Quoted in full below is the full text of the recent decision of the Philippine Supreme Court en banc in the case of “FOODSPHERE, INC. vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., EN BANC, A.C. No. 7199 [Formerly CBD 04-1386], July 22, 2009”, for the information of the visitors of this blog. This is related to the previous item that I have posted on this blog, entitled “ACDC Syndrome”.
In the said case, the Court held that the respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes”; and that the respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate that “a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel” and .”a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,”
The Court stressed that to be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
The Court reminded the Bar to observe Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs lawyers to “at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.”
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name “CDO,” filed a Verified Complaint for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as “Batas Mauricio” (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event, “outrageous.”
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainant’s offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- BATAS NG BAYAN at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:
“OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, ‘aling liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned “KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!” In another article, he wrote “IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!” which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled “DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.”
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles: (a) “Uod sa liver spread,” Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276); (b) “Uod, itinanggi ng CDO,” Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277); (c) “Pagpapatigil sa CDO,” Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); (d) “Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado,” Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279); (e) “Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod,” Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); (f) “Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy,” Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281); (g) “Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards,” Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284); (h) “Brutalidad ng CDO guards,” Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); (i) “CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP,” Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); (j) “May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili,” Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); (k) “Desperado na ang CDO,” Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); (l) “Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO,” Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291); (m) “Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero,” Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292); (n) “Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO,” Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).
In his September 8, 2004 column “Anggulo ng Batas” published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article “Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.”
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the “same baseless and malicious allegations/issues” against it.
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice, alleging:
x x x x
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
x x x x
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his complaint?
x x x x
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here;
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
x x x x
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04, before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against complainant and to malign complainant through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation:
I.
x x x x
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled “Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.”, the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
“Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant plaintiff’s motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff’s prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products.”
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from “further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products”, respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column “Atty. Batas”, 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid “Balitang Bayan –Toro” (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: “A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
II.
x x x x
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his “Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice”. In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:
x x x x
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: “A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.”
III.
The “Kasunduan” entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. …
x x x x
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said “Kasunduan” was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the “Kasunduan” and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of complainant’s products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainant’s failure to give in to respondent’s “request” that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainant’s explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the “Kasunduan” which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said “Kasunduan” and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,
by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified. (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to “at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.”
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondent’s services as “she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,” only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Poor court management
In “Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. 02-8-207-MTCC, July 27, 2009”, the Philippine Supreme Court, once again showing its seriousness to push trial judges to decide their pending cases with dispatch in order to give flesh to the constitutional doctrine of speedy trial, imposed an administrative fine on Judge Evelyn Gamotin-Nery in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to decide cases within the reglementary period; imposed the same fine on Judge Gregorio D. Pantanosas, Jr. for the same reason; and suspended for six months court staff Alfredo B. Magno Jr. for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.
The administrative matter, which showed how mismanagement and poor leadership in the courts could adversely affect the spirit and substance of equity and justice, stemmed from the August 19, 2002 Report on the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted by the Audit Team of the Court Management Office in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Cagayan de Oro City.
The report disclosed that as of April 26, 2002, the trial court had a total case load of 1,654 cases, of which 155 cases have been submitted for decision. Of the 155 cases, 140 cases were already beyond the prescribed 90-day period to decide ordinary cases or the 30-day period to decide cases covered by summary procedure. There were also 10 cases with pending incidents for resolution which had not been acted upon and 428 cases had remained dormant for a considerable length of time either due to the trial court’s failure to take action on the pending incidents thereon or its failure to set the case for hearing. Six (6) civil cases had also never been acted upon despite the assignment of the said cases to the trial court as early as August 1997 to October 1999. In 9 criminal cases, the trial court failed to issue writs of execution relative to its orders of confiscation of the bail bonds of accused who jumped bail. The trial court also failed to archive (1) 125 criminal cases where the accused were not arrested despite the lapse of more than 6 months since the issuance of the warrants of arrest, and (2) 35 civil cases where the defendants were not served summons despite the lapse of more than 6 months from the issuance of summons.
The judicial audit report also showed that the new Executive Judge had relieved Mr. Alfredo B. Magno, Jr. as Clerk of Court of MTCC, Branch 2, due to the latter’s incompetence and inefficiency. The executive judge blamed Mr. Magno for the chaotic record management in the court. He alleged that during her initial inventory of cases, she found some records of pending cases missing and discovered them with the files of archived cases. She also discovered that some criminal cases which were supposed to have been long disposed of were not promulgated and were merely kept inside the filing cabinet. She alleged that Mr. Magno failed to submit on time the reports on 46 cases which were subject of ex-parte proceedings. She revealed that some records of pending cases were found bundled together with the records of decided cases.
