The petitioners' accusations on the charge of INDIRECT CONTEMPT fail to persuade.

"xxx.

Chairman Brillantes is not
liable for indirect contempt.

Finally, the Court does not agree with the petitioners' claim that former COMELEC Chairman Brillantes acted in a way that would make him liable for indirect contempt.

The petitioners allege that the respondents' refusal to abide by the Court's Resolution dated May 8, 2013 constitutes indirect contempt, as afore-outlined. Said Resolution stated, to wit:

After hearing the issues and arguments raised, the Court Resolved, in open court, to require the parties to SUBMIT simultaneously their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from date or until May 28, 2013.

The Chief Justice, in open court, DIRECTED the Chairperson of the COMELEC to include in his memorandum report of his COMPLIANCE with the undertakings he had made before this Court, including a report on how the COMELEC had proceeded to obtain and secure the source code of all the computerized voting machines used in the elections, how it was able to call the parties to make the same available for their review and how the review was conducted, as well as the discussions it had made with the parties.

Thereafter, with or without the parties' respective memoranda, the case shall be deemed SUBMITTED for resolution.66

Put simply, the order of the Court was for Chairman Brillantes to include in his memorandum the various undertakings he made in open court. Clearly, the only set undertakings promised by Chairman Brillantes were the following: first, to allow review after an interested party applies and complies with all the requirements for review under the resolution, as queried by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, and as confirmed during the oral arguments; second, categorically stating that he and the COMELEC would amend the resolutions to allow interested parties more time to comply with the documentary requirements, while mentioning that this would need to be implemented after the elections; and third, that the respondents would accommodate the petitioners' request to review the source code. All of which shall be reported in the memorandum.

The petitioners' accusations on the charge of indirect contempt fail to persuade. Under the law, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; and

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.67

The Court's review of the records reveals that the respondents did not renege on these undertakings. As to the first undertaking, while the Court questioned and ultimately found that the guidelines promulgated by the respondents went against the law in allowing the source code review, for purposes of the charge of indirect contempt, the Court finds that the respondents discharged their duty in making the same available for review. This is evidenced by the fact that other parties complied with the requirements and were able to review the source code, a fact that the petitioners do not contest.

As to the second undertaking, the respondents promulgated Resolution No. 9657, its purpose solely to grant interested parties time to comply with the documentary requirements, to wit:

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, [R.A.] No. 9369, and other election laws, the [COMELEC] has RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the request for the conduct of source code review, together with the credentials of the reviewer, shall not be filed not later than 01 April 2013, during regular office hours, at the Office of the Clerk of the Commission, [COMELEC], 8F Palacio del Gobernador Condominium, Intramuros, Manila, free from filing fee.68

As to the third, the Court agrees with the respondents that Chairman Brillantes' manifestations in open court, as well as its letter dated May 23, 2013, all sufficiently show that he made the effort to comply with the directive. It was the petitioners who failed to follow up on the respondents' initiative and invitation. While the petitioners indeed wrote a letter, this was done on the day itself of the review. It is not surprising, thus, that the respondents were unable to respond to the letter sent by the petitioners requesting for the immediate appraisal of the source code and the details appurtenant to the review. After all, the letter is dated May 9, 2013, the same day the review was scheduled, at 9:00 a.m., something the petitioners acknowledge. Both events occurred at around the same time on the same day, and it is impossible for the respondents to have replied to the same. It is ironic that the petitioners conveniently allege the lack of time to comply with the requirements of COMELEC, yet expect the respondents to reply the very same morning to a letter sent.

As for the SMS message allegedly sent by Senator Gordon asking for the time and venue of the source code review, there is nothing in the records that confirms the same. If the SMS message indeed existed, it was incumbent on the petitioners to produce it. This they failed to do, and as such, the Court cannot put any stock into this allegation.

In deciding that Chairman Brillantes is not liable for indirect contempt, the Court focuses solely on the undertakings that were directly promised to the Court, not those which the petitioner feels were promised. The Court does not subscribe to the arguments of the petitioners as articulated in their petition and reply, as to the propriety69 of the source code being reviewed only after four days which is allegedly a lack of time. Likewise, the petitioners' speculations that there was no subsequent source code review or even was a source code to review for both the 2010 and the 2013 elections,70 lose its sheen when one considers that other interested parties were able to review the code without a single complaint.

