Saturday, April 30, 2022
The acquittal of accused-appellant is in order. Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course of action depends on whether the prosecution has presented evidence to establish the guilt of the accused
"The acquittal of accused-appellant is in order. Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course of action depends on whether the prosecution has presented evidence to establish the guilt of the accused
The State insists that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings so that the trial court may comply with the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116.
For his part, accused-appellant insists that he should be acquitted because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. In support thereof, he cited Janjalani80 which ruled that "[c]onvictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment."
Unfortunately, accused-appellant's quote is misleading. While it is true that convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are indeed set aside if the plea is the sole basis of the judgment, it does not automatically result in the acquittal of the accused. Rather, the case is remanded to the lower court for compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.
The issue of the effects of an improvident plea of guilty on a conviction is not novel.
The applicable course of action prior to the 1985 Rules is clear. As stated above, the conviction of the accused simply depends on whether the plea of guilty to a capital offense was improvident or not. An indubitable admission of guilt automatically results to a conviction. Otherwise, a conviction on the basis of an improvident plea of guilt, on appeal, would be set aside and the case would be remanded for presentation of evidence. An exception to this is when, despite the existence of an improvident plea, a conviction will not be disturbed when the prosecution presented sufficient evidence during trial to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existing rules, however, shifted the focus from the nature of the plea to whether evidence was presented during the trial to prove the guilt of the accused.
People v. Derilo81 explained this shift, thus:
Over the years and through numerous cases, this Court has adopted an exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there is no need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in an information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge. Our rulings regarding this principle were expressed more or less in this wise:
Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances were deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime.
We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but more specifically with the consequences thereof. Thus, in People vs. Rapirap, it was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has the following effects:
A plea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the complaint or information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged in the complaint or information and in this sense takes the place of the trial itself. Such plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents and purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for decision. It leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law.
Then, in People vs. Lambino, we prevented the accused in criminal actions from contradicting the outcome of his admission, with our holding that by the plea of guilty, the accused admits all the facts alleged in the information and, by that plea, he is precluded from showing that he has not committed them.
People vs. Yamson, et al. thereafter expanded the application of the doctrine to both capital and non-capital cases:
A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof. It matters not even if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances.
Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr. cited by some of the cases relied upon by the lower court, declared that —
While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstance therein recited, x x x The prosecution does not need to prove the three aggravating circumstances (all alleged in the second amended information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite proof.
With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must have believed that it had acted correctly in presuming the existence of evident premeditation based on appellant's plea of guilty without any proof being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the developmental growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the advent of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the course that trial courts should follow in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty, was introduced into our remedial law with this provision:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
We expounded on this in People vs. Camay with this explanation:
Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.
The presentation of evidence is required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalty.
To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse of discretion.
This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting trial courts in the
earlier Rules of Court sufficient discretion in requiring evidence whenever guilt is admitted by the accused, the Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the accused fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty.82 (citations omitted)
Thus, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for by Sec. 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the prosecution prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of Sec. 3 would become idle and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of criminal liability and aggravating circumstances on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule.83
As it stands, the conviction of the accused shall be based principally on the evidence presented by the prosecution. The improvident plea of guilty by the accused becomes secondary.
Accordingly, convictions involving improvident pleas are affirmed if the same are supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the conviction is set aside and the case remanded for re-trial when the conviction is predicated solely on the basis of the improvident plea of guilt, meaning that the prosecution was unable to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus:
As in the case of an improvident plea of guilty, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard per se does not work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case and enforce an automatic remand thereof to the trial court. In People v. Molina, to warrant the remand of the case it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial —
In People v. Abapo we found that undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by xxx the "attendant circumstances."
Conversely, where facts are adequately represented in the criminal case and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that the guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. Verily, in such a case, it would be a useless ritual to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings.84 (emphases supplied)
Accordingly, this Court has sustained convictions85 involving improvident pleas of guilt because, in any case, the sentence of conviction is supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt independent of the accused's plea of guilty.
