Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of an Ombudsman case.

"xxx.

Court of Appeals' Jurisdiction Over the Criminal Aspect of the Case

Duyon was correct in his insistence that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of an Ombudsman case. "The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases."32

In Kuizon v. Hon. Desierto33 this Court clarified:

The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. (Citations omitted.)

Bunag-Cabacungan's argument that the Court of Appeals now has appellate jurisdiction to review both the administrative and criminal aspects of orders and decisions of the Ombudsman because of the September 15, 2003 amendment to Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman deserves no merit at all.

Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, reads:

SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)

Bunag-Cabacungan's contention that the phrase "in all other cases" has removed the distinction between administrative and criminal cases of the Ombudsman is ludicrous. It must be stressed that the above-quoted Section 7 is provided under Rule III, which deals with the procedure in administrative cases. When Administrative Order No. 07 was amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Section 7 was retained in Rule III. It is another rule, Rule II, which provides for the procedure in criminal cases. Thus, the phrase "in all other cases" still refers to administrative cases, not criminal cases, where the sanctions imposed are different from those enumerated in Section 7.

It is important to note that the petition filed by Bunag-Cabacungan in CA-G.R. SP No. 86630 assailed only the "administrative decision" rendered against her by the OMB for Luzon. Quoted hereunder is the pertinent portion of her petition:

Believing that she is innocent of the administrative charges against her, your petitioner interposes this instant petition for the review of the administrative decision against her by the Office of the Ombudsman and the denial of her motion for reconsideration thereof.34 (Emphases ours.)

Moreover, the lone issue she submitted to the Court of Appeals for its consideration reads:

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN HOLDING COMPLAINANT GUILTY OF SIMPLE MISCONDUCT FOR THE MISTAKE COMMITTED BY ANOTHER [PERSON] IN THE ISSUANCE UNDER HER NAME OF EMANCIPATION PATENT No. A-347307.35

Furthermore, her arguments all throughout her petition for review before the Court of Appeals centered on how she should not have been found guilty of simple misconduct by the OMB for Luzon. Even the jurisprudence she cited in support of her arguments pertained to "misconduct in office." The same is true with Duyon's Comment,36 which focused on why Bunag-Cabacungan should be judged guilty of misconduct. Duyon actually argued for a more severe administrative punishment and prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to MODIFY the Decision dated December 11, 2003 and the Joint Order dated August 27, 2004 imposing upon [Bunag-Cabacungan] and her husband the penalty of DISMISSAL from the government service for gross misconduct. Alternatively, should the Honorable Court find the punishment to be too harsh, it is humbly asked that they be punished for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service punishable to a maximum period of one (1) year suspension, without pay, in accordance with Executive Order No. 292.37

In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that in the case before us, the Court of Appeals went beyond its jurisdiction by touching on the criminal aspect of the Decision and Joint Order of the OMB for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0111-A and OMB-L-C-03-0125-A. As such, the Court of Appeals' ruling on the criminal aspect of the aforementioned cases is void.38

Xxx."


G.R. No. 172218
November 26, 2014

FELICIANO B. DUYON, substituted by his children: MAXIMA R. DUYON-ORSAME, EFREN R. DUYON, NOVILYN R. DUYON, ELIZABETH R. DUYON-SIBUMA, MODESTO R. DUYON, ERROL R. DUYON, and DIVINA R. DUYON-VINLUAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS and ELEONOR P. BUNAG-CABACUNGAN, Respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion

"xxx.

A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.-When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.39

This Court has defined grave abuse of discretion as such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."40

Xxx."


G.R. No. 172218
November 26, 2014

FELICIANO B. DUYON, substituted by his children: MAXIMA R. DUYON-ORSAME, EFREN R. DUYON, NOVILYN R. DUYON, ELIZABETH R. DUYON-SIBUMA, MODESTO R. DUYON, ERROL R. DUYON, and DIVINA R. DUYON-VINLUAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS and ELEONOR P. BUNAG-CABACUNGAN, Respondents.

A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. - There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory.

"xxx.

The sole issue addressed by our 5 April 2000 Resolution is whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.

Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:

Sec. 27. Effectively and Finality of Decisions. — All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on the following grounds:

x x x x x x x x x

Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman 17 likewise contain a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides as follows:

Sec. 7. Finality of Decision. — where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unapllealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.

It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is no among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim "inclusion unius est exclusio alterus" finds application. The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that "(I)n all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rules 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."

