of June 1, 1994.

Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.

The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of the appellate courts wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion for execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the records are still with the appellate court, or even after the same have been remanded to the lower court, the appellate court can direct the issuance of the writ of execution since such act is merely in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has the power to require."

X x x.

Execution; death of party - If the levy had been made before the death of the judgment debtor, the sale on execution could be carried to completion in accordance with the aforequoted rule which provides that in case the judgment debtor dies after execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of judgment. (Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-31299, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 130). In the instant case, the order of execution was issued on January 20, 1970 and the levy on the properties was made on March 13, 1970, prior to the death of Quiterio Ibatan on June 6, 1971. Hence, the properties levied upon by the sheriff may be sold for the satisfaction of the money judgment. The subsequent issuance of the alias writ of execution and levy after the death of Ibatan did not affect the validity of the first writ and levy thereon. It has been held that the issuance of subsequent writ of execution does not operate as abandonment or waiver of a prior writ of execution (Government v. Echaus and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318).

GERUNDIA IBATAN, by herself and in representation of the minors, CANCIO JUANA, MARILYN, IRENEO EMMA ALEJANDRO AND VERONICA, all surnamed IBATAN, RAYMUNDO IBATAN, ESTELITA IBATAN, ERNESTO IBATAN, AND EDILBERTO IBATAN, petitioners,  vs. HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, MARCIAL Z. SERON, Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, GERTRUDES IBATAN, CLARA ARGUELLES EUGENIA ARGUELLES, AND BENIGNO ARGUELLES respondents. G.R. No. L-39125, August 20, 1990. 

“x x x.

To justify the quashing of a writ of execution, there must, of course, be sufficient ground therefor. A writ may be quashed or recalled only when a) it appears that it has been improvidently issued, b) that the writ is defective in substance, or c) is issued against the wrong party, or d) that the judgment debt has been paid, or e) that the writ has been issued without authority, or f) there is a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable, or g) the controversy was never submitted to the judgment of the court (International School, Inc. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 54243, July 21, 1989). Clearly, petitioners failed herein to allege or to sufficiently show in their petition the existence of any ground to justify the setting aside of the writ. We find that the order of execution of the trial court on January 20, 1970 is valid where it merely enforces the dispositive portion of the final and executory judgment in the partition case. Consequently, the levy made on the real properties of the judgment debtor Ibatan on March 13, 1970 should also be considered valid and regular in the absence of any showing that the requisities therefor had not been complied with.

Petitioners submit that the trial court acted whimsically in refusing to set aside the alias writ of execution and levy on execution for having been issued after the death of the deceased defendant Quiterio Ibatan. Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Execution in case of death of party. — Where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order, execution thereon may issue, or one already issued may be enforced in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

c) In case of the death of the judgment debtor after execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the officer making the sale shall account to the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.

If the levy had been made before the death of the judgment debtor, the sale on execution could be carried to completion in accordance with the aforequoted rule which provides that in case the judgment debtor dies after execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of judgment. (Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-31299, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 130). In the instant case, the order of execution was issued on January 20, 1970 and the levy on the properties was made on March 13, 1970, prior to the death of Quiterio Ibatan on June 6, 1971. Hence, the properties levied upon by the sheriff may be sold for the satisfaction of the money judgment. The subsequent issuance of the alias writ of execution and levy after the death of Ibatan did not affect the validity of the first writ and levy thereon. It has been held that the issuance of subsequent writ of execution does not operate as abandonment or waiver of a prior writ of execution (Government v. Echaus and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318).

Finally, with respect to the partition of the parcels of land subject of the decision in Civil Case No. 839, We believe that the repartition made by the court on January 13, 1973 (p. 67, Rollo) approving the commissioner's report by the sheriff upon the instance of petitioners herein and without objection from private respondents has cured whatever defects or irregularities attended the execution and delivery of the parcels of land to the prevailing parties. With respect to the levy and execution sale held on June 28, 1973 for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the judgment debtor, petitioners have not clearly and sufficiently shown to this Court legal and justifiable grounds upon which the foregoing incidents should be nullified and set aside.

X x x.”

Execution - A supervening event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on compromise if it "brought about a material change in [the] situation"64 between the parties. The material change contemplated must render the execution of the final judgment unjust and inequitable. Otherwise, a party to the compromise agreement has a "right to have the compromise agreement executed, according to its terms."