The Court reminds the petitioners that contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.71 It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

In the case at bar, none of the above circumstances are present. This Court also notes that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.72 Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.73 The Court finds that the respondents were able to properly show their compliance with their undertakings, both in their contemporaneous and subsequent actions, as well as in their responsive pleadings to the charge of the petitioners. As a result, the Court is satisfied that the respondents did not commit any acts which would signify possible disobedience and disrespect to the Court, and thus, Chairman Brillantes is not liable for indirect contempt.

Xxxx."

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019.

The petition has ceased to become a JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY and has become MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

"xxx.

Petitioners are not entitled to
the Writ of Mandamus to compel
COMELEC to once again open up
the source code review for the
upcoming elections immediately
for the review of the petitioners
and other similarly situated
parties, as the same has ceased to
become a justiciable controversy
and has become moot and
academic.

As the thrust of its Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, the petitioners firmly advance their narrative that the COMELEC failed to comply with Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 9369 The brunt of the petitioners' grievances lies in the alleged procrastination and negligence in both obtaining the source code, as well as the delay in making the same available for review to all concerned.41 This delay is attributed to the requirements for review as found in the assailed resolutions issued by the COMELEC, which go against the mandate of R.A. No. 8436 to "promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof."

By introducing requirements deemed as difficult to obtain and fulfill before the source code would be reviewable by an interested party, the petitioners advocate that the respondents, in effect, ensured that the source code could not promptly be made reviewable, which would then go against the express provisions of the pertinent statute. Thus, the petitioners pray for Mandamus that would direct the COMELEC to allow the source code review even if there is a lack of compliance or even complete non-compliance for the requirements for review as promulgated by the COMELEC.

To counter the petitioners' claim, the respondents put forth the defense that the strict nature of the guidelines is necessary in order to safeguard the process, and that the COMELEC has the power to regulate the conduct of the review through its guidelines.42

The respondents also posit the view that Resolution No. 9651, being the product of official acts, enjoys the presumption of regularity which all parties interested in reviewing the source codes must observe.43

As a matter of great importance, the Court takes judicial notice44 of the recent Resolution No. 10423 promulgated on September 21, 2018, or the Guidelines on the Conduct of the Local Source Code Review of the Automated Election Systems for the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections by Interested Parties and Groups.

As a result of this new issuance, the dictates of procedural due process behoove the Court to dismiss the prayer for the Writ of Mandamus as to the source code. The Court holds that there has ceased to be a justiciable controversy.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.45 In relation to the foregoing, a case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value, and as a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.46

The reasoning behind the dismissal of a case for being declared moot and academic is clear. Especially for pragmatic reasons, courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.47 It is deemed unnecessary to indulge in an academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.48

In this case, the supervening event is found in the superseding of the assailed resolutions on the source code review with a new resolution, which pertains to the source code review for the upcoming 2019 elections. In Resolution 10423, it is observed that the COMELEC modified the qualifications for the local source code reviewer, to wit:

Sec. 5. Qualifications. The source code reviewer must be duly-authorized by the interested party or group and must be knowledgeable in computer programming languages and must be able to understand computer language preferably on the following programming languages and systems: C/C++, Java application development, Bash, Object Oriented Programming Language, Unix-like systems, and linux operating system.

The prescribed qualification is to ensure that the code reviewer can understand and appreciate the source codes of the AES to be reviewed. The interested parties and groups are expected to choose their reviewers based on this consideration.

Sec. 6. Number of Reviewers; Limitations. Each interested party or group may appoint primary and secondary code reviewers for each system. However, depending on the availability of space at any given time, each party or group may be limited to field only one (1) qualified reviewer at a given time.

The Court also observes that the application process contained in Resolution No. 10423 contains several steps before an interested party may actually get around to reviewing the source code. To wit:

IV. APPLICATION FOR THE LOCAL SOURCE CODE REVIEW

SEC. 7. Procedure. The interested party or group must submit a written request addressed to the Local Source Code Review Ad-hoc Committee signifying its intent to participate including its attachments. The written request must be signed by the duly-authorized representative of the party or group.

