For
legal research purposes of my readers, may I share the jurisprudential part of a
motion for reconsideration I have just filed with the office of the city prosecutor
of a city in southern Metro Manila seeking the indictment for estafa of the respondent
therein. The investigating fiscal had earlier indicted the respondent only for violation
of BP Blg. 22 (bouncing check law). I felt that the respondent should be likewise
indicted for Estafa under Art. 315 of the Rev. Penal Code. I removed all references
to names of parties and the like.
MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
THE COMPLAINANT, by counsel, respectfully states:
1.
On March 27,
2012 the complainant received via registered mail a copy of the RESOLUTION,
dated March 13, 2012, dismissing the complaint for SYNDICATED ESTAFA and
indicting the respondent x x x merely for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The 15th
day of the complainant to file this motion expires on April 11, 2012.
Hence,
this motion.
2.
The complainant
submits that the resolution erred in not indicting x x x at the very least for
the felony of regular or ordinary ESTAFA under Art. 315 of the Rev. Penal Code (assuming, arguendo, that PD 1689, re: Syndicated Estafa does not apply in the
instant case).
The
complainant agrees, though, that x x x was correctly indicted for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.
(As of this
date, the complainant has paid the requisite filing and docket fees with the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court of x x x City, in
the amount of more than P95, 000.00, so that the said case for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 may forthwith proceed with dispatch in the said Court).
3.
The complainant
humbly submits that the resolution erred in finding that there was no estafa
(whether syndicated or regular/ordinary) because the transaction was a simple loan;
that what motivated the complainant to issue his checks was not the malice or
deceit of SON but the complainant’s desire for interest income.
The
complainant will not contest anymore the issue of Syndicated Estafa
under P.D. No. 1689 but will simply focus herein on the sole issue of whether
or not x x x should have been likewise indicted for the felony of
Ordinary/Regular Estafa under Art. 315, Rev. Penal Code.
4.
The
resolution failed to appreciate the points of law and fact raised by the
complainant in his Reply-Affidavit, to wit:
X x x.
4.
Likewise, the resolution erred in not appreciating the
proofs of deceit/malice described in the Complaint as alleged bythe
complainant, to wit:
X x x.
5.
The complainant does not have the duty to submit proofs
of the nonexistence of the alleged x x x PROJECT. Sufficie it to state that
upon the presentation by the complainat in his Complaint of concrete
allegations aboput the clear use by x x x of the x x x PROJECT as her express excuse to exact money
from the complainant, the BURDEN OF EVIDENCE had shifted to x x x to prove the
existence of the said Project to show the purity of her intentions and
conscience. But x x x failed to do this.
6.
LOAN per se
does not exempt a criminal from indictment for estafa so long as it can be
proved, as is the factual mileu in the instant case, that the motive behind
such a transaction was deceit, swindling and malice on the part of the
debtor/respondent.
7.
We repeat hereinbelow what we had argued in our previous
pleadings before this Honorable Office.
8. In the case of LIBERATA AMBITO,
BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, it was held that in the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,[1]
it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false
statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at
least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant; and
that false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such
false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
which induces the offended party to part with his money. Thus:
“x x x.
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether
committed by false pretenses or concealment, are the following – (a) that there
must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b) That such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. (c) That the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (d) That as
a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[2]
In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,[3]
it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false
statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at
least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.
The false pretense or fraudulent act must be
committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being
essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very
cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his
money. In the absence of such requisite,
any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it might
appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said
provision.[4]
In the case at
bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that
they will pay the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs
with petitioners’ banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural
Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be presented
for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay the amount of deposit
stated thereon.
The amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to the purchase cost of the
machineries and equipment that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI as
evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the trial. It is
uncontroverted that PSI did not apply for and secure loans from RBBI and
RBLI. In fine, PSI and co-petitioner
Basilio Ambito were engaged in a vendor-purchaser business relationship while
PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as depositor-depository. It is
likewise established that petitioners employed deceit when they were able to
persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment
through down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through
the CCTDs with RBBI and RBLI issued in PSI’s name with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never
made any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not
recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator appointed by
the Central Bank of the Philippines even corroborated this finding of anomalous
bank transactions in her testimony during the trial. [5]
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners’ representations
were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose
of inducing PSI to sell and deliver to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito machineries
and equipments. Petitioners knew
that no deposits were ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI, as
represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did not intend to deposit any
amount to pay for the machineries. PSI
was an innocent victim of deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by
petitioners which resulted in its pecuniary damage and, thus, confirming the
lower courts’ finding that petitioners are guilty of the complex crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
X x x.”
10. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on
deceit/swindling (estafa) provides any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned therein shall be punished by the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years; provided that the fraud
be committed by any of the following means:
1.
With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
X
x x.
(b)
By misappropriating or
converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
2.
By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a)
By using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
X
x x.
(a)
By pretending to have
bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for calumny
which the offended
party may deem proper to
bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty.
(b)
By post-dating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary
to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4885,
approved June 17, 1967.)
10.1. Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon “any person who, to the prejudice of another,
shall execute any fictitious contract.”
10.2. Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by “any
other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.”
9.
In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER,
G.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011,
the accused was convicted for the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Information alleged that on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality
of San Pedro, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner:
said accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks
are fully funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10)
Prudential Bank Checks, all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
and all aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash
knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said
checks were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank
on reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite demand accused failed and refused to
pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the
aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
X x x.
The Court cited Paragraph
2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
x x x x
2. By means of any of the
following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
x x x x
(d) By postdating a check,
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds
in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
According to the Court,
the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds
to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.[6]
In the said case, the
prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis’s clear and categorical
testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks,
each in the amount of P5, 000.00 or a total of P50, 000.00, in
his house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
From the circumstances,
the Court held that it was evident that Solis would not have given P50,
000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential
Bank checks. These postdated checks were
undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash them,
they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was already closed.
Solis wrote appellant a
demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was received by appellant’s husband
to inform appellant that her postdated checks had bounced and that she must
settle her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor
did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from
receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is
an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent
act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.
X x x.
10.
In the case of BETTY GABIONZA AND ISABELITA TAN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, LUKE ROXAS AND EVELYN NOLASCO, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. No. 161057,
September 12, 2008], it was held that “to be
clear, it is possible to hold the borrower in a money market placement liable
for estafa if the creditor was induced to extend a loan upon the false or
fraudulent misrepresentations of the borrower”; that “such estafa is one by means of deceit”; that
“the borrower would not be generally liable for estafa through misappropriation
if he or she fails to repay the loan, since the liability in such instance is
ordinarily civil in nature”, except when deceit is present, of course. Thus:
“x x x.
We can thus conclude that the DOJ
Resolution clearly supports a prima facie finding that the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) has been
committed against petitioners. Does it also establish a prima facie finding that there has been a violation of the then-Revised Securities
Act, specifically Section 4 in relation to Section 56 thereof?
Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 176, or the Revised Securities Act, generally requires the registration of securities and prohibits the sale or distribution of unregistered securities.[29] The DOJ extensively concluded that private respondents are liable for violating such prohibition against the sale of unregistered securities:
Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 176, or the Revised Securities Act, generally requires the registration of securities and prohibits the sale or distribution of unregistered securities.[29] The DOJ extensively concluded that private respondents are liable for violating such prohibition against the sale of unregistered securities:
Respondents Roxas and
Nolasco do not dispute that in 1998, ASB borrowed funds about 700 individual
investors amounting to close to P4 billion, on recurring, short-term basis,
usually 30 or 45 days, promising high interest yields, issuing therefore mere
postdate checks. Under the circumstances, the checks assumed the character of
"evidences of indebtedness," which are among the
"securities" mentioned under the Revised Securities Act. The term
"securities" embodies a flexible rather than static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits
(69 Am Jur 2d, p. 604). Thus, it has been held that checks of a debtor received
and held by the lender also are evidences of indebtedness and therefore
"securities" under the Act, where the debtor agreed to pay interest
on a monthly basis so long as the principal checks remained uncashed, it being
said that such principal extent as would have promissory notes payable on
demand (Id., p. 606, citing Untied States v. Attaway (DC La) 211 F Supp
682). In the instant case, the checks were issued by ASB in lieu of the
securities enumerated under the Revised Securities Act in a clever attempt, or
so they thought, to take the case out of the purview of the law, which requires
prior license to sell or deal in securities and registration thereof. The
scheme was to
designed to circumvent the
law. Checks constitute mere substitutes for cash if so issued in payment of
obligations in the ordinary course of business transactions. But when they are
issued in exchange for a big number of individual non-personalized loans
solicited from the public, numbering about 700 in this case, the checks cease
to be such. In such a circumstance, the checks assume the character of
evidences of indebtedness. This is especially so where the individual loans
were not evidenced by appropriate debt instruments, such as promissory notes,
loan agreements, etc., as in this case. Purportedly, the postdated checks
themselves serve as the evidences of the indebtedness. A different rule would
open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby companies without prior
license or authority from the SEC. This cannot be countenanced. The subsequent
repeal of the Revised Securities Act does not spare respondents Roxas and
Nolasco from prosecution thereunder, since the repealing law, Republic Act No.
