The instant petition is partially meritorious.
The petitioners raise the procedural issue of whether or not the CA validly gave due course to the petition for certiorari filed before it under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As the substantive issue of whether or not the
petitioners constructively dismissed the respondents is closely-intertwined with the procedural question raised, they will be resolved jointly.
Yolanda Mercado, et al. v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc.[33] is instructive as to the nature of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:
x x x [R]ule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?[34]
It is thus settled that this Court is bound by the CA's factual findings. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, among which is when the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.[35] The case before us falls under the aforementioned exception.
The petitioners argue that the respondents resorted to an erroneous mode of appeal as the issues raised in the petition lodged before the CA essentially sought a re-evaluation of facts and evidence, hence, based on purported errors of judgment which are outside the ambit of actions which can be aptly filed under Rule 65.
We agree.
Again in Mercado,[36] we ruled that:
x x x [I]n certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence. x x x.[37]
In the case at bench, in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the respondents before the CA, the following issues were presented for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [NLRC] committed patent errors in the appreciation of facts and application of pertinent jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of discretion or lack or in excess of jurisdiction WHEN IT HELD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS [herein petitioners] ARE NOT GUILTY OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL BECAUSE IT WAS THE PETITIONERS [herein private respondents] WHO ABANDONED THEIR JOB AND REFUSED TO WORK WITH RESPONDENTS WHEN THEY WERE REQUIRED TO PUT UP CASH BOND OR SIGN AN AUTHORIZATION FOR DEDUCTION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT committed patent errors in the appreciation of facts and application of pertinent jurisprudence
amounting to grave abuse of discretion or lack or in excess of jurisdiction WHEN IT DID NOT ORDER THE REINSTATEMENT OF HEREIN PETITIONERS AND DELETED THE AWARD OF 13th MONTH PAY AND DENIED THE CLAIMS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, DAMAGES AND FULL BACKWAGES.[38]
Essentially, the issues raised by the respondents for resolution by the CA were anchored on an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence by the NLRC and the LA when they both ruled that abandonment of work and not constructive dismissal occurred.
We agree with the petitioners that what the respondents sought was a re-evaluation of evidence, which as a general rule cannot be properly done in a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65, save in cases where substantial evidence to support the NLRC's findings are wanting.
In Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo v. Leopoldo Bungubung,[39] the Court defined substantial evidence and laid down guidelines relative to the conduct of judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power, viz:
x x x Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.[40] (citations omitted)
We find the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC that the respondents were not dismissed are supported by substantial evidence.
In the Joint Affidavit[41] executed by Generoso Fortunaba, Erdie Pilares and Crisanto Ignacio, all goldsmiths under Niña Jewelry's employ, they expressly stated that they have personal knowledge of the fact that the respondents were not terminated from employment. Crisanto Ignacio likewise expressed that after Elisea returned from the
Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.[43]
In the case now under our consideration, the petitioners did not whimsically or arbitrarily impose the policy to post cash bonds or make deductions from the workers' salaries. As attested to by the respondents' fellow goldsmiths in their Joint Affidavit, the workers were convened and informed of the reason behind the implementation of the new policy. Instead of airing their concerns, the respondents just promptly stopped reporting for work.
Although the propriety of requiring cash bonds seems doubtful for reasons to be discussed hereunder, we find no grounds to hold that the respondents were dismissed expressly or even constructively by the petitioners. It was the respondents who merely stopped reporting for work. While it is conceded that the new policy will impose an additional burden on the part of the respondents, it was not intended to result in their demotion. Neither is a diminution in pay intended because as long as the workers observe due diligence in the performance of their tasks, no loss or damage shall result from their handling of the gold entrusted to them, hence, all the amounts due to the goldsmiths shall still be paid in full. Further, the imposition of the new policy cannot be viewed as an act tantamount to discrimination, insensibility or disdain against the respondents. For one, the policy was intended to be implemented upon all the goldsmiths in Niña Jewelry's employ and not solely upon the respondents. Besides, as stressed by the petitioners, the new policy was intended to merely curb the incidences of gold theft in the work place. The new policy can hardly be said to be disdainful or insensible to the workers as to render their continued employment unreasonable, unlikely or impossible.
On September 7, 2004, or more or less three weeks after the imposition of the new policy, the respondents filed their complaints for illegal dismissal which include their prayer for the payment of separation pay. On September 20, 2004, they filed amended complaints seeking for reinstatement instead.
The CA favored the respondents' argument that the latter could not have abandoned their work as it can be presumed that they would not have filed complaints for illegal dismissal had they not been really terminated and had they not intended themselves to be reinstated. We find that the presumption relied upon by the CA pales in comparison to the substantial evidence offered by the petitioners that it was the respondents who stopped reporting for work and were not dismissed at all.
In sum, we agree with the petitioners that substantial evidence support the LA's and the NLRC's findings that no dismissal occurred. Hence, the CA should not have given due course to and granted the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the respondents before it.
In view of our disquisition above that the findings of the LA and the NLRC that no constructive dismissal occurred are supported by substantial evidence, the CA thus erred in giving due course to and granting the petition filed before it. Hence, it is not even necessary anymore to resolve the issue of whether or not the policy of posting cash bonds or making deductions from the goldsmiths' salaries is proper. However, considering that there are other goldsmiths in Niña Jewelry's employ upon whom the policy challenged by the respondents remain to be enforced, in the interest of justice and to put things to rest, we shall resolve the issue.