SEC. 8. Written Request; Contents. The written request shall contain the following details:

i. Name of the interested party or group;

ii. Intent to participate in the conduct of the local source code review;

iii. Name of the local source code reviewer/s and the latter's credentials;

iv. Signature of the duly-authorized representative of the interested party or group.

For this purpose, interested parties and groups shall completely fill-out Annex "A" of this resolution.

SEC. 9. Annexes to the written request. The written request shall attach the resume of the local source code reviewer specifically mentioning his or her experience in computer programming or related field. Said resume shall be under oath.

For IT Groups, a favorable recommendation from the CAC and/or the DICT shall also be attached.

For Civil Society Organizations, a brief summary of the electoral reforms initiated or supported shall also be attached.

In the event that the interested parties or groups cannot submit the complete requirements, a reasonable explanation must also be attached.

SEC. 10. Approval. All requests filed within the specified period shall be subject to the approval of the Local Source Code Review Ad-hoc Committee. The approval or denial shall be based on the following:

i. Request and its attachments;

ii. Presence of Qualifications;

iii. Date and time of the request received, if applicable; and

iv. Availability of slots/space in the source code review room.

The approval or denial of the request shall be sent to the e-mail address of the interested party or group used in the application.

The approval of the request shall also be posted in the official website of the Commission on Elections.

As this Resolution No. 10423 now governs the conduct of the upcoming elections, and any automated election from here on out unless it, itself, is superseded by another, the cause of action of the petitioners has ceased to exist.

Despite its aforementioned misgivings about the conduct of the COMELEC at the time the consolidated petition was filed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to this important development in the case's factual milieu, the issuance of the new Resolution No. 10423. Thus, as to the source code review, with a mention that the COMELEC should be more circumspect when it comes to its rule-making power, the Court rules that the claims of the petitioners are moot and academic.

Xxx."

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019.

Locus standi in Mandamus suits involving a public right

"xxx.

The petitioners have the
prerequisite locus standi to file the
Petition for Mandamus.

In their Memorandum,27 petitioners Bagumbayan and Senator Gordon state that they have locus standi to file the instant petition. They assert that Bagumbayan is a duly registered political party, while Senator Gordon was a candidate for Senator at the time of the filing, during the May 16, 2013 national and local elections.28

Furthermore, they posit that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, pursuant to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,29 the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere feet that Senator Gordon is a citizen of the country.

On the other hand, while the respondents concede that Senator Gordon has legal standing due to his status as a Filipino voter, they allege that the same does not apply to Bagumbayan.30 The respondents posit that "even if Bagumbayan had legal standing to conduct a source code review, it failed to establish in its petition its capacity to conduct said review, as it did not submit the qualifications of its reviewer."31

The Court agrees with the petitioners. Locus standi, or legal standing, is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental ac that is being challenged.32 The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.33 This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that the Court settle only actual cases or controversies.34

In Mandamus cases, jurisprudence is clear that the requirement of proper standing is properly addressed if the petitioning party has a clear and unmistakable right to compel the performance of the ministerial duty.35 The Court finds that the requirement is satisfied by the petitioners. The petitioners have filed for Mandamus in their capacity as interested parties, Bagumbayan as a political party, and Tan Dem, et. al., as a people's organization created for the purpose of defending democracy in the Philippines. R.A. No. 9369 grants them the right as members of "any interested political party or group" to conduct their own review of the source code. Here, a clear and unmistakable right exists as it is the ministerial duty of the COMELEC to make available the source code for purposes of examination and test by any political party or candidate, or even their representatives, as expressly stated by the law itself, to wit:


SEC. 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 14. Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code for Review. - The Commission shall allow the political parties and candidates or their representatives, citizens' arm or their representatives to examine and test. (Emphasis Ours)

