The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:
x x x x
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case[.] [emphases ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies upon[74] and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.[75] The obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the administration of justice.[76]
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from introducing further evidence;[77] but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other;[78] or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,[79] the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion[80] under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a “good reason” and be in furtherance of “the interest of justice.” For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower court’s action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.[81] Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment[82] or mere abuse of discretion.[83]
In Lopez v. Liboro,[84] we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; emphases ours)
Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,[85] we ruled:
The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. “The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion,” it has been said by an eminent author, “is, that material testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously.”
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge “for special reasons,” to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties “to offer evidence upon their original case.” These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.[86]
The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.[87]
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the petitioner’s concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion “redundant.” This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the contemplation of law.
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted “through oversight.”[88] The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.[89]
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the submission of the Bane deposition.
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The state of the parties’ submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the parties have more than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after remand.[90] We are thus left with no choice but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.
x x x."
