RA 10845, c. 2016, Anti-Agricultural Smuggling Act of 2016.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10845 - ANTI-AGRICULTURAL SMUGGLING ACT OF 2016..

SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the

“ANTI-AGRICULTURAL SMUGGLING ACT OF 2016”.

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to promote the productivity of the agriculture sector and to protect farmers from unscrupulous traders and importers, who by their illegal importation of agricultural products, especially rice, significantly affect the production, availability of supply and stability of prices, and the food security of the State.

The State shall impose higher sanctions for large-scale smuggling of agricultural products, as a self-preservation measure to shield itself from the manipulative scheme of economic saboteurs, and to protect the livelihood of our farmers and to ensure their economic well-being.

SECTION 3. Large-Scale Agricultural Smuggling as Economic Sabotage. – The crime of large-scale agricultural smuggling as economic sabotage, involving sugar, corn, pork, poultry, garlic, onion, carrots, fish, and cruciferous vegetables, in its raw state, or which have undergone the simple processes of preparation or preservation for the market, with a minimum amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00), or rice, with a minimum amount of ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), as valued by the Bureau of Customs (BOC), is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Importing or bringing into the Philippines without the required import permit from the regulatory agencies;

(b) Using import permits of persons, natural or juridical, other than those specifically named in the permit;

(c) Using fake, fictitious or fraudulent import permits or shipping documents;

(d) Selling, lending, leasing, assigning, consenting or allowing the use of import permits of corporations, nongovernment organizations, associations, cooperatives, or single proprietorships by other persons;

(e) Misclassification, undervaluation or misdeclaration upon the filing of import entry and revenue declaration with the BOC in order to evade the payment of rightful taxes and duties due to the government;

(f) Organizing or using dummy corporations, nongovernment organizations, associations, cooperatives, or single proprietorships for the purpose of acquiring import permits;

(g) Transporting or storing the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage regardless of quantity; or

(h) Acting as broker of the violating importer.

SECTION 4. Penalties. – (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of twice the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on any person who commits any of the acts enumerated under Section 3 of this Act.

(b) The penalty of imprisonment of not less than seventeen (17) years but not more than twenty (20) years, and a fine of twice the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on the officers of dummy corporations, nongovernment organizations, associations, cooperatives, or single proprietorships who knowingly sell, lend, lease, assign, consent or allow the unauthorized use of their import permits for purposes of smuggling.

(c) The penalty of imprisonment of not less than fourteen (14) years but not more than seventeen (17) years and a fine equal to the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on the following:

(1) The registered owner and its lessee or charterer, in case of lease, of a chartered boat, motorized commercial vessel of more than three (3) gross tonnage, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity;

(2) The registered owner and its lessee, in case of lease of six (6) or more wheeler trucks, vans and other means of transportation, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity;

(3) The registered owner and lessee of a warehouse, or any property, who knowingly stores the smuggled agricultural product subject to economic sabotage; or

(4) The registered owner, lessee, president or chief executive officer of the private port, fish port, fish landing sites, resorts, and airports who knowingly allows the agricultural product to be smuggled into the country.

(d) The penalty of imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years but not more than fourteen (14) years and a fine equal to the fair value of the smuggled agricultural product subject to economic sabotage and the aggregate amount of the taxes, duties and other charges avoided shall be imposed on the following:

(1) The registered owner and its lessee or charterer, in case of lease.; of a chartered boat, motorized commercial vessel of three (3) gross tonnage or less, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity; or

(2) The registered owner and its lessee, in case of lease, of less than six (6) wheeler trucks, vans and other means of transportation, who knowingly transports the agricultural product subject to economic sabotage, regardless of quantity.

In all cases, the smuggled agricultural products shall be confiscated and the property used in agricultural smuggling, consistent with Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code and without prejudice to Section 2531 of the same Code, shall be forfeited in favor of the government.

When the offender is a juridical person, criminal liability shall attach to its president, chief operating officer or manager who consents to or knowingly tolerates the commission of the prohibited crime.

