Mandatory "unbroken chain of custody of evidence" under Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MUSTAFA SALI Y ALAVVADDIN A.K.A. "TAPANG/PANG," Accused-Appellant.  G.R. No. 236596,  January 29, 2020.  

"x x x. 

The prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized sachets of shabu from the time they were recovered from Sali up to the time they were presented in court. Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,21 which implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines chain of custody as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non­ compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall, be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

In the present case, the physical inventory and photograph, as evidenced by the Certificate of inventory,22 were done at the PDEA, Regional Office 9, Upper Calarian, Zamboanga City, and not where the buy-bust operation was conducted. Although these processes may be excused in cases where the safety and security of the apprehending officers, witnesses required by law and item seized are threatened by immediate danger, the present case is not one of those. The allegation that the physical inventory and photograph were not done in the crime scene because of security reason will not suffice. The prosecution failed to expound what security threats the law enforcement agents were facing at the time of the buy-bust operation.

In the Joint-Affidavit of Arrest of IO1 Lanza and IO2 Natividad, it was mentioned that it was only after Sali was brought to their office, which is at the PDEA, Regional Office 9, when the proper documentation happened and not immediately upon seizure and arrest. There is also no justification contained in the Joint-Affidavit of Arrest of why the physical inventory and photograph were done away from the crime scene. It is hard to imagine that the apprehending officers were able to mark the items seized at the crime scene but were not able to photograph the same.

Moreover, it is apparent from the Certificate of Inventory that it was signed by the representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, and by an elected public official, but there is no signature of Sali or his representative. No evidence was proffered to indicate that the inventory was conducted in the presence of Sali or his duly authorized representative. The photographs submitted as evidence could not conclusively determine whether Sali was present during the inventory.

Hence, the prosecution failed to prove valid causes for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. Worse, there is no showing that earnest efforts were done to secure the attendance of Sali 's representative. The witnesses' testimonies in open court and in the Joint-Affidavit miserably failed to mention the causes for non­ compliance with Section 21.

The Court stressed in People of the Philippines v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:23

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non­ compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.

The non-observance of the procedure mandated by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, casts serious doubt if the illegal drugs presented in court are the same illegal drugs seized from Sali. It is worthy to note the quantities of the illegal drugs seized which are only 0.0241 gram and 0.0155 gram. They are extremely small amounts which are highly susceptible to planting and tampering. This is the very reason why strict adherence to Section 21 is a must.

X x x. "

Robbery with rape - "Finally, for the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery that was accompanied by rape. The facts do not bear out that the robbery was a mere afterthought, considering that AAA testified that accused-appellant "took time to disable her and then got away with her personal belongings."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PIO SALEN, JR. Y SENA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 231013,  January 29, 2020. 

"x x x. 

For this Court's resolution is the lone issue of whether or not accused-appellant Pio Salen, Jr. y Sena is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape.

This Court dismisses the appeal and affirms accused-appellant's conviction.

Great respect is given to the trial court's factual findings, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This is the general rule, unless the lower courts have "overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the case."42

This case is no exception. A scrutiny of the records shows no cogent reason for this Court to reverse the Regional Trial Court's findings and assessment of the witnesses' credibility, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The crime of robbery with rape is punished under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659:

ARTICLE 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

The elements of robbery with rape are the following:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.43

Here, the prosecution has sufficiently showed that the elements of the crime are present.

AAA testified clearly and unequivocally to how accused-appellant raped then robbed her. While her testimony was uncorroborated, this Court has ruled in a plethora of cases that "[t]he victim's testimony alone, if credible, suffices to convict."44 The testimony of AAA, whom the trial court found to be a credible witness, was clear and straightforward.

Accused-appellant admitted that he had sex with AAA-insisting that it was consensual-and denied robbing her. However, these self-serving, unsubstantiated defenses of denial fail against the victim's positive identification.

What further bolsters the prosecution's case is the medico-legal officer's corroborative testimony. The medico-legal report showed that AAA had sustained "hematoma, abrasions, [and] lacerated and punctured wounds all over her body."45 These findings corroborate AAA's testimony that "accused-appellant stabbed her with a pointed weapon and inflicted force and violence against her in order for her to submit to him."46

The records back the trial court's ruling. Thus, contrary to accused­ appellant's contention, there is no reason to believe that the Regional Trial Court's presiding judge was biased.

Finally, for the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery that was accompanied by rape. The facts do not bear out that the robbery was a mere afterthought, considering that AAA testified that accused-appellant "took time to disable her and then got away with her personal belongings."47

In sum, the prosecution established accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He was correctly convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

X x x." 