Overall, the audit team concluded that the loss or erroneous filing of some case records and the failure to act on certain cases raffled to the court were caused by faulty records management. It appeared that Branch 2 did not maintain the prescribed docket books and instead used an ordinary logbook. The court merely relied on the case folders to determine the status of the cases. Consequently, the court personnel could not properly monitor the status of the cases pending before the court.
Upon an investigation conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OPCA), the Supreme Court held that it could not overemphasize the policy on prompt resolution of disputes. Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties.
The Court stated that proper and efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge, and he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. The responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases primarily rests on the presiding judge. He ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution, and he is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since proper and efficient court management is his responsibility. Court personnel are not the guardians of a judge’s responsibilities. The efficient administration of justice cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame from one court personnel to another. A judge should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subordinates.
The Court stated that it was not unmindful of the burden of heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of every trial judge. But that cannot excuse them from doing their mandated duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they think they cannot comply with their judicial duty. Hence, under the circumstances, all that said judge needed to do was request for an extension of time since this Court has, almost invariably, been considerate with regard to such requests. She did not avail of such remedy. A heavy caseload may excuse a judge’s failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time.
As to the liability of respondent clerk of court, it was undisputed that Mr. Magno was remiss in his duty and responsibility as clerk of court by failing to adopt a system of record management. His efficiency or inefficiency in the performance of his duties and responsibilities does not depend on how his predecessors performed theirs. As the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, clerks of court perform very delicate functions and are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment thereof. It is presumed that they have familiarized themselves with the various statutes and administrative circulars pertinent to their functions to effectively discharge their duties and
responsibilities. Thus, the Court was not inclined to be sympathetic to Mr. Magno because he could not plead his lack of knowledge (or ignorance) as an excuse. He is presumed to know his functions and responsibilities.
The Court stressed that clerks of court are essential judicial officers who perform delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duty is, inter alia, to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all matters that do not involve the discretion or judgment properly belonging to the judge. They play a key role in the complement of the court, as their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. As such, they are required to be persons of competence, honesty and probity; they cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs.
An important duty of the trial court is to conduct a monthly physical inventory of cases. Thus, on the clerks of court, as much as on the judges, rests the responsibility for ensuring that delay in the disposition of cases is kept to a minimum. Indeed, while the clerks of court are not guardians of a judge’s responsibility, they are expected to assist in the speedy dispensation of justice.
As branch clerk of court, Mr. Magno’s duties included conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case were accounted for. It was likewise his duty to initiate and cause the search for missing records. It was incumbent upon him to ensure an orderly and efficient records management in the court. His failure to do so constitutes manifest inefficiency and ineptitude which cannot be countenanced.
As to the imposable penalty, the failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period constitutes a violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge punishable under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, thus:
x x x x
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10, 000.00 but not exceeding P20, 000.00. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
A respondent judge’s optional retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. It does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. Indeed, the Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
Section 52, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties as a grave offense and punishable by suspension ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 1 year, for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
The administrative matter, which showed how mismanagement and poor leadership in the courts could adversely affect the spirit and substance of equity and justice, stemmed from the August 19, 2002 Report on the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted by the Audit Team of the Court Management Office in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Cagayan de Oro City.
The report disclosed that as of April 26, 2002, the trial court had a total case load of 1,654 cases, of which 155 cases have been submitted for decision. Of the 155 cases, 140 cases were already beyond the prescribed 90-day period to decide ordinary cases or the 30-day period to decide cases covered by summary procedure. There were also 10 cases with pending incidents for resolution which had not been acted upon and 428 cases had remained dormant for a considerable length of time either due to the trial court’s failure to take action on the pending incidents thereon or its failure to set the case for hearing. Six (6) civil cases had also never been acted upon despite the assignment of the said cases to the trial court as early as August 1997 to October 1999. In 9 criminal cases, the trial court failed to issue writs of execution relative to its orders of confiscation of the bail bonds of accused who jumped bail. The trial court also failed to archive (1) 125 criminal cases where the accused were not arrested despite the lapse of more than 6 months since the issuance of the warrants of arrest, and (2) 35 civil cases where the defendants were not served summons despite the lapse of more than 6 months from the issuance of summons.
