Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The [Department] of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines, “recruitment and placement” as: “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”
The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.[5]
In disputing the absence of the first element, petitioner offers her opinion that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's reliance on a mere certification from the DOLE Dagupan District Office that she does not have the necessary licence to recruit workers for abroad. She claims that the prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring a certification from the agency primarily involved, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The said argument, however, is flawed.
Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.[6] Clearly, the creation of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over recruitment and placement of activities. The governing rule is still Article 35[7] of the Labor Code. This is further discussed in this Court's ruling in Trans Action Overseas Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,[8] wherein it was ruled that:
In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, we held that:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above-quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to “restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,” but also to “promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions” governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, on its own initiative or upon a filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, “xxx (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity” for certain enumerated offenses including -
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.
The Administrator was also given the power to “order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof.”
This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz, viz.:
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.[9]
Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office stating that petitioner has not been issued any license by the POEA nor is a holder of an authority to engage in recruitment and placement activities. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment[10] dated October 9, 2006, also gives a valid observation as to the admissibility of the certification as evidence for the prosecution, thus:
x x x Notably, there is nothing on record to show that petitioner objected to the admissibility of the certification for the purpose for which it was offered. Thus, petitioner's argument that the certification was inadmissible because it was not properly identified by the issuing officer should be rejected. It is well-settled that “[e]very objections to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall have become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered waived.” Accordingly, the certification has been accepted as admissible by the trial court and properly considered as evidence for the party who submitted it.[11]
Anent the second element, petitioner insists that the CA was wrong in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. According to her, the accommodation extended by the petitioner to the private respondents is far from the referral as contemplated in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.
It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses' credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings.[12] After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses.[13]
Nevertheless, the testimonies of the private respondents clearly establish the fact that petitioner's conduct falls within the term recruitment as defined by law. As testified by Romulo Padlan, petitioner convinced him and Arturo Siapno to give her US$3,600.00 for the processing of their papers, thus:
Q: In September 2000, did you see the accused?
A: There was, sir.
Q: Where did you see each other?
A: At her stall, sir.
x x x x
Q: What was your purpose in going to her stall?
A: My purpose is to inquire about my application to Israel, sir.
Q: What happened when you inquired from her about your application in going to Israel?
A: I inquired from her and she responded with me with sweet words, sir.
Q: What did you ask her when you first met her in her stall [in] September 2000?
A: I asked her about the possible placement and the condition about the job in Israel.
Q: And what was her response?
A: Her response was positive and very encouraging, sir.
Q: What was the very good and very encouraging response of the accused?
A: Regarding the salary amounting to $700.00 to $1,000.00 dollars a month, sir.
Q: When you were informed that the salary is quite good in Israel, what did you do, if any?
A: I planned to produce money so that I can apply for Israel, sir.
Q: And what transpired next after that?
A: She told me that, “If you can produce $3,600.00 dollars then I will begin to process your papers.
Q: After telling you that, what did you do, if any?
A: So I planned to have a loan [from] Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan and borrow some money [from] my other friends, sir.
x x x x
Q: After producing that money, what did you do?
x x x x
A: I [went] to her stall [in] September 26 around 10:00 P.M. and handed the money to Mrs. Delia Romero, sir.
x x x x
Q: How much money did you give to the accused [in] September 2000?
A: [In] September 2000, I gave her $1,500.00 US dollars, sir.[14]
Arturo Siapno also testified as to how petitioner convinced him to apply for a job in Israel and offered her services for a fee, thus:
Q: [I]n August 2000, where were you?
A: I was residing in Puelay-Carangalaan. Dagupan City.
Q: On the same month, did you have any transaction with the accused?
A: Yes sir[.] I met the accused at the appliance store which is located at Puelay and she offered me a job in Israel.
Q: [When] she offered you a job in Israel, what did you do?
A: I went to their stall which is located [in] Calasiao, and in the same place I also met several applicants.
Q: When did you go to the stall of the accused?
A: The following day, sir.
x x x x
Q: And what did you do at the stall of the accused in Calasiao, Pangasinan?
A: When I went to the stall of the accused, since I saw other applicants, I was convinced to apply and I called up my aunt and asked for help.
Q: Since you were at the stall of the accused in Calasiao, what transpired next?
A: When I talked to her, she told me if I have a money of P3,600.00 I could easily depart within one (1) week or two (2) weeks.[15]
From the above testimonies, it is apparent that petitioner was able to convince the private respondents to apply for work in Israel after parting with their money in exchange for the services she would render. The said act of the petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the meaning of recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.
As to petitioner's contention that the testimony of Arturo Siapno that the latter paid a certain amount of money to the former must not be given any credence due to the absence of any receipt or any other documentary evidence proving such, the same is without any merit. In People v. Alvarez,[16] this Court ruled that in illegal recruitment cases, the failure to present receipts for money that was paid in connection with the recruitment process will not affect the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution as long as the payment can be proved through clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses. It was discussed that:
In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.
x x x x
x x x The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegalrecruitment is not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment. Such case is made, not by the issuance or the signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority.
In People v. Pabalan, the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the amounts delivered to the accused did not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses.[17]
With regard to the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, this Court finds it to be inappropriate. The trial court imposed the penalty of eight (8) years imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 plus cost and ordered petitioner to return the amount of US$3,600.00 or its equivalent to Romulo Padlan and the amount of US$3,600.00 or its equivalent to Arturo Siapno. Under Article 39 (c) of the Labor Code, which prescribes the penalty for illegal recruitment, any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under the law and found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years but not more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. Clearly, the trial court, by imposing a straight penalty, disregarded the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[18] In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court ruled that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code and the special laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the application and non-application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases:
a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139) or espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, February 22, 1974) Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O. G. 6701, November 19, 1982).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same. (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, January 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.[20]
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the offense is punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The imposable penalty is imprisonment of not less than four (4) years but not more than eight (8) years; hence, the proper penalty imposed should be within the range of four (4) years to eight (8) years. Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court can impose the minimum and maximum terms of the penalty of imprisonment within the range of four (4) years to eight (8) years.
x x x."
