In the case of TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, G.R. No. 120592, March 14, 1997, the Philippine Supreme Court the two concepts of attorney’s fees (ordinary and extraordinary) in relation to the law on damages in the Civil Code and the provisions of the Labor Code.
I wish to digest the said case below, for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog. Thus:
X x x.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
X x x.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court.
The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
X x x.
It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. It will thus be appropriate, at this juncture, to determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under the retainer agreement entered into by him and petitioner.
X x x.
The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.
The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a remuneration for legal services actually rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer.
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorney’s fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.
As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on its concept in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 579 (1949), citing 7 C.J.S. 1019, in this wise:
There is in legal practice what is called a “retaining fee,” the purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. “A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform.” (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firm’s pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its “commitment to render the legal services enumerated.” The fee is not payment for private respondent’s execution or performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there.
X x x.
We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent and different from the compensation which private respondent should receive in payment for his services. While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latter’s promise to extend services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law firm’s actual performance of services in favor of the union. Hence, the retainer agreement cannot control the measure of remuneration for private respondent’s services.
We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner that private respondent had already waived his right to charge additional fees because of their failure to come to an agreement as to its payment.
Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted to waive the additional charges in consonance with Part D of the agreement. Secondly, the prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice of charging lien and filing of motion to determine attorney’s fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to compensation for prosecuting the labor case instituted by the union. And, lastly, to adopt such theory of petitioner may frustrate private respondent’s right to attorney’s fees, as the former may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any special agreement with the latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm had relinquished its right because of the absence of the same.
The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As embodied in our law, certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (Articles 1157 and 2142, Civil Code).
A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent’s lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of petitioner’s cause without awaiting the latter’s consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private respondent’s efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondent’s actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.
Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC, on top of the P3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly from petitioner. The law firm’s services are decidedly worth more than such basic fee in the retainer agreement. Thus, in Part C thereof on “Fee Structure,” it is even provided that all attorney’s fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to private respondent, aside from petitioner’s liability for appearance fees and reimbursement of the items of costs and expenses enumerated therein.
A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Some of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto us under the same circumstances. (See: Tolentino, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. V, 1992 ed., 575).
As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, notwithstanding the lack of understanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis of quasi-contract. Hence, it is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the special services rendered by private respondent in order that petitioner may be obligated to pay compensation to the former. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from private respondent’s services. [See Perez vs. Pomar, 2 Phil. 682 (1903)].
We are not unaware of the old ruling that a person who had no knowledge of, nor consented to, or protested against the lawyer’s representation may not be held liable for attorney’s fees even though he benefited from the lawyer’s services. But this doctrine may not be applied in the present case as petitioner did not object to private respondent’s appearance before the NLRC in the case for differentials. [Orosco vs. Heirs of Hernandez, 1 Phil. 77 (1901)].
Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondent’s legal services and assistance regarding its claims against the bank, only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor, there is at least the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give). This rule of law, likewise founded on the principle against unjust enrichment, would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent which proved beneficial to petitioner’s members. (Corpuz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980, 98 SCRA 424).
In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services. [See: Panis vs. Yangco, 52 Phil. 499 (1928)]. However, the value of private respondent’s legal services should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. Said article provides:
ART. 111. Attorney’s fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.
x x x
The implementing provision of the foregoing article further states:
Sec. 11. Attorney’s fees. - Attorney’s fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.
(See: Sec. 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code).
In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorney’s fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and payable to the prevailing part. In the second place, the ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees provided for in Article 111 of the Labor Code and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award that may thus be granted.
(Sebuguero, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 115394, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 532). Article 111 thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney’s fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it. [Taganas vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 118746, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 133].
The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as against his client should properly be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction. Quantum meruit, meaning “as much as he deserves,” is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client. [Sesbreño vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995, 245 SCRA 30].
Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. [Lorenzo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 85383, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 260].
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. [Agpalo, R.E., The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 1991 ed., 257]..
Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a lawyer’s services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorney’s fees in favor of private respondent. Instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the amount of attorney’s fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He completely relied on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorney’s fees at P17,574.43. Observe the conclusion stated in his order.
x x x
FIRST. Art. 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly declares movant’s right to a ten (10%) per cent of the award due its client. In addition, this right to ten (10%) per cent attorney’s fees is supplemented by Sec. 111, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.
x x x
As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorney’s fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorney’s fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorney’s fees in such maximum limit.
It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney’s fees. The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of private respondent’s fees.
It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorney’s fees is a question of fact. [Gonzales vs. National Housing Corporation, G.R. No. 50092, December 18, 1979, 94 SCRA 786]. Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded this case for further reception of evidence as to the extent and value of the services rendered by private respondent to petitioner. However, so as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable to fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees in favor of private respondent. For that purpose, we have duly taken into account the accepted guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that regard. On such premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
X x x.
Monday, February 2, 2009
Monday, January 26, 2009
Obama
I am digesting the salient parts of the inaugural speech of the 44th US president, Barack Obama, in relation to the rule of law and social justice, to help predict how his leadership in the next 4 years might influence these 2 serious areas of concern. Thus:
“We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.”
“What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them -- that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works -- whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end. And those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account -- to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day -- because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.”
“As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience's sake. And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: Know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more.”
“Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”
“x x x. We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet. We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.”
“For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus -- and nonbelievers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.”
“To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West: Know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”
“To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.”
“Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends -- hard work and honesty, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism -- these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility -- a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation and the world; duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task.”
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/20/obama.politics/index.html
“We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.”
“What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them -- that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works -- whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end. And those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account -- to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day -- because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.”
“As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience's sake. And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: Know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more.”
“Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”
“x x x. We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet. We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.”
“For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus -- and nonbelievers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.”
“To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West: Know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”
“To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.”
“Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends -- hard work and honesty, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism -- these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility -- a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation and the world; duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task.”
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/20/obama.politics/index.html
16 judges killed
Sixteen Filipino judges have been killed since 1999, forcing the Philippine Supreme Court to exploit human greed in helping solve the murders.
Below is a news item issued by the Supreme Court announcing a P1 million fund to serve as the source of rewards for tipsters.
Court News Flash December 2008
See: www.supremecourt.gov.ph
PhP1Million Reward for Informants, Witnesses in Judge’s Killings; Security Training for Judges Continues
Posted: December 11, 2008
By Jay B. Rempillo
The Judiciary has set aside a total of PhP1 million as reward money for informants and witnesses whose information and testimonies can lead to the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of the perpetrators and masterminds of the senseless killings and attempts on the life of our magistrates.
Upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court Committee on Security, the Court has approved the grant of such incentives and rewards. The million-peso reward fund comes from the Philippine Judges Foundation, Inc. (PJFI), headed by retired Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and retired Court of Appeals Justice Mariano M. Umali, PJFI’s Chairperson and President, respectively.
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Chairperson of the SC Committee on Security, has announced that a reward of PhP100,000 will be given to informants/witnesses for information leading to the identity of a person threatening or killing any member of the Judiciary. Another PhP100,000 will be given upon the latter’s conviction.
Informants/witnesses may contact the Supreme Court through the Office of Assistant Court Administrator Edwin A. Villasor at (+632) 5216809, or Atty. Allan Contado and Mr. Jason Domingo of the National Bureau of Investigation Task Force for Judiciary Protection at (+632) 5238231.
Sixteen judges have been killed since 1999, the latest victim being Judge Philip G. Labastida of the San Juan Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), who was found dead with several stab wounds in his Quezon City house last December 7.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has condemned Judge’s Labastida’s killing and called for the early resolution of the case. “The entire Judiciary strongly condemns the killing of Judge Labastida. I am urging the police authorities to exert all efforts for the immediate apprehension of those responsible for Judge Labastida’s death,” Chief Justice Puno said.
The foregoing development was welcomed by the participants in the Personal Security Training for Judges which is being held at the Bohol Tropics Hotel in Tagbilaran City. Attendees to the seminar-training, which concludes today, December 11, are Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges, Municipal Trial Court (MTC) judges, Muncipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges from Judicial Regions VI, VII, and VIII.
Judges Weigh in on Security
Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens of the Calbayog City RTC, Branch 31 said that the reward will encourage witnesses to come out to help solve the killings. His late colleague, Judge Roberto A. Navidad of the Calbayog City RTC, Branch 32, was shot dead by still unidentified suspect in January this year.
Judge Rowena Nieves Tan of the Balangiga, Eastern Samar RTC, Branch 42 shared the same sentiment. Judge Tan opined that witnesses to the killings of judges will be more encouraged to come out if they will be assured of their protection and security and not just be given financial rewards.
The judges-participants are oriented by able resource speakers from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on crime prevention and basic first aid, threat awareness and personal security measures, among others.
Among other things, the participants were told that “it helps to have a little paranoia” to ensure their safety and protection.
Judge Clemens could not agree more saying that because of paranoia “you prepare for your safety.” For her part, however, Judge Tan said she would rather be “cautious but not paranoid” and “careful but to continue trusting people.”
Even a judge-couple differed in their opinions this time on the issue of judges’ carrying firearms for their protection. Judge Franklin J. Demonteverde of the Himamaylan City RTC, Branch 55, whose sala is located in the middle of a sugarcane plantation, gave an affirmative response, while his wife Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde of the Bacolod City MTCC, Branch 2 said she would rather not handle a gun. The Demonteverdes are also participants to the seminar.
Today, the participants will have firearms orientation, as well as marksmanship and technical proficiency training.
The Bohol training is the third of its kind since the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Judicial Security between the Supreme Court and the NBI last January. . It is a joint project by the Supreme Court Committee on Security, the Philippine Judicial Academy, and the Office of the Court Administrator, in coordination with the NBI.
The Security Trainings were first held in Davao last July and Baguio City last August after the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Judicial Security between the Supreme Court and the NBI last January.
Under the said MOA, the NBI created the Task Force Judiciary Protection as the bureau’s investigating and operating unit. The TFJP is composed of NBI personnel who will “provide prompt and effective protection to judges and justices needing or requesting protection due to threats to their personal safety arising from judicial work” and “investigate thoroughly without letup until final resolution all killings or attempted killings of judges and justices.”
Previous Security Measures for Judges
The Court has already drawn up earlier measures to curb the work-related killing of judges.
In August 2007, Chief Justice Puno, through Memorandum Circular No. 10-2007, provided an interim security procedure to improve the security for justices and judges pending the issuance of a comprehensive security protocol for the lower courts.
The above security protocol designates two focal persons, whom all justices and judges should immediately contact in case of threats to their security or safety. Assigned as contact persons are Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben dela Cruz and Atty. Allan C. Contado, who is also the Liaison Officer to the Supreme Court for the NBI’s Task Force for Judiciary Protection.