However, where the conviction is predicated solely on the basis of an improvident plea of guilty, this Court has consistently chosen to set aside said conviction and, instead, remand the case to the lower court for further proceedings. This was the ruling in an unbroken line of jurisprudence.86 "Further proceedings" usually entails re-arraignment and reception of evidence from both the prosecution and the defense in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116.
In People v. Dalacat,87 this Court, in deciding to remand the case, stated the following:
Given the unchanging state of the three-tiered requisites in Section 3, Rule 116, there is, indeed, no justification for the trial court's failure to observe them.
Thus, we purge the decision under review of its errors and remand the case to the trial court for further re-arraignment, a more incisive searching inquiry and the reception of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, if the latter so desires, in accordance with the foregoing guideposts.88 (citation omitted)
Parenthetically, it is a mistake to assume that an invalid arraignment automatically results to a remand of the case. In People v. Ong (Ong),89 the Court decided the case on its merits despite a determination of an invalid arraignment.
Jurisprudence has developed in such a way that cases are remanded back to the trial court for re-arraignment and re-trial when undue prejudice was brought about by the improvident plea of guilty. The Court explains this course of action in People v. Abapo,90 viz:
We are not unmindful of the rulings of this Court to the effect that the manner by which the plea of guilt was made, whether improvidently or not, loses its legal significance where the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. However, after a careful examination of the records of this case, we find that the improvident plea of guilt of the accused-appellant has affected the manner by which the prosecution conducted its presentation of the evidence. The presentation of the prosecution's case was lacking in assiduity and was not characterized with the meticulous attention to details that is necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense. The state prosecutor in his examination of the victim was evidently concerned only with proving the respective dates of the commission of the repeated rapes, and did not attempt to elicit details about the commission of each rape that would satisfy the requirements for establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt that the offenses charged have in fact been committed by the accused. It is clear to our mind that the prosecution did not discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on the part of the accused, x x x[.]91 (citation omitted)
The Court repeated the rule in People v. Molina (Molina)92 when it held that:
It is also urged in the Brief for the Appellant that an improvident plea of guilty per se results in the remand of the criminal case(s) to the trial court for the re-arraignment of accused-appellant and for further proceedings. We hold that this argument does not accurately reflect the standing principle. Our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se rule that once a plea of guilty is deemed improvidently made that the accused-appellant is at once entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. In People v. Abapo, we found that undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea of guilty, or what People v. Tizon, encapsulizes as the "attendant circumstances."93 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Here, the Court cannot sustain the conviction as there is nothing in the records that would show the guilt of accused-appellant. Neither is it just to remand the case. This is not a situation where the prosecution was wholly deprived of the opportunity to perform its duties under the 2000 Revised Rules to warrant a remand. In this case, the prosecution was already given reasonable opportunity to prove its case against accused-appellant. Regrettably, the State squandered its chances to the detriment of accused-appellant. If anything, the State, given its vast resources and awesome powers, cannot be allowed to vex an accused with criminal prosecution more than once. The State should, first and foremost, exercise fairness.
The records also do not disclose that the improvident plea of guilty jeopardized the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, to the prejudice of either the prosecution or accused-appellant.
Therefore, in instances where an improvident plea of guilt has been entered and the prosecution was given reasonable opportunity to present evidence to establish the guilt of the accused but failed to do so, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, if only to give rise to the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and the presumption of innocence.
Since the prosecution was given four (4) separate hearing dates to present evidence against accused-appellant and, despite these chances, the prosecution was unable to prove his guilt, the Court acquits accused- appellant for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
There is no transcript of stenographic notes which would reveal what actually took place, what words were spoken, what warnings were given, if a translation was made and the manner by which it was made, and whether or not the guidelines for a searching inquiry were duly observed.
"Applying the foregoing principles in this case, it is evident that the trial court failed miserably to comply with the duties imposed by the 2000 Revised Rules. As regards the first duty.... The Court scanned the records of the case to see compliance with the said duty. The search, however, was in vain. The records are barren of any proceeding where the trial court gauged the mindset of the accused when he pleaded guilty.
