Technicality vs. Merits of the Case. Doctrine of Liberality in Litigation.

 "Under the circumstances, the failure to file the appellant’s brief on time rightly deserved the outright rejection of the appeal. The acts of his counsel bound Diaz like any other client. It was, of course, only the counsel who was well aware that the Rules of Court fixed the periods to file pleadings and equally significant papers like the appellant’s brief with the lofty objective of avoiding delays in the administration of justice.

Yet, we have before us an appeal in two criminal cases in which the appellant lost his chance to be heard by the CA on appeal because of the failure of his counsel to serve and file the appellant’s brief on time despite the grant of several extensions the counsel requested. Diaz was convicted and sentenced to suffer two indeterminate sentences that would require him to spend time in detention for each conviction lasting two years, as minimum, to five years, as maximum, and to pay fines totaling ₱100,000.00 (with subsidiary imprisonment in case of his insolvency). His personal liberty is now no less at stake. This reality impels us to look beyond the technicality and delve into the merits of the case to see for ourselves if the appeal, had it not been dismissed, would have been worth the time of the CA to pass upon. After all, his appellant’s brief had been meanwhile submitted to the CA. While delving into the merits of the case, we have uncovered a weakness in the evidence of guilt that cannot be simply ignored and glossed over if we were to be true to our oaths to do justice to everyone.

We feel that despite the CA being probably right in dismissing the excuses of oversight and excusable negligence tendered by Diaz’s counsel to justify the belated filing of the appellant’s brief as unworthy of serious consideration, Diaz should not be made to suffer the dire consequence. Any accused in his shoes, with his personal liberty as well as his personal fortune at stake, expectedly but innocently put his fullest trust in his counsel’s abilities and professionalism in the handling of his appeal. He thereby delivered his fate to the hands of his counsel. Whether or not those hands were efficient or trained enough for the job of handling the appeal was a learning that he would get only in the end. Likelier than not, he was probably even unaware of the three times that his counsel had requested the CA for extensions. If he were now to be left to his unwanted fate, he would surely suffer despite his innocence. How costly a learning it would be for him! That is where the Court comes in. It is most important for us as dispensers of justice not to allow the inadvertence or incompetence of any counsel to result in the outright deprivation of an appellant’s right to life, liberty or property.13

We do not mind if this softening of judicial attitudes be mislabeled as excessive leniency. With so much on the line, the people whose futures hang in a balance should not be left to suffer from the incompetence, mindlessness or lack of professionalism of any member of the Law Profession. They reasonably expect a just result in every litigation. The courts must give them that just result. That assurance is the people’s birthright. Thus, we have to undo Diaz’s dire fate."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO RELLON alias "GENIO", accused-appellant. G.R. No. 74051, November 8, 1988.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

EUGENIO RELLON alias "GENIO", accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 74051, November 8, 1988. 

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/nov1988/gr_74051_1988.html

GENERAL SEARCH WARRANTS

G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020 MERLINA R. DIAZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

"We deny the Petition.

The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution27 and in Rule 126, Section 428 of the Rules Court, viz.: "(1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized."29 The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrant.30

There is no question that the search warrant was issued after judicial determination of probable cause. This Court is thus confined in determining the presence or absence of the fifth requisite element as stated above, i.e., whether the subject warrant specifically described the place to be searched.

"A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution."31 The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to search and whom and what to seize.32 "Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the [court] that the described items are to be found in a particular place."33

Notably, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. Hence, "[a] designation that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness."34

Simply put, the test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met is whether the description of the place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other premises located within the surrounding area or community. A "place" may refer to a single building or structure, or a house or residence,35 such as in the case at bar.

Thus, it has been held that a designation of a place to be searched as "MASAGANA compound located at Governor's Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City ";36 "the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City ";37 or "premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela"38 is sufficient description of the premises to be searched.