Any person, natural or juridical, found guilty under this Act shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification to engage in any business involving importation.

In applying the abovementioned penalties, if the offender is an alien and the prescribed penalty is not life imprisonment, he/she shall be deported after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation.

If the offender is a government official or employee, the penalty shall be the maximum as hereinabove prescribed and the offender shall suffer an additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office, to vote and to participate in any public election.

SECTION 5. Presumption of Agricultural Smuggling. – Mere possession of rice or any agricultural product under this Act, which has been the subject of smuggling, entered into the Philippines other than the BOC controlled ports or without the necessary permits shall be prima facie evidence of smuggling.

SECTION 6. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The BOC, in consultation with concerned agencies, shall promulgate the implementing rules and regulations of this Act within thirty (30) days upon its effectivity.

SECTION 7. Prescription of Crimes. – The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.1âwphi1

SECTION 8. Separability Clause. – If any portion of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the portions or provisions which are not affected shall continue to be in full force and effect.

SECTION 9. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, executive issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.

SECTION 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Independent central monetary authority

TOPIC: THE "INDEPENDENT CENTRAL MONETARY AUTHORITY" VIS-A-VIS THE PROPOSED MAHARLIKA INVESTMENT FUND ACT (MAHARLIKA SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND, MAHARLIKA INVESTMENT CORPORATION). -

Under Section 20 of Article XII, "National Economy and Patrimony", of the 1987 Constitution, "Congress shall establish an "INDEPENDENT CENTRAL MONETARY AUTHORITY".

That "INDEPENDENT central monetary authority" is the BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP).

The BSP (formerly called the "Central Bank of the Philippines") was created by R.A. No. 7653, c. 1993, entitled "The Central Bank Act". R. A. No. 7653 was later amended in 2018 by R. A. No. 11211 to strengthen the regulatory powers of the BSP as the "INDEPENDENT central monetary authority" mentioned in the 1987 Constitution.

The central monetary authority (BSP) "shall provide POLICY DIRECTION in the areas of MONEY, BANKING, AND CREDIT". It shall have "SUPERVISION over the operations of BANKS and exercise such REGULATORY POWERS as may be provided by LAW OVER THE OPERATIONS OF FINANCE COMPANIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS PERFORMING SIMILAR FUNCTIONS". (Section 20, Article XII, 1987 Constitution).

FURTHER, under Section 21 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, "FOREIGN LOANS may only be incurred in accordance with LAW and the REGULATION OF THE MONETARY AUTHORITY".

FURTHERMORE, under Section 20 of Article VII, "Executive Department", of the 1987 Constitution, "the PRESIDENT may CONTRACT OR GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the PRIOR CONCURRENCE OF THE MONETARY BOARD, and subject to such LIMITATIONS as may be provided by LAW".

FINALLY, the MONETARY BOARD is mandated by the 1987 Constitution to regularly submit to Congress a COMPLETE REPORT of its decisions on APPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN LOANS "CONTRACTED OR GUARANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS which would have the EFFECT OF INCREASING THE FOREIGN DEBT".

The statements issued yesterday by the leaders of the Lower House of the Philippine Congress revealed that the "SURPLUS PROFITS OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS" would be used to fund the start-up capital or equity of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation).

I humbly submit that if the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas would stand as the SOLE OR MAIN OR MAJOR EQUITY/CAPITAL CONTRIBUTOR of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation), SUCH A FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

How can the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be expected to INDEPENDENTLY, HONESTLY AND COMPETENTLY SUPERVISE AND EXAMINE THE OPERATIONS of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation) when it is the sole or main or major equity owner, capital contributor or shareholder of the proposed financial institution?

Moreover, how can the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be expected to INDEPENDENTLY, FAIRLY AND REASONABLY PROVIDE "POLICY DIRECTION IN THE AREAS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND CREDIT" when it is a MAJOR PLAYER IN THE PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKET as the sole or main or major equity owner, capital contributor or shareholder of the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (Maharlika Investment Corporation)?