8799 known as the "Securities Regulation Code," continues to punish
the same offense (see Section 8 in relation to Section 73, R.A. No. 8799).[30]
The Court of Appeals however ruled that the postdated checks
issued by ASBHI did not constitute a security under the Revised Securities Act.
To support this conclusion, it cited the general definition of a check as
"a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand," and took
cognizance of the fact that "the issuance of checks for the purpose of
securing a loan to finance the activities of the corporation is well within the
ambit of a valid corporate act" to note that a corporation does not need
prior registration with the SEC in order to be able to issue a check, which is
a corporate prerogative.
This analysis is highly myopic and ignorant of the bigger picture. It is one thing for a corporation to issue checks to satisfy isolated individual obligations, and another for a corporation to execute an elaborate scheme where it would comport itself to the public as a pseudo-investment house and issue postdated checks instead of stocks or traditional securities to evidence the investments of its patrons. The Revised Securities Act was geared towards maintaining the stability of the national investment market against activities such as those apparently engaged in by ASBHI. As the DOJ Resolution noted, ASBHI adopted this scheme in an attempt to circumvent the Revised Securities Act, which requires a prior license to sell or deal in securities. After all, if ASBHI's activities were actually regulated by the SEC, it is hardly likely that the design it chose to employ would have been permitted at all.
But was ASBHI able to successfully evade the requirements under the Revised Securities Act? As found by the DOJ, there is ultimately a prima facie case that can at the very least sustain prosecution of private respondents under that law. The DOJ Resolution is persuasive in citing American authorities which countenance a flexible definition of securities. Moreover, it bears pointing out that the definition of "securities" set forth in Section 2 of the Revised Securities Act includes "commercial papers evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity, irrespective of maturity, issued, endorsed, sold, transferred or in any manner conveyed to another."[31] A check is a commercial paper evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity. Since the checks in this case were generally rolled over to augment the creditor's existing investment with ASBHI, they
This analysis is highly myopic and ignorant of the bigger picture. It is one thing for a corporation to issue checks to satisfy isolated individual obligations, and another for a corporation to execute an elaborate scheme where it would comport itself to the public as a pseudo-investment house and issue postdated checks instead of stocks or traditional securities to evidence the investments of its patrons. The Revised Securities Act was geared towards maintaining the stability of the national investment market against activities such as those apparently engaged in by ASBHI. As the DOJ Resolution noted, ASBHI adopted this scheme in an attempt to circumvent the Revised Securities Act, which requires a prior license to sell or deal in securities. After all, if ASBHI's activities were actually regulated by the SEC, it is hardly likely that the design it chose to employ would have been permitted at all.
But was ASBHI able to successfully evade the requirements under the Revised Securities Act? As found by the DOJ, there is ultimately a prima facie case that can at the very least sustain prosecution of private respondents under that law. The DOJ Resolution is persuasive in citing American authorities which countenance a flexible definition of securities. Moreover, it bears pointing out that the definition of "securities" set forth in Section 2 of the Revised Securities Act includes "commercial papers evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity, irrespective of maturity, issued, endorsed, sold, transferred or in any manner conveyed to another."[31] A check is a commercial paper evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity. Since the checks in this case were generally rolled over to augment the creditor's existing investment with ASBHI, they
most definitely take on the attributes of traditional stocks.