Evident premeditation not present

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020.

"x x x. 

Meanwhile, to substantiate the claim of evident premeditation, this Court instructed in People v. Borbon70 that it is indispensable that the facts on "how and when the plan to kill was hatched"71 are presented into evidence. In People v. Ordona,72 we added that "[t]he requirement of deliberate planning should not be based merely on inferences and presumptions but on clear evidence."73

Here, the prosecution failed to establish in its version of the events that accused-appellant and his family members had schemed to kill Villalobos. Fresado's testimony merely showed that Villalobos followed Lorna to Delpan Bridge, and that he was later attacked by accused-appellant, Lorna, and Lorna's husband. The Regional Trial Court merely inferred that there was a plan in place because accused-appellant's act of stabbing Villalobos five (5) times implied that "[s]ufficient time elapsed from the time [accused-appellant] determined to kill the victim up to the time he actually committed the act[.]"74 In fact, no evidence was presented to show the how and when of the plan to kill Villalobos.

Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the Regional Trial Court's finding of evident premeditation:

The prosecution failed to establish by clear and positive evidence the time when the accused-appellant resolved to kill the accused (sic) with respect to the time when it was actually accomplished; mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient. Also, mere determination to commit the crime does not of itself establish evident premeditation for it must appear, not only that the accused made a decision to commit the crime prior to the moment of execution, but also that his decision was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection or persistent attempt. Apropos, there is much to be desired from David 's testimony on this respect.75 (Citations omitted)

Nonetheless, because treachery is present in the killing, accused­ appellant's conviction for murder is affirmed. Moreover, this Court modifies the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each, in accordance with People v. Jugueta.76

WHEREFORE, the February 18, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06744 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Greg Antonio y Pableo @ Tokmol is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Arthuro B. Villalobos, civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages worth P100,000.00 each. All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.77

X x x. "

Murder and treachery - "Treachery is defined as "the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his [or her] part." To substantiate its allegation of treachery, the prosecution must prove: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him."

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020.

"x x x. 

Accused-appellant was charged with murder, which is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.

With evident premeditation.

With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

The Regional Trial Court found that Villalobos' killing was attended by treachery and evident premeditation, thereby qualifying it to murder.64 For its part, the Court of Appeals only appreciated treachery, ruling that there was a want of evidence for evident premeditation.65

The Court of Appeals is correct. Only treachery is present here.

Treachery is defined as "the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his [or her] part."66 To substantiate its allegation of treachery, the prosecution must prove: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him."67

Here, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found that treachery attended accused-appellant's attack on Villalobos. The Court of Appeals held:

Clearly, treachery in this case is evident from the fact that: accused-appellant grabbed the victim's arm by surprise and simultaneously stabbing him with a foot-long knife despite being unarmed. To the Court, these are methods employed which rendered Arthuro helpless as it left him with no opportunity to defend himself or even to retaliate; ultimately causing his death.68 (Citation omitted)

The lower courts' finding of treachery finds substantial basis in Fresado's testimony, which both courts found to be convincing and believable.69

X x x. "

Factual findings of lower courts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020.

"x x x. 

This Court sees no reason to reverse the factual findings of the lower courts. After all, when it comes to the credibility of witnesses, the trial court's findings and its calibration of their testimonies' probative weight are accorded high respect and even finality. The trial court's unique vantage point allows it to observe the witnesses during trial, putting it in the best position to determine whether a witness is telling the truth.60

In People v. Cirbeto,61 this Court underscored that an appellate court can only overturn the trial court's factual findings and replace it with its own factual findings if "there is a showing that the [trial court] overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case."62 This rule "finds an even more stringent application where the findings of the [trial court] are sustained by the [Court of Appeals]."63

X x x." 

Self-defense - "An admission of self-defense or defense of a relative frees the prosecution from the burden of proving that the accused committed the act charged against him or her. The burden is shifted to the accused to prove that his or her act was justified."

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020.

"x x x.

Accused-appellant's defense centers on his claim of self-defense and defense of his sister, invoking the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

An admission of self-defense or defense of a relative frees the prosecution from the burden of proving that the accused committed the act charged against him or her. The burden is shifted to the accused to prove that his or her act was justified:

It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.42

For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be appreciated in the accused's favor, the accused must prove the following: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense."43 The justifying circumstance of defense of a relative likewise requires the first two (2) requisites, but in lieu of the third requirement, it requires that "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein."44

The first requisite of unlawful aggression is defined as the actual or imminent threat to the person invoking self-defense.45 This requirement is an indispensable condition of both self-defense and defense of a relative; after all, if there is no unlawful aggression, the assailant would have nothing to prevent or repel.46 In People v. Caratao,47 this Court emphasized that if unlawful aggression is not proven, "self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present."48

As for the second requisite, "reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel such aggression" envisions a rational equivalence between the perceived danger and the means employed to repel the attack.49 This Court in People v. Encomienda50 recognized that in circumstances that lead to self-defense or defense of a relative, the instinct for self-preservation will outweigh-rational thinking.51 Thus, "when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences."52

Finally, the third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation requires the person invoking self-defense to not have antagonized the attacker.53 This Court explained in People v. Nabora54 that a provocation is deemed sufficient if it is "adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity."55

X x x."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020.