There is no transcript of stenographic notes which would reveal what actually took place, what words were spoken, what warnings were given, if a translation was made and the manner by which it was made, and whether or not the guidelines for a searching inquiry were duly observed.
The RTC merely stated in its August 20, 2009 Order77 that "[a]ll the contents of the Information as well as the particular crime charged was personally read to accused-appellant in a Cebuano-Visayan dialect."78 The RTC further stated that the court and his counsel explained to accused-appellant the consequences of his plea of guilt and that he will be sentenced and imprisoned. Despite this, accused-appellant maintained his plea of guilty.
Simply, there is no proof whatsoever that the herein judge conducted the searching inquiry required. No other conclusion can be made other than that the RTC failed to discharge its duties. Accused-appellant's plea of guilt is improvident.
What compounded the RTC's strenuous oversight is the fact that the trial court penalized accused-appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to present evidence of his guilt. This is in direct contravention of the mandate of the second duty stated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.
In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that accused-appellant's guilt for the crime of murder was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is beyond cavil that the prosecution did not present any witness, despite being given four (4) separate hearing dates to do so. Thus, the RTC's conviction of accused-appellant relied solely on his improvident plea of guilty.
Lastly, as regard the third requisite, the October 5, 2011 Order of the RTC stated that "[a]ccused[-appellant,] despite the non-reception of prosecution's evidence,] opted not to present any evidence in [sic] his behalf."79 It would appear that accused-appellant waived his right to present evidence under Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules. However, the same Order and the records of the case are bereft of any showing that the trial court complied with the guidelines promulgated by the Court in People v. Bodoso. Such cavalier attitude of the trial court to the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence leaves much to be desired.
The RTC's noncompliance with the Rules of Court is beyond dispute. Both the OSG and accused-appellant agree on this point. The divergence, however, is centered on the effect of such noncompliance. Accused-appellant contends that he should be acquitted while the OSG agrees with the CA's order to remand the case for reception of evidence to prove accused-appellant's guilt."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
The accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
"The accused must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence
The third duty imposed on the trial court by the 2000 Revised Rules is to allow the accused to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence on his behalf in order to properly calibrate the correct imposable penalty. This duty, however, does not mean that the trial court can compel the accused to present evidence. Of course, the court cannot force the accused to present evidence when there is none. The accused is free to waive his right to present evidence if he so desires.
Consistent with the policy of the law, the Court has issued guidelines regarding the waiver of the accused of his right to present evidence under this rule, thus:
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client's right to present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching inquiry" as specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly —
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to —
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time to this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used for this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in English.
In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing procedure even when the waiver of the right to be present and be heard is made in criminal cases involving non-capital offenses. After all, in whatever action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver that he makes if it is to be binding and effective must still be exhibited in the case records to have been validly undertaken, that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. As a matter of good court practice, the trial court would have to rely upon the most convenient, if not primary, evidence of the validity of the waiver which would amount to the same thing as showing its adherence to the step-by-step process outlined above.
Clearly, the rationale behind the foregoing requirements is that courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence in irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times thrown caution to the wind and given up defending themselves out of ignorance or desperation. Moreover, the necessity of taking further evidence would aid this Court in determining on appellate review the proprietary or impropriety of the waiver.76 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)"
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
The plea of guilt made by the accused does not relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
"The plea of guilt made by the accused
does not relieve the prosecution of the
duty to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt
On account of the amendment of the 1964 Rules of the Court, the second duty of the trial court, to require the prosecution to present evidence of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, has become mandatory. Hence, it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.74
The reason behind this requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to produce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.75
Thus, as it stands, the conviction of the accused no longer depends solely on his plea of guilty but rather on the strength of the prosecution's evidence."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
The essence of the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry is the ascertainment of the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
"The essence of the requirement of the
conduct of a searching inquiry is the
ascertainment of the accused's
voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea
The searching inquiry requirement means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony.65 The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.66
Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of lenient treatment, or upon bad advice, or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.''67
A searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress — and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently — either by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.68
Further, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-economic status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. These matters are relevant since they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the crime he was charged with and its respective penalties and civil liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused and has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.69
Simply, the requirement ensures that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and that the accused comprehends the severe consequences of his plea. This means asking a myriad of questions which would solicit any indication of coercion, misunderstanding, error, or fraud that may have influenced the decision of the accused to plead guilty to a capital offense.