The protocol was based on the recommendations of the Committee on Security of the Judiciary in response to the recent spate of violence and killings against members of the Judiciary, especially judges in the lower courts who are continuously exposed to violent attacks.
In 2005, the Court approved the Guidelines for Detail of Court Personnel as Security of Judges. The Guidelines cover all Regional Trial Courts, Shari’a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Shari’a Circuit Courts.
Under the Guidelines, a judge who receives a direct threat may apply with the Philippine National Police (PNP) for protective security. A direct threat is defined as “an actual threat of danger or physical harm.”
If the judge is under an imminent threat or if his request to the PNP is denied, he or she may apply with the Court’s Security Committee for authority to designate a member of the judge’s staff as an escort. An imminent threat is defined as “a probable danger of death or physical harm.” Only one employee of the court may be designated as an escort by the judge.
Likewise, the Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, has inked a Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine National Police in 2005 “to work and coordinate with each other in the processing of Permits to Carry Licensed Firearms of the members of the Judiciary,” especially those who are receiving death threats. With the MOA, judges are granted permits to carry their firearms even outside their stations.
Also, in 2004, the Court abolished the Heinous Crimes Courts “owing to the relatively low caseloads in the said courts and considering that the current set-up makes a Heinous Crime Court Judge easily identifiable, making him/her an easy prey to vindictive litigants.” Heinous crimes are now cognizable by all second-level courts.
Below is a news item issued by the Supreme Court announcing a P1 million fund to serve as the source of rewards for tipsters.
Court News Flash December 2008
See: www.supremecourt.gov.ph
PhP1Million Reward for Informants, Witnesses in Judge’s Killings; Security Training for Judges Continues
Posted: December 11, 2008
By Jay B. Rempillo
The Judiciary has set aside a total of PhP1 million as reward money for informants and witnesses whose information and testimonies can lead to the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of the perpetrators and masterminds of the senseless killings and attempts on the life of our magistrates.
Upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court Committee on Security, the Court has approved the grant of such incentives and rewards. The million-peso reward fund comes from the Philippine Judges Foundation, Inc. (PJFI), headed by retired Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and retired Court of Appeals Justice Mariano M. Umali, PJFI’s Chairperson and President, respectively.
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Chairperson of the SC Committee on Security, has announced that a reward of PhP100,000 will be given to informants/witnesses for information leading to the identity of a person threatening or killing any member of the Judiciary. Another PhP100,000 will be given upon the latter’s conviction.
Informants/witnesses may contact the Supreme Court through the Office of Assistant Court Administrator Edwin A. Villasor at (+632) 5216809, or Atty. Allan Contado and Mr. Jason Domingo of the National Bureau of Investigation Task Force for Judiciary Protection at (+632) 5238231.
Sixteen judges have been killed since 1999, the latest victim being Judge Philip G. Labastida of the San Juan Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), who was found dead with several stab wounds in his Quezon City house last December 7.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has condemned Judge’s Labastida’s killing and called for the early resolution of the case. “The entire Judiciary strongly condemns the killing of Judge Labastida. I am urging the police authorities to exert all efforts for the immediate apprehension of those responsible for Judge Labastida’s death,” Chief Justice Puno said.
The foregoing development was welcomed by the participants in the Personal Security Training for Judges which is being held at the Bohol Tropics Hotel in Tagbilaran City. Attendees to the seminar-training, which concludes today, December 11, are Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges, Municipal Trial Court (MTC) judges, Muncipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges from Judicial Regions VI, VII, and VIII.
Judges Weigh in on Security
Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens of the Calbayog City RTC, Branch 31 said that the reward will encourage witnesses to come out to help solve the killings. His late colleague, Judge Roberto A. Navidad of the Calbayog City RTC, Branch 32, was shot dead by still unidentified suspect in January this year.
Judge Rowena Nieves Tan of the Balangiga, Eastern Samar RTC, Branch 42 shared the same sentiment. Judge Tan opined that witnesses to the killings of judges will be more encouraged to come out if they will be assured of their protection and security and not just be given financial rewards.
The judges-participants are oriented by able resource speakers from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on crime prevention and basic first aid, threat awareness and personal security measures, among others.
Among other things, the participants were told that “it helps to have a little paranoia” to ensure their safety and protection.
Judge Clemens could not agree more saying that because of paranoia “you prepare for your safety.” For her part, however, Judge Tan said she would rather be “cautious but not paranoid” and “careful but to continue trusting people.”
Even a judge-couple differed in their opinions this time on the issue of judges’ carrying firearms for their protection. Judge Franklin J. Demonteverde of the Himamaylan City RTC, Branch 55, whose sala is located in the middle of a sugarcane plantation, gave an affirmative response, while his wife Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde of the Bacolod City MTCC, Branch 2 said she would rather not handle a gun. The Demonteverdes are also participants to the seminar.
Today, the participants will have firearms orientation, as well as marksmanship and technical proficiency training.
The Bohol training is the third of its kind since the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Judicial Security between the Supreme Court and the NBI last January. . It is a joint project by the Supreme Court Committee on Security, the Philippine Judicial Academy, and the Office of the Court Administrator, in coordination with the NBI.
The Security Trainings were first held in Davao last July and Baguio City last August after the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Judicial Security between the Supreme Court and the NBI last January.
Under the said MOA, the NBI created the Task Force Judiciary Protection as the bureau’s investigating and operating unit. The TFJP is composed of NBI personnel who will “provide prompt and effective protection to judges and justices needing or requesting protection due to threats to their personal safety arising from judicial work” and “investigate thoroughly without letup until final resolution all killings or attempted killings of judges and justices.”
Previous Security Measures for Judges
The Court has already drawn up earlier measures to curb the work-related killing of judges.
In August 2007, Chief Justice Puno, through Memorandum Circular No. 10-2007, provided an interim security procedure to improve the security for justices and judges pending the issuance of a comprehensive security protocol for the lower courts.
The above security protocol designates two focal persons, whom all justices and judges should immediately contact in case of threats to their security or safety. Assigned as contact persons are Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben dela Cruz and Atty. Allan C. Contado, who is also the Liaison Officer to the Supreme Court for the NBI’s Task Force for Judiciary Protection.
The protocol was based on the recommendations of the Committee on Security of the Judiciary in response to the recent spate of violence and killings against members of the Judiciary, especially judges in the lower courts who are continuously exposed to violent attacks.
In 2005, the Court approved the Guidelines for Detail of Court Personnel as Security of Judges. The Guidelines cover all Regional Trial Courts, Shari’a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Shari’a Circuit Courts.
Under the Guidelines, a judge who receives a direct threat may apply with the Philippine National Police (PNP) for protective security. A direct threat is defined as “an actual threat of danger or physical harm.”
If the judge is under an imminent threat or if his request to the PNP is denied, he or she may apply with the Court’s Security Committee for authority to designate a member of the judge’s staff as an escort. An imminent threat is defined as “a probable danger of death or physical harm.” Only one employee of the court may be designated as an escort by the judge.
Likewise, the Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, has inked a Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine National Police in 2005 “to work and coordinate with each other in the processing of Permits to Carry Licensed Firearms of the members of the Judiciary,” especially those who are receiving death threats. With the MOA, judges are granted permits to carry their firearms even outside their stations.
Also, in 2004, the Court abolished the Heinous Crimes Courts “owing to the relatively low caseloads in the said courts and considering that the current set-up makes a Heinous Crime Court Judge easily identifiable, making him/her an easy prey to vindictive litigants.” Heinous crimes are now cognizable by all second-level courts.
Ultimate dream
Most Filipinos, even the highly educated ones, have the wrong impression that the ultimate dream of a private lawyer is to be appointed in the Supreme Court.
This impression arises either out of arrogance on the part of the justices who claim such a theory or out of ignorance of insecure members of the Bench and the Bar, and of the Media, as to the sociology and the philosophy of the Bar.
Government service, e.g., appointment in the Supreme Court, is not the sole criterion of self-fulfillment of a member of the Bar. Enlightenment and selfless service to mankind are the true indicia of ultimate success and liberation of a private lawyer.
I, for one, prefer not to serve in Government or to be employed in multibillion corporations. I prefer to be on my own, serving the common Filipinos in my modest capacity as a private litigator. Employed corporate lawyers would brand private lawyers like me as “main street lawyers”, as distinguished from “Wall Street lawyers”.
I am happy and satisfied working alone as a legal advocate, doing justice one case at a time, teaching law one listener at a time, and living a modest and transparent life untainted by greed, hatred, envy, and illusions of grandeur and permanence. I own my own small law office. I control my own time and my own psychic income. I am my own boss. I can speak out my mind on current national and local issues without fear of violating any bureaucratic chain of command. Truly, I am most effective in the private sector as I carry the cudgel for the oppressed, the poor, the weak, and the ignorant.
At any rate, in a recent column of former Justice Isagani Cruz in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, he reacted to the system of public interviews by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) of nominees or applicants to vacancies in the Supreme Court, calling the same as humiliating and demeaning, to wit:
“I view the proceedings with distaste because they cheapen the applicant and even the Supreme Court itself where it is the position that must seek the person to occupy it and not vice versa. Prospective justices are not politicians whose highest qualification is popularity that may be won through the box office or other preposterous inducements, never mind integrity and competence. Judges require a higher level of intelligence, morality and, no less important, self-respect. I don’t think any of our eminent jurists in the past would have agreed to submit to the interrogation imposed by the JBC on persons hoping for its imprimatur.”
However, if we revert to the old system of commanding that nominees to the Supreme Court must undergo the partisan rigors before the congressional Commission on Appointments, it would seem to be a worse case, at first glance. In the end, though, such an arrangement is the lesser evil.
I would rather entrust the fate of the Supreme Court to elected lawmakers constituting a Commission on Appointments than rely on the decisions of unelected personalities appointed by the President to the JBC. Electoral mandate forms a sui generis human conscience that is preferable to that of well-connected and elitist appointees.
Below is the full text of his column.
Separate Opinion
The lawyer’s ultimate dream
By Isagani A. Cruz
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:07:00 01/25/2009
WITH the retirement of another justice of the Supreme Court next month, there is even now a scramble for the vacancy to be filled by the President from a list of nominees to be submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. Aspirants must apply with their bio-data to the JBC so it can schedule their interview, or examination. No one, however prestigious, can expect to be just invited; he must ask to be nominated like all other applicants. The public can witness the competition where the candidates will be subjected to sundry questions to test their eligibility to sit on the highest tribunal.
I view the proceedings with distaste because they cheapen the applicant and even the Supreme Court itself where it is the position that must seek the person to occupy it and not vice versa. Prospective justices are not politicians whose highest qualification is popularity that may be won through the box office or other preposterous inducements, never mind integrity and competence. Judges require a higher level of intelligence, morality and, no less important, self-respect. I don’t think any of our eminent jurists in the past would have agreed to submit to the interrogation imposed by the JBC on persons hoping for its imprimatur.