The CONFLICT OF INTEREST will weaken, if not destroy, the fundamental constitutional principles of TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CHECK AND BALANCE that guide the equitable and Inclusive socio-economic development of a genuine democratic republic.

The aforementioned scenario will produce a fertile ground conducive to UNCHECKED MASSIVE GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION.

An UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE ACT is VOID AB INITIO for being violative of the spirit, intent and express language of the Constitution.

"PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. Public officers and employees must, at all times, BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE , SERVE THEM with UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, and EFFICIENCY; ACT WITH PATRIOTISM AND JUSTICE, and LEAD MODEST LIVES." (Section 1, "Accountability of Public Officers", Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

Please note that the incumbent BSP Governor FELIPE M. MEDALLA a few days ago expressed the same sentiment as stated above (although he meekly added that he would abide by the final decision of Congress on the matter).

GSIS Provident Fund is a Trust Fund (Trust vs. Co-ownership)

"TRUST is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.[19] A trust fund refers to money or property set aside as a trust for the benefit of another and held by a trustee.[20] Under the Civil Code, trusts are classified as either express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law.[21]

There is no doubt that respondent intended to establish a trust fund from the employees’ contributions (5% of monthly salary) and its own contributions (45% of each member’s monthly salary and all unremitted Employees Welfare contributions). We cannot accept petitioners’ submission that respondent could not impose terms and conditions on the availment of benefits from the Fund on the ground that members already own respondent’s contributions from the moment such was remitted to their account. Petitioners’ assertion that the Plan was a purely contractual obligation on the part of respondent is likewise mistaken.

Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as “The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997,” mandated respondent to maintain a provident fund subject to rules and regulations it may adopt. Thus:

SECTION 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. — The GSIS shall exercise the following powers and functions:

x x x x

(s) to maintain a provident fund, which consists of contributions made by both the GSIS and its officials and employees and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to such officials and employees or their heirs under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe; (Emphasis supplied.)

In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,[22] this Court recognized DBP’s establishment of a trust fund to cover the retirement benefits of certain employees. We noted that as the trustor, DBP vested in the trustees legal title over the Fund as well as control over the investment of the money and assets of the Fund. The Trust Agreement therein also stated that the principal and income must be used to satisfy all of the liabilities to the beneficiary officials and employees under the Gratuity Plan.[23]

Here, petitioners as beneficiaries of the Fund contend that they became co-owners of the entire Fund including respondent’s contributions and its accumulated earnings. On this premise, they demand a proportionate share in the GRF which was deducted from the earnings on respondents’ contributions.

Under the PFRR, however, the GRF is allocated for specific purposes and not intended for distribution to members. Section 8,[24] Article IV thus provides:

Section 8. Earnings. At the beginning of each quarter, the earnings realized by the Fund in the previous quarter just ended shall be credited to the accounts of the members in proportion to the amounts standing to their credit as of the beginning of the same quarter after deducting therefrom twenty per cent (20%) of the proportionate earnings of the System’s contributions, which deduction shall be credited to a General Reserve Fund. Whenever circumstances warrant, however, the Committee may reduce the percentage to be credited to the General Reserve Fund for any given quarter; provided that in no case shall such percentage be lower than five per cent (5%) of the proportionate earnings of the System’s contributions for the quarter. When and as long as the total amount in the General Reserve Fund is equivalent to at least ten per cent (10%) of the total assets of the Fund, the Committee may authorize all the earnings for any given quarter to be credited to the members.

The General Reserve Fund shall be used for the following purposes:

(a) To cover the deficiency, if any, between the amount standing to the credit of a member who dies or is separated from the service due to permanent and total disability, and the amount due him under Article V Section 4[25];

(b) To make up for any investment losses and write-offs of bad debts, in accordance with policies to be promulgated by the Board;

(c) To pay the benefits of separated employees in accordance with Article IV, Section 3[26]; and

(d) For other purposes as may be approved by the Board, provided that such purposes is consistent with Article IV, Section 4[27].