Whether the Deed of Sale is invalid because it does not appear in a public document

 

THE ESTATE OF PEDRO C. GONZALES and HEIRS OF PEDRO C. GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF MARCOS PEREZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 169681, November 5, 2009.

 

“On the question of whether the subject Deed of Sale is invalid on the ground that it does not appear in a public document, Article 1358 of the same Code enumerates the acts and contracts that should be embodied in a public document, to wit:

 

Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:

 

(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405;

 

(2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains;

 

(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person; and

 

(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document.

 

All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405.

 

On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 1403 of the Civil Code provide as follows:

 

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

 

x x x x

 

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

 

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;

 

x x x x

 

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein; x x x27

 

Under Article 1403(2), the sale of real property should be in writing and subscribed by the party charged for it to be enforceable.28 In the case before the Court, the Deed of Sale between Pedro and Marcos is in writing and subscribed by Pedro and his wife Francisca; hence, it is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

 

However, not having been subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, the Deed of Sale is not a public document and, therefore, does not comply with Article 1358 of the Civil Code.

 

Nonetheless, it is a settled rule that the failure to observe the proper form prescribed by Article 1358 does not render the acts or contracts enumerated therein invalid. It has been uniformly held that the form required under the said Article is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but merely for convenience.29 The Court agrees with the CA in holding that a sale of real property, though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is, nevertheless, valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate produces legal effects between the parties.30 Stated differently, although a conveyance of land is not made in a public document, it does not affect the validity of such conveyance. Article 1358 does not require the accomplishment of the acts or contracts in a public instrument in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy.31 Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA did not err in ruling that the contract of sale between Pedro and Marcos is valid and binding.”

Whether the Deed of Sale is authentic and duly executed.

 

THE ESTATE OF PEDRO C. GONZALES and HEIRS OF PEDRO C. GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF MARCOS PEREZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 169681, November 5, 2009.

 

“In their second assignment of error, petitioners question the authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Marcos. Petitioners also argue that even assuming that Pedro actually executed the subject Deed of Sale, the same is not valid because it was not notarized as required under the provisions of Articles 1403 and 1358 of the Civil Code.

 

The Court is not persuaded.

 

The RTC, in its abbreviated discussion of the questions raised before it, did not touch on the issue of whether the Deed of Sale between Pedro and Marcos is authentic and duly executed. However, the CA, in its presently assailed Decision, adequately discussed this issue and ruled as follows:

 

x x x In the present case, We are convinced that plaintiffs-appellants [herein respondents] have substantially proven that Pedro, indeed, sold the subject property to Marcos for ₱9,378.75. The fact that no receipt was presented to prove actual payment of consideration, in itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be conclusive since consideration is always presumed. Likewise, the categorical statement in the trial court of Manuel P. Bernardo, one of the witnesses in the Deed of Sale, that he himself saw Pedro sign such Deed lends credence. This was corroborated by another witness, Guillermo Flores. Although the defendants-appellees [herein petitioners] are assailing the genuineness of the signatures of their parents on the said Deed, they presented no evidence of the genuine signatures of their parents as would give this Court a chance to scrutinize and compare it with the assailed signatures. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules.24

 

In the instant petition, petitioners would have us review the factual determinations of the CA. However, settled is the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and only questions of law are the proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari in this Court.25 While there are exceptions to this rule,26 the Court finds that the instant case does not fall under any of them. Hence, the Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of the CA, which are supported by evidence on record.”

The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.

 

THE ESTATE OF PEDRO C. GONZALES and HEIRS OF PEDRO C. GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF MARCOS PEREZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 169681, November 5, 2009.

 

“Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides:

 

The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.

 

In conjunction with the above-stated provision, Article 1497 of the Civil Code states that:

 

The thing sold shall be understood as delivered when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.