When the Supreme Court was reorganized in 1986 after Edsa I, there was no JBC yet and no campaigning either. As far as I know, none of those appointed engaged in the cheap tactics now being employed by the present hopefuls. I myself can swear that I never approached even Speaker J. B. Laurel and Vice President Doy Laurel, who were my law partners then, or any one else for that matter. Malacañang learned about our qualifications not directly from us but from our public credentials and the people who knew us.
It was Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, at that time only a casual acquaintance, who informed me of my appointment and the oath-taking the next day. That was the first time I met President Cory Aquino who had never seen me before and probably knew me principally from my résumé that Dean Rodolfo Palma of the UE College of Law, husband of Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, had requested from me.
I guess we were less aggressive then, or more decorous, because of the dignity of the office for which we were being considered. I recall that when, years later, I recommended the appointment to the Supreme Court of Adolfo Azcuna, who was then a stranger to me, he reacted with admirable modesty and gratefully declined the honor. (Somebody now would have grabbed it ferociously.) He was such a contrast to that insolent aspirant who practically commanded the JBC to “just nominate me and I’ll take care of Malacañang!” There was also that executive underling who sent a niece of mine to bring me a cake and request my help to make him a justice.
As a consultant of the JBC for several years, I was able to observe the many types of applicants it had to deal with and especially noticed the courtesy with which it received them. The docility of some of them must have been caused by their feeling that they were taking another bar test. The JBC now schedules some of its sessions in the South to make their search more economical to lawyers who may not have the means to prove in far-away Manila their capacity to be judges.
There are many extra-constitutional tests that applicants may flunk even if they pass all the constitutional requirements. In the exercise of its discretion, the JBC may reject persons who do not belong to the party in power, wear outmoded or loud clothes, are graduates of obscure law schools, have gambling, graft or liquor problems, or simply look disreputable. It may also take into account some pluses, like topping the bar examinations, post-graduate studies abroad, impressive work experience, and loyalty or opposition to the administration. According to Chief Justice Puno, being over 65 years old is not a constitutional bar but may only be among the many factors to be studied by the JBC in evaluating the over-all acceptability of the applicant.
We usually imitate the United States in many things good and bad, but unfortunately not in the way it chooses appointive judges. In “The Nine” by Jeffrey Toobin, there is an interesting account of President Bill Clinton’s unsuccessful efforts to persuade estimable prospects to join the federal Supreme Court. Especially regrettable was the case of appellate Judge Richard Arnold, the generally acclaimed jurist with a classical education in Greek and Latin and valedictorian of Harvard Law School in 1960, among many other distinctions. The brilliant candidate never became one of The Nine because he had been diagnosed two decades earlier with lymphatic cancer that Clinton feared might spread out any time. It did seven years later.
There is no compulsory retirement age for judges in the United States, unlike here where members of the judiciary, including justices, presumably become senile at 70 and must go out to pasture. That is why many ambitious figures from the bench and the bar, including those older than 65, are setting their sights on a seat on our Supreme Court as their ultimate dream.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090125-185379/The-lawyers-ultimate-dream
This impression arises either out of arrogance on the part of the justices who claim such a theory or out of ignorance of insecure members of the Bench and the Bar, and of the Media, as to the sociology and the philosophy of the Bar.
Government service, e.g., appointment in the Supreme Court, is not the sole criterion of self-fulfillment of a member of the Bar. Enlightenment and selfless service to mankind are the true indicia of ultimate success and liberation of a private lawyer.
I, for one, prefer not to serve in Government or to be employed in multibillion corporations. I prefer to be on my own, serving the common Filipinos in my modest capacity as a private litigator. Employed corporate lawyers would brand private lawyers like me as “main street lawyers”, as distinguished from “Wall Street lawyers”.
I am happy and satisfied working alone as a legal advocate, doing justice one case at a time, teaching law one listener at a time, and living a modest and transparent life untainted by greed, hatred, envy, and illusions of grandeur and permanence. I own my own small law office. I control my own time and my own psychic income. I am my own boss. I can speak out my mind on current national and local issues without fear of violating any bureaucratic chain of command. Truly, I am most effective in the private sector as I carry the cudgel for the oppressed, the poor, the weak, and the ignorant.
At any rate, in a recent column of former Justice Isagani Cruz in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, he reacted to the system of public interviews by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) of nominees or applicants to vacancies in the Supreme Court, calling the same as humiliating and demeaning, to wit:
“I view the proceedings with distaste because they cheapen the applicant and even the Supreme Court itself where it is the position that must seek the person to occupy it and not vice versa. Prospective justices are not politicians whose highest qualification is popularity that may be won through the box office or other preposterous inducements, never mind integrity and competence. Judges require a higher level of intelligence, morality and, no less important, self-respect. I don’t think any of our eminent jurists in the past would have agreed to submit to the interrogation imposed by the JBC on persons hoping for its imprimatur.”
However, if we revert to the old system of commanding that nominees to the Supreme Court must undergo the partisan rigors before the congressional Commission on Appointments, it would seem to be a worse case, at first glance. In the end, though, such an arrangement is the lesser evil.
I would rather entrust the fate of the Supreme Court to elected lawmakers constituting a Commission on Appointments than rely on the decisions of unelected personalities appointed by the President to the JBC. Electoral mandate forms a sui generis human conscience that is preferable to that of well-connected and elitist appointees.
Below is the full text of his column.
Separate Opinion
The lawyer’s ultimate dream
By Isagani A. Cruz
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:07:00 01/25/2009
WITH the retirement of another justice of the Supreme Court next month, there is even now a scramble for the vacancy to be filled by the President from a list of nominees to be submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. Aspirants must apply with their bio-data to the JBC so it can schedule their interview, or examination. No one, however prestigious, can expect to be just invited; he must ask to be nominated like all other applicants. The public can witness the competition where the candidates will be subjected to sundry questions to test their eligibility to sit on the highest tribunal.
I view the proceedings with distaste because they cheapen the applicant and even the Supreme Court itself where it is the position that must seek the person to occupy it and not vice versa. Prospective justices are not politicians whose highest qualification is popularity that may be won through the box office or other preposterous inducements, never mind integrity and competence. Judges require a higher level of intelligence, morality and, no less important, self-respect. I don’t think any of our eminent jurists in the past would have agreed to submit to the interrogation imposed by the JBC on persons hoping for its imprimatur.
When the Supreme Court was reorganized in 1986 after Edsa I, there was no JBC yet and no campaigning either. As far as I know, none of those appointed engaged in the cheap tactics now being employed by the present hopefuls. I myself can swear that I never approached even Speaker J. B. Laurel and Vice President Doy Laurel, who were my law partners then, or any one else for that matter. Malacañang learned about our qualifications not directly from us but from our public credentials and the people who knew us.
It was Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, at that time only a casual acquaintance, who informed me of my appointment and the oath-taking the next day. That was the first time I met President Cory Aquino who had never seen me before and probably knew me principally from my résumé that Dean Rodolfo Palma of the UE College of Law, husband of Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, had requested from me.
I guess we were less aggressive then, or more decorous, because of the dignity of the office for which we were being considered. I recall that when, years later, I recommended the appointment to the Supreme Court of Adolfo Azcuna, who was then a stranger to me, he reacted with admirable modesty and gratefully declined the honor. (Somebody now would have grabbed it ferociously.) He was such a contrast to that insolent aspirant who practically commanded the JBC to “just nominate me and I’ll take care of Malacañang!” There was also that executive underling who sent a niece of mine to bring me a cake and request my help to make him a justice.
As a consultant of the JBC for several years, I was able to observe the many types of applicants it had to deal with and especially noticed the courtesy with which it received them. The docility of some of them must have been caused by their feeling that they were taking another bar test. The JBC now schedules some of its sessions in the South to make their search more economical to lawyers who may not have the means to prove in far-away Manila their capacity to be judges.
There are many extra-constitutional tests that applicants may flunk even if they pass all the constitutional requirements. In the exercise of its discretion, the JBC may reject persons who do not belong to the party in power, wear outmoded or loud clothes, are graduates of obscure law schools, have gambling, graft or liquor problems, or simply look disreputable. It may also take into account some pluses, like topping the bar examinations, post-graduate studies abroad, impressive work experience, and loyalty or opposition to the administration. According to Chief Justice Puno, being over 65 years old is not a constitutional bar but may only be among the many factors to be studied by the JBC in evaluating the over-all acceptability of the applicant.
We usually imitate the United States in many things good and bad, but unfortunately not in the way it chooses appointive judges. In “The Nine” by Jeffrey Toobin, there is an interesting account of President Bill Clinton’s unsuccessful efforts to persuade estimable prospects to join the federal Supreme Court. Especially regrettable was the case of appellate Judge Richard Arnold, the generally acclaimed jurist with a classical education in Greek and Latin and valedictorian of Harvard Law School in 1960, among many other distinctions. The brilliant candidate never became one of The Nine because he had been diagnosed two decades earlier with lymphatic cancer that Clinton feared might spread out any time. It did seven years later.
There is no compulsory retirement age for judges in the United States, unlike here where members of the judiciary, including justices, presumably become senile at 70 and must go out to pasture. That is why many ambitious figures from the bench and the bar, including those older than 65, are setting their sights on a seat on our Supreme Court as their ultimate dream.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090125-185379/The-lawyers-ultimate-dream
Identity
In the case of ZENAIDA B. GONZALES vs. ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS, A.C. No. 6713, December 8, 2008, the Supreme Court suspended a lawyer from law practice for 3 months and revoked his notarial commission.
The Court held that the respondent lawyer did not know the complainant personally, yet he did not require proof of identity from the person who appeared before him and executed and authenticated the three questioned documents. It added that had the respondent lawyer done so, the fraudulent transfer of complainant's property could have been prevented. It warned all Filipino notaries public that they must observe utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it embodies.
May I quote below the salient parts of the said decision. Thus:
X x x.
On December 19, 2003, complainant amended her complaint. This time, she charged respondent with gross negligence and failure to exercise the care required by law in the performance of his duties as a notary public, resulting in the loss of her property in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, a 141,497 square meters of mango land covered by TCT NT-29578. The complainant claimed that because of the respondent’s negligent acts, title to her property was transferred to Asterio Gonzales, Estrella Gonzales and Rodolfo Gonzales. She reiterated that when the three documents disposing of her property were notarized, she was out of the country. Estrella Gonzales Mendrano, one of the vendees, was also outside the country as shown by a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) on September 14, 1989. She likewise claimed that Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales (the widow of Rodolfo Gonzales, another vendee) executed an affidavit describing the “Deed of Absolute Sale and Subdivision Agreement” as spurious and without her husband's participation. The affidavit further alleged that the complainant’s signatures were forged and the respondent did not ascertain the identity of the person who came before him and posed as vendor despite the fact that a large tract of land was being ceded and transferred to the vendees.