The Office of the Solicitor General insists however that the case of Fabian vs. Desierto 18 has voided Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As such, the review of decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is now governed by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates, under Section 12 19 thereof, the immediately executory character of the decision or order appealed from.

The contention of the Solicitor General is not well-taken. Our ruling in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included in said section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand.

Neither can respondents find support in Section 12, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as follows:

Sec. 12. Effect of Appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

On this point, respondents contend that considering the silence of the Ombudsman Act on the matter of execution pending appeal, the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, which allegedly mandates the immediate execution of all decisions rendered by administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, should apply suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. We do not agree.

A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. 20 Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal in of appeal is perfected 21 or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal become final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. 22 In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.

The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become final and executory, 2 execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule. It is the contention of respondents however that with respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative bodies, the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule with respect to quasi-judicial and administrative agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even pending appeal.

The contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory. Decisions rendered by the Securities and Exchange Commission 24 and the Civil Aeronautics Board, 25 for example, are not immediately executory and are stayed when an appeal is filed before the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code 26 , and the Office of the President under the Local Government Code 27 , which respondents cite, are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be so. The provisions of the last two cited laws expressly provide for the execution pending appeal of their final orders or decisions. The Local Government Code, under Section 68 thereof provides as follows:

Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.

Similarly, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par. (4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.

Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.

Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. Section 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials. Similarly, the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil Service Commission involving members of the Civil Service.

There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. 28

And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. 29 In the instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the President under the Local Government Code or before the Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case.

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the ruling against execution pending review of the Ombudsman's decision grants a one-sided protection to the offender found guilty of misconduct in office and nothing at all to the government as the aggrieved party. The offender, according to respondents, can just let the case drag on until the expiration of his office or his reelection as by then, the case against him shall become academic and his offense, obliterated. As such, respondents conclude, the government is left without further remedy and is left helpless in its own fight against graft and corruption.

We find this argument much too speculative to warrant serious consideration. If it perceived that the fight against graft and corruption is hampered by the inadequacy of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act, the remedy lies not with this Court but by legislative amendment.

As regards the contention of the Office of the Ombudsman that under Sec. 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law," suffice it to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still appealable and hence, not final and executory. Under these rules, which were admittedly promulgated by virtue of the rule-making power of the Office of the Ombudsman, the decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not immediately executory.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 142261
June 29, 2000

GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.

Ombudsman administrative cases; appeal to Court of Appeals, not Supreme Court.

"xxx.

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. 23 was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. 24

We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.

Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. 25 The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.

Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

x x x x x x x x x

Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari. 27

There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent. 28

VI

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great
difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 32

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy. 34

Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy. 35

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.

The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.

Xxx."


G. R. No. 129742
September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/sep1998/gr_129742_1998.html#fnt12

Perjury: probable cause, elements.

"xxx.

Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention is untenable. Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."21 The elements of perjury under Article 18322 of the Revised Penal Code are:

(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent here in that private respondents’ statements in their counter-affidavits in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were not material to that case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

On the Element of Materiality

In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the "main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact xxx."24 To hold private respondents liable, there must be evidence that their assailed statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of inquiry in that case. Petitioner has presented no such evidence. The records are hardly helpful, as petitioner did not furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387.

What is before the Court is a portion of respondent Pascua’s counter-affidavit in that case as quoted by public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution. Admittedly, some inference is possible from this quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioner’s complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that respondent Pascua prevented her from taking part in the 16 July 1998 meeting. However, it would be improper for the Court to rely on such inference because the element of materiality must be established by evidence and not left to inference.25

At any rate, petitioner’s complaint for perjury will still not prosper because respondent Pascua’s statement — that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as petitioner’s and Yabut’s administrative complaint against respondent Pascua before the DECS — is immaterial to the inferred issue.

On the Element of Deliberate Assertion of Falsehood

The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense.26 Here, the Court finds that respondent Pascua’s statement in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that he called the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a deliberate assertion of falsehood. While it was Yabut and some unidentified ACNTS personnel who requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was respondent Pascua’s consent to their request which led to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent Pascua’s statement in question is not false much less malicious. It is a good faith interpretation of events leading to the holding of the meeting.

Regarding respondent Pascua’s allegation in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that petitioner’s complaint was a mere "rehash and duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of the DECS administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua, petitioner has not shown why this is false. Petitioner again did not furnish the Court a copy of her and Yabut’s complaint with the DECS.

Respondent Turla’s statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that respondent Pascua called the 16 July 1998 meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent Pascua told him. Consequently, it was correct for public respondent to hold that since respondent Turla merely repeated what he heard from respondent Pascua, he could not be held liable for making a false and malicious statement.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 144692
January 31, 2005

CELSA P. ACUÑA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), respondents.