The search warrant in the instant case clearly complied with the foregoing standard since it particularly described the place to be searched, which is petitioner's "house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna." The subject search warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched with clear indication that the same was intended to authorize a search of the entire house of petitioner, albeit confined to the area of her house, to the exclusion of the other two structures or buildings similarly located along the street of Gitna. Simply put, the constitutional requirement of definiteness has been met. We therefore agree with the CA when it held, viz.:

In this case, although the house number of petitioner's house was not indicated in Search Warrant No. 97 (12), the description of the place to be searched was sufficient as the police officers who served the same were able, with reasonable effort, to ascertain and identify the house of petitioner at Gitna, Barangay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, as stated in the search warrant. It bears emphasis that informant Jericho Labrador, when asked by Executive Judge Morga, also drew sketches where petitioner's house was located as well [as] the floor plan of her house, which were used by the searching team.39

This notwithstanding, petitioner argued that the warrant was issued on a mistaken belief that the house was a single dwelling unit occupied by petitioner alone. Petitioner thus insisted that the inaccurate depiction of the house's floor plan, and the consequent search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy structure, invalidated the warrant.

In this regard, the records would confirm that the house described in the warrant was composed of and divided into five separate units or rooms each occupied by petitioner, and her four siblings and their families. Petitioner explained that although the units or rooms were contiguous to each other, each unit was a complete household independent of the other and may be entered only through their respective front doors. Considering the foregoing, petitioner stressed that the central issue in the instant case is not whether the police officers who enforced the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched, but rather, whether the description of the place to be searched set out in the warrant was sufficient which would prevent the officers from exercising discretion.

From the foregoing, it would appear that the issue on the requirement of definiteness raised by petitioner is two-tiered – that of the place to be searched, i.e., her home at No. 972, Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, and the interior description thereof. Petitioner persists on the lack of sufficient definiteness of the latter.

While petitioner did not deny that the place actually searched by the police officers is her home in Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, she argued, however, that it was incumbent upon PO2 Avila and Labrador to infonn Judge Morga of an accurate description or floor plan of the house so as to confine the scope of the search within the unit where petitioner actually resided. Considering PO2 Avila's and Labrador's failure to provide Judge Morga a full and accurate description of the house described in the warrant, i.e., that the same was partitioned into five separate units, and that there were other families living in the other units of the house, Judge Morga was led to believe that the area to be searched comprised of the whole house.

Petitioner thus argued that the coverage of the warrant was broader than appropriate considering that the search covered the whole house and was not limited to the unit actually occupied by petitioner. To petitioner's mind, this gave the police officers undue discretion in enforcing the warrant, which they allegedly did when they searched the units occupied by petitioner's siblings, namely, Leomer and Leonora.

In support of her argument, petitioner cited People v. Estrada40 (Estrada) and Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Asuncion41 (Asuncion). In Estrada,42 this Court invalidated the search warrant because it merely indicated the address of the compound where the place to be searched was located, without, however, pinpointing the specific house to be searched from the other buildings or structures which were also situated within the same compound. Along the same lines, this Court, in Asuncion,43 characterized the search warrant as a general warrant since it authorized a search of a compound, which, however, was made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structure, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares."

Petitioner's reliance on the said cases, however, was misplaced as the factual milieus therein are not in all fours with the case at bench. The ruling in these cases were, on one hand, premised on the fact that the subject warrants gave the police officers unbridled discretion to search several, if not all, structures found inside the compounds – enclosed areas of land containing clusters of structures and/or buildings – while probable cause existed in only one of the several structures located in the compounds. Clearly, the warrants in these cases gave the police officers unbridled discretion and, therefore, illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the compounds. On the other hand, the instant case involved a single structure, and, unlike in the Estrada and Asuncion cases, was readily identifiable to the police officers serving the warrant from the other structures similarly located along the street where petitioner's house was located. In other words, the description of petitioner's house was sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other structures located within the surrounding area or community.

What is therefore involved in this case is a singular structure containing multiple family dwellings or units therein – a fact which was discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of petitioner's house was conducted by the police officers. The pith of the issue therefore lies in the validity of a warrant which appears to have authorized the search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy structure containing several units occupied by other persons other than petitioner.