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the respondents that Bagumbayan lost that right when it failed to submit the qualifications of its reviewer, and which allegedly contravened the resolutions of the COMELEC. Section 12 of R.A. No. 9369 does not contain any provision or stipulation stating that the existence of the right to inspect may only come about after an interested party complies with any subsequent guidelines promulgated by the COMELEC. To rule otherwise would mean an unauthorized expanding or even the creation of unreasonable qualifications prerequisite to the review, which goes against both the spirit and letter of the law. Notably, pursuant to the Legaspi36 case, a cause of action exists on the simple basis that they are Filipino citizens and voters asserting a public right. The Court held therein:

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas... But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws x x x.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.37

It is important to note that a Petition for Mandamus has often been held to be proper if there are dire considerations of public welfare and for the advancement of public policy.38 It may also be taken into consideration to avoid future litigation39 and in furtherance of the broader interest of justice and equities.40 The law states that the COMELEC must allow political parties, candidates, and interested parties to examine and test the source code, regardless if those mentioned actually followed the subsequent guidelines as promulgated. Therefore, a cause of action to compel the COMELEC exists for Bagumbayan, as well as for any political party or candidate or their representative, as seen from the express mandate of the law. Thus, all the petitioners complied with the requirement of standing.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent

Intra-corporate controversy: relationship test and nature of the controversy test.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020.

Intra-corporate controversy: relationship test and nature of the controversy test.

“x x x.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)[2] assailing the July 27, 2015 Decision[3] and March 4, 2016 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129574. The CA affirmed the Orders dated August 10, 2012[5] and January 14, 2013[6] rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 197 (RTC), in Civil Case No. LP-05-0212 which refused to apply the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) and denied the Request for Admission applied for by the petitioner.

X x x.

The Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799 applies to the proceedings in the RTC.

The Court notes that the petitioner does not challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in hearing the complaint filed by the respondents. The controversy lies in whether the trial court correctly applied the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies in its proceedings below.

The Interim Rules traces its roots from Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 which transferred all cases under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate RTC. Under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, the following cases were transferred to the RTC:

a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission;

b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;

c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. (emphasis supplied)


In compliance, the Court approved the Interim Rules on March 13, 2001 and took effect on April 1, 2001.[36] Section 1(a), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules restates the cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A with the addition of derivative suits[37] and inspection of corporate books.[38]

In the assailed Decision, the CA observed that based on the impleaded parties, allegations, and the reliefs prayed for, the complaint concerned the recovery of assets of the dissolved TGICI. It concluded that because of the fraudulent dissipation of TGICI assets caused by the officers, the matter had become an intra-corporate dispute under Sec. 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.[39]

Indeed, the respondents initiated their action under the Interim Rules as shown on the face of the complaint which reads: "For: Devices or Schemes Amounting to Fraud and Misrepresentation Detrimental to the Interest of the Public Under PD No. 902-A and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. 8799 with Declaration of Nullity of Contracts and Specific Performance with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction."[40] But since courts cannot rely on the caption of the complaint alone, and if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction, the complaint must show on its face what the claimed fraudulent corporate acts[41] are which require the application of the Interim Rules. We expounded on this requirement in Guy v. Guy[42] as follows:

x x x. In Reyes, we pronounced that "in cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction." This is because fraud in intra-corporate controversies must be based on "devices and schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors, business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any corporation, partnership, or association," as stated under Rule 1, Section 1(a) (1) of the Interim Rules. The act of fraud or misrepresentation complained of becomes a criterion in determining whether the complaint on its face has merits, or within the jurisdiction of special commercial court, or merely a nuisance suit. (emphasis supplied)

We perused the subject complaint and were convinced that it contained specific allegations of corporate layering, improper matched orders and other manipulative devices or schemes resorted to by the corporate officers in defrauding the stockholders and investors of TGICI.[43] Evidently, these averments meet the standard of specificity required by Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A and Section 1(a)(1), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules.

However, the petitioner remained unconvinced that the Interim Rules applies. It argued that the complaint does not involve an intra-corporate controversy as it failed to satisfy the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. It ventured that since Cielo Azul has a separate and distinct personality, there can be no relationship between the corporation and the respondents as TGICI receiver and investors.

The contention is erroneous.