The judicial audit report also showed that the new Executive Judge had relieved Mr. Alfredo B. Magno, Jr. as Clerk of Court of MTCC, Branch 2, due to the latter’s incompetence and inefficiency. The executive judge blamed Mr. Magno for the chaotic record management in the court. He alleged that during her initial inventory of cases, she found some records of pending cases missing and discovered them with the files of archived cases. She also discovered that some criminal cases which were supposed to have been long disposed of were not promulgated and were merely kept inside the filing cabinet. She alleged that Mr. Magno failed to submit on time the reports on 46 cases which were subject of ex-parte proceedings. She revealed that some records of pending cases were found bundled together with the records of decided cases.
Overall, the audit team concluded that the loss or erroneous filing of some case records and the failure to act on certain cases raffled to the court were caused by faulty records management. It appeared that Branch 2 did not maintain the prescribed docket books and instead used an ordinary logbook. The court merely relied on the case folders to determine the status of the cases. Consequently, the court personnel could not properly monitor the status of the cases pending before the court.
Upon an investigation conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OPCA), the Supreme Court held that it could not overemphasize the policy on prompt resolution of disputes. Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties.
The Court stated that proper and efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge, and he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. The responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases primarily rests on the presiding judge. He ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution, and he is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since proper and efficient court management is his responsibility. Court personnel are not the guardians of a judge’s responsibilities. The efficient administration of justice cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame from one court personnel to another. A judge should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subordinates.
The Court stated that it was not unmindful of the burden of heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of every trial judge. But that cannot excuse them from doing their mandated duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they think they cannot comply with their judicial duty. Hence, under the circumstances, all that said judge needed to do was request for an extension of time since this Court has, almost invariably, been considerate with regard to such requests. She did not avail of such remedy. A heavy caseload may excuse a judge’s failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time.
As to the liability of respondent clerk of court, it was undisputed that Mr. Magno was remiss in his duty and responsibility as clerk of court by failing to adopt a system of record management. His efficiency or inefficiency in the performance of his duties and responsibilities does not depend on how his predecessors performed theirs. As the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, clerks of court perform very delicate functions and are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment thereof. It is presumed that they have familiarized themselves with the various statutes and administrative circulars pertinent to their functions to effectively discharge their duties and
responsibilities. Thus, the Court was not inclined to be sympathetic to Mr. Magno because he could not plead his lack of knowledge (or ignorance) as an excuse. He is presumed to know his functions and responsibilities.
The Court stressed that clerks of court are essential judicial officers who perform delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duty is, inter alia, to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all matters that do not involve the discretion or judgment properly belonging to the judge. They play a key role in the complement of the court, as their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. As such, they are required to be persons of competence, honesty and probity; they cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs.
An important duty of the trial court is to conduct a monthly physical inventory of cases. Thus, on the clerks of court, as much as on the judges, rests the responsibility for ensuring that delay in the disposition of cases is kept to a minimum. Indeed, while the clerks of court are not guardians of a judge’s responsibility, they are expected to assist in the speedy dispensation of justice.
As branch clerk of court, Mr. Magno’s duties included conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case were accounted for. It was likewise his duty to initiate and cause the search for missing records. It was incumbent upon him to ensure an orderly and efficient records management in the court. His failure to do so constitutes manifest inefficiency and ineptitude which cannot be countenanced.
As to the imposable penalty, the failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period constitutes a violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge punishable under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, thus:
x x x x
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10, 000.00 but not exceeding P20, 000.00. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
A respondent judge’s optional retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. It does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. Indeed, the Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
Section 52, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties as a grave offense and punishable by suspension ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 1 year, for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
Conflict of interest
In the case of “QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON – ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW, EN BANC, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC , August 19, 2009”, the Philippine Supreme Court fined Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos for professional misconduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning that a repetition of the violation and the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely by the Court.
The case involves the proper interpretation of Section 7(b) (2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), which places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession, to wit:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
x x x.
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
x x x.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon. She resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
When asked by the Court for comment, the Court Administrator stated that general intent of the law was to uphold the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust. Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that “they public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. Thus, the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which might occur in any transaction between the retired government employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.