Policy of non-interference in Ombudsman cases

"xxx.

We reiterate this Court’s policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.19 We explained the reason for such policy in Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman:20

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.

The Court, in the present case, finds no reason to deviate from this long-standing policy.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 144692
January 31, 2005

CELSA P. ACUÑA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), respondents.

Appeals in Ombudsman cases

"xxx.

Private respondents contend that petitioner filed this petition beyond the ten-day period provided in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.15 Section 27 states in part:

Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — xxxx

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The contention has no merit. Section 27 is no longer in force because this Court in Fabian v. Desierto16 declared it unconstitutional for expanding the Court’s jurisdiction without its consent in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Furthermore, Section 27 relates only to appeals from rulings of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It does not apply to appeals from the Ombudsman’s rulings in criminal cases such as the present case.17

The remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we held in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario:18

The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party [in administrative cases] is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused persons.

However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman xxx is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack [or] excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in dismissing her complaint against private respondents. Under Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner had 60 days from her receipt of the 19 June 2000 Order within which to file this petition. Petitioner received a copy of the 19 June 2000 Order on 13 July 2000. Thus, petitioner had until 11 September 2000 within which to file this petition. Petitioner did so on 11 August 2000. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on time.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 144692
January 31, 2005

CELSA P. ACUÑA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), respondents.

Supervision vs. Control

"xxx.

Last Aug. 27, 2021, resigned DBM Secretary Wendel Avisado told the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that the Procurement Service of the Department of Budget and Management (PS-DBM) “operates independently.” He explained that “we don’t interfere in their day-to-day operations.” Avisado pointed out that the Procurement Service was created in 1978 under Letter of Instructions No. 755, which placed the Procurement Service under the Office of the President. Subsequent issuances attached the Procurement Service to the DBM. In the website of the DBM, the PS-DBM belongs to “Other Offices/Attached Agencies.” This has ramifications on who has direct responsibility over the allegedly overpriced nine purchase contracts amounting to P8.7 billion entered into by the PS-DBM with Pharmally Pharmaceutical Corporation from April to June 2020.

First, under the Revised Administrative Code, the Department Secretary exercises administrative “supervision and control” over the Department. However, the Secretary only exercises administrative supervision, and not control, over agencies attached to his Department. Administrative supervision is the power to “generally oversee the operations” of the agency “without interference with day to day operations.” Administrative supervision does not include the power to review “contracts entered into by the agency in the pursuit of its objectives.” It does not also include the power to “review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions” of the attached agency.

Second, administrative control over an attached agency like PS-DBM remains with the President as head of the Executive branch of government. It is the President who can interfere in the day to day operations of the PS-DBM, and who can “review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions” of the PS-DBM. In case of conflict between the DBM Secretary and the head of the PS-DBM, the Secretary “shall bring the matter to the President for resolution and direction.” In short, the real boss of Lloyd Christopher Lao when he headed the PS-DBM was President Duterte, who legally exercised direct administrative control over Lao when Lao entered into the questioned purchase contracts with Pharmally.

Third, the Department Secretary has authority to designate an officer-in-charge in case of vacancy in an office arising from absence, resignation, or removal of an employee. However, the Secretary must designate as officer-in-charge “an officer or employee within the organization.” When Avisado designated Lao on Jan. 2, 2020, as Officer-in-Charge of the PS-DBM, Lao was not “within the organization” of PS-DBM since Lao’s last government position was Chief Executive Officer of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Thus, Lao’s designation was illegal, and Lao at most was merely the de facto and not the de jure head of the PS-DBM. Only the President can designate an officer-in-charge who is not “within the organization” but is “already in the government service.“ The President may also designate as officer-in-charge “any other competent person” even if not from the government service.

Fourth, Lao obviously enjoys the trust and confidence of President Duterte. In his 2019 State of the Nation Address, President Duterte told the nation that when the “Korean went to Malacañang just to complain why is it that there is no request for delivery” of the frigate, he instructed Bong Go, “Bong, ayusin mo yan.” Go’s office then sent a letter to Commodore Robert Empedrad requesting for a meeting in Malacañang. The letter was signed by Lao, a presidential appointee and Undersecretary in the “Office of the Special Assistant to the President,” the office of Bong Go. Clearly, Lao is part of the inner circle entrusted by President Duterte to handle sensitive matters.