In determining whether a case is an intracorporate controversy, We resort to a combined application of the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.[44]

Under the relationship test, the existence of any of the following relations makes the conflict intra-corporate: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. For as long as any of these intra-corporate relationships exists between the parties, the controversy would be characterized as intra-corporate.[45]

Meanwhile, in the nature of controversy test, the controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.[46]

The subject complaint specifically alleged that the corporate officers resorted to corporate layering by transferring funds accumulated through investments by the public to TGICI subsidiaries. Such allegation plainly established the relationship between the petitioner as the issuer of shares funneled to Cielo Azul, and herein respondents as court-appointed receiver and investors. Based on this relationship, respondents sought the lower court to pierce the corporate veil and declare Cielo Azul, JAMCOR Holdings, TMG Holdings, Jesus Tibayan and Gelacio as having one personality. Accordingly, We concur with the CA that petitioner cannot take refuge from the defense of being a third party. The CA fittingly explained:

It is also undisputed that there is a right of action vested upon the Receiver of the said holding corporation as well as the investors thereof over the wholly owned subsidiary. The latter is sued in due regard to the allegations on the singular identity of the holding corporation and the wholly owned subsidiary in this case. This right of action by interested parties in the holding corporation over the subsidiary transcends the individual juridical personalities of the said corporations as ruled by the Supreme Court in Gokongwei vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, wherein the right of the stockholder of the parent corporation to inspect the books of the wholly owned subsidiary was upheld. x x x

x x x x

Accordingly, the fact that Prudential Bank (now Petitioner Bank) and the vendees who seem to be third parties do not necessarily convert this action into an ordinary civil action where only the Rules of Court applies. There are sufficient allegations of anomalies in the sale of all the corporate assets (the 630,225 shares of stocks) of the subsidiaries to the vendees with the latter's knowledge and participation and also with the knowledge of Prudential Bank. Thus, the impleading of the vendees and Prudential Bank aside from the subsidiaries and the officers of the corporation is only consequential because of Prudential Bank's and the vendees' participation in violating the investors' rights. What matters is that there is a violation of the Corporation Code and defraudation of those interested therein, i.e., the investing public.

In Spouses Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, the Supreme Court clarified that when it affects the interests of the corporation, i.e., the enforcement of rights and obligations under the Corporation Code affecting the internal or intracorporate affairs of the said Corporation, the same is an Intracorporate dispute. xxx

x x x x

Indeed, in Rivilla vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court citing Abejo, recognized the dispute as Intracorporate as when schemes were resorted to by officers of corporations to defraud investors. x x x[47] (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

As a mere conduit in the alleged fraudulent investment scheme by TGICI, Tibayan and Elacio, Cielo Azul, with TMG Holdings and JAMCOR Holdings, cannot prevent the court-appointed receiver of TGICI from accessing its corporate books and records to recover the assets which have been purportedly dissipated through illegal stock trading. Verily, the nature of the dispute raised by the respondents in their complaint is intrinsically connected with the regulation of TGICI and its subsidiaries.

Considering that the present matter involves an intra-corporate dispute, the CA did not err in affirming the denial by the RTC of the petitioner's belated filing of Requests for Admissions based on Section 1, Rule 3[48] of the Interim Rules.

X x x.”

The rule against splitting the cause of action does not apply in a Petition for Certiorari

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020.


“x x x.

The rule against splitting the cause of action does not apply in a Petition for Certiorari


Petitioner maintains that the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting a cause of action. Accordingly, a Petition for Certiorari is not based on a cause of action but rather the presence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the assailed order.[49]

We agree with the petitioner.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a "cause of action" as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.[50]

On the other hand, a Writ of Certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 will issue when there is grave abuse of discretion committed by a tribunal, board or officer who in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instance of grave abuse of discretion, the court may annul or modify the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and grant such incidental reliefs as the law and justice may require.

Verily, a Petition for Certiorari cannot be based on a cause of action. First, the parties involved in such petition would be the petitioner and the tribunal, board or officer who purportedly exceeded its discretion in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In a cause of action, the parties would be the plaintiff and the defendant who violated the right of the former which he (defendant) had the obligation to respect.