When asked by the Court for comment, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) took the view that the law generally prohibits incumbent public officials and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act, which accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution. The policy requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over the former.
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which is the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside employment to one that “does not require the practice of law.” The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service.
The Court required the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province of Romblon to verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her resignation in February 2008, and submit to the Court a report on his verification. In compliance therewith, the Executive Judge reported that Atty. Buffe had made appearances in at least four civil cases pending before the trial court.
The Court resolved that Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearances, before the very same branch she had served and immediately after her resignation, was a violation that it could not close its eyes to and that she could not run away from under the cover of the letter-query she had filed and her petition for declaratory relief. The Court noted that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she had committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing before her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.
The Court held that Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the “outside employment” that an incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of law. The practice of law is defined as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. The objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.
To repeat, the Court held that a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b) (2) is her awareness of the law and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceived in the law, the Court stated. It found it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justified her position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches where they were previously employed. The Court found this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe’s part and, to its mind, only emphasized her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as “unlawful,” Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
x x x
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The Court stated that unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 does not necessarily require the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it. Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
The Court held that Atty. Buffe had failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she cited and wanted to replicate – the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law. By her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers. Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b) (2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b) (2), the principle of res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
The Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The Court has ruled in many cases that on the basis of this principle, no evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record. The Court has punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. It had ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined. In a case, the respondent was disciplined and punished by the Court for contempt for his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against the Court through the media and even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements.
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
The absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As stated earlier, Atty. Buffe had been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.
In this case, the Court could not discern any mitigating factors to apply, save OCAT’s observation that Atty Buffe’s letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the prohibition on the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after one’s separation from the service.
The Court stated that Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this was not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she had done was something that the Court could not help but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have spawned. This was a point against Atty. Buffe that cancelled out the leniency the Court might have exercised because of the OCAT’s observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from the service.
The case involves the proper interpretation of Section 7(b) (2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), which places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession, to wit:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
x x x.
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
x x x.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon. She resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
When asked by the Court for comment, the Court Administrator stated that general intent of the law was to uphold the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust. Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that “they public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. Thus, the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which might occur in any transaction between the retired government employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.
When asked by the Court for comment, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) took the view that the law generally prohibits incumbent public officials and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act, which accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution. The policy requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over the former.
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which is the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside employment to one that “does not require the practice of law.” The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service.
The Court required the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province of Romblon to verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her resignation in February 2008, and submit to the Court a report on his verification. In compliance therewith, the Executive Judge reported that Atty. Buffe had made appearances in at least four civil cases pending before the trial court.
The Court resolved that Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearances, before the very same branch she had served and immediately after her resignation, was a violation that it could not close its eyes to and that she could not run away from under the cover of the letter-query she had filed and her petition for declaratory relief. The Court noted that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she had committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing before her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.
The Court held that Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the “outside employment” that an incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of law. The practice of law is defined as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. The objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.
To repeat, the Court held that a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b) (2) is her awareness of the law and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceived in the law, the Court stated. It found it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justified her position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches where they were previously employed. The Court found this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe’s part and, to its mind, only emphasized her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as “unlawful,” Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
x x x
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The Court stated that unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 does not necessarily require the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it. Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
The Court held that Atty. Buffe had failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she cited and wanted to replicate – the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law. By her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers. Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b) (2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b) (2), the principle of res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
The Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The Court has ruled in many cases that on the basis of this principle, no evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record. The Court has punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. It had ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined. In a case, the respondent was disciplined and punished by the Court for contempt for his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against the Court through the media and even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements.
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
The absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As stated earlier, Atty. Buffe had been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.
In this case, the Court could not discern any mitigating factors to apply, save OCAT’s observation that Atty Buffe’s letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the prohibition on the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after one’s separation from the service.
The Court stated that Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this was not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she had done was something that the Court could not help but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have spawned. This was a point against Atty. Buffe that cancelled out the leniency the Court might have exercised because of the OCAT’s observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from the service.
Penalty on charity
In “RE: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., En Banc, A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009”, the Philippine Supreme Court did not exempt the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. from legal and filing fees despite its recognized mission of working for indigent and underprivileged Filipinos. It held that the “free access” clause of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, as implemented by Rule 3 and Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines (re: indigent litigants), applies only to natural persons who suffer from economic poverty.