Thus, in every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially when he is ignorant with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance, and consequences of his plea.70 In particular, trial courts are mandated to conduct the searching inquiry, thus:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
a. how he was brought into the custody of the law;
b. whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
c. under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.71
Corollary to this duty, a plea of guilty to a capital offense without the benefit of a searching inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry, as required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, results to an improvident plea of guilty. It has even been held that the failure of the court to inquire into whether the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime constitutes a violation of the accused's fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.72
This requirement is a reminder that judges must be cautioned against the demands of sheer speed in disposing of cases for their mission, after all, and as has been time and again put, is to see that justice is done.73"
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
The evolution of the duty of trial courts in instances where the accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense
"The evolution of the duty of trial
courts in instances where the accused
pleaded guilty to a capital offense
Accused-appellant was charged with murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, making said crime a capital offense.37
It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the proscription against the imposition of death as a punishment.38 In People v. Albert,39 the Court ruled that "in case death was found to be the imposable penalty, the same would only have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the prohibition against the imposition of the capital punishment, but the nature of the offense of murder as a capital crime, and for that matter, of all crimes properly characterized as capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code, was never tempered to that of a non-capital offense."40
Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital offense. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant, viz.:
SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and [shall] require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Interestingly, the rule encapsulated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 was not the rule prior to the advent of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The evolution of the rule reveals a dichotomy which the Court now addresses. The development of the rule, as well as jurisprudence, dictates a just resolution of the case.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1940 Rules of Court, jurisprudence has had to grapple with instances where an accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense. In such instances, the Court maintained a policy of restraint in rendering judgment on the sole basis of such plea.
As early as 1903, in U.S. v. Patala,41 the Court cautioned against the acceptance of pleas of guilty and opined that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing pleas of guilty to be withdrawn if the accused does not fully realize the probable effects of his admission:
The pleas of "guilty" and "not guilty" as accepted in American law were unknown to the Spanish law. Under the Spanish law there was what was called "judicial confession," whereby the accused admitted the commission of the act alleged in the complaint, but by so doing the defendant did not attempt to characterize the act as criminal, as is the case with a defendant who pleads "guilty" under American law. It also appears that there are no words in the Tagalog or Visayan dialects which can express exactly the idea conveyed by the English word "guilty." In a case of homicide, for instance, when the question is put to the defendant in either of these two dialects as to whether he is guilty or not guilty, he is asked whether he killed the deceased or not. If he answers that he did kill the deceased, he merely admits that he committed the material act which caused the death of the deceased. He does not, however, understand it to be an admission on his part that he has no defense and must be punished. The case at bar serves to illustrate this fact. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing the plea of "guilty" to be withdrawn; indeed, he must, on his own motion, order that it be withdrawn if, in his opinion, the accused does not fully realize the probable effect of his admission.42
Again, in the 1917 case of U.S. v. Jamad (Jamad),43 this Court noted that "[notwithstanding the plea of 'guilty,' several witnesses were examined, under the well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which contemplates the taking of additional evidence in cases wherein pleas of 'guilty' are entered to complaints or information charging grave crimes, and more especially crimes for which the prescribed penalty is death."44 Hence, the following guidelines were adopted:
We may say then, in response to the request for a ruling on this subject by the Attorney-General:
(1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information.
(2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof.
(3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids the introduction of evidence as to the guilt of the accused, and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime, after the entry of a plea of "guilty."
(4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the prudent and advisable course, especially in cases wherein grave crimes are charged, is to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime.
(5) The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to leave no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to the possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.
(6) Notwithstanding what has been said, it lies in the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge whether he will take evidence or not in any case wherein he is satisfied that a plea of "guilty" has been entered by the accused, with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act.