X x x.
Rule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice provides:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - “Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and present an integrally complete instrument on document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purpose stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.”
Under the given facts, the respondent clearly failed to faithfully comply with the foregoing rules when he notarized the three documents subject of the present complaint. The respondent did not know the complainant personally, yet he did not require proof of identity from the person who appeared before him and executed and authenticated the three documents. The IBP Report observed that had the respondent done so, “the fraudulent transfer of complainant's property could have been prevented.”
X x x.
The respondent should be reminded that a notarial document is, on its face and by authority of law, entitled to full faith and credit. For this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it embodies.
X x x. A notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document to be personally present, and to swear before him that he is the person named in the document and is voluntarily and freely executing the act mentioned in the document. The notary public faithfully discharges this duty by at least verifying the identity of the person appearing before him based on the identification papers presented.
X x x.
The Court held that the respondent lawyer did not know the complainant personally, yet he did not require proof of identity from the person who appeared before him and executed and authenticated the three questioned documents. It added that had the respondent lawyer done so, the fraudulent transfer of complainant's property could have been prevented. It warned all Filipino notaries public that they must observe utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it embodies.
May I quote below the salient parts of the said decision. Thus:
X x x.
On December 19, 2003, complainant amended her complaint. This time, she charged respondent with gross negligence and failure to exercise the care required by law in the performance of his duties as a notary public, resulting in the loss of her property in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, a 141,497 square meters of mango land covered by TCT NT-29578. The complainant claimed that because of the respondent’s negligent acts, title to her property was transferred to Asterio Gonzales, Estrella Gonzales and Rodolfo Gonzales. She reiterated that when the three documents disposing of her property were notarized, she was out of the country. Estrella Gonzales Mendrano, one of the vendees, was also outside the country as shown by a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) on September 14, 1989. She likewise claimed that Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales (the widow of Rodolfo Gonzales, another vendee) executed an affidavit describing the “Deed of Absolute Sale and Subdivision Agreement” as spurious and without her husband's participation. The affidavit further alleged that the complainant’s signatures were forged and the respondent did not ascertain the identity of the person who came before him and posed as vendor despite the fact that a large tract of land was being ceded and transferred to the vendees.
X x x.
Rule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice provides:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - “Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and present an integrally complete instrument on document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purpose stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.”
Under the given facts, the respondent clearly failed to faithfully comply with the foregoing rules when he notarized the three documents subject of the present complaint. The respondent did not know the complainant personally, yet he did not require proof of identity from the person who appeared before him and executed and authenticated the three documents. The IBP Report observed that had the respondent done so, “the fraudulent transfer of complainant's property could have been prevented.”
X x x.
The respondent should be reminded that a notarial document is, on its face and by authority of law, entitled to full faith and credit. For this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it embodies.
X x x. A notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document to be personally present, and to swear before him that he is the person named in the document and is voluntarily and freely executing the act mentioned in the document. The notary public faithfully discharges this duty by at least verifying the identity of the person appearing before him based on the identification papers presented.
X x x.
ratio decidendi
What is the legal effect of a decision of the Supreme Court where a majority concurred only in the result and not in the ratio decidendi thereof?
Is it doctrinal in nature?
Does it comply with Section 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which mandates that the courts shall clearly present the findings of fact and law in their decisions?
My answer is in the negative.
The issue is the crux of the ongoing partisan attempt to oust Chief Justice Reynato Puno from office.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”; and that “no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.”
Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban states: “Second, I believe that the subject decision is unconstitutional, not because it lacks doctrinal value, but because it violates Sec. 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution that states, “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.” Per Velarde v Social Justice Party (June 28, 2004), a decision that violates this provision is void and non-existent.
He adds: “An ‘in the result’ vote concurs with the conclusion of the decision, but not with its premises and reasons. The majority who merely concurred “in the result” did not express “clearly and distinctly the facts and law” justifying their vote. In effect, the majority did not state at all the bases of the judgment”.
Justice Cruz states in his column: “This provision is a reiteration of the original rule included in the Commonwealth Constitution to further strengthen the right to notice and hearing guaranteed by the due process clause. It is intended to prevent the court from ruling on any case by simply holding, without more, “Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of X and against Y.” Such arbitrariness is anathema under the Bill of Rights. The parties are entitled to know how a decision has been reached and to appeal from it if it is permitted. This would not be possible if the pertinent facts and the applicable laws are not examined and resolved to support the reasoned decision.”
Columnist Amado Doronilla explains the political motive of the powers-that-be: “If impeachment proceedings against Puno are initiated in Congress, Kampi voting as a party could muster enough votes to impeach Puno. If Puno is impeached, the administration will be free to appoint a new chief justice who will be accommodating to Charter change through a constituent assembly. Puno is known to be against Charter change through a constituent assembly created by Congress voting as one chamber. This explains why Puno is alarmed.”
Reproduced below are the recent columns of Retired Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz, Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, and respected columnist Amado Doronilla. We all share the same view on the above matter.
Separate Opinion
Concurring only in the result
By Isagani A. Cruz
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:34:00 01/18/2009
THERE is now a suspect movement to impeach Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno for his refusal to promulgate a decision against a sitting member of the House of Representatives on the ground of non-citizenship. The sketchy reports from the media say it was written by recently retired Justice Ruben Reyes and concurred in without qualification by three or five members of the Supreme Court, with the rest of the justices concurring only in the result.
The threat to impeach Puno has more bark than bite. What is more believable is the suspicion that it has been initiated to remove the chief justice because of his known opposition to the administration’s oft-defeated Cha-cha schemes and replace him with someone more sympathetic to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s dream of perpetuating herself in illicit power. She is again involving the supposedly apolitical Judiciary with this latest machination of her cohorts against a respected jurist, no less than the chief justice himself, to insure her quest for her eternal glorification.
I believe the chief’s reason for not promulgating the so-called decision is based on Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution, which says:
“No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
“No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.”
This provision is a reiteration of the original rule included in the Commonwealth Constitution to further strengthen the right to notice and hearing guaranteed by the due process clause. It is intended to prevent the court from ruling on any case by simply holding, without more, “Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of X and against Y.” Such arbitrariness is anathema under the Bill of Rights. The parties are entitled to know how a decision has been reached and to appeal from it if it is permitted. This would not be possible if the pertinent facts and the applicable laws are not examined and resolved to support the reasoned decision.
The above-quoted provision was not observed in the Reyes ponencia that Chief Justice Puno has not promulgated to date. He is correct in refusing to do so because it is not supported by the majority vote required by the Constitution. Decisions of the Supreme Court en banc require the conformity of at least eight of the 15 members, which was not reached in the case under consideration. (The singular exception is where a quorum of only eight deliberates on a constitutional question that can be decided by only five of them, but that is another story.)
The news accounts say that nine justices concurred with the Reyes ponencia only “in the result,” with the other five or three members concurring without any reservation and thus agreeing with the facts and the law on which it was based. But there were only four or at most only six of them and so they could not constitute the majority of the Court to render a valid and binding decision.
As for the other nine justices, what they concurred in was only in the result, which meant they did not agree with the facts and the law approved in the ponencia.
The result they were supporting had no basis at all and was therefore an empty gesture. Unlike the justices who merely concurred and thereby indicated their full agreement with the facts and the law that supported the result, the nine justices who concurred only in the result rejected the factual and legal basis discussed in the Reyes ponencia. In effect, they agreed with its dispositive portion but did not say why. Their votes were clearly invalid for not complying with the requirements of Art. VIII, Sec. 14, of the Constitution.
I think those who concurred with Justice Reyes but only in the result did so out of compañerismo with their colleague or agreement with the winner in the case. But they could not accept the reasons given for sustaining her, which is why they could not concur with the ponencia in full without any ifs or buts. Chief Justice Puno was correct in refusing to promulgate the so-called decision as it was supported by only a minority of the Court.
This is only my own personal opinion, and the chief may have his own legal justification. But in any case, the move to impeach him for his perfectly valid stand is making a mountain out of a molehill. The members of the lower House would again demonstrate their ignorance of the Constitution by plotting against the innocent Chief Justice Puno instead of impeaching, not him, but their sainted Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for her many unconstitutional sins.
I conclude with recollection of a similar case but with a different ending. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727, the Supreme Court finally upheld the petitioner, in what was more of a sentimental tribute than a judicial decision, by reversing established doctrines in three earlier cases against him.
Only five justices concurred completely, four agreed pro hac vice (only for that particular case), three in the result, one dissented, and two did not take part. The lone dissenter was Hilario G. Davide Jr. who later became chief justice in his own time.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090118-184004/Concurring-only-in-the-result
Analysis
Who gains from Puno’s impeachment?
By Amando Doronila
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:40:00 01/16/2009
The Supreme Court has come under a storm of controversy after withholding the promulgation of a draft decision upholding a verdict of the Commission on Elections that disqualified Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong from sitting as a representative of Negros Oriental province in the House of Representatives on the grounds that she is a Chinese citizen.
Limkaichong won the congressional election in 2007, defeating Olivia Paras, wife of former congressman Jacinto Paras, by more than 7,000 votes.
The Court en banc decided unanimously in a resolution to withhold promulgation of the draft decision. The draft, although signed by 14 justices, except Chief Justice Reynato Puno, was confidential since it was still to be deliberated upon by the Court.
The non-promulgation of the decision, dated July 15, 2008, sparked a flurry of rumors during the past two weeks that moves were afoot in Congress that the Chief Justice faced impeachment by Congress for sitting on the draft decision, penned by Justice Ruben Reyes who retired last Jan. 2.
Court spokesman Midas Marquez has acknowledged the threat, saying “we have heard of the ouster moves but we don’t’ know where they are coming from.” He said Puno was “accused of sitting on that case and of not promulgating the decision despite the signature of 14 other justices.”
Although an impeachment complaint has yet to be lodged with the House of Representatives, Puno himself did not discount such an attempt by administration allies in the House to pave the way for the appointment of a chief justice who might be more amendable to current proposals to change the Constitution to make way for extending the hold on power of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo beyond her term which ends in 2010. Puno said he was prepared to face any attempt to impeach him.
“It is not in our hands,” he said. “If they proceed with that move, then let it be. We cannot prevent it. We’ll meet it when it happens. I’m in perfect peace.” He said he was concerned that the reported moves to impeach him could have devastating effects on the independence of the judiciary. “I like to think that I’m just an incident in this fight. The bigger stake is the independence of the judiciary. If we lose the independence of the judiciary, democracy would die,” Puno said.