It is clear that while respondent’s monthly contributions are credited to the account of each member, and the same were received by petitioners upon their retirement, they were entitled to only a proportionate share of the earnings thereon. The benefits of retiring members of the Fund are covered by Section 1(b), Article V which states:

(b) Retirement. In the event the separation from the System is due to retirement under existing laws, such as P.D. 1146, R.A. 660 or R.A. 1616, irrespective of the length of membership to the Fund, the retiree shall be entitled to withdraw the entire amount of his contributions to the Fund, as well as the corresponding proportionate share of the accumulated earnings thereon, and in addition, 100% of the System’s contributions, plus the proportionate earnings thereon.

We find nothing illegal or anomalous in the creation of the GRF to address certain contingencies and ensure the Fund’s continuing viability. Petitioners’ right to receive retirement benefits under the Plan was subject to well-defined rules and regulations that were made known to and accepted by them when they applied for membership in the Fund.

Petitioners have the right to demand for an accounting of the Fund including the GRF. Under Section 5,[28] Article VIII of the PFRR, the Committee is required to prepare an annual report showing the income and expenses and the financial condition of the Fund as of the end of each calendar year. Said report shall be submitted to the GSIS Board and shall be available to members. There is, however, no allegation or evidence that the Committee failed to comply with the submission of such annual report, or that such report was not made available to members."


G.R. No. 189827, October 16, 2013

GERSIP ASSOCIATION, INC., LETICIA ALMAZAN, ANGELA NARVAEZ, MARIA B. PINEDA, LETICIA DE MESA AND ALFREDO D. PINEDA, PETITIONERS, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENT.


https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/56303

The funds contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) created by the law are NOT PUBLIC FUNDS, but funds belonging to the members which are MERELY HELD IN TRUST BY THE GOVERNMENT.

"It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.

In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.

Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .

Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.

There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.

Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people."

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-15045_1961.html

Signing bonus, when not a truly reasonable compensation

"This Court has been very consistent in characterizing the funds being administered by SSS as a trust fund for the welfare and benefit of workers and employees in the private sector.37 In United Christian Missionary v. Social Security Commission38 we were unequivocal in declaring the funds contributed to the Social Security System by compulsion of law as funds belonging to the members which were merely held in trust by the government, and resolutely imposed the duty upon the trustee to desist from any and all acts which would diminish the property rights of owners and beneficiaries of the trust fund. Consistent with this declaration, it would indeed be very reasonable to construe the authority of the SSC to provide for the compensation of SSS personnel in accordance with the established rules governing the remuneration of trustees -

x x x x the modern rule is to give the trustee a reasonable remuneration for his skill and industry x x x x In deciding what is a reasonable compensation for a trustee the court will consider the amount of income and capital received and disbursed, the pay customarily given to agents or servants for similar work, the success or failure of the work of the trustee, any unusual skill which the trustee had and used, the amount of risk and responsibility, the time consumed, the character of the work done (whether routine or of unusual difficulty) and any other factors which prove the worth of the trustee’s services to the cestuis x x x x The court has power to make extraordinary compensation allowances, but will not do so unless the trustee can prove that he has performed work beyond the ordinary duties of his office and has engaged in especially arduous work.39

On the basis of the foregoing pronouncement, we do not find the signing bonus to be a truly reasonable compensation. The gratuity was of course the SSC’s gesture of good will and benevolence for the conclusion of collective negotiations between SSC and ACCESS, as the CNA would itself state, but for what objective? Agitation and propaganda which are so commonly practiced in private sector labor-management relations have no place in the bureaucracy and that only a peaceful collective negotiation which is concluded within a reasonable time must be the standard for interaction in the public sector. This desired conduct among civil servants should not come, we must stress, with a price tag which is what the signing bonus appears to be."