(7) But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if called upon to review the proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and send back for a new trial, if, on the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused did in fact enter the plea of "guilty" with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of the act.45
From the foregoing, it is evident that this jurisdiction places a premium on ensuring that an accused pleading guilty to a grave crime understands his plea and the possible consequences thereof. Further, this Court expressly recognized the wisdom in receiving evidence in such cases despite the fact that Sec. 3146 of General Order No. 5847 contemplated the reception of evidence only in cases where a plea of not guilty has been entered.
The Jamad guidelines became the standard for trial courts when confronted with similar circumstances. It must be noted, however, that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty remained discretionary on the part of the trial court. In fact, convictions solely on the basis of a plea of guilty were upheld by this Court.
In U.S. v. Burlado,48 this Court affirmed therein accused's conviction for the crime of qualified theft on the strength of his plea of guilty. The Court explained that "[a] plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty. (United States v. Dineros, 18 Phil. 566 (1911); United States v. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 (1917).) The defendant having admitted his guilt of the facts charged in the complaint, the only question left for decision is the penalty"49
The 1940 Rules of Court, the earliest progenitor of the 2000 Revised Rules, extended the same level of protection. Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 5. Plea of Guilty — Determination of Punishment. — Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed.50
The 1964 version of the Rules of Court reproduced this section verbatim.51 Thus, when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court may hear witnesses for purposes of determining the punishment to be imposed; the guilt of the accused was a forgone conclusion. The rule seemed to institutionalize Jamad as shown by the discretionary nature of the hearing.
Accordingly, in People v. Ng Pek,52 this Court stated that "[t]he record shows that when the case was called for the arraignment of the accused on November 3, 1947, the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and then and there entered the plea of guilty. That plea necessarily foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself and left the court with no other alternative than to impose the penalty prescribed by law."53
In the same breath, the Court, in People v. Santa Rosa,54 upheld the conviction of therein accused for illegal possession of a firearm due to his plea of guilty. It stated that "[t]he general rule is that 'a plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty."55
Finally, in People v. Acosta,56 which involved the imposition of the supreme penalty of death for the crime of robbery with homicide, this Court upheld the conviction and penalty imposed and stated that:
"x x x the essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information; that when formally entered, such a plea is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof; and that while it may be prudent and advisable in some cases, especially where grave crimes are charged, to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime nevertheless it lies in the sound discretion of the court whether to take evidence or not in any case where it is satisfied that the plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act. (citations omitted)"57
Clearly, to this point, the reception of evidence when an accused pleads guilty depended on the sound discretion of the trial court.
However, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules) introduced a paradigm shift to the formerly discretionary role of trial courts when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The 1985 version of the rule,58 as amended, reads:
SECTION 3. Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense; Reception of Evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (5a, R-118)
The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient points of the 1985 amendment. Hence, at present, the three (3)-fold duty of the trial court in instances where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense is as follows: (1) conduct a searching inquiry, (2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of culpability, and (3) allow the accused to present evidence on his behalf.
The present rules formalized the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry as to the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Further, it made mandatory the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. Most importantly, the present rules require that the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Evidently, starting with the 1985 Rules, the accused may no longer be convicted for a capital offense on the sole basis of his plea of guilty.
The Court acknowledged the paradigm shift in People v. Lagarto,59 thus:
Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishments shall be imposed." The trial court in a criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged in the information, without the necessity of taking testimony. (US v. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs. Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of Court, however, decrees that where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules of Court).60 (emphasis supplied)
It is equally important to note that the 1985 Rules retained the directive that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense is discretionary on the part of the trial court.
This is encapsulated in Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules.61 The 2000 Revised Rules adopted Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules verbatim.
