A transferee pendente lite of registered land, whose title bears a notice of a pending litigation involving his transferor’s title to the said land, is bound by the outcome of the litigation, whether it be for or against his transferor. Given this principle, the modification of the final decision against the transferor in order to include the transfereependente lite does not violate the doctrine of immutability of final judgments. His inclusion does not add to or change the judgment; it is only a legal consequence of the established doctrine that a final judgment binds the privy of a litigating party.
Enforcement of judgment against transferees pendente lite
“A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property.”[50] The effect of the annotation of lis pendens on future transactions over the subject property is discussed by an authority on land titles and registration:
Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or issuance of the title of the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same, would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. In other words, upon the termination of the litigation there can be no risk of losing the property or any part thereof as a result of any conveyance of the land or any encumbrance that may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice of lis pendens.[51]
It is not disputed that petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 23554, which covers Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2, as early as September 21, 1984.[52] On July 29, 1985 and August 24, 1998, TCT No. 23554 was cancelled with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 and new individual titles were issued to Victorino and Dimaguila. Both titles had the notice of lis pendens which was carried over from TCT No. 23554. Ineluctably, both Victorino and Dimaguila had notice of the litigation involving GSIS’s ownership over the subject properties, and were bound by the outcome of the litigation.When a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice of lis pendens, such transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of the litigation. As held in Selph v. Vda. de Aguilar,[53] an order to cancel the transferor’s title may be enforced against his transferee, whose title is expressly subject to the outcome of the litigation by the fact of the annotation of lis pendens.
The existence of these entries on Dimaguila’s and Victorino’s titles bars any defense of good faith[54] against petitioners and effectively makes Dimaguila and Victorino mere privies of GSIS and subject to whatever rights GSIS might have in the subject properties, which (as it turns out) is none at all. What Dimaguila and Victorino possess are derivative titles of the GSIS’s title over Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2, which this Court has finally adjudicated to be null and void. Given the legal maxim that a spring cannot rise higher than its source, it follows that Dimaguila’s and Victorino’s titles, or any other title over the subject properties that are derived from TCT No. 23554 of the GSIS, are likewise null and void. As explained by this Court in another case, the title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest.[55]
In Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon,[56] the Court allowed the issuance of an alias
writ of execution against the transferees pendente lite, who had knowledge of the pending litigation on the basis of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on their titles. The Court clarified therein that there was no need for the victorious [parties] to file a separate action to enforce their right to recover the property as against the new registered owners.[57]
In Associated Bank v. Pronstroller,[58] the Court affirmed the judgments of the trial and appellate courts cancelling the titles of the spouses Vaca, who were transfereespendente lite of Associated Bank, despite the fact that the spouses Vaca were not parties to the case between Associated Bank and the Pronstrollers. The Court explained therein:
Admittedly, during the pendency of the case, respondents timely registered a notice of lis pendens to warn the whole world that the property was the subject of a pending litigation.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. x x x
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.
This registration, therefore, gives the court clear authority to cancel the title of the spouses Vaca, since the sale of the subject property was made after the notice of lis pendens. x x x[59]
Upon Associated Bank’s MR, the spouses Vaca filed a motion to intervene arguing that they had a real interest in assailing the July 14, 2008 Decision, which ordered the cancellation of their title. The Court denied the intervention. It was held that the interests of the spouses Vaca in the subject property were properly represented in the action by their transferor/vendor Associated Bank, which was already a party thereto. As transferees pendente lite, the spouses Vaca stand exactly in the shoes of their predecessor-in-interest, Associated Bank.[60]
The Court cannot accept GSIS’s theory that the dispositive portion of the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is enforceable only against GSIS’s title because it does not contain the phrase “and all its derivative titles.” GSIS’s narrow interpretation would render nugatory the principle that a final judgment against a party is binding on his privies and successors-in-interest. We cannot sustain this interpretation. In Cabresos v. Judge Tiro,[61] the Court upheld the respondent judge’s issuance of an alias writ of execution against the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant despite the fact that these successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were never parties to the case. The Court explained that an action is binding on the privies of the litigants even if such privies are not literally parties to the action. Their inclusion in the writ of execution does not vary or exceed the terms of the judgment. In the same way, the inclusion of the “derivative titles” in the writ of execution will not alter the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 ordering the cancellation of GSIS’s title.
Cancellation of title
The RD claimed that it cannot execute the order to cancel the GSIS’s titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and
GSIS refused to turn over the needed documents and information, claiming that these acts go beyond what were ordered in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398. GSIS’s protestations ring hollow.
The order contained in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is for the RD to cancel GSIS’s titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and
A similar predicament was ruled upon by the Court in Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[62] In that case, the Court declared that Republic Mines had no right to the property involved but during the execution, the RD refused to cancel the TCT in Republic Mine’s name on the ground that the dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision did not order the RD to cancel the title and to revive the old title in favor of the victorious party. The Court held that the missing “order to cancel and revive” should be deemed implied in the trial court’s decision. Speaking through Justice Feliciano, the Court explained thus:
What is involved here is not what is ordinarily regarded as a clerical error in the dispositive part of the decision of the Court of First Instance, which type of error is perhaps best typified by an error in arithmetical computation. At the same time, what is involved here is not a correction of an erroneous judgment or dispositive portion of a judgment. What we believe is involved here is in the nature of an inadvertent omission on the part of the Court of First Instance x x x, of what might be described as a logical follow-through of something set forth both in the body of the decision and in the dispositive portion thereof: the inevitable follow-through, or translation into, operational or behavioral terms, of the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, from which petitioners' title or claim of title embodied in TCT 133153 flows. The dispositive portion of the decision itself declares the nullity ab initio of the simulated Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage and instructed the petitioners and all persons claiming under them to vacate the subject premises and to turn over possession thereof to the respondent-spouses. Paragraph B of the same dispositive portion, confirming the real estate mortgage executed by the respondent-spouses also necessarily assumes that Title No. 133153 in the name of petitioner Republic Mines is null and void and therefore to be cancelled, since it is indispensable that the mortgagors have title to the real property given under mortgage to the creditor (Article 2085 [2], Civil Code).[63]
x x x x
There are powerful considerations of an equitable nature which impel us to the conclusions we reach here. Substantial justice cannot be served if the
When a judgment calls for the issuance of a new title in favor of the winning party (as in the instant case), it logically follows that the judgment also requires the losing party to surrender its title for cancellation. It is the only sensible way by which the decision may be enforced. To this end, petitioners can obtain a court order requiring the registered owner to surrender the same and directing the entry of a new certificate of title in petitioners’ favor.[65] The trial court should have granted petitioners’ motion for supplemental writ of execution as it had authority to issue the necessary orders to aid the execution of the final judgment.[66]
GSIS’s objection that these orders cannot be enforced because they do not literally appear in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is unreasonable. GSIS would have the Court spell out the wheres, whys, and hows of the execution. GSIS wants a dispositive portion that is a step-by-step detailed description of what needs to be done for purposes of execution. This expectation is unreasonable and absurd.