He said the Limkaichong electoral case was decided by the entire Supreme Court. “The Court itself has already explained what happened to the case. And this is the position taken collectively by the 15 justices,” he said. “So, if they think there is fault in that collective stand of the 15 justices why don’t they complain about the entire Court? Why are they trying to pin the blame on a single person when the entire Court has explained that this is not my decision alone but the decision of the entire Court?”
In a resolution last month, the Court explained why Reyes’ draft was not promulgated despite the concurrence of all the justices during an en banc session in July last year. It pointed out that nine justices concurred only “in the result.” With nine out of 15 justices concurring only in the result, the ruling written by Reyes “has no doctrinal value,” the Court said. Thus, “the justices decided to withhold the promulgation of the ‘ponencia’ [authored decision] of Justice Reyes.”
There were threats that privilege speeches were to be delivered in the House when Congress resumes its session on Monday to denounce Puno for wrongdoings related to the non-promulgation of the Court’s draft decision on the unseating of Limkaichong. These attacks were planned to jump-start the impeachment moves by members of the President’s party, Kampi.
Should this move materialize, it would be the second time an impeachment move has been taken against a chief justice since 2003, when an impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., spearheaded by the hit men of Eduardo Cojuangco’s Nationalist People’s Coalition. The attack was led by Cojuangco’s two sons in the House and his nephew Gilberto Teodoro. They accused Davide of alleged misappropriation of funds intended for the living allowances of court employees. Standing its ground against this frontal assault from a co-equal political department of government, the court unequivocally ruled that the impeachment complaint against Davide was unconstitutional.
This time, the attack on the Puno Court is spearheaded by a citizen, Louis Biraogo who claims he has filed a taxpayer’s suit in the cause of “public interest” to put pressure on the Supreme Court to promulgate the draft decision that would unseat Limkaichong. Biraogo also launched a media campaign, accusing Puno of giving favorable treatment to Limkaichong. He went to the media and imputed wrongdoing by Puno for withholding the promulgation of the draft.
These accusations provided ammunition for the President’s political allies in the House to begin moving against Puno. Claims by Biraogo that his intervention in the Limkaichong case was motivated by “public interest” are undermined when tested by the question, who stands to gain from the impeachment of Puno?
If impeachment proceedings against Puno are initiated in Congress, Kampi voting as a party could muster enough votes to impeach Puno. If Puno is impeached, the administration will be free to appoint a new chief justice who will be accommodating to Charter change through a constituent assembly. Puno is known to be against Charter change through a constituent assembly created by Congress voting as one chamber. This explains why Puno is alarmed.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090116-183623/Who-gains-from-Punos-impeachment
With Due Respect
Political terrorism
By Artemio V. Panganiban
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:39:00 01/18/2009
TOMORROW, Jan. 19, Congress will resume its session amid talk that an impeachment complaint would be filed against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno for allegedly withholding the promulgation of a decision, penned by Justice Ruben T. Reyes, ousting Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong from her congressional seat. I believe that, by itself, this withholding cannot support an impeachment.
CJ not personally liable. First, in its Resolution dated Dec. 10, 2008, the Supreme Court stated, “Since nine (9) Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only ‘in the result,’ the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the ponencia of Justice Reyes. It was noted that if a majority concurs only ‘in the result,’ the ponencia has no doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme measure.” (bold types and italics in original)
Plainly then, it was the Court itself, not the Chief Justice, that withheld the promulgation. Some, including me, may—with due respect—disagree with the Court’s two reasons (and even with the grammar used) for the non-promulgation. The Constitution does not require “doctrinal value” to validate a judgment. Neither does it demand such value in ousting a solon. Indeed, there are many decisions that do not lay down doctrines. Nonetheless, the inaction of the Court en banc as a collegial body cannot be used against the CJ.
Second, I believe that the subject decision is unconstitutional, not because it lacks doctrinal value, but because it violates Sec. 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution that states, “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.” Per Velarde v Social Justice Party (June 28, 2004), a decision that violates this provision is void and non-existent.
An “in the result” vote concurs with the conclusion of the decision, but not with its premises and reasons. The majority who merely concurred “in the result” did not express “clearly and distinctly the facts and law” justifying their vote. In effect, the majority did not state at all the bases of the judgment.
Third, the grounds for impeachment are: “Culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” Sitting on a void decision is not one of them. Au contraire, promulgating a decision with nine justices concurring only “in the result” may arguably—repeat, arguably—constitute “culpable violation of the Constitution.”
Numbers game? Many politicians claim that impeachment is a numbers game where all that is needed is the vote of “at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives.” However, I think that to ignore the constitutional grounds would constitute grave abuse of discretion that the Supreme Court could enjoin, as it did with the attempt to oust Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in 2003. A naked insistence to impeach Chief Justice Puno based on sheer tyranny of numbers would be political terrorism of the most odious kind.
Having said that, I also believe that the Court should decide the Limkaichong case with deliberate speed. Already, more than one and a half years have lapsed in the three-year term of a representative. The case has been amply deliberated upon. The issues are not difficult. In fairness, the Court should issue a prudent decision within 30 days from now.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090118-184006/Political-terrorism
Is it doctrinal in nature?
Does it comply with Section 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which mandates that the courts shall clearly present the findings of fact and law in their decisions?
My answer is in the negative.
The issue is the crux of the ongoing partisan attempt to oust Chief Justice Reynato Puno from office.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”; and that “no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.”
Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban states: “Second, I believe that the subject decision is unconstitutional, not because it lacks doctrinal value, but because it violates Sec. 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution that states, “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.” Per Velarde v Social Justice Party (June 28, 2004), a decision that violates this provision is void and non-existent.
He adds: “An ‘in the result’ vote concurs with the conclusion of the decision, but not with its premises and reasons. The majority who merely concurred “in the result” did not express “clearly and distinctly the facts and law” justifying their vote. In effect, the majority did not state at all the bases of the judgment”.
Justice Cruz states in his column: “This provision is a reiteration of the original rule included in the Commonwealth Constitution to further strengthen the right to notice and hearing guaranteed by the due process clause. It is intended to prevent the court from ruling on any case by simply holding, without more, “Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of X and against Y.” Such arbitrariness is anathema under the Bill of Rights. The parties are entitled to know how a decision has been reached and to appeal from it if it is permitted. This would not be possible if the pertinent facts and the applicable laws are not examined and resolved to support the reasoned decision.”
Columnist Amado Doronilla explains the political motive of the powers-that-be: “If impeachment proceedings against Puno are initiated in Congress, Kampi voting as a party could muster enough votes to impeach Puno. If Puno is impeached, the administration will be free to appoint a new chief justice who will be accommodating to Charter change through a constituent assembly. Puno is known to be against Charter change through a constituent assembly created by Congress voting as one chamber. This explains why Puno is alarmed.”
Reproduced below are the recent columns of Retired Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz, Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, and respected columnist Amado Doronilla. We all share the same view on the above matter.
Separate Opinion
Concurring only in the result
By Isagani A. Cruz
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:34:00 01/18/2009
THERE is now a suspect movement to impeach Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno for his refusal to promulgate a decision against a sitting member of the House of Representatives on the ground of non-citizenship. The sketchy reports from the media say it was written by recently retired Justice Ruben Reyes and concurred in without qualification by three or five members of the Supreme Court, with the rest of the justices concurring only in the result.
The threat to impeach Puno has more bark than bite. What is more believable is the suspicion that it has been initiated to remove the chief justice because of his known opposition to the administration’s oft-defeated Cha-cha schemes and replace him with someone more sympathetic to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s dream of perpetuating herself in illicit power. She is again involving the supposedly apolitical Judiciary with this latest machination of her cohorts against a respected jurist, no less than the chief justice himself, to insure her quest for her eternal glorification.
I believe the chief’s reason for not promulgating the so-called decision is based on Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution, which says:
“No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
“No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.”
This provision is a reiteration of the original rule included in the Commonwealth Constitution to further strengthen the right to notice and hearing guaranteed by the due process clause. It is intended to prevent the court from ruling on any case by simply holding, without more, “Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of X and against Y.” Such arbitrariness is anathema under the Bill of Rights. The parties are entitled to know how a decision has been reached and to appeal from it if it is permitted. This would not be possible if the pertinent facts and the applicable laws are not examined and resolved to support the reasoned decision.
The above-quoted provision was not observed in the Reyes ponencia that Chief Justice Puno has not promulgated to date. He is correct in refusing to do so because it is not supported by the majority vote required by the Constitution. Decisions of the Supreme Court en banc require the conformity of at least eight of the 15 members, which was not reached in the case under consideration. (The singular exception is where a quorum of only eight deliberates on a constitutional question that can be decided by only five of them, but that is another story.)
The news accounts say that nine justices concurred with the Reyes ponencia only “in the result,” with the other five or three members concurring without any reservation and thus agreeing with the facts and the law on which it was based. But there were only four or at most only six of them and so they could not constitute the majority of the Court to render a valid and binding decision.
As for the other nine justices, what they concurred in was only in the result, which meant they did not agree with the facts and the law approved in the ponencia.
The result they were supporting had no basis at all and was therefore an empty gesture. Unlike the justices who merely concurred and thereby indicated their full agreement with the facts and the law that supported the result, the nine justices who concurred only in the result rejected the factual and legal basis discussed in the Reyes ponencia. In effect, they agreed with its dispositive portion but did not say why. Their votes were clearly invalid for not complying with the requirements of Art. VIII, Sec. 14, of the Constitution.
I think those who concurred with Justice Reyes but only in the result did so out of compañerismo with their colleague or agreement with the winner in the case. But they could not accept the reasons given for sustaining her, which is why they could not concur with the ponencia in full without any ifs or buts. Chief Justice Puno was correct in refusing to promulgate the so-called decision as it was supported by only a minority of the Court.
This is only my own personal opinion, and the chief may have his own legal justification. But in any case, the move to impeach him for his perfectly valid stand is making a mountain out of a molehill. The members of the lower House would again demonstrate their ignorance of the Constitution by plotting against the innocent Chief Justice Puno instead of impeaching, not him, but their sainted Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for her many unconstitutional sins.
I conclude with recollection of a similar case but with a different ending. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727, the Supreme Court finally upheld the petitioner, in what was more of a sentimental tribute than a judicial decision, by reversing established doctrines in three earlier cases against him.
Only five justices concurred completely, four agreed pro hac vice (only for that particular case), three in the result, one dissented, and two did not take part. The lone dissenter was Hilario G. Davide Jr. who later became chief justice in his own time.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090118-184004/Concurring-only-in-the-result
Analysis
Who gains from Puno’s impeachment?
By Amando Doronila
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:40:00 01/16/2009
The Supreme Court has come under a storm of controversy after withholding the promulgation of a draft decision upholding a verdict of the Commission on Elections that disqualified Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong from sitting as a representative of Negros Oriental province in the House of Representatives on the grounds that she is a Chinese citizen.