Considering the mandatory nature of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, this Court, in People v. Gambao (Gambao),62 restated the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense as follows:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.63
Gambao also explained the rationale for these duties, thus:
Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.64 (emphasis supplied). "
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
courts in instances where the accused
pleaded guilty to a capital offense
Accused-appellant was charged with murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, making said crime a capital offense.37
It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the proscription against the imposition of death as a punishment.38 In People v. Albert,39 the Court ruled that "in case death was found to be the imposable penalty, the same would only have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the prohibition against the imposition of the capital punishment, but the nature of the offense of murder as a capital crime, and for that matter, of all crimes properly characterized as capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code, was never tempered to that of a non-capital offense."40
Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital offense. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant, viz.:
SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and [shall] require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Interestingly, the rule encapsulated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 was not the rule prior to the advent of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The evolution of the rule reveals a dichotomy which the Court now addresses. The development of the rule, as well as jurisprudence, dictates a just resolution of the case.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1940 Rules of Court, jurisprudence has had to grapple with instances where an accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense. In such instances, the Court maintained a policy of restraint in rendering judgment on the sole basis of such plea.
As early as 1903, in U.S. v. Patala,41 the Court cautioned against the acceptance of pleas of guilty and opined that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing pleas of guilty to be withdrawn if the accused does not fully realize the probable effects of his admission:
The pleas of "guilty" and "not guilty" as accepted in American law were unknown to the Spanish law. Under the Spanish law there was what was called "judicial confession," whereby the accused admitted the commission of the act alleged in the complaint, but by so doing the defendant did not attempt to characterize the act as criminal, as is the case with a defendant who pleads "guilty" under American law. It also appears that there are no words in the Tagalog or Visayan dialects which can express exactly the idea conveyed by the English word "guilty." In a case of homicide, for instance, when the question is put to the defendant in either of these two dialects as to whether he is guilty or not guilty, he is asked whether he killed the deceased or not. If he answers that he did kill the deceased, he merely admits that he committed the material act which caused the death of the deceased. He does not, however, understand it to be an admission on his part that he has no defense and must be punished. The case at bar serves to illustrate this fact. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the trial judge should freely exercise his discretion in allowing the plea of "guilty" to be withdrawn; indeed, he must, on his own motion, order that it be withdrawn if, in his opinion, the accused does not fully realize the probable effect of his admission.42
Again, in the 1917 case of U.S. v. Jamad (Jamad),43 this Court noted that "[notwithstanding the plea of 'guilty,' several witnesses were examined, under the well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which contemplates the taking of additional evidence in cases wherein pleas of 'guilty' are entered to complaints or information charging grave crimes, and more especially crimes for which the prescribed penalty is death."44 Hence, the following guidelines were adopted:
We may say then, in response to the request for a ruling on this subject by the Attorney-General:
(1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information.
(2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof.
(3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids the introduction of evidence as to the guilt of the accused, and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime, after the entry of a plea of "guilty."
(4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the prudent and advisable course, especially in cases wherein grave crimes are charged, is to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime.
(5) The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to leave no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to the possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.
(6) Notwithstanding what has been said, it lies in the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge whether he will take evidence or not in any case wherein he is satisfied that a plea of "guilty" has been entered by the accused, with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act.
(7) But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if called upon to review the proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and send back for a new trial, if, on the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused did in fact enter the plea of "guilty" with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of the act.45
From the foregoing, it is evident that this jurisdiction places a premium on ensuring that an accused pleading guilty to a grave crime understands his plea and the possible consequences thereof. Further, this Court expressly recognized the wisdom in receiving evidence in such cases despite the fact that Sec. 3146 of General Order No. 5847 contemplated the reception of evidence only in cases where a plea of not guilty has been entered.
The Jamad guidelines became the standard for trial courts when confronted with similar circumstances. It must be noted, however, that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty remained discretionary on the part of the trial court. In fact, convictions solely on the basis of a plea of guilty were upheld by this Court.
In U.S. v. Burlado,48 this Court affirmed therein accused's conviction for the crime of qualified theft on the strength of his plea of guilty. The Court explained that "[a] plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty. (United States v. Dineros, 18 Phil. 566 (1911); United States v. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 (1917).) The defendant having admitted his guilt of the facts charged in the complaint, the only question left for decision is the penalty"49
The 1940 Rules of Court, the earliest progenitor of the 2000 Revised Rules, extended the same level of protection. Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 5. Plea of Guilty — Determination of Punishment. — Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed.50
The 1964 version of the Rules of Court reproduced this section verbatim.51 Thus, when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court may hear witnesses for purposes of determining the punishment to be imposed; the guilt of the accused was a forgone conclusion. The rule seemed to institutionalize Jamad as shown by the discretionary nature of the hearing.
