The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

 "10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating officers.

16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.

17. SO ORDERED."

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-51770, March 20, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/mar1985/gr_l51770_1985.html

Habeas Corpus: Under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.

 "Power of the Courts.

18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of liberty. It is the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has been illegally detained. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, but not the writ itself.

19. The Bill of Rights provides:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:

In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court 'had 'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution ...' Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

21. We reiterate this doctrine.

22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.

23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and does violence to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic society."

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-61016, April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO R. MORALES, JR., petitioner,

vs.

MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,

vs.

MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1983/apr1983/gr_l_61016_1983.html

Rights of arrested person undergoing custodial investigation

 "4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would have no rights to speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. 1 We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We believe in human rights and we protect and defend them. Petitioners are entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this Court stands as the guarantor of those rights.

5. Our Constitution provides:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2

6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and un familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his counsel at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and privately, in the jail or any other place of custody. 3"

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-61016, April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO R. MORALES, JR., petitioner,

vs.

MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,

vs.

MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1983/apr1983/gr_l_61016_1983.html

Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

 "The petition has merit.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held:

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x

x x x x

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16

Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006

IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,

vs.

HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2006.html