Saturday, July 30, 2011

Litis pendencia not appreciated; G.R. No. 167246

G.R. No. 167246

Excerpts:


"THE COURT’S RULING

We disagree with the petitioner and find that there is no litis pendentia.

As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.[19]

Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[20]

In the present case, the parties’ bone of contention is whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause of action. The petitioner argues that the causes of action are similar, while the respondent argues otherwise. If an identity, or substantial identity, of the causes of action in both cases exist, then the second complaint for unlawful detainer may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.

We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.

Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action.[21] If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.[22]

Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action[23] (also known as the “same evidence” test),[24] or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.[25] Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.[26]

Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint – and to which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint onOctober 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, fromJanuary 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.

In response to the petitioner’s contention that the similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 rests on the reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, we rule that the restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action,[27] which, in the second case, was the expiration of the lease contract.

Also, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, there can be no conflict between the decisions rendered in Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 because the MTC-Branch 71 decided the latter case on the sole issue of whether the lease contract between the parties had expired. Although alleged by the respondent in its complaint, the MTC-Branch 71 did not rule on the alleged violations of the lease contract committed by the petitioner. We note that the damages awarded by the MTC-Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 9210 were for those incurred after the expiration of the lease contract,[28] not for those incurred prior thereto.

Similarly, we do not find the respondent guilty of forum shopping in filing Civil Case No. 9210, the second civil case. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[29] Considering our pronouncement that not all the requisites of litis pendentia are present in this case, the CA did not err in declaring that the respondent committed no forum shopping. Also, a close reading of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[30] (attached to the second ejectment complaint) shows that the respondent did disclose that it had filed a former complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. Thus, the respondent cannot be said to have committed a willful and deliberate forum shopping."