Accordingly, in People v. Ng Pek,52 this Court stated that "[t]he record shows that when the case was called for the arraignment of the accused on November 3, 1947, the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and then and there entered the plea of guilty. That plea necessarily foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself and left the court with no other alternative than to impose the penalty prescribed by law."53
In the same breath, the Court, in People v. Santa Rosa,54 upheld the conviction of therein accused for illegal possession of a firearm due to his plea of guilty. It stated that "[t]he general rule is that 'a plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty."55
Finally, in People v. Acosta,56 which involved the imposition of the supreme penalty of death for the crime of robbery with homicide, this Court upheld the conviction and penalty imposed and stated that:
"x x x the essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information; that when formally entered, such a plea is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof; and that while it may be prudent and advisable in some cases, especially where grave crimes are charged, to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime nevertheless it lies in the sound discretion of the court whether to take evidence or not in any case where it is satisfied that the plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act. (citations omitted)"57
Clearly, to this point, the reception of evidence when an accused pleads guilty depended on the sound discretion of the trial court.
However, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules) introduced a paradigm shift to the formerly discretionary role of trial courts when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The 1985 version of the rule,58 as amended, reads:
SECTION 3. Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense; Reception of Evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (5a, R-118)
The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient points of the 1985 amendment. Hence, at present, the three (3)-fold duty of the trial court in instances where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense is as follows: (1) conduct a searching inquiry, (2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of culpability, and (3) allow the accused to present evidence on his behalf.
The present rules formalized the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry as to the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Further, it made mandatory the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. Most importantly, the present rules require that the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Evidently, starting with the 1985 Rules, the accused may no longer be convicted for a capital offense on the sole basis of his plea of guilty.
The Court acknowledged the paradigm shift in People v. Lagarto,59 thus:
Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishments shall be imposed." The trial court in a criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged in the information, without the necessity of taking testimony. (US v. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs. Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of Court, however, decrees that where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules of Court).60 (emphasis supplied)
It is equally important to note that the 1985 Rules retained the directive that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense is discretionary on the part of the trial court.
This is encapsulated in Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules.61 The 2000 Revised Rules adopted Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules verbatim.
Considering the mandatory nature of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, this Court, in People v. Gambao (Gambao),62 restated the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense as follows:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.63
Gambao also explained the rationale for these duties, thus:
Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.64 (emphasis supplied). "
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
"Accused-appellant availed of the
wrong remedy
Procedurally, it must be noted that accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the May 8, 2018 CA Decision before this Court.
He filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, which provides:
SECTION 13. Certification or Appeal of Cases to Supreme Court. —
x x x x
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Here, the CA Decision annulled and set aside the RTC conviction and ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Notably, the assailed CA Decision did not affirm the conviction or the penalty imposed by the RTC. Thus, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 is not applicable to the case at bench.
Instead, accused-appellant should have filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the CA Decision pursuant to Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules, which expressly provides that "[e]xcept as provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45."
Accordingly, the remedy available to accused-appellant to question the CA Decision is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It is an oft-repeated rule that appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court except when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, in which case the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal before the CA.36 Evidently, accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal to question the May 8, 2018 CA Decision.
Nonetheless, this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, shall treat the instant ordinary appeal as an appeal by certiorari so as to resolve the substantive issues with finality."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
Right reason and justice
"For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and ONE LAW which establishes this JUSTICE. This law is RIGHT REASON, which is the TRUE RULE of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked."
— Marcus Tullius CICERO
"In addition, the Court remains mindful of the fact that the State possesses vast powers and has immense resources at its disposal. Indeed, as the Court held in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, the individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-a-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government and his only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES under the BILL OF RIGHTS which shield him in times of need."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A. "DINDO," ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, EN BANC.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_241257_2020.html
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