 

In the present case, there is no dispute that Pedro took control and possession of the said lot immediately after his bid was accepted by the Municipal Government of Marikina. In fact, herein petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim admit that both Pedro and Marcos, together with their respective heirs, were already occupying the subject property even before the same was sold to Pedro and that, after buying the same, Pedro allowed Marcos and his family to stay thereon.21 This only shows that upon perfection of the contract of sale between the Municipality of Marikina and Pedro, the latter acquired ownership of the subject property by means of delivery of the same to him.

 

Hence, the issuance of TCT No. 223361, as well as the execution of the Deed of Absolute Transfer of Real Property on February 7, 1992 by the Municipal Mayor of Marikina, could not be considered as the operative acts which transferred ownership of Lot C to Pedro. Pedro already acquired ownership of the subject property as early as 1966 when the same was delivered to him by the Municipality of Marikina, and the execution of the Deed of Absolute Transfer of Real Property as well as the consequent issuance of TCT No. 223316 are simply a confirmation of such ownership.1avvphi1

 

It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that the Deed of Absolute Transfer of Real Property executed by the Mayor of Marikina was no longer subject to approval by the Provincial Governor of Rizal because Marikina already became part of Metro Manila on November 7, 1975.22 On December 8, 1996, Marikina became a chartered city.23”

When the government of a municipality is a party to a deed or an instrument which conveys real property or any interest therein or which creates a lien upon the same, such deed or instrument shall be executed on behalf of the municipal government by the mayor, upon resolution of the council, with the approval of the governor.

 

THE ESTATE OF PEDRO C. GONZALES and HEIRS OF PEDRO C. GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF MARCOS PEREZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 169681, November 5, 2009.

 

“In their first and last assigned errors, petitioners contend that Marcos, who is respondents' predecessor-in-interest, could not have legally bought the disputed parcel of land from petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Pedro, in September 1966 because, during that time, Pedro had not yet acquired ownership of the subject lot. Petitioners' assertion is based on the premise that as of February 29, 1968, the Deed of Sale between Pedro and the Municipality of Marikina was still subject to approval by the Provincial Governor of Rizal, as required under Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code. Considering that on the supposed date of sale in favor of Marcos, the requisite approval of the Provincial Governor was not yet secured, petitioners conclude that Pedro could not be considered as the owner of the subject property and, as such, he did not yet possess the right to transfer ownership thereof and, thus, could not have lawfully sold the same to Marcos.

 

The Court does not agree.

 

Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

 

SECTION 2196. Execution of deeds. – When the government of a municipality is a party to a deed or an instrument which conveys real property or any interest therein or which creates a lien upon the same, such deed or instrument shall be executed on behalf of the municipal government by the mayor, upon resolution of the council, with the approval of the governor.

 

In Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez,16 the Court found occasion to expound on the nature and effect of the provincial governor's power to approve contracts entered into by a municipal government as provided for under Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court held, thus:

 

x x x The approval by the provincial governor of contracts entered into and executed by a municipal council, as required in [S]ection 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code, is part of the system of supervision that the provincial government exercises over the municipal governments. It is not a prohibition against municipal councils entering into contracts regarding municipal properties subject of municipal administration or control. It does not deny the power, right or capacity of municipal councils to enter into such contracts; such power or capacity is recognized. Only the exercise thereof is subject to supervision by approval or disapproval, i.e., contracts entered in pursuance of the power would ordinarily be approved if entered into in good faith and for the best interests of the municipality; they would be denied approval if found illegal or unfavorable to public or municipal interest. The absence of the approval, therefore, does not per se make the contracts null and void.17

 

This pronouncement was later reiterated in Pechueco Sons Company v. Provincial Board of Antique,18 where the Court ruled more emphatically that:

 

In other words, as regards the municipal transactions specified in Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Provincial Governor has two courses of action to take – either to approve or disapprove the same. And since absence of such approval does not necessarily render the contract entered into by the municipality null and void, the transaction remains voidable until such time when by subsequent unfavorable action of the governor, for reasons of public interest, the contract is thereby invalidated.19

 

It is clear from the above-quoted pronouncements of the Court that, pending approval or disapproval by the Provincial Governor of a contract entered into by a municipality which falls under the provisions of Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract is considered voidable. In the instant case, there is no showing that the contract of sale entered into between Pedro and the Municipality of Marikina was ever acted upon by the Provincial Governor. Hence, consistent with the rulings enunciated above, the subject contract should be considered voidable. Voidable or annullable contracts, before they are set aside, are existent, valid, and binding, and are effective and obligatory between the parties.20

 

In the present case, since the contract was never annulled or set aside, it had the effect of transferring ownership of the subject property to Pedro. Having lawfully acquired ownership of Lots A and C, Pedro, in turn, had the full capacity to transfer ownership of these parcels of land or parts thereof, including the subject property which comprises a portion of Lot C.”