It is a pity that the Justice System is being subverted by frivolous and flimsy petitions for certiorari filed by litigants and their lawyers questioning interlocutory orders issued by first-level trial courts in summary cases, e.g., ejectment cases, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Rules of Summary Procedure. The Bar should discipline itself in this regard to maintain the respect of the public in the Philippine justice system. A petition for certiorari, as a rule, is a prohibited pleading/action in summary cases. Here is one example of a recent civil case that I handled along this line. The citations below may be useful to readers for purposes of legal research.
COMMENT/ANSWER
TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
THE RESPONDENTS, by counsel, respectfully state:
1. At the outset, the respondent respectfully submit that the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari must be denied due course outright because it is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 19 (g) of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, as well as Sec. 13 , Par. 7, of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, both of which prohibit the filing of a “petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order” issued by the public respondent Hon. Xxx, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch xxx, of xxx City. [1]
2. The subject matters of the instant suit are the interlocutory orders of Hon. Xxx, dated September 19, 2007 and November 14, 2007, which allowed the inclusion of petitioner xxx as a co-defendant in the underlying ejectment case (unlawful detainer) in the court below, i.e., Civil Case No. xxx, entitled “x x x”. The case is still pending in the lower court.
3. Moreover, the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright because it fails to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 65, considering that:
3.1. The public respondent Hon. Xxx has jurisdiction over the ejectment case;
3.2. The public respondent did not act in excess of his jurisdiction;
3.3. The public respondent did not commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
3.4. The petitioner has the right of ordinary appeal to question/appeal any adverse judgment of the lower court in the future -- which is “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” under the aforecited provision;
4. Further, under Sec. 8, Rule 65, this Honorable Court may dismiss outright the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari because it is “without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration”.
5. In addition to being a prohibited pleading or action or suit under the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, with due respect, the respondents humbly submit that the instant suit is unmeritorious, dilatory, flimsy, frivolous, and undeserving of credence.
6. Private respondent xxx, by counsel (Atty. Xxx), had duly and properly served a demand letter to the petitioner Maria Conte, as required by Sec. 1, Rule 70. (See Complaint for ejectment filed by xxx, marked as Annex “C” of the instant petition, and see also Annex “D” of the said Complaint for ejectment, which is the demand letter the petitioner xxx, et. al., dated xxx).
7. The private respondent xxx had properly complied with the relevant provisions of Rule 70:
7.1. Sec.1, Rule 70 provides that “a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs”.
7.2. Sec. 2, Rule 70 provides that “such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings”.
7.3. Sec. 3, Rule 70 categorizes an ejectment suit as a summary proceeding.
8. The private respondent xxx reiterates and adopts hereto her previous legal and factual arguments presented in the court below in her “SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENT/OPPOSITION (To: MOTION TO DISMISS)”, dated May 1, 2007, as to the issue of the propriety of continuing to include and implead the petitioner xxx as a co-defendant. THUS:
8.1. It is an elementary doctrine in this jurisprudence that the absence of barangay conciliation (viz. secondary defendant xxx) is NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT, the same being merely a procedural precondition.
Under ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93 of the Supreme Court, dated July 15, 1993, re: GUIDELINES ON THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEDURE TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REVISED KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW [SECTIONS 399-422, CHAPTER VII, TITLE I, BOOK III, R. A. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991], the Supreme Court expressly stated that “a case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s, not for lack of jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or prematurity (Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court may suspend proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court; and refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law”.
8.2. xxx is under the control and authority of the lead defendants xxx, et. al. and is a privy, agent, underling and beneficiary of the latter with the permission and consent of the latter insofar as the matter of living in the subject property is concerned. Xxx is a relative of the lead defendants who lives with the latter with the latter’s consent and permission and is under the control and supervision of the latter in respect of her stay in the subject premises.
8.3. The said lead defendants xxx had been duly summoned by the local Barangay prior to the commencement of the instant suit (see Annexes “B” and “C”, Complaint).