Second, a Petition for Certiorari cannot arise from a violation of a right belonging to the petitioner that the tribunal, board or officer has the concomitant obligation to respect. To reiterate, a certiorari writ will only lie when the tribunal, board of officer commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the existence of a cause of action will be the basis of every ordinary civil action.[51]

Third, a Writ of Certiorari results in the annulment or modification of the proceedings. However, the violation of a right of a plaintiff or breach of obligation by the defendant would give rise to a cause of action that will provide the plaintiff with the right to file an action in court for the recovery of damages or other relief.[52]

Finally, a Petition for Certiorari, being a special civil action, may only be availed of when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Meanwhile, a cause of action is the basic requirement in an ordinary civil action.

Here, the CA held that petitioner violated the subject rule and should have joined all its objections against the August 10, 2012 Order of the RTC in one Petition for Certiorari. The CA explained:

Petitioner is guilty of splitting its cause of action in the filing of the instant Petition. Rule 2, Sections 3 and 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide:

Section 3. One Suit For A Single Cause of Action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. (3 a)

Section 4. Splitting A Single Cause of Action; Effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

It is undisputable that CA-G.R. 127072 is a Petition assailing the contents of the 10 August 2012 Order of the trial court on the issue of whether the plaintiffs are non-suited. The instant action on the other hand, assails the same Order, albeit this time only on the portion resolving the issue of non-applicability of the ICC and the disallowance of the Requests for Admission. Definitely, the Petitioner could have joined all its objections to the assailed Order in a single Petition for Certiorari, but rather elected to file two (2) Petitions thus taxing the energy and the docket of this Court. Thus, the instant action should also be dismissed based on this ground.[53]

The CA arrived at an erroneous conclusion.

Petitioner filed the first petition (CA-G.R. 127072) to question the November 28, 2011 and August 10, 2012 Orders upon the belief that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to declare FITI and Bacalla as not suited. On the other hand, the second petition (CA-G.R. No. 129574) now subject of the instant case, arose from the August 10, 2012 and January 14, 2013 Orders of the trial court which petitioner maintains to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion due to the application of the Interim Rules. Clearly, the said petitions did not allege the RTC to have violated petitioner's right which may be the basis for a cause of action. Instead, petitioner alleged separate occasions of grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in not declaring FITI and Batalla as not suited and in applying the Interim Rules. Both petitions will give rise to an annulment or modification of the proceedings below and will not afford the petitioner with a remedy of damages against the RTC.

Moreover, a Writ of Certiorari may only be availed when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For this reason, We cannot fault the petitioner for filing the second petition because the trial court only ruled on the applicability of the Interim Rules in the August 10, 2012 Order. It is settled rule that a Motion for Reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.[54] Hence, petitioner properly moved for a reconsideration of that portion in the August 10, 2012 Order pertaining to the application of the Interim Rules before directly resorting to a Petition for Certiorari. Accordingly, the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting the cause of action in the assailed rulings.

A final note.

The inaccurate application by the CA of the rule against splitting a cause of action will not negatively impact the efficacy of its July 27, 2015 Decision and March 4, 2016 Resolution. To recall, We affirmed the CA in denying the petitioner's application for a Writ of Certiorari because the Interim Rules apply in the proceedings below. The misapplication of the rule on splitting the cause of action was merely an innocuous mistake on the part of the CA and will not disaffirm our resolve to deny the present petition due to lack of merit.

X x x.”

Publication of laws

"xxx.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html

Right to information on matters of public concern

"xxx.

Right to Information

E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 169777

April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html

Executive privilege

"xxx.

Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."65

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68

Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the President’s general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.

Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77 Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.

In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.

Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

Congress; power of inquiry

"xxx.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html

Unpaid Marcos estate taxes

Duterte's greatest gift to the Marcos political dynasty? -

Opinion (Justice Antonio Carpio):

"The Court of Appeals dismissed Bongbong Marcos’s petition on the ground that the estate tax assessment had already become “final and unappealable.” Twenty-four years after the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision, the Marcos heirs still have not paid the estate tax. There are two consequences to this failure to pay the estate tax.