This Court finds that the omission of the warrant to (a) indicate that the place to be searched contained five rooms which were separately occupied by petitioner and her siblings; and (b) confine the search to petitioner's unit is inconsequential and, therefore, does not affect the warrant's validity for the following reasons:

First, the units or rooms where petitioner and her siblings lived all form an integral part of the house, which, as already discussed, was sufficiently described with particularity under the warrant. The rooms inside the house, which were in fact occupied by family members of petitioner, cannot be treated separately as they form part of the house where petitioner actually resided.

Prudente v. Dayrit44 is instructive on this point, viz.:

Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

People v. Tuan45 also teaches that the description of the place to be searched under the warrant described as the "house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City," which contained several rooms, was specific enough and, therefore, satisfied the constitutional requirement of definiteness:

In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough.1âшphi1 There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant's residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.46

Second, even assuming that an ambiguity or inaccuracy in the interior description of the place to be searched may affect the validity of the warrant,47 such finding, which only emerged after the warrant was issued, has no bearing on its validity or invalidity.

That the house of petitioner was composed of several units separately occupied by her siblings was discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of petitioner's house was conducted by the police officers. Notably, PO2 Avila could not have known or detected the multi-unit character of petitioner's house prior to the actual search.

On this point, it has been held that the requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require technical accuracy in the description of the property to be seized, and that a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be described.48 The same principle should be applied in the case at bench. It would be unreasonable to expect PO2 Avila, or an outsider such as Labrador for that matter, to have extensive knowledge of the interior set-up or floor plan of petitioner's house without, however, having apparent authority or opportunity to access the premises prior to the search.

In this regard, the Court holds that the validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the pieces of information made available to Judge Morga at the time PO2 Avila applied for the issuance of the search warrant which, in this case, were sufficiently supported by the sketches of Labrador, and the testimonies of PO2 Avila and Labrador, who were, in fact, personally examined by Judge Morga in the form of searching questions and answers. Quoting Justice John Paul Stevens' opinion in Maryland v. Garrison49:

Those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. Just as a discovery of the contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid when issued, so is it equally clear that the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant. The validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and disclose, to the issuing Magistrate."

G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020

MERLINA R. DIAZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jul2020/gr_213875_2020.html

SEARCH WARRANTS

"In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following assignment of errors:

I.

The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant.

II.

Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had already waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant, the search conducted was still highly irregular, thereby rendering the seized articles as inadmissible in evidence.

Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. He denies waiving the right through his supposed failure to assail the search warrant’s validity during the trial. On the contrary, he claims to have objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of the search warrant.

Even assuming that he questioned the search warrant’s validity only during appeal, Ogayon contends that this should not be interpreted as a waiver of his right. Since an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, any objection made on appeal, though not raised before the trial court, should still be considered.

Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the police team on his premises, pursuant to an already defective search warrant, was highly irregular. He and his spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos allegedly discovered the shabu in the comfort room located outside their house, so they were not able to witness the search. Moreover, he claimed that there were other persons near the premises of his house (and the comfort room) when the search was conducted. Hence, it could not indubitably be concluded that the seized items were under his actual and effective control and possession.

The Court’s Ruling

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the fundamental constitutional rights. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [emphasis ours]

This right has been included in our Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos Constitution20 and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing the Philippines during the American colonization,21 the 1935 Constitution,22 and the 1973 Constitution.23

The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its recognition as a fundamental human right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 to both of which the Philippines is a signatory.25 Both the Covenant and the Declaration recognize a person’s right against arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy and property.26

Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its stealthy encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put in place for its protection are observed.

Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge conducting the examination.27 To substantiate a finding of probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that –

Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statem gether with the affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]

Ogayon’s appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search warrant was defective because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause."28 We find that the failure to attach to the records the depositions of the complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge’s examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules of procedure or statutory requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide new constitutional requirements.29

Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after which he determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The examination requirement was originally a procedural rule found in Section 98 of General Order No. 58,30 but was elevated as part of the guarantee of the right under the 1935 Constitution.31 The intent was to ensure that a warrant is issued not merely on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but only after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses. As the same examination requirement was adopted in the present Constitution, we declared that affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to establish the factual basis for probable cause.32 Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and the examination should be probing and exhaustive, notmerely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.33

The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions and transcript does not necessarily indicate that no examination was made by the judge who issued the warrant in compliance with the constitutional requirement.