8.4. In the case of Palanca vs. Guides, G.R. No. 146365, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 461, the doctrine of substantial compliance was discussed, thus:
X x x.
The Court likewise affirms the finding that there was substantial compliance with Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1508, respondent having been able to sufficiently explain the clerical errors in the certification to file action earlier submitted and to submit the revised certification which
bears the proper caption of the case. Petitioner’s attempt to make an issue by distinguishing himself from his manager Oscar Rivera to show that the barangay reconciliation proceedings had not been undertaken fails given the fact that Rivera appeared at the hearings in behalf and at the behest of petitioner who was his subdivision manager.
X x x.
8.5. In the case SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION vs. CA, et al., GR 136274, September 3, 2003, “… although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is:
8.5.1. a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;
8.5.2. a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant;
8.5.3. a transferee pendente lite;
8.5.4. a sublessee;
8.5.5. a co-lessee or
8.5.6. a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.
X x x.
The basic issue before us is whether petitioner’s members, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land subject of this case.
We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioner’s members are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent. Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle its members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioner’s only defense against the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support since its members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment.
Petitioner’s argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not included in the original ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent filed with the MeTC of Parañaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matter under litigation in the unlawful detainer case. Thus, petitioner’s members, together with all the parties in the unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed land.
The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her twilight years, who has been unlawfully deprived of her land for a good number of years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin to execute this decision with reasonable dispatch, consistent with the requirements of Section 28 of RA 7279 and EO 152, on eviction and demolition.
X x x.
9. The main defense of the defendants in the ejectment case below was the claim of ownership over the questioned property raised by their lead defendant xxx. Such a claim cannot divest the public respondent in the instant suit of his jurisdiction over the underlying ejectment case in the court below. Xxx has not produced any written contract or agreement to prove the alleged sale of the property to her by xxx. The Statute of Frauds disallow such a tactic.
Sec. 16, Rule 70 provides that when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Sec. 18, Rule 70 provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.
10. The fact of the matter is that the defendants in the ejectment case in the court below occupied the property out of tolerance of the owner Seiwa because they are all close relatives, i.e., sister (Irene Herrera), brother (Ronald Herrera), and aunt (Maria Conte).
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which an action for unlawful detainer may be instituted against him. (Dakudao v. Consolacion, No. L-54753, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 877).
11. In closing, it must be stressed that petitioner xxx knew of the demand to vacate made by xxx because the demand letter was addressed to her (as a minor/secondary defendant) and to the other lead/senior defendants (i.e., xxx, et. al.), all of whom occupied and live in the same questioned property; that all of the defendants have the same/common lawyer, Atty. Xxx, up to now; that his law firm had replied to xxx, thru counsel (Atty. Xxx), denying, rejecting and ignoring the said demand, in behalf of all of the defendants; that petitioner xxx knew of the Barangay proceedings to which xxx, et. al. were summoned; that she (petitioner xxx) had actual and constructive knowledge thereof; that she opted to ignore it and not to voluntarily appear and participate therein; and that, therefore, she had waived her right to avail of the procedural benefits under the Barangay Justice Law.
All the above facts are not denied by petitioner in all her past pleadings in the court below.
12. To abbreviate the proceedings and to protect the underlying ejectment case from unjust delays, it is submitted that that this case may be resolved without setting a trial and without requiring the parties to submit Memoranda because the sole Barangay-related question raised in this suit is purely legal and there is no factual issue involved herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ii is respectfully prayed that the instant Rule 65 petition of certiorari be DENIED DUE COURSE, for lack of merit, for being a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, and for being dilatory, flimsy and frivolous.
Las Pinas City, January 11, 2008.
LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES
Counsel for Respondents
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1743
Tel/Fax 8742539, 8725443
MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85
IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907
IBP PPLM Chapter
PTR No. 9628887, 1/7/08, Las Pinas
MCLE Exemption No. II-000844 (3/31/07)
[1] Sec. 13, Rule 70, lists the prohibited pleadings and motions in a summary suit:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions.