Fifth, as a Palace insider Lao knew that the corporate officers of Pharmally, together with Michael Yang, had met President Duterte in Davao City in March 2017. The RTVM, the media arm of the Office of the President, had released photos and a video of that meeting. Undoubtedly, Pharmally officers have direct access to President Duterte through Yang, the Davao businessman and Chinese national whom President Duterte once officially appointed as his economic consultant.

Lastly, while Avisado has credibly washed his hands from responsibility for the P8.7 billion Pharmally contracts of PS-DBM, he has thrown President Duterte under the bus. President Duterte, as the official exercising direct administrative control over Lao, will have a harder time escaping responsibility for any overpriced purchase contract that Lao may have awarded to Pharmally.

acarpio@inquirer.com.ph. "

Source:

https://opinion.inquirer.net/143723/ps-dbm-operates-independently#ixzz75QlSg0Cz


Read more: https://opinion.inquirer.net/143723/ps-dbm-operates-independently#ixzz75Qpky8Cv
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The Philippine National Red Cross Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law

"xxx.

The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law

The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:

SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a "body corporate and politic," thus:

SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied)

In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,23 the Court explained the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:

We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.

In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.

The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.24 (Emphasis supplied)

In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned or controlled corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were public property which were managed, operated by or under the control of the city, municipality or province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations Act,25 the LWUA has a budget amounting to ₱400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements.26 There is no private capital invested in the Local Water Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts all come from the government, either through transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or the income from such assets or funds.

The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and other personnel of the Local Water Districts are government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered government-owned or controlled corporations not only because of their creation by special charter but also because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water Districts.

Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers,27 is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,28 2,29 3,30 4(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.

The other provisions41 of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine Government’s treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National Society, the Society must be "duly recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field."

In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 175352 (2009)

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_175352_2009.html#rnt20

Philipine National Red Cross is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions

"xxx.

PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions

On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,7 otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.8 The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.9

The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.10 The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read:

WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a convention by which the nations of the world were invited to join together in diminishing, so far lies within their power, the evils inherent in war;

WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the subsequent revision of said convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross Convention);

WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each country of a voluntary organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish supplies for that purpose;

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention;

WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the American National Red Cross which must be terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)

The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles:

1. HUMANITY – The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

2. IMPARTIALITY – It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

3. NEUTRALITY – In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

4. INDEPENDENCE – The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE – It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

6. UNITY – There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

7. UNIVERSALITY – The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)

The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.11

The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.

Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society.12 It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State.

To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:

SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides:

SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. x x x.

Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members already chosen — a select group where the private sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.

The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.

Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,14 the President appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise:

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x

x x x

In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.

x x x

The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.

The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of the President, then such office is not part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,18 the Court explained the President’s power of control over all government offices as follows:

Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.

The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."

Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.

The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.

In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)

An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.1avvphi1

Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination with the public authorities, and the government representatives may take part in decision-making within a National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of a National Society’s active members must remain in a large majority in a National Society’s governing bodies.19

The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing ₱35, ₱100, ₱300, ₱500 or ₱1,000 for the year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,21 reads:

SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said contribution shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes.

Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.

Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC,22 which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 175352 (2009)

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_175352_2009.html#rnt20

Quo warranto

"xxx.

Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition

A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners allege in their petition that:

4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "A."

5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during his incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, having been elected as such during the national elections last May 2004.

6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.

7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x x x

x x x x

10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the Board of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x

11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, law and jurisprudence.

12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and represent himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.

Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayer’s suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 175352 (2009)

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_175352_2009.html#rnt20

"Cause of action" explained

"xxx.

The rule against splitting the cause of action does not apply in a Petition for Certiorari

Petitioner maintains that the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting a cause of action. Accordingly, a Petition for Certiorari is not based on a cause of action but rather the presence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the assailed order.[49]

We agree with the petitioner.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a "cause of action" as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.[50]

On the other hand, a Writ of Certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 will issue when there is grave abuse of discretion committed by a tribunal, board or officer who in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instance of grave abuse of discretion, the court may annul or modify the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and grant such incidental reliefs as the law and justice may require.

Verily, a Petition for Certiorari cannot be based on a cause of action. First, the parties involved in such petition would be the petitioner and the tribunal, board or officer who purportedly exceeded its discretion in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In a cause of action, the parties would be the plaintiff and the defendant who violated the right of the former which he (defendant) had the obligation to respect.