To encourage and promote the growth of charity work in the Philippines, I think it is high time for the Court to amend Rule 3 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to accommodate the needs of accredited and reputable non-profit and non-stock juridical persons whose mission are to serve and save the poorest of the poor in Philippine society.
A few years back, the Court risked the ire of the Filipino people, especially the poor litigants, and the Philippine Bar for partnering with Congress for the passage of a special law (R.A. No. 9227) commanding the imposition of radical increases in court docket and filing fees and other legal costs just to double the special allowances of judges and justices (which excluded ordinary court personnel, at that). The issue irked the top leaders of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on constitutional grounds. They filed a well-publicized petition before the Court seeking its nullification. They held protest rallies in front of Congress. But the petition died of a natural death on technical grounds when a majority of the IBP leaders, for unknown and mysterious reasons (and without explaining the matter to its national membership), withdrew their signatures in the petition.
And now, the Court has the gall to refuse the simple request of a reputable corporate charitable institution for exemption from huge court docket and filing fees and other legal costs involving a litigation which affects the said institution. The reason? The charitable institution is “not a poor natural person”. Somehow, I cannot hold my insulting smile founded on disbelief, anger, and shock. Here is a digest of the said case.
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines that reserve the privilege of exemption from docket and filing fees to “indigent persons”. He questioned why the rules excluded foundations or associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons, as in the case of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been reaching out since 1985 “to the poorest among the poor, the newly born and abandoned babies, children who never saw the smile of their mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, broken families who returned to a normal life”, whom the Philippine Government and the Filipino society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Supreme Court held that it could not grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty”.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court, which respectively state thus:
“Sec. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.”
“Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. – Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300, 000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.”
The Court held that the clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicated that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
The Court stated that the free access clause of the Constitution applies only to a natural person who suffers from poverty. It added that extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees and that the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
To encourage and promote the growth of charity work in the Philippines, I think it is high time for the Court to amend Rule 3 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to accommodate the needs of accredited and reputable non-profit and non-stock juridical persons whose mission are to serve and save the poorest of the poor in Philippine society.
A few years back, the Court risked the ire of the Filipino people, especially the poor litigants, and the Philippine Bar for partnering with Congress for the passage of a special law (R.A. No. 9227) commanding the imposition of radical increases in court docket and filing fees and other legal costs just to double the special allowances of judges and justices (which excluded ordinary court personnel, at that). The issue irked the top leaders of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on constitutional grounds. They filed a well-publicized petition before the Court seeking its nullification. They held protest rallies in front of Congress. But the petition died of a natural death on technical grounds when a majority of the IBP leaders, for unknown and mysterious reasons (and without explaining the matter to its national membership), withdrew their signatures in the petition.
And now, the Court has the gall to refuse the simple request of a reputable corporate charitable institution for exemption from huge court docket and filing fees and other legal costs involving a litigation which affects the said institution. The reason? The charitable institution is “not a poor natural person”. Somehow, I cannot hold my insulting smile founded on disbelief, anger, and shock. Here is a digest of the said case.
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines that reserve the privilege of exemption from docket and filing fees to “indigent persons”. He questioned why the rules excluded foundations or associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons, as in the case of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been reaching out since 1985 “to the poorest among the poor, the newly born and abandoned babies, children who never saw the smile of their mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, broken families who returned to a normal life”, whom the Philippine Government and the Filipino society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Supreme Court held that it could not grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty”.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court, which respectively state thus:
“Sec. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.”
“Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. – Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300, 000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.”
The Court held that the clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicated that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
The Court stated that the free access clause of the Constitution applies only to a natural person who suffers from poverty. It added that extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees and that the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
Search warrants for heinous crimes
In the Philippines, the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) of Manila and Quezon City are authorized to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may be enacted by Congress and included in the above list by the Supreme Court. The warrants may be enforced in any part of the country.
Last month, in “RE: REQUEST OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO I. RAZON FOR AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE THE ENDORSEMENT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT, En Banc, A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC, July 7, 2009”, the Philippine Supreme Court, acting on the request of the Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP), granted the request of the PNP to delegate to the Director of the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM) of the PNP the authority to endorse applications for search warrants to be filed before the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) of Manila and Quezon City, thus amending Sec. 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, En Banc, January 27, 2004, to read as follows:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. – The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court acknowledges that, to be efficient in the campaign to fight crime, the PNP Chief must not be tied to his desk. Recent developments and trends in criminality require the PNP Chief to be mobile, so that he will be effective in the performance of several functions and responsibilities attendant to his position. That being the case, there will be instances when documents demanding the PNP Chief’s immediate attention and signature will not be acted upon right away. One such document may be an application for a search warrant, the immediate endorsement of which is a must in order for the PNP to be effective and responsive in the conduct of its criminal investigation.
