"The defense of denial
The petitioner denied that his car had bumped the victim, and insists that he just saw the victim’s body sprawled on the road after his car had already ramped on the island divider.
The petitioner’s defense of denial must crumble in light of Victor’s positive and specific testimony. We reiterate that the petitioner, aside from merely alleging the inconsistency between Victor’s affidavit and court testimony, did not impute any ill motive on Victor’s part to falsely testify against him. The petitioner, in fact, admitted that he and Victor did not know each other prior to the incident. We have consistently held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent, and without anyshowing of ill-motive on the part of the testifying eyewitness, should prevail over the denial of the accused whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[48] A denial is negative evidence. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, the denial is purely self-serving and has no evidentiary value.[49]
We significantly note that the petitioner claimed for the first time in his present petition that he saw a “rug-like thing”[50] being thrown out of a passing car as he was about to alight from his car after turning off its engine; he later discovered that the thing thrown was a person’s body. He reiterated this claim in his motion for reconsideration before this Court. This assertion was a clear rip-off from his co-accused Mendez’ version who likewise claimed to have seen the same thing. To our mind, the modification of the petitioner’s story was a belated attempt to cover up his failure to convincingly explain the presence of the victim’s slumped body on the road near his car and a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself. Nowhere in his affidavit or earlier court testimonies, or even in his previous pleadings with the lower courts, did he ever state that a passing car had thrown a “rug-like thing”[51] on the street. The petitioner’s sudden change of story at this stage of the proceedings casts doubt on the veracity of his claim.
In addition, we are baffled by the petitioner’s act of frequenting the hospital after the incident. Amanda Ycong, the victim’s aunt, testified that she saw the petitioner “several times” at the hospital when the victim was confined there; but would immediately leave whenever he saw members of the victim’s family. We find it highly unusual for a person who allegedly had no participation in the incident to be overly concerned with the victim’s well-being. What puzzles us even more is why the petitioner would evade members of the victim’s family whenever he was seen by them at the hospital.
All told, we see no reason to overturn the lower courts’ findings of fact and conclusions of law finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged."