Second, a Petition for Certiorari cannot arise from a violation of a right belonging to the petitioner that the tribunal, board or officer has the concomitant obligation to respect. To reiterate, a certiorari writ will only lie when the tribunal, board of officer commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the existence of a cause of action will be the basis of every ordinary civil action.[51]

Third, a Writ of Certiorari results in the annulment or modification of the proceedings. However, the violation of a right of a plaintiff or breach of obligation by the defendant would give rise to a cause of action that will provide the plaintiff with the right to file an action in court for the recovery of damages or other relief.[52]

Finally, a Petition for Certiorari, being a special civil action, may only be availed of when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Meanwhile, a cause of action is the basic requirement in an ordinary civil action.

Here, the CA held that petitioner violated the subject rule and should have joined all its objections against the August 10, 2012 Order of the RTC in one Petition for Certiorari. The CA explained:

Petitioner is guilty of splitting its cause of action in the filing of the instant Petition. Rule 2, Sections 3 and 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide:

Section 3. One Suit For A Single Cause of Action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. (3 a)

Section 4. Splitting A Single Cause of Action; Effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

It is undisputable that CA-G.R. 127072 is a Petition assailing the contents of the 10 August 2012 Order of the trial court on the issue of whether the plaintiffs are non-suited. The instant action on the other hand, assails the same Order, albeit this time only on the portion resolving the issue of non-applicability of the ICC and the disallowance of the Requests for Admission. Definitely, the Petitioner could have joined all its objections to the assailed Order in a single Petition for Certiorari, but rather elected to file two (2) Petitions thus taxing the energy and the docket of this Court. Thus, the instant action should also be dismissed based on this ground.[53]

The CA arrived at an erroneous conclusion.

Petitioner filed the first petition (CA-G.R. 127072) to question the November 28, 2011 and August 10, 2012 Orders upon the belief that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to declare FITI and Bacalla as not suited. On the other hand, the second petition (CA-G.R. No. 129574) now subject of the instant case, arose from the August 10, 2012 and January 14, 2013 Orders of the trial court which petitioner maintains to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion due to the application of the Interim Rules. Clearly, the said petitions did not allege the RTC to have violated petitioner's right which may be the basis for a cause of action. Instead, petitioner alleged separate occasions of grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in not declaring FITI and Batalla as not suited and in applying the Interim Rules. Both petitions will give rise to an annulment or modification of the proceedings below and will not afford the petitioner with a remedy of damages against the RTC.

Moreover, a Writ of Certiorari may only be availed when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For this reason, We cannot fault the petitioner for filing the second petition because the trial court only ruled on the applicability of the Interim Rules in the August 10, 2012 Order. It is settled rule that a Motion for Reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.[54] Hence, petitioner properly moved for a reconsideration of that portion in the August 10, 2012 Order pertaining to the application of the Interim Rules before directly resorting to a Petition for Certiorari. Accordingly, the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting the cause of action in the assailed rulings.

A final note.

The inaccurate application by the CA of the rule against splitting a cause of action will not negatively impact the efficacy of its July 27, 2015 Decision and March 4, 2016 Resolution. To recall, We affirmed the CA in denying the petitioner's application for a Writ of Certiorari because the Interim Rules apply in the proceedings below. The misapplication of the rule on splitting the cause of action was merely an innocuous mistake on the part of the CA and will not disaffirm our resolve to deny the present petition due to lack of merit.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS.

"Intra-corporate controversy" explained

"xxx.

The Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799 applies to the proceedings in the RTC.

The Court notes that the petitioner does not challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in hearing the complaint filed by the respondents. The controversy lies in whether the trial court correctly applied the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies in its proceedings below.

The Interim Rules traces its roots from Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 which transferred all cases under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate RTC. Under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, the following cases were transferred to the RTC:


a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission;

b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;

c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. (emphasis supplied)

In compliance, the Court approved the Interim Rules on March 13, 2001 and took effect on April 1, 2001.[36] Section 1(a), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules restates the cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A with the addition of derivative suits[37] and inspection of corporate books.[38]

In the assailed Decision, the CA observed that based on the impleaded parties, allegations, and the reliefs prayed for, the complaint concerned the recovery of assets of the dissolved TGICI. It concluded that because of the fraudulent dissipation of TGICI assets caused by the officers, the matter had become an intra-corporate dispute under Sec. 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.[39]