NESTOR T. GADRINAB, Petitioner, vs. NORA T. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA LOPEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014

.

“x x x.

This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court60 the doctrine of finality of judgment:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.61

This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:

1. "The correction of clerical errors;

2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;

3. void judgments; and

4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable."62

Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court.

Because a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the parties and a judgment on the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code provisions on contracts. It can be avoided on grounds that may avoid an ordinary contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the law;63 lack of consent by a party; and existence of fraud or duress. Further, the pertinent Civil Code provisions on compromise agreements provide:

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.

Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.

Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.

In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement’s terms.

This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves.

Likewise, respondents’ argument that a supervening event, i.e. disagreement among the parties, was present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on compromise fails to persuade. A supervening event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on compromise if it "brought about a material change in [the] situation"64 between the parties. The material change contemplated must render the execution of the final judgment unjust and inequitable. Otherwise, a party to the compromise agreement has a "right to have the compromise agreement executed, according to its terms."65

The subsequent disagreement among the parties did not cause any material change in the situation or in the relations among the parties. The situation and relations among the parties remained the same as the situation and their relations prior to the compromise agreement. They remained co-owners of the property, which they desired to partition.

Moreover, the parties voluntarily agreed to the compromise agreement, which was already stamped with judicial approval. The agreement’s execution would bring about the effects desired by all parties and the most just and equitable situation for all. On the other hand, the judgment granting the second action for partition filed by respondent Salamanca was obtained with opposition.

Judges "have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce [a compromise agreement]."66 Absent appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify, impose terms different from the terms of a compromise agreement, or set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their discretion.67

"[They cannot] relieve parties from [their] obligations . . . simply because [the agreements are] . . . unwise."68Further, "[t]he mere fact that the Compromise Agreement favors one party does not render it invalid."69 Courts do not have power to "alter contracts in order to save [one party]

from [the effects of] adverse stipulations. . . ."70

X x x.”

Execution - We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.

SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO, Petitioners, vs. JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO FLORES, BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR. FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F. FLORES, JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY, MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA VDA. DE FAYLONA, Respondents. G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013.

“x x x.

The legal issue is whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final judgment against petitioners inequitable.

Ruling

We deny the petition for review, and rule that the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari. Indeed, the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in issuing its order of May 13, 1998 denying petitioners’ motion to defer resolution on the motion for demolition, and its order dated June 10, 1998 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the November 20, 1989 decision directed the partition of the 402-square meter parcel of land between the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona, with the former getting the western half and the latter the eastern half; and ordered the latter to remove their improvements encroaching the western portion adjudicated to the former. The decision became final after its affirmance by the CA through its decision promulgated on December 28, 1995 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 25347 modifying the decision only by deleting the award of rentals. There being no further appellate proceedings after the affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of judgment on June 3, 1996.

Thereafter, the RTC issued several writs of execution to enforce the judgment. The execution of the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, followed as a matter of course, because the prevailing parties were entitled to its execution as a matter of right, and a writ of execution should issue to enforce the dispositions therein.7

The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed of sale dated March 4, 1998 was a supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable is devoid of merit.

Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.8 This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.9

Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis their demand for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores.

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.10 A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.11 In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution,12 or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event.13 The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.

Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself.

The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not constitute an abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such issuance would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision. According to Section 10( d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court, when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With the special order being designed to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to their respective owners, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be upheld.1âwphi1

It irritates the Court to know that petitioners have delayed for nearly 17 years now the full implementation of the final and immutable decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by the CA. It is high time, then, that the Court puts a firm stop to the long delay in order to finally enable the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona as the winning parties to deservedly enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.14

X x x.”

Execution; exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of final judgment.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 199595, April 02, 2014, PHILIPPINE WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC., RESPONDENT.

"x x x.

While firmly ingrained as a basic procedural tenet in Philippine jurisprudence, immutability of final judgments was never meant to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. The doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness and substantial justice. Hence, it’s application admits the following exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[2]

Here, the third exception is attendant. The nullity of the RTC judgment and all subsequent rulings affirming the same, render inoperative the doctrine of immutability of judgment, and consequently justify the propriety of giving due course to the present petition.

x x x."