Limkaichong won the congressional election in 2007, defeating Olivia Paras, wife of former congressman Jacinto Paras, by more than 7,000 votes.
The Court en banc decided unanimously in a resolution to withhold promulgation of the draft decision. The draft, although signed by 14 justices, except Chief Justice Reynato Puno, was confidential since it was still to be deliberated upon by the Court.
The non-promulgation of the decision, dated July 15, 2008, sparked a flurry of rumors during the past two weeks that moves were afoot in Congress that the Chief Justice faced impeachment by Congress for sitting on the draft decision, penned by Justice Ruben Reyes who retired last Jan. 2.
Court spokesman Midas Marquez has acknowledged the threat, saying “we have heard of the ouster moves but we don’t’ know where they are coming from.” He said Puno was “accused of sitting on that case and of not promulgating the decision despite the signature of 14 other justices.”
Although an impeachment complaint has yet to be lodged with the House of Representatives, Puno himself did not discount such an attempt by administration allies in the House to pave the way for the appointment of a chief justice who might be more amendable to current proposals to change the Constitution to make way for extending the hold on power of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo beyond her term which ends in 2010. Puno said he was prepared to face any attempt to impeach him.
“It is not in our hands,” he said. “If they proceed with that move, then let it be. We cannot prevent it. We’ll meet it when it happens. I’m in perfect peace.” He said he was concerned that the reported moves to impeach him could have devastating effects on the independence of the judiciary. “I like to think that I’m just an incident in this fight. The bigger stake is the independence of the judiciary. If we lose the independence of the judiciary, democracy would die,” Puno said.
He said the Limkaichong electoral case was decided by the entire Supreme Court. “The Court itself has already explained what happened to the case. And this is the position taken collectively by the 15 justices,” he said. “So, if they think there is fault in that collective stand of the 15 justices why don’t they complain about the entire Court? Why are they trying to pin the blame on a single person when the entire Court has explained that this is not my decision alone but the decision of the entire Court?”
In a resolution last month, the Court explained why Reyes’ draft was not promulgated despite the concurrence of all the justices during an en banc session in July last year. It pointed out that nine justices concurred only “in the result.” With nine out of 15 justices concurring only in the result, the ruling written by Reyes “has no doctrinal value,” the Court said. Thus, “the justices decided to withhold the promulgation of the ‘ponencia’ [authored decision] of Justice Reyes.”
There were threats that privilege speeches were to be delivered in the House when Congress resumes its session on Monday to denounce Puno for wrongdoings related to the non-promulgation of the Court’s draft decision on the unseating of Limkaichong. These attacks were planned to jump-start the impeachment moves by members of the President’s party, Kampi.
Should this move materialize, it would be the second time an impeachment move has been taken against a chief justice since 2003, when an impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., spearheaded by the hit men of Eduardo Cojuangco’s Nationalist People’s Coalition. The attack was led by Cojuangco’s two sons in the House and his nephew Gilberto Teodoro. They accused Davide of alleged misappropriation of funds intended for the living allowances of court employees. Standing its ground against this frontal assault from a co-equal political department of government, the court unequivocally ruled that the impeachment complaint against Davide was unconstitutional.
This time, the attack on the Puno Court is spearheaded by a citizen, Louis Biraogo who claims he has filed a taxpayer’s suit in the cause of “public interest” to put pressure on the Supreme Court to promulgate the draft decision that would unseat Limkaichong. Biraogo also launched a media campaign, accusing Puno of giving favorable treatment to Limkaichong. He went to the media and imputed wrongdoing by Puno for withholding the promulgation of the draft.
These accusations provided ammunition for the President’s political allies in the House to begin moving against Puno. Claims by Biraogo that his intervention in the Limkaichong case was motivated by “public interest” are undermined when tested by the question, who stands to gain from the impeachment of Puno?
If impeachment proceedings against Puno are initiated in Congress, Kampi voting as a party could muster enough votes to impeach Puno. If Puno is impeached, the administration will be free to appoint a new chief justice who will be accommodating to Charter change through a constituent assembly. Puno is known to be against Charter change through a constituent assembly created by Congress voting as one chamber. This explains why Puno is alarmed.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090116-183623/Who-gains-from-Punos-impeachment
With Due Respect
Political terrorism
By Artemio V. Panganiban
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:39:00 01/18/2009
TOMORROW, Jan. 19, Congress will resume its session amid talk that an impeachment complaint would be filed against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno for allegedly withholding the promulgation of a decision, penned by Justice Ruben T. Reyes, ousting Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong from her congressional seat. I believe that, by itself, this withholding cannot support an impeachment.
CJ not personally liable. First, in its Resolution dated Dec. 10, 2008, the Supreme Court stated, “Since nine (9) Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only ‘in the result,’ the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the ponencia of Justice Reyes. It was noted that if a majority concurs only ‘in the result,’ the ponencia has no doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme measure.” (bold types and italics in original)
Plainly then, it was the Court itself, not the Chief Justice, that withheld the promulgation. Some, including me, may—with due respect—disagree with the Court’s two reasons (and even with the grammar used) for the non-promulgation. The Constitution does not require “doctrinal value” to validate a judgment. Neither does it demand such value in ousting a solon. Indeed, there are many decisions that do not lay down doctrines. Nonetheless, the inaction of the Court en banc as a collegial body cannot be used against the CJ.
Second, I believe that the subject decision is unconstitutional, not because it lacks doctrinal value, but because it violates Sec. 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution that states, “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.” Per Velarde v Social Justice Party (June 28, 2004), a decision that violates this provision is void and non-existent.
An “in the result” vote concurs with the conclusion of the decision, but not with its premises and reasons. The majority who merely concurred “in the result” did not express “clearly and distinctly the facts and law” justifying their vote. In effect, the majority did not state at all the bases of the judgment.
Third, the grounds for impeachment are: “Culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” Sitting on a void decision is not one of them. Au contraire, promulgating a decision with nine justices concurring only “in the result” may arguably—repeat, arguably—constitute “culpable violation of the Constitution.”
Numbers game? Many politicians claim that impeachment is a numbers game where all that is needed is the vote of “at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives.” However, I think that to ignore the constitutional grounds would constitute grave abuse of discretion that the Supreme Court could enjoin, as it did with the attempt to oust Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in 2003. A naked insistence to impeach Chief Justice Puno based on sheer tyranny of numbers would be political terrorism of the most odious kind.
Having said that, I also believe that the Court should decide the Limkaichong case with deliberate speed. Already, more than one and a half years have lapsed in the three-year term of a representative. The case has been amply deliberated upon. The issues are not difficult. In fairness, the Court should issue a prudent decision within 30 days from now.
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20090118-184006/Political-terrorism
Continuing detention
In a situation where the respondent in a criminal case is under an inquest proceeding and the inquest prosecutor dismisses the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause, may the detention of the respondent be continued on the ground that the complainant has filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor or a petition for review before the Department of Justice or on the ground that the case is subject to automatic review pursuant to a department order of the Secretary of Justice?
This is the main legal and procedural issue in the controversial case of the Alabang Boys which is now raging in the Philippine mass media.
When a respondent is arrested under Rule 13 (valid warrantless arrest), he is immediately subjected to an inquest proceeding (that is, within 36 hours at the most, counted from the arrest of the respondent, if he does not waive his right against illegal detention under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code).
If the inquest prosecutor is satisfied with the proofs of probable cause submitted by the complainant and the arresting police officers, he will file the appropriate information in court, subject to review and approval by the chief city or provincial prosecutor, within the maximum period allowed by Article 125.
If the respondent waives his Article 125 rights, he continues to be detained and the criminal case is subjected to regular preliminary investigation, which must be completed by the investigating prosecutor within 15 days (from the expiration of the maximum time allowed by Article 125). In a regular preliminary investigation, the respondent may file his counter-affidavit, the affidavits of his witnesses, and his supporting evidence.
If the investigating prosecutor dismisses the complaint for lack of probable cause, and the complainant or the arresting police officers file a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation or appeal the dismissal via petition for review to the Department of Justice or if the resolution is subjected to automatic review by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to a department order, should the respondent be released pending such proceedings to avoid a violation of Article 125?
I believe so. The respondent must be released pending such proceedings.
The spirit of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure favors the theory that the respondent, in the above scenario, must be immediately released. Otherwise, his continuing detention would stifle his constitutional and human rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, and presumption of innocence, as enshrined in Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
A DOJ department order imposing the procedure of automatic review for big and controversial criminal cases may be allowed because it is discretionary on the part of the Secretary of Justice, he being in control of the national prosecution arm of the State, but he must release a respondent from detention when the investigating prosecutor, with the approval of the chief city or provincial prosecutor, has dismissed a case for lack of probable cause, notwithstanding the pendency of appellate proceedings before the DOJ. Otherwise, there is sufficient basis to initiate a criminal complaint against the guilty DOJ and police officials for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Holes in DOJ
(excerpts from the editorial)
Jan. 8, 2009
Philippine Daily Inquirer
THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON THE CASE OF THE alleged bribery involving the “Alabang Boys,” but already it seems clear that the Department of Justice has some housekeeping to do.
X x x.
It was, of course, no such thing. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuño, who signed the original DOJ resolution on Dec. 2 already incorporating the release order for the three young men, called Verano’s maneuver “not normal”. Verano himself explained it in terms anyone dealing with a corrupt organization would find familiar: “I am just facilitating the order. Maybe I was a little bit overzealous.”
X x x.
The justice department also seems to have tolerated a culture of confusion. The answers of DOJ lawyers to questions raised at the House committee hearings about the procedures involved in the release of suspected illegal drug users and pushers have been less than illuminating. Under the Manual Prosecutors, the chief state prosecutor has the authority to conclude the resolution of a case. Gonzalez, however, had issued a department order requiring his personal approval of the resolution of important cases, especially those involving drugs and smuggling cases. In Gonzalez’s own words: “If it is a drug or smuggling case, if the punishment is more than five years, and you dismiss a case of that nature, you must get my imprimatur.”
Under questioning, however, state prosecutors like John Resado described a work culture where the justice secretary’s circular providing for automatic review was either honored in the breach or interpreted laxly.
This confusing state of affairs allows a state prosecutor to act on the assumption that a resolution signed by the chief state prosecutor is effective immediately even while it is pending automatic review.
None of this is to say that the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s performance is flawless, and that therefore every single arrest it makes must end in conviction. But the many loopholes in DOJ processes help explain why the burden of responsibility, in this high-profile case, rests largely on the Department of Justice.
X x x.
This is the main legal and procedural issue in the controversial case of the Alabang Boys which is now raging in the Philippine mass media.
When a respondent is arrested under Rule 13 (valid warrantless arrest), he is immediately subjected to an inquest proceeding (that is, within 36 hours at the most, counted from the arrest of the respondent, if he does not waive his right against illegal detention under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code).
If the inquest prosecutor is satisfied with the proofs of probable cause submitted by the complainant and the arresting police officers, he will file the appropriate information in court, subject to review and approval by the chief city or provincial prosecutor, within the maximum period allowed by Article 125.
If the respondent waives his Article 125 rights, he continues to be detained and the criminal case is subjected to regular preliminary investigation, which must be completed by the investigating prosecutor within 15 days (from the expiration of the maximum time allowed by Article 125). In a regular preliminary investigation, the respondent may file his counter-affidavit, the affidavits of his witnesses, and his supporting evidence.
If the investigating prosecutor dismisses the complaint for lack of probable cause, and the complainant or the arresting police officers file a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation or appeal the dismissal via petition for review to the Department of Justice or if the resolution is subjected to automatic review by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to a department order, should the respondent be released pending such proceedings to avoid a violation of Article 125?
I believe so. The respondent must be released pending such proceedings.
The spirit of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure favors the theory that the respondent, in the above scenario, must be immediately released. Otherwise, his continuing detention would stifle his constitutional and human rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, and presumption of innocence, as enshrined in Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
A DOJ department order imposing the procedure of automatic review for big and controversial criminal cases may be allowed because it is discretionary on the part of the Secretary of Justice, he being in control of the national prosecution arm of the State, but he must release a respondent from detention when the investigating prosecutor, with the approval of the chief city or provincial prosecutor, has dismissed a case for lack of probable cause, notwithstanding the pendency of appellate proceedings before the DOJ. Otherwise, there is sufficient basis to initiate a criminal complaint against the guilty DOJ and police officials for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Holes in DOJ
(excerpts from the editorial)
Jan. 8, 2009
Philippine Daily Inquirer
THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON THE CASE OF THE alleged bribery involving the “Alabang Boys,” but already it seems clear that the Department of Justice has some housekeeping to do.
X x x.
It was, of course, no such thing. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuño, who signed the original DOJ resolution on Dec. 2 already incorporating the release order for the three young men, called Verano’s maneuver “not normal”. Verano himself explained it in terms anyone dealing with a corrupt organization would find familiar: “I am just facilitating the order. Maybe I was a little bit overzealous.”
X x x.
The justice department also seems to have tolerated a culture of confusion. The answers of DOJ lawyers to questions raised at the House committee hearings about the procedures involved in the release of suspected illegal drug users and pushers have been less than illuminating. Under the Manual Prosecutors, the chief state prosecutor has the authority to conclude the resolution of a case. Gonzalez, however, had issued a department order requiring his personal approval of the resolution of important cases, especially those involving drugs and smuggling cases. In Gonzalez’s own words: “If it is a drug or smuggling case, if the punishment is more than five years, and you dismiss a case of that nature, you must get my imprimatur.”
Under questioning, however, state prosecutors like John Resado described a work culture where the justice secretary’s circular providing for automatic review was either honored in the breach or interpreted laxly.
This confusing state of affairs allows a state prosecutor to act on the assumption that a resolution signed by the chief state prosecutor is effective immediately even while it is pending automatic review.
None of this is to say that the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s performance is flawless, and that therefore every single arrest it makes must end in conviction. But the many loopholes in DOJ processes help explain why the burden of responsibility, in this high-profile case, rests largely on the Department of Justice.
X x x.
Consolation
In the case of ENGR. EDGARDO C. GARCIA vs. JUDGE MELJOHN DE LA PEÑA, EN BANC, A.M. No. MTJ-92-687, December 8, 2008, the Supreme Court held that a judge or, for that matter, any judicial personnel, who has been dismissed from the service, “may still enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he earned during the period of his government service”. This is a departure from past rulings of the Court, where the Court had held that all benefits of the dishonorably dismissed judicial officer or personnel are automatically declared forfeited. Thus:
X x x.
To be sure, the penalty imposed on respondent was made pursuant to Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) which provides:
The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Further, it may be imposed without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
However, there have been instances in the past when this Court has shown compassion in modifying already final decisions in administrative cases.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr., this Court, out of humanitarian considerations, allowed dismissed Judge Romillo, Jr. to enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he earned during his government service. In Prudential Bank v. Castro, this Court likewise allowed respondent Judge to enjoy the money equivalent of all his vacation and sick leave benefits.
Furthermore, Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 41, Series of 1998, as amended by MC No. 14, Series of 1999, provides:
Section 37. Payment of terminal leave. – Any official/employee of the government who retires, voluntarily resigns, or is separated from the service and who is not otherwise covered by special law, shall be entitled to the commutation of his leave credits exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned.
Section 65. Effect of decision in administrative case. – An official or employee who has been penalized with dismissal from the service is likewise not barred from entitlement to his terminal leave benefits.
Also, Section 11.A.1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:
Section 11. Sanctions. –
A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits. (Underscoring supplied)
X x x.
X x x.
To be sure, the penalty imposed on respondent was made pursuant to Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) which provides:
The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Further, it may be imposed without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
However, there have been instances in the past when this Court has shown compassion in modifying already final decisions in administrative cases.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr., this Court, out of humanitarian considerations, allowed dismissed Judge Romillo, Jr. to enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he earned during his government service. In Prudential Bank v. Castro, this Court likewise allowed respondent Judge to enjoy the money equivalent of all his vacation and sick leave benefits.
Furthermore, Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 41, Series of 1998, as amended by MC No. 14, Series of 1999, provides:
Section 37. Payment of terminal leave. – Any official/employee of the government who retires, voluntarily resigns, or is separated from the service and who is not otherwise covered by special law, shall be entitled to the commutation of his leave credits exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned.
Section 65. Effect of decision in administrative case. – An official or employee who has been penalized with dismissal from the service is likewise not barred from entitlement to his terminal leave benefits.
Also, Section 11.A.1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:
Section 11. Sanctions. –
A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits. (Underscoring supplied)
X x x.
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
2008 laws
May I list below the important national laws passed by Congress in 2008, for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog:
Republic Act No. 9516
An Act Further Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended, Entitled Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or... Approved by the President on December 22, 2008
Republic Act No. 9515
"An Act Defining the Liability of Ship Agents in the Tramp Service and for Other Purposes" Approved by the President on December 19, 2008
Republic Act No. 9514
"An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Fire Code of the Philippines Repealing Presidential Decree No. 1185 and for Other Purposes" Approved by the President on December 19, 2008
Republic Act No. 9513
An Act Promoting the Development, Utilization and Commercialization of Renewable Energy Resources and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on December 16, 2008
Republic Act No. 9512
An Act to Promote Environmental Awareness Through Environmental Education and for Other Purposes. Approved by the President on December 12, 2008
Republic Act No. 9511
An Act Granting the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines a Franchise to Engage in the Business of Conveying or Transmitting Electricity Through High Voltage Back-Bone System of... Approved by the President on December 1, 2008
Republic Act No. 9510
An Act Establishing the Credit Information System, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on October 31, 2008
Republic Act No. 9507
An Act to Establish a Socialized and Low-Cost Housing Loan Restructuring and Condonation Program, Providing the Mechanisms Therefor, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on October 13, 2008
Republic Act No. 9508
An Act Providing for the Reapportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Agusan Del Sur Approved by the President on October 20, 2008
Republic Act No. 9509
An Act Establishing Livelihood and Skills Training Centers in Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Class Municipalities, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on October 21, 2008
Republic Act No. 9506
An Act Creating the Bacolor Rehabilitation Council and Appropriating Funds Therefor Approved by the President on September 28, 2008
Republic Act No. 9503
An Act Further Expanding the Organizational Structure of the Court of Tax Appeals, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on June 12, 2008
Republic Act No. 9505
An Act Establishing a Provident Personal Savings Plan, Known as the Personal Equity and Retirement Account (PERA) Approved by the President on August 22, 2008 292.8KB
Republic Act No. 9504
An Act Amending Sections 22, 24, 34, 35, 51 and 79 of Republic Act No. 8424, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1987. Approved by the President on June 17, 2008 193.6KB
Republic Act No. 9502
An Act Providing for Cheaper and Quality Medicines, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code, Republic Act No. 6675 or the Generics Act of 1988, and... Approved by the President on June 6, 2008 1016KB
Republic Act No. 9501
An Act to Promote Entrepreneurship by Strengthening Development and Assistance Programs to Micro, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6977, as... Approved by the President on May 23, 2008 663.4KB
Republic Act No. 9500
An Act to Strengthen the University of the Philippines as the National University Approved by the President on April 29, 2008 656.1KB
Republic Act No. 9499
An Act Allowing Filipino World War II Veterans to Continue Receiving Philippine Government Pensions and Benefits Notwithstanding Similar Pensions and Benefits Provided by the United States... Approved by the President on April 9, 2008 85.5KB
Republic Act No. 9498
An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines From January One to December Thirty-One, Two Thousand and Eight, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on March 11, 2008
Republic Act No. 9497
An Act Creating the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on March 4, 2008 1.8MB
Republic Act No. 9496
An Act to Extend the Utilization Period of the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund, Amending Republic Act No. 8178, Entitled An Act Replacing Quantitative Import Restrictions on... Approved by the President on February 28, 2008
Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.