Indeed, the respondents initiated their action under the Interim Rules as shown on the face of the complaint which reads: "For: Devices or Schemes Amounting to Fraud and Misrepresentation Detrimental to the Interest of the Public Under PD No. 902-A and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. 8799 with Declaration of Nullity of Contracts and Specific Performance with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction."[40] But since courts cannot rely on the caption of the complaint alone, and if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction, the complaint must show on its face what the claimed fraudulent corporate acts[41] are which require the application of the Interim Rules. We expounded on this requirement in Guy v. Guy[42] as follows:

x x x. In Reyes, we pronounced that "in cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction." This is because fraud in intra-corporate controversies must be based on "devices and schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors, business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any corporation, partnership, or association," as stated under Rule 1, Section 1(a) (1) of the Interim Rules. The act of fraud or misrepresentation complained of becomes a criterion in determining whether the complaint on its face has merits, or within the jurisdiction of special commercial court, or merely a nuisance suit. (emphasis supplied)

We perused the subject complaint and were convinced that it contained specific allegations of corporate layering, improper matched orders and other manipulative devices or schemes resorted to by the corporate officers in defrauding the stockholders and investors of TGICI.[43] Evidently, these averments meet the standard of specificity required by Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A and Section 1(a)(1), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules.

However, the petitioner remained unconvinced that the Interim Rules applies. It argued that the complaint does not involve an intra-corporate controversy as it failed to satisfy the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. It ventured that since Cielo Azul has a separate and distinct personality, there can be no relationship between the corporation and the respondents as TGICI receiver and investors.

The contention is erroneous.

In determining whether a case is an intracorporate controversy, We resort to a combined application of the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.[44]

Under the relationship test, the existence of any of the following relations makes the conflict intra-corporate: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. For as long as any of these intra-corporate relationships exists between the parties, the controversy would be characterized as intra-corporate.[45]

Meanwhile, in the nature of controversy test, the controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.[46]

The subject complaint specifically alleged that the corporate officers resorted to corporate layering by transferring funds accumulated through investments by the public to TGICI subsidiaries. Such allegation plainly established the relationship between the petitioner as the issuer of shares funneled to Cielo Azul, and herein respondents as court-appointed receiver and investors. Based on this relationship, respondents sought the lower court to pierce the corporate veil and declare Cielo Azul, JAMCOR Holdings, TMG Holdings, Jesus Tibayan and Gelacio as having one personality. Accordingly, We concur with the CA that petitioner cannot take refuge from the defense of being a third party. The CA fittingly explained:

It is also undisputed that there is a right of action vested upon the Receiver of the said holding corporation as well as the investors thereof over the wholly owned subsidiary. The latter is sued in due regard to the allegations on the singular identity of the holding corporation and the wholly owned subsidiary in this case. This right of action by interested parties in the holding corporation over the subsidiary transcends the individual juridical personalities of the said corporations as ruled by the Supreme Court in Gokongwei vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, wherein the right of the stockholder of the parent corporation to inspect the books of the wholly owned subsidiary was upheld. x x x

x x x x

Accordingly, the fact that Prudential Bank (now Petitioner Bank) and the vendees who seem to be third parties do not necessarily convert this action into an ordinary civil action where only the Rules of Court applies. There are sufficient allegations of anomalies in the sale of all the corporate assets (the 630,225 shares of stocks) of the subsidiaries to the vendees with the latter's knowledge and participation and also with the knowledge of Prudential Bank. Thus, the impleading of the vendees and Prudential Bank aside from the subsidiaries and the officers of the corporation is only consequential because of Prudential Bank's and the vendees' participation in violating the investors' rights. What matters is that there is a violation of the Corporation Code and defraudation of those interested therein, i.e., the investing public.

In Spouses Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, the Supreme Court clarified that when it affects the interests of the corporation, i.e., the enforcement of rights and obligations under the Corporation Code affecting the internal or intracorporate affairs of the said Corporation, the same is an Intracorporate dispute. xxx

x x x x

Indeed, in Rivilla vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court citing Abejo, recognized the dispute as Intracorporate as when schemes were resorted to by officers of corporations to defraud investors. x x x[47] (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

As a mere conduit in the alleged fraudulent investment scheme by TGICI, Tibayan and Elacio, Cielo Azul, with TMG Holdings and JAMCOR Holdings, cannot prevent the court-appointed receiver of TGICI from accessing its corporate books and records to recover the assets which have been purportedly dissipated through illegal stock trading. Verily, the nature of the dispute raised by the respondents in their complaint is intrinsically connected with the regulation of TGICI and its subsidiaries.

Considering that the present matter involves an intra-corporate dispute, the CA did not err in affirming the denial by the RTC of the petitioner's belated filing of Requests for Admissions based on Section 1, Rule 3[48] of the Interim Rules.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020 

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS.