"The petition is without merit.
Ejectment cases – forcible entry and unlawful detainer – are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.[13] In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[14]
In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondent were claiming ownership over the subject property. Hence, the CA correctly touched upon the issue of ownership only to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the subject property.
True, as found by the CA, both petitioner and respondent presented weak evidence of ownership. Respondent on his part based his claim of ownership over the subject property on the strength of a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right from a certain Antonio Natavio. The subject land, however, was said to be a portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro yEsteban covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which this Court has declared null and void in the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals[15] as such, respondent could not derive any right therefrom.
Petitioner, on the other hand, anchored his contention that he has a better right to possess the property on the fact the he is in actual possession of the property and that he was awarded a Certificate of Project Qualification by the Office of the President through the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. However, although petitioner claimed ownership over the subject lot, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence therefor, or even sufficient reason on the manner by which he acquired ownership.
Having settled the issue of ownership, it was but just and proper for the CA to have reminded the courts a quo to have settled the case by restricting their resolution to the basic issue of possession.
From the various evidence submitted by the respondent, it can be clearly inferred that respondent is entitled to the possession of the subject lot. As aptly found by the CA:
To recall, in its (sic) Answer, respondent (defendant herein) alleged:
4. That defendant also DENIES the allegations in paragraphs 6 and 7 of complaint, the truth of the matter being that defendant is the exclusive occupant of said lot since 1989 and that he built thereon a residential house from his own resources as a consequence of which he has been registered as the qualified beneficiary of the property as is (sic) indicated in the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form issued by the National Government Center – Housing Project on August 18, 1997, copy attached as ANNEX “C” hereof. (Answer, p. 2; Records, p. 167) (Emphasis supplied)
Going over Annex “C” (records, p. 24) or the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form which bears TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1, Our attention was caught by the words “CARETAKER” written on the top of the entry BIENVENIDO/GLORIA BARRIENTOS.
We also find, appended to petitioner's Reply to Answer with Special Defense and Counterclaim (records p. 50), a Census Survey Certificate that bears TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1 with a notation “Registered to Rapal family.”
x x x x
But considering Our preceeding (sic) findings and the fact that the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form submitted by the respondent himself bears no indication that it was tampered, We are inclined to believe the version maintained by the petitioner. The mark “CARETAKER” purports what it explicitly states; that is, Bienvenido C. Barrientos was only a caretaker of the subject lot.
Consequently, and taking into consideration the great number of affidavits and evidence in favor of the petitioner, We find that the petitioner was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.[16]
Thus, based on the evidence presented by the respondent, it can be deduced that petitioner's occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Petitioner was initially permitted by respondent to occupy the lot as a caretaker. Petitioner even admitted this fact in his Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form. Moreover, all other supporting evidence, such as the Census Survey Certificate[17] and construction material receipts,[18] bolster the fact that respondent was in prior possession of the property before petitioner entered the same by mere tolerance of the respondent.
Perusing respondent's complaint, respondent clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer, since petitioner's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[19]
It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits, under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.[20]"