EN BANC, G.R. No. 149240, July 11, 2002

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jul2002/gr_149240_2002.html

Authority to sue

"We find no legitimate and compelling reason to reverse the COA. To begin with, the instant petition is fatally defective. It was filed in the name of the SSS although no directive from the SSC authorized the instant suit and only the officer-in-charge in behalf of petitioner executed the purported directive. Clearly, this is irregular since under Sec. 4, par. 10, in relation to par. 7,13 RA 1161 as amended by RA 8282 (The Social Security Act of 1997, which was already effective14 when the instant petition was filed), it is the SSC as a collegiate body which has the power to approve, confirm, pass upon or review the action of the SSS to sue in court. Moreover, the appearance of the internal legal staff of the SSS as counsel in the present proceedings is similarly questionable because under both RA 1161 and RA 8282 it is the Department of Justice (DoJ) that has the authority to act as counsel of the SSS.15 It is well settled that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings16 and that such illicit representation produces no legal effect.17 Since nothing in the case at bar shows that the approval or ratification of the SSC has been undertaken in the manner prescribed by law and that the DoJ has not delegated the authority to act as counsel and appear herein, the instant petition must necessarily fail. These procedural deficiencies are serious matters which this Court cannot take lightly and simply ignore since the SSS is in reality confessing judgment to charge expenditure against the trust fund under its custodianship.

In Premium Marble Resources v. Court of Appeals18 we held that no person, not even its officers, could validly sue in behalf of a corporation in the absence of any resolution from the governing body authorizing the filing of such suit. Moreover, where the corporate officer’s power as an agent of the corporation did not derive from such resolution, it would nonetheless be necessary to show a clear source of authority from the charter, the by-laws or the implied acts of the governing body.19 Unfortunately there is no palpable evidence in the records to show that the officer-in-charge could all by himself order the filing of the instant petition without the intervention of the SSC, nor that the legal staff of SSS could act as its counsel and appear therein without the intervention of the DoJ. The power of attorney supposedly authorizing this suit as well as the signature of the legal counsel appearing on the signing page of the instant petition is therefore ineffectual."

EN BANC, G.R. No. 149240, July 11, 2002

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jul2002/gr_149240_2002.html

SSS funds are workers' trust funds

"THE FUNDS contributed to the SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) are not only IMBUED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST, they are part and parcel of the fruits of the workers’ labors pooled into ONE ENORMOUS TRUST FUND UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM designed to insure against the vicissitudes and hazards of their working lives. In a very real sense, the trust funds are the workers’ property which they could turn to when necessity beckons and are thus more personal to them than the taxes they pay. It is therefore only fair and proper that charges against the trust fund be STRICTLY SCRUTINIZED for every lawful and judicious opportunity to keep it intact and viable in the interest of enhancing the WELFARE OF THEIR TRUE AND ULTIMATE BENEFICIARIES."


EN BANC, G.R. No. 149240, July 11, 2002

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jul2002/gr_149240_2002.html

Pork barrel system is unconstitutional

"Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED."



ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:


See Concurring Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice



See Concurring Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice


NO PART
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice


I concur and also join the concurring opinion of Justice Carpio.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice


I join the Opinion of Justice Carpio, subject to my Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice


DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice


LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice


MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice


I join the concurring opinion of J. A.T. Carpio of the ponencia
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice


MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice


JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice


JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice


BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice


See Concurring Opinion
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

"Operative fact" doctrine

"Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively."



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

The proper remedy to invoke the "right to information" is to file a petition for mandamus.

"Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here."



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.



Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

Checks and balances, veto power and accountability.

"Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

x x x x

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘"220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional."



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

Invalid delegation of legislative power

"Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

x x x x

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional."




G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

"Separation of powers" and pork barrels

"Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

x x x x

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.

x x x x

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.

x x x x

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193

Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own."



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

"Res judicata" and "stare decisis"

"Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply."



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html