First, any deficiency estate tax earns 20 percent interest per annum until full payment, in addition to a one-time 25 percent penalty for failure to pay within the prescribed period. Thus, the annual interest payable by the Marcos estate is P4,658,721,527, which 30 years after the finality of the assessment on Oct. 12, 1991 adds another P139,761,645,828 to the principal estate tax of P23,293,607,638. There is still the 25 percent penalty amounting to P5,823,401,909, on which the 20 percent interest per annum is also imposed and now amounts to P34,940,411,454. Second, no property of the deceased can be transferred to any of the heirs until the estate tax is paid. Thus, no Marcos heir can transfer any asset of the Marcos estate in his or her name, or sell such asset until all these taxes are paid.

The BIR must renew written demands on the Marcos heirs to pay these tax liabilities once every five years, otherwise they prescribe and become uncollectable. The Ramos, Arroyo, and Aquino administrations have faithfully issued such written demands. Has the Duterte administration done the same? If not, then it is the greatest gift of President Duterte to the Marcos heirs — waiver of a tax debt to the Filipino people now aggregating P203.819 billion."

Read more: 

https://opinion.inquirer.net/144747/tax-debt-of-the-marcos-estate#ixzz77tZ6CgYv

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A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state.

The power of the legislature to inquire into the operations of government;

Our right as a people to take part in government.

JURISPRUDENCE:

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, etc., et. al. vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, etc., et. al., G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (with accompanying cases).

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html

"CARPIO MORALES, J.:

A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."1

History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

X x x.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;

Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

X x x.

Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For [w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

SO ORDERED.


CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
(ON LEAVE)

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO
Asscociate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice 

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice 

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Asscociate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice 

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice 

DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice 

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice."

Constitutional crisis

THE DICTATOR DUTERTE is ready to (a) create a CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, (b) destroy the RULE OF LAW, the CONSTITUTION and the doctrine of SEPARATION OF POWERS or CHECK AND BALANCE, and (c) deepen the destructive POLITICS OF POLARIZATION in the country.

He fears the revelation of the truth about the MASSIVE CORRUPTION in his government.

He must protect the DAVAO MAFIA at all costs, even if it means the TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF OUR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

Otherwise, the evidence of conspiracy, graft, plunder and abuse of power would ULTIMATELY LEAD TO HIS CORRUPT AND AUTHORITARIAN OFFICE.

The psychopathic mastermind is in PANIC MODE.

As his PANIC escalates, he becomes more dangerous, destructive, violent, cruel and oppressive.

He is prepared to bring the country to the status of a FAILED STATE TO SAVE HIS NECK.

The SOVEREIGN FILIPINO PEOPLE, as the CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY, are left with no other fair and reasonable options but to exercise their INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION and their NATURAL RIGHT TO EXPEL A TYRANT to SAVE THE DYING REPUBLIC.

Their options of last resort are clear:

(a) nonviolent nationwide CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE movement,

(b) peaceful but massive PARLIAMENTS OF THE STREETS, 

(c) total WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT by the civil bureaucracy and the military who are lavishly compensated by the hard-earned taxes of the masses, and 

(d) the power of the BALLOT and the RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. 

We humbly advise Duterte to avoid another EDSA PEOPLE POWER REVOLUTION. 

NEWS:

"President Rodrigo Duterte orders the issuance of a memo blocking the attendance of Cabinet members and orders uniformed personnel to ignore arrest warrants issued by the Senate

President Rodrigo Duterte continued to rage against the Senate on Thursday night, September 30, spewing a series of orders that would limit the appearance of Cabinet officials and witnesses in an ongoing probe into the alleged corruption in his administration’s pandemic response.

In his now bi-weekly public addresses, Duterte was furious over hearings at the Senate blue ribbon committee, after its chairman, Senator Richard Gordon, claimed that the panel would continue its investigation “until kingdom come” as witnesses remained “evasive” in answering lawmaker’s questions. Gordon said the chamber had a lot more to dig on questionable pandemic purchases."

Read:

https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-seeks-block-cabinet-witnesses-from-appearing-in-senate-probe-pandemic