We should be clear that the question of whether the subject checks fall within the classification of securities under the Revised Securities Act may still be the subject of debate, but at the very least, the DOJ Resolution has established a prima facie case for prosecuting private respondents for such offense. The thorough determination of such issue is best left to a full-blown trial of the merits, where private respondents are free to dispute the theories set forth in the DOJ Resolution. It is clear error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss such finding so perfunctorily and on such flimsy grounds that do not consider the grave consequences. After all, as the DOJ Resolution correctly pointed out: "[T]he postdated checks themselves serve as the evidences of the indebtedness. A different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby companies without prior license or authority from the SEC. This cannot be countenanced."[32]
This conclusion quells the stance of the Court of Appeals that the unfortunate events befalling petitioners were ultimately benign, not malevolent, a consequence of the economic crisis that beset the Philippines during that era.[33] That conclusion would be agreeable only if it were undisputed that the activities of ASBHI are legal in the first place, but the DOJ puts forth a legitimate theory that the entire modus operandi of ASBHI is illegal under the Revised Securities Act and if that were so, the impact of the Asian economic crisis would not obviate the criminal liability of private respondents.
We should be clear that the question of whether the subject checks fall within the classification of securities under the Revised Securities Act may still be the subject of debate, but at the very least, the DOJ Resolution has established a prima facie case for prosecuting private respondents for such offense. The thorough determination of such issue is best left to a full-blown trial of the merits, where private respondents are free to dispute the theories set forth in the DOJ Resolution. It is clear error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss such finding so perfunctorily and on such flimsy grounds that do not consider the grave consequences. After all, as the DOJ Resolution correctly pointed out: "[T]he postdated checks themselves serve as the evidences of the indebtedness. A different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby companies without prior license or authority from the SEC. This cannot be countenanced."[32]
This conclusion quells the stance of the Court of Appeals that the unfortunate events befalling petitioners were ultimately benign, not malevolent, a consequence of the economic crisis that beset the Philippines during that era.[33] That conclusion would be agreeable only if it were undisputed that the activities of ASBHI are legal in the first place, but the DOJ puts forth a legitimate theory that the entire modus operandi of ASBHI is illegal under the Revised Securities Act and if that were so, the impact of the Asian economic crisis would not obviate the criminal liability of private respondents.
X x x.
It is ineluctable that
the DOJ Resolution established a prima
facie case for violation of
Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and Sections 4 in relation to 56
of the Revised Securities Act. X x x
X x x.”
11.
IN FINE,
respondent x x x must be indicted at the least for the felony of ordinary/regular ESTAFA under Art. 315,
Rev. Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that resolution,
dated March 13, 2012, be reconsidered and that a new resolution be issued
FURTHER indicting x x x for the felony of regular/ordinary ESTAFA under Art.
315, Rev. Penal Code. Involving the two checks issued by the complainant to
satisfy the total claim of the complainant in the amount of Five
Million Pesos (P5, 000,000.00), plus exemplary damages of P100, 000.00, moral
damages of P100, 000.00, attorney’s fees of P125, 000.00 plus 5% of the
recoverable amounts, and costs of suit.
Las
Pinas City, April 10, 2012.
LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER
LAW OFFICES
Counsel for the Complainant
Unit 15, Star Arcade. C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. No. 8725443; Fax No. 8462539.
MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85
IBP Lifetime Member No.
1907
IBP Leyte Chapter
PTR 10288207, 1/18/12, Las
Pinas City
MCLE Compliance No.
IV-1326, 2/3/11
Cc:
X x x aka x x x
Respondent
c/o x x x Inc.
x x x x
x x x City
Reg. Rec. No.
Date PO
Client
File Copy
EXPLANATION
A copy hereof is served on respondent SON via registered
mail due to the lack of staff and time of undersigned counsel at this time.
Thanks you.
Manuel
J. Laserna Jr.
[1]
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).
– Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . .
x x x
2.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a)
By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of other similar deceits.
[2] R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No.
156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 393.
[3]
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).
– Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . .
x x x
2.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a)
By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of other similar deceits.
[4] Aricheta v. People, G.R. No. 172500,
September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 695, 704.
[5] Rollo, pp. 184-187.
[6] Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541,
February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
