| ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, FRANCISCO ELCA y ARCAS, and BARTOLOME BALDEMOR y MADRIGAL, Petitioners,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
| G.R. No. 161651
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
NACHURA, ABAD, and
Promulgated:
June 8, 2011
|
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
x x x.
Inarguably, the resolution of the issues raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, including the credibility of the witnesses, a course of action which this Court will not do, consistent with our repeated holding that this Court is not a trier of facts. Basic is the rule that factual findings of trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the findings.[15]
It is true that the rule admits of several exceptions,[16] but none of the recognized exceptions is present in the case at bar.
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code lists the ways by which estafa may be committed, which includes:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – x x x.
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of the felony are as follows:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[17]
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the transaction involving the Bacoor property was a continuation of the transaction involving parcels of land in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. When Lucero discovered that Elca’s certificates of title over the Muntinlupa property were fake, Elca offered, as substitute, the 5-hectare portion of his purported 14-hectare lot in Bacoor, Cavite, but asked for an additional P2,000,000.00, in this wise:
Dear Ms. Lucero:
This is with reference to the advances we had obtained from you in the total amount of P4.7 million, more or less. It was agreed that the said advances shall be due and demandable upon the release of titles over my parcels of land situated in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila of which we are presently working out with appropriate government agencies. Your current demand fro[m] us to pay the aforesaid amount plus your unilaterally imposed interests is therefore premature and baseless.
However, with regards to your alternative demand that you be given a total of 5 hectares (2 has. upon signing of an agreement assigning my rights and additional 3 has. upon complete release of the remaining 14 hectares) please be informed that I am now amenable, provided that an additional P2.0 million will be paid to me to take care of my other personal commitments. These 5 hectares are situated in Malipay, Bacoor, Cavite with a portion of Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs-04213-000441-D. I am expecting the title of said property early next year. The current market [valuation] of real estate properties in that area is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the property will be more [than] sufficient to cover our obligates (sic).
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
Francisco N. Elca
Bo. Katihan, Poblacion
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila[18]
As it turned out, Elca did not own 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite. He merely had an inchoate right over the Bacoor property, derived from his Application to Purchase Friar Lands, which covered only 7 hectares.[19] Elca’s application was later amended to cover only 4 hectares, in view of the protest by Alfredo Salenga (Salenga).[20] Clearly, Elca was in no position to transfer ownership of the 5-hectare Bacoor property at the time petitioners offered it to Lucero.
In Alcantara v. Court of Appeals,[21] this Court, citing People v. Balasa,[22] explained the meaning of fraud and deceit, viz.:
[F]raud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Indubitably, petitioners’ parody that Elca owned 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite, and was offering a 5-hectare portion of it, in substitution of the Muntinlupa property, and demanding an additional P2,000,000.00 from Lucero, constituted fraud and deceit.
To reiterate, it is an oft-repeated principle that the factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witness’ credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the findings.[23] Considering that there is nothing in the records that shows that the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court were erroneous, we affirm their conclusion that petitioners attempted to defraud Lucero again.
Undoubtedly, petitioners commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but they failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension by the authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown,[24] the RTC and the CA correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa.
On the penalty. The RTC sentenced petitioners to an imprisonment term of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years. The CA modified it to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Petitioners and the OSG both argue that the penalty imposed by the CA was wrong, and plead for its modification.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Thus, if the crime of estafa had been consummated, Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00.[25] Hence, the applicable penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the first P22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty should not exceed twenty years.
Since what was established was only attempted estafa, then the applicable penalty would be that which is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony pursuant to Article 51,[26] in relation to Article 61(5),[27] of the RPC. Accordingly, the imposable penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum period,[28] or an imprisonment term ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And because the amount involved exceeded P22,000.00, one (1) year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 should be added, bringing the total to seven (7) years.
However, we agree with the OSG that it would be inequitable to impose the additional incremental penalty of 7 years to the maximum period of penalty, considering that petitioners were charged and convicted merely of attempted and not consummated estafa. We, therefore, modify the penalty and sentence petitioners to imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23240 are AFFIRMED. Petitioners Elvira Lateo, Francisco Elca, and Bartolome Baldemor are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted estafa, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per raffle dated April 5, 2011.
* * Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per raffle dated April 5, 2011.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), concurring; CA rollo, pp. 135-143.
[2] Records, Vol. IV, pp. 182-198.
[3] Records, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.
[4] Supra note 1, at 136-137.
[5] Id. at 137-139.
[6] Supra note 2.
[7] Id. at 196-198.
[8] Records, Vol. IV, p. 198.
[9] Id. at 209-227.
[10] Id. at 255-256.
[11] CA rollo, pp. 69-79.
[12] Supra note 1, at 143.
[13] CA rollo, pp. 144-150.
[14] Id. at 173.
[15] Pucay v. People, G.R. No. 167084, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 411, 420.
[16] (1) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Id.)
[17] Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 72, 88-89 (2003).
[18] Exhibit “Q”; records, Vol. II, p. 176.
[19] Exhibit “18”; records, Vol. IV, p. 25.
[20] See Exhibit “LLLL”; id. at 343-346.
[21] Supra note 17, at 89.
[22] G.R. Nos. 106357 & 108601-02, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 49.
[23] Pucay v. People, supra note 15, at 423.
[24] See Koh Tieck Heng v. People, G.R. Nos. 48535-36, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 533, 545.
[25] See Exhibits “VVV-2” to “VVV-581”; records, Vol. II, pp. 205-322.
[26] Art. 51. – Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crime. – The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
[27] Art. 61. - Rules for graduating penalties.—For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
x x x x
(5) When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not specifically provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
[28] See Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111399, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 116, 139.