Execution - The court may refuse to issue a writ of execution to enforce a final judgment when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable.

R. J. FRANCISCO 

PLEADINGS AND TRIAL PRACTICE 

Volume II 1996

Page 851

"x x x.

Although the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay (Amor vs. Jugo, 77 Phil. 703) because the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment is a ministerial duty of the court compellable by mandamus, (Ebero vs. Cañizares, 79 Phil. 152) it may do so in the following instances:

(a) When there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable; (Warner, Barners & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Lee vs. Mapa; 51 Phil. 624).

x x x."

Execution - Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.

RUFA A. RUBIO, BARTOLOME BANTOTO, LEON ALAGADMO, RODRIGO DELICTA, AND ADRIANO ALABATA, PETITIONERS, VS. LOURDES ALABATA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 203947, February 26, 2014. - The Lawyer's Post

“x x x.

“This case falls under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states:

SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.”

x x x

“Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment. Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final.

An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

x x x x

(3) Upon a judgment

Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.

Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for their subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait.

No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal. Withdrawing her appeal means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the “Declaration of Heirship and Sale,” dismissed respondent’s counterclaim, and ordered her to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality.

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. Thus:

“x x x procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.”

X x x.”

Execution - Although when a judgment or order has become final, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution, there are exceptions thereto.

Although when a judgment or order has become final, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution, there are exceptions thereto, to wit:

(1) When subsequent facts and circumstances transpire which render such execution unjust, or impossible, such as a supervening cause like the act of the Commissioner of Civil Service finding the plaintiff administratively guilty and which constituted a bar to his reinstatement as ordered by the trial court in a civil case; or where the defendant bank was placed under receivership;

(2) On equitable grounds, as when there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable;

(3) Where the judgment has been novated by the parties;

(4) When a petition for relief or an action to enjoin the judgment is filed and a preliminary injunction is prayed for and granted;

(5) Where the judgment has become dormant, the five (5) year period under Rule 39, Section 6 having expired without the judgment having been revived; or

(6) Where the judgment turns out to be incomplete or is conditional since, as a matter of law, such judgment cannot become final.

See: 

Bench Book for Trial Court Judges (Civil Procedure), Supreme Court, Manila, 2002 ed., citing: The City of Butuan v. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636 [1961]. Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, G. R. No. 73884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 257. Vda. de Albar v. De Carandang, 116 Phil. 516 [1962]; Heirs of Guminpin v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34220, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 687; Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. 68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7. Fua Cam Lu v. Yap Fauco, 74 Phil. 287 [1943]; Zapanta v. De Rotaeche, 21 Phil. 154 [1912]; Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236 [1951]. Refer to Rules of Court, Rule 38, Sec. 5. Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-25511, September 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 263. Del Rosario v. Villegas, 49 Phil. 634 [1926]; Ignacio v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 [1946]. Cu Unjieng e Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 380 [1940]. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, G. R. No. 22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637; Sandico, Sr. v. Piguing, No. L-26115, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 322.

Execution - In computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.

ESTEBAN YAU vs. RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008; with companion case: ARTURO MACAPAGAL vs. HON. IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., et. al., G.R. No. 171994, February 4, 2008

“x x x.

The principal and common issue in both petitions is whether the Decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 may no longer be enforced against Silverio and Macapagal since more than five (5) years have already lapsed from its finality. 

X x x. 

Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended provides:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. 

It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the statute of limitations, by action. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. 

In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[1] this Court held that in computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. 

There had been many instances where this Court allowed the execution by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.[2]

Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be enforced for the full satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial court’s judgment and the writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ. 

X x x.

Every litigation must come to an end. While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, however, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice.[3]

Let it be stressed that with respect to Macapagal and Silverio the Decision of the trial court has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.

In Lim v. Jabalde,[4] this Court further explained the necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, thus:

“Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.”

Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the law.” Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down.[5] The statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their control.[6]

X x x.”

[1] G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8, citing Lancita v. Magbanua, 7 SCRA 42 (1963). 

[2] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118339, March 19, 1998, 287 SCRA 611, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344 (1996). 

[3] Id. 

[4] G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211 cited in Seven Brother Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, supra. 

[5] Seven Brother Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, supra, citing In Re: Petition for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court, G.R. No. 123780, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 493. 

[6] Lancita v. Magbanua, supra at footnote 9.