lcmlaw@gmail.com
Republic Act No. 9516
An Act Further Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended, Entitled Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or... Approved by the President on December 22, 2008
Republic Act No. 9515
"An Act Defining the Liability of Ship Agents in the Tramp Service and for Other Purposes" Approved by the President on December 19, 2008
Republic Act No. 9514
"An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Fire Code of the Philippines Repealing Presidential Decree No. 1185 and for Other Purposes" Approved by the President on December 19, 2008
Republic Act No. 9513
An Act Promoting the Development, Utilization and Commercialization of Renewable Energy Resources and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on December 16, 2008
Republic Act No. 9512
An Act to Promote Environmental Awareness Through Environmental Education and for Other Purposes. Approved by the President on December 12, 2008
Republic Act No. 9511
An Act Granting the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines a Franchise to Engage in the Business of Conveying or Transmitting Electricity Through High Voltage Back-Bone System of... Approved by the President on December 1, 2008
Republic Act No. 9510
An Act Establishing the Credit Information System, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on October 31, 2008
Republic Act No. 9507
An Act to Establish a Socialized and Low-Cost Housing Loan Restructuring and Condonation Program, Providing the Mechanisms Therefor, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on October 13, 2008
Republic Act No. 9508
An Act Providing for the Reapportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Agusan Del Sur Approved by the President on October 20, 2008
Republic Act No. 9509
An Act Establishing Livelihood and Skills Training Centers in Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Class Municipalities, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on October 21, 2008
Republic Act No. 9506
An Act Creating the Bacolor Rehabilitation Council and Appropriating Funds Therefor Approved by the President on September 28, 2008
Republic Act No. 9503
An Act Further Expanding the Organizational Structure of the Court of Tax Appeals, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on June 12, 2008
Republic Act No. 9505
An Act Establishing a Provident Personal Savings Plan, Known as the Personal Equity and Retirement Account (PERA) Approved by the President on August 22, 2008 292.8KB
Republic Act No. 9504
An Act Amending Sections 22, 24, 34, 35, 51 and 79 of Republic Act No. 8424, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1987. Approved by the President on June 17, 2008 193.6KB
Republic Act No. 9502
An Act Providing for Cheaper and Quality Medicines, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code, Republic Act No. 6675 or the Generics Act of 1988, and... Approved by the President on June 6, 2008 1016KB
Republic Act No. 9501
An Act to Promote Entrepreneurship by Strengthening Development and Assistance Programs to Micro, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6977, as... Approved by the President on May 23, 2008 663.4KB
Republic Act No. 9500
An Act to Strengthen the University of the Philippines as the National University Approved by the President on April 29, 2008 656.1KB
Republic Act No. 9499
An Act Allowing Filipino World War II Veterans to Continue Receiving Philippine Government Pensions and Benefits Notwithstanding Similar Pensions and Benefits Provided by the United States... Approved by the President on April 9, 2008 85.5KB
Republic Act No. 9498
An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines From January One to December Thirty-One, Two Thousand and Eight, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on March 11, 2008
Republic Act No. 9497
An Act Creating the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on March 4, 2008 1.8MB
Republic Act No. 9496
An Act to Extend the Utilization Period of the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund, Amending Republic Act No. 8178, Entitled An Act Replacing Quantitative Import Restrictions on... Approved by the President on February 28, 2008
Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.
lcmlaw@gmail.com
The chief is under attack
May I share a material from the Supreme Court stating the sectoral supports that Chief Justice Reynato Puno has been receiving in re: the rumor that partisan political factions, some say, aided by the Palace, have launched an impeachment campaign against him. The Chief Justice, who I find to be modest, humble, a free thinker and a libertarian, must be spared from the filth of partisan politics. The independence of the judiciary is at stake.
Outpouring of Support for Chief Justice Puno
Posted: January 14, 2009
By Jay B. Rempillo
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno today was visited by “Running Priest” Fr. Robert Reyes who joined the men and women of the Judiciary, private individuals, and multi-sectoral groups who have expressed their full support for the chief magistrate and appealed that he and the Supreme Court be spared from politics.
Fr. Reyes, who runs to bring attention to his advocacies, prayed for Chief Justice Puno inside the chief magistrate’s chambers. Fr. Reyes was with the farmers-group Ugnayan ng mga Nagsasariling Lokal na Organisasyon ng Mamamayan sa Kanayunan-Southern Tagalog (UNORKA-Southern Tagalog), one of the multi-sectoral groups which manifested support for Chief Justice Puno. The group presented Chief Justice Puno with a letter written in Filipino expressing their full and unwavering support for him.
In separate manifestos of support, the Philippine Judges Association (PJA), the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, and the Las Piñas City Judges Association expressed their unqualified and unwavering support for Chief Justice Puno in face of reports saying that the chief magistrate is in danger of being impeached by Congress over the alleged non-promulgation of a purported SC decision in the case of Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, a case questioning the qualification as to citizenship of Representative-elect Jocelyn LImkaichong. They denounced the alleged threats to oust Chief Justice Puno.
Aside from the issuance of a manifesto of support for Chief Justice Puno, the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines (MeTCJAP), headed by its Executive Vice-President Judge Jaime B. Santiago of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court, stated that it will hold an emergency meeting this Friday to discuss its course of action. In a statement, MeTCJAP said that it “sees the recent events as a political maneuver to destroy the integrity of the Chief Justice and the institution he is representing as a whole.”
PJA President Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., in a statement, said that the PJA is “opposing any ‘contrived plot’ against Chief Justice Puno and any attempt to oust him before he retires in May 2010” and that the Judiciary “should be spared from ‘partisan manipulations.’”
“The PJA calls upon everyone to observe the Rule of Law, not to callously trample upon it for self-serving aims or purposes. More importantly, the PJA makes known its intentions that all legal measures and stops will be taken in order to see to it that the herein support being extended to Chief Justice Puno will be put into further action, if need be,” said the PJA. The PJA, an organization of around 900 RTC Judges nationwide, said that the attempt to impeach Chief Justice Puno is “a sickening reflection of how low ‘power-hungry’ individuals would go in order to put [the chief magistrate] in a bad light and promote their ‘sinister agenda.’”
The judges and employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dismissed as “unfounded and baseless” the accusations against Chief Justice Puno. “We extol the Honorable Chief Justice in his efforts to cleanse the Judiciary, and we urge the citizenry to support him in this endeavor,” the manifesto stated.
The RTC of Manila underscored that Chief Justice Puno “has shown his integrity, uprightness, independence, impartiality, industry, and competence, with the decisions he has rendered, and his unblemished record, free from influence and corruption.” They commended Chief Justice Puno for initiating judicial reforms to win the trust and confidence of the general public.
The Las Piñas City Judges Association echoed the sentiments of the PJA that Chief Justice Puno should be spared from partisan manipulations. It described the alleged ouster move as among the “scandalous efforts…being exerted by seemingly ill-minded individuals to promote their political agency at the expense of every democratic institution in the country.” It vowed to take all legal measures and steps to ensure that its support to Chief Justice Puno will be put into action if the need arises.
Chief Justice Puno has also received letters of support from private law firms, including the Chua Law Office, expressing their support and deploring the ouster allegations. They also volunteered to act as counsel for the chief magistrate.
Outpouring of Support for Chief Justice Puno
Posted: January 14, 2009
By Jay B. Rempillo
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno today was visited by “Running Priest” Fr. Robert Reyes who joined the men and women of the Judiciary, private individuals, and multi-sectoral groups who have expressed their full support for the chief magistrate and appealed that he and the Supreme Court be spared from politics.
Fr. Reyes, who runs to bring attention to his advocacies, prayed for Chief Justice Puno inside the chief magistrate’s chambers. Fr. Reyes was with the farmers-group Ugnayan ng mga Nagsasariling Lokal na Organisasyon ng Mamamayan sa Kanayunan-Southern Tagalog (UNORKA-Southern Tagalog), one of the multi-sectoral groups which manifested support for Chief Justice Puno. The group presented Chief Justice Puno with a letter written in Filipino expressing their full and unwavering support for him.
In separate manifestos of support, the Philippine Judges Association (PJA), the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, and the Las Piñas City Judges Association expressed their unqualified and unwavering support for Chief Justice Puno in face of reports saying that the chief magistrate is in danger of being impeached by Congress over the alleged non-promulgation of a purported SC decision in the case of Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, a case questioning the qualification as to citizenship of Representative-elect Jocelyn LImkaichong. They denounced the alleged threats to oust Chief Justice Puno.
Aside from the issuance of a manifesto of support for Chief Justice Puno, the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines (MeTCJAP), headed by its Executive Vice-President Judge Jaime B. Santiago of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court, stated that it will hold an emergency meeting this Friday to discuss its course of action. In a statement, MeTCJAP said that it “sees the recent events as a political maneuver to destroy the integrity of the Chief Justice and the institution he is representing as a whole.”
PJA President Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., in a statement, said that the PJA is “opposing any ‘contrived plot’ against Chief Justice Puno and any attempt to oust him before he retires in May 2010” and that the Judiciary “should be spared from ‘partisan manipulations.’”
“The PJA calls upon everyone to observe the Rule of Law, not to callously trample upon it for self-serving aims or purposes. More importantly, the PJA makes known its intentions that all legal measures and stops will be taken in order to see to it that the herein support being extended to Chief Justice Puno will be put into further action, if need be,” said the PJA. The PJA, an organization of around 900 RTC Judges nationwide, said that the attempt to impeach Chief Justice Puno is “a sickening reflection of how low ‘power-hungry’ individuals would go in order to put [the chief magistrate] in a bad light and promote their ‘sinister agenda.’”
The judges and employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dismissed as “unfounded and baseless” the accusations against Chief Justice Puno. “We extol the Honorable Chief Justice in his efforts to cleanse the Judiciary, and we urge the citizenry to support him in this endeavor,” the manifesto stated.
The RTC of Manila underscored that Chief Justice Puno “has shown his integrity, uprightness, independence, impartiality, industry, and competence, with the decisions he has rendered, and his unblemished record, free from influence and corruption.” They commended Chief Justice Puno for initiating judicial reforms to win the trust and confidence of the general public.
The Las Piñas City Judges Association echoed the sentiments of the PJA that Chief Justice Puno should be spared from partisan manipulations. It described the alleged ouster move as among the “scandalous efforts…being exerted by seemingly ill-minded individuals to promote their political agency at the expense of every democratic institution in the country.” It vowed to take all legal measures and steps to ensure that its support to Chief Justice Puno will be put into action if the need arises.
Chief Justice Puno has also received letters of support from private law firms, including the Chua Law Office, expressing their support and deploring the ouster allegations. They also volunteered to act as counsel for the chief magistrate.
Extortion
In the case of FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA vs. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, A.C. No. 7298 [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565], June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court found the respondent lawyer liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was meted out the penalty of reprimand with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Let me digest the case below for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog.
In this administrative complaint, the respondent lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
The salient parts of the demand letter are as follows:
“BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).”
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.” In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., we held that “[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent’s disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution.” While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that “a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State.” He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.
Respondent’s assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands. It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
Let me digest the case below for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog.
In this administrative complaint, the respondent lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
The salient parts of the demand letter are as follows:
“BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).”
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.” In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., we held that “[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent’s disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution.” While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that “a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State.” He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.
Respondent’s assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands. It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
Lawyer-client relationship
In the case of MA. LUISA HADJULA vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007, the Supreme Court reprimanded and admonished the respondent lawyer to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. Let me digest the case below for legal research purposes.
In 2002, the complainant charged the respondent lawyer with violation of Article 209 (Betrayal of Trust by an Attorney/Revelation of Secrets) of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
The complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant’s account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant’s promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter’s act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent’s legal advice.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover … where she has a child ….Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all part of public records ….Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta, 432 Phil. 840 (2002):
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former’s business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former’s fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
In 2002, the complainant charged the respondent lawyer with violation of Article 209 (Betrayal of Trust by an Attorney/Revelation of Secrets) of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
The complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant’s account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant’s promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter’s act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent’s legal advice.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover … where she has a child ….Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all part of public records ….Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta, 432 Phil. 840 (2002):
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former’s business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former’s fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
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