True, since in People v. Tee,34 we declared that –

[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.1âwphi1 The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony was presented.35

Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the records that the requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.36

The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the absence of depositions and transcripts, the records indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a statement in the search warrant itself attests to this:

Search Warrant

x x x x

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under oath of the applicant and his witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that respondent, without authority of law, has under his possession and control the following articles to wit:

---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and paraphernalia which are kept and concealed in the premises of his house particularly in the kitchen and in the CR outside his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as described in the sketch attached to the Application for Search Warrant, located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay.37 (emphasis and underscore ours)

Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was substantial basis for that determination.38 "Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched."39

Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records of this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the application for the search warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself,40 could not be found in the records. Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given during trial revealed that an extensive examination of the applicant’s witness was made by the judge issuing the warrant, the testimonies given during Ogayon’s trial made no reference to the application for the search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who conducted the surveillance before the application for a search warrant was made. However, he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know who applied for it.41

The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.

The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayon’s belated objections thereto.

The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to make a timely objection against the search warrant’s validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should be made during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides the manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence obtained thereby:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. [emphasis ours]

We find the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It prioritized compliance with a procedural rule over compliance with the safeguards for a constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights;42 their non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable cause determined after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.

Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; we should not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.43 In People v. Decierdo,44 the Court declared that "[w]henever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver." The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly.

In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was his failure to make a timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress the presentation of the seized items as evidence. This failure alone, to our mind, is not a sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly, and intelligently made a waiver.45 He cannot reasonably be expected to know the warrant’s defect for lack of data in the records suggesting that defect existed. It would thus be unfair to construe Ogayon’s failure to object as a waiver of his constitutional right. In People v. Bodoso,46 the Court noted that "[i]n criminal cases where life, liberty and property are all at stake… The standard of waiver requires that it ‘not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’"

At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court – a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000). The provision was derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals47 to resolve the main issue of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed. In other words, the provision was "intended to resolve what is perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue thereof…."48 It was certainly not intended to preclude belated objections against the search warrant’s validity, especially if the grounds therefor are not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that "all grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived," and that "a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress."

A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly brushed aside belated objections would reveal that the objections were disregarded because they had been cured or addressed based on the records.

In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused asserted that the search warrant was never produced in court, thus suggesting its absence. The Court, however, noted that "there were supposed testimonies of its existence."

In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the issuing judge failed to exhaustively examine the complainant and his witnesses, and that the complainant’s witness (a National Bureau of Intelligence operative) had no personal knowledge of the facts comprising probable cause, but the Court brushed these claims aside. It found that the witness’ knowledge of the facts supporting probable case was not based on hearsay as he himself assisted the accused in handling the contraband, and that the issuing judge extensively questioned this witness. In People v. Torres,51 the accused assailed the validity of the search conducted pursuant to a search warrant as it was supposedly made without the presence of at least two witnesses, but the Court found otherwise, citing the testimonies taken during the trial contradicting this claim. A similar objection was made by the accused in People v. Nuñez,52 but the Court noted the testimony of the officer conducting the search who stated that it was made in the presence of the accused himself and two barangay officials.

The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53 People v. Court of Appeals,54 and People v. Correa55 are without significance to the present case. As mentioned, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals involved the question of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in People v. Court of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand, involved a warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against search warrants during trial is a procedural rule established by jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance with this requirement cannot in any way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a search warrant should be issued upon a finding of probable cause.1âwphi1 Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the validity of the void warrant would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution.

In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.56 With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus, we see no reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, as stated in the joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Lig ity, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the criminal charges against him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 188794, September 2, 2015

HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

September 2, 2015G.R. No. 188794HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/sep2015/gr_188794_2015.html