CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., , G.R. No. 145408, August 20, 2008.
"x x x.
CBL contends that when the Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC, its earlier decision dated July 30, 1993 was already final and executory. Thus, the Compromise Agreement substantially altered the July 30, 1993 MTC decision, and the subsequent application for an Alias Writ of Execution after more than seven (7) years cannot be entertained since “it is fundamental that a final and executory decision cannot be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes.”[1]
The argument is specious. As correctly emphasized by the CA in its Decision,[2] “it is also well-settled that the court is authorized to modify or alter a judgment after the same has become executory, whenever the circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and equitable.”[3] The Compromise Agreement, thus, explicitly justified the amicable settlement reached by the parties after “having seriously considered in all good faith, the financial position and the capacity of the defendant CBL to fulfill its obligation under the decision promulgated in this case and cognizant over the fate of almost seven hundred employees and the riding public in the event the decision is executed…”.
The parties voluntarily entered into the Compromise Agreement which accorded to each party mutually acceptable concessions. MIAA agreed that the obligation of CBL be paid in installments in accordance with a schedule of installments disputed by the parties and CBL was allowed to stay in the leased premises provided the rentals mentioned in the Agreement are paid. Furthermore, the parties themselves invoked the jurisdiction of the MTC by submitting with the assistance of their counsel the Compromise Agreement for approval after the July 30, 1993 MTC decision has become final and executory.
Considering the foregoing circumstance, it would be highly inequitable to rule that the MTC has no jurisdiction to amend the final and executory July 30, 1993 MTC decision, when the MTC decision of December 13, 1993, approving the Compromise Agreement, was rendered at the instance of both CBL and MIAA and for their mutual benefit.
Moreover, CBL had complied with the terms of said Compromise Agreement for a period of five (5) years from its execution on November 3, 1993 until November 1998. CBL cannot question the MTC decision based on said Compromise Agreement and insist upon the execution of the July 30, 1993 MTC decision without trifling with court processes. Accordingly, we find the December 13, 1993 MTC decision, based on the Compromise Agreement, to be valid and binding upon the parties thereto.
Having upheld the validity and binding effect of the December 13, 1993 MTC decision, MIAA was well within the five-year reglementary period dictated by Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[4] when it filed its first Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution of the said decision on February 3, 1994 due to CBL’s non-compliance with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. This resulted in the issuance of the Writ of Execution dated February 10, 1994. A levy on CBL’s property was made but this was later on lifted when the latter issued postdated checks to secure payment of its monetary obligation under the Compromise Agreement. Subsequently, CBL failed again to pay the outstanding balance of its obligation. MIAA filed another Motion for the Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution on January 31, 1996, which led to the issuance of the Alias Writ of Execution dated January 13, 1998. However, the same was not enforced up to this day.
MIAA correctly contend that CBL’s dilatory tactics and legal maneuverings to evade payment of its obligations suspended the running of the five-year reglementary period within which to enforce the judgment by motion. The Court previously had the occasion to rule that in computing the time for suing out an execution, the time during which the execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.[5] In cases where the delays were occasioned by the judgment obligor’s own initiatives and for his advantage, which were beyond the judgment obligee’s control, the five (5) - year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.[6]
Here, CBL made several acts that constituted delay which redounded to its benefit. The judgment based on the Compromise Agreement was promulgated on December 13, 1993. It became final and executory because CBL did not appeal therefrom. The first writ of execution issued on February 10, 1994 was stalled because CBL issued postdated checks as security for its outstanding obligation. The second writ of execution issued on January 13, 1998 was likewise never enforced because CBL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC and, subsequently after being rebuffed by the said trial court, an erroneous remedy of petition for review under Rule 42 was filed by CBL with the CA which likewise dismissed the said petition. The latter development occasioned the filing of CBL’s present petition under Rule 65.
Undoubtedly, CBL was benefited by the continued deferment of the payment of its long-established outstanding balance of its monetary obligation to MIAA due to its incessant but futile resort to the review processes of our justice system. CBL successfully evaded the payment of its debt under the shield of technicalities, at the expense of MIAA.
The assailed Alias Writ of Execution dated January 13, 1998 was validly issued by the RTC and is still enforceable because the prescriptive period by which it can be enforced by motion has been effectively suspended beginning November 23, 1998 when CBL filed with the RTC its petition for certiorari under Rule 65[7].
The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on their rights, MIAA persistently pursued their rights of action. It is utterly unjust to allow CBL to further evade the satisfaction of its obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality, which CBL itself had put aside to serve its own interest, the well-being of its employees and the interest of the riding public. After all, procedural rules are liberally construed in order to promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[8]
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It is high time to write finis to this case. Litigation must at some time be terminated for public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.
The Court finds CBL’s obstinate efforts to stay the execution of a valid judgment as an unjustifiable use of the processes of our legal system. CBL and counsel so far only succeeded in unduly delaying the complete execution of the judgment based on the Compromise Agreement to which it had voluntarily acceded.
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[1] Yu v. National Labor Relations Commission, 245 SCRA 134
[2] Supra note 3.
[3] Aboitiz Shipping Employees Asso. v. Trajano, 278 SCRA 387 and Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354.
[4] Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.)
[5] Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano, 96 SCRA 463, 464 and De la Rosa v. Fernandez, 172 SCRA 371.
[6] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611.
[7] CA Records, pp. 103-108.
[8] Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario, 335 SCRA 288.
[9] Sec. 1. Scope. - This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
[10] Sec.10-xxx The OGCC is authorized to receive attorney’s fees adjudged in favor of their client government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries/other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset corporation. xxx.
[11] Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
[12] Rollo, pp. 284-292.
[13] Indirect Contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x.
(paragraphs [c] & [d], Section 3, Rule 71, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)
[14] Sesbreño v. Igonia, 480 SCRA 243.
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