SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO, Petitioners, vs. JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO FLORES, BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR. FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F. FLORES, JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY, MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA VDA. DE FAYLONA, Respondents. G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013.
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The legal issue is whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final judgment against petitioners inequitable.
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, and rule that the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari. Indeed, the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in issuing its order of May 13, 1998 denying petitioners’ motion to defer resolution on the motion for demolition, and its order dated June 10, 1998 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the November 20, 1989 decision directed the partition of the 402-square meter parcel of land between the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona, with the former getting the western half and the latter the eastern half; and ordered the latter to remove their improvements encroaching the western portion adjudicated to the former. The decision became final after its affirmance by the CA through its decision promulgated on December 28, 1995 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 25347 modifying the decision only by deleting the award of rentals. There being no further appellate proceedings after the affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of judgment on June 3, 1996.
Thereafter, the RTC issued several writs of execution to enforce the judgment. The execution of the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, followed as a matter of course, because the prevailing parties were entitled to its execution as a matter of right, and a writ of execution should issue to enforce the dispositions therein.7
The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed of sale dated March 4, 1998 was a supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable is devoid of merit.
Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.8 This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.9
Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis their demand for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores.
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.10 A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.11 In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution,12 or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event.13 The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.
Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself.
The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not constitute an abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such issuance would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision. According to Section 10( d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court, when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With the special order being designed to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to their respective owners, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be upheld.1âwphi1
It irritates the Court to know that petitioners have delayed for nearly 17 years now the full implementation of the final and immutable decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by the CA. It is high time, then, that the Court puts a firm stop to the long delay in order to finally enable the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona as the winning parties to deservedly enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.14
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