Last month, in “RE: REQUEST OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO I. RAZON FOR AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE THE ENDORSEMENT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT, En Banc, A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC, July 7, 2009”, the Philippine Supreme Court, acting on the request of the Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP), granted the request of the PNP to delegate to the Director of the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM) of the PNP the authority to endorse applications for search warrants to be filed before the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) of Manila and Quezon City, thus amending Sec. 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, En Banc, January 27, 2004, to read as follows:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. – The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court acknowledges that, to be efficient in the campaign to fight crime, the PNP Chief must not be tied to his desk. Recent developments and trends in criminality require the PNP Chief to be mobile, so that he will be effective in the performance of several functions and responsibilities attendant to his position. That being the case, there will be instances when documents demanding the PNP Chief’s immediate attention and signature will not be acted upon right away. One such document may be an application for a search warrant, the immediate endorsement of which is a must in order for the PNP to be effective and responsive in the conduct of its criminal investigation.
Friday, August 21, 2009
Land registration
For legal research purposes of lawyers visiting this blog, may I simplify hereinbelow the basic things to do in handling a petition or application for original and cadastral land registration before the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) of the Philippines.
Original Land Registration (ordinary and cadastral);
Simplified Procedures.
Ref.:
1. 2002 Rev. Manual for Clerks of Court; see Appendix “B” (LRA Manual of Instructions [for clerks of courts]);
2. PD 1529, Sec. 14, et. seq. (Prop. Reg. Decree of 1978 [Orig. Reg.]);
3. Act 2259 (Cadastral Act);
4. CA No. 141 (Public Land Act).
Format of application/petition: read Sec. 15, PD 1529.
Attachments to the petition (3 copies of petition to be filed with RTC OCC):
1. Orig. plan in tracing cloth or diazo polyester film duly approved by the DENR Reg. Tech. Dir.
2. In lieu thereof, a true copy of the said orig. plan attested and certified correct by the Reg. Tech. Dir. or his duly authorized official.
3. Two white or blue print copies of the plan.
4. Orig. And two copies of the technical descriptions certified by the Reg. Tech. Dir. or his authorized official. Not merely signed by the Geod. Engr.
5. Orig. and two copies of the Geod. Engr.’s certificate. In lieu thereof, a certification (orig. and two copies) from the Reg. Tech. Dir. as to its non-availability.
6. Tax Dec. or in lieu thereof, an affid. of 3 disinterested person as to the market value of the land (Jud. Form 81).
7. All orig. muniments of title of the petitioner which prove his ownership of the land. Not mandatory as along as the docs can be produced before the court during the trial.
Work to do before filing petition (secure orig. copies of the attachments to the petition):
1. Work out with the ofc. of the DENR Reg. Tech. Dir. All the approved plans, tech. descrip., certif.. of non-availability of Geod. Engr.’s certificate.
2. Work out with priv. Geod. Engr. the orig. copy of his Certif.
3. Work out with the local Assessor the orig. copy of the Tax Dec.
4. Gather all proofs of ownership – deeds, contracts, special powers of attorney, etc.
5. Gather all proofs of payments of taxes - local real estate and transfer taxes and all BIR/national revenue taxes involving the land and all related transactions.
6. Others.
The petitioner must submit proof of service of a copy of the petition and its annexes on the Reg. Exec. Dir. of the DENR (by way of Copy Furnished). Allege in the petition. Attach affid. of service. (Sec. 17, Pd 1529).
Court docket and filing fees – pay to RTC OCC.
Publication fees (notice of initial hearing) – pay to LRA docket section. Bring certified copy of the order. The initial hearing is set not earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the issuance of the order. (Sec. 23, PD 1529).
Initial hearing:
1. Follow up the order of initial hearing.
2. Follow up the publications of the order.
3. During the initial hearing, move for general default
4. Later on, get copy of the order of gen. default.
5. During the initial hearing in open court, mark the proofs of juris. facts (see the Record of the case), to wit:
5.1. Order of initial hearing
5.2. Letter of RTC BCC forwarding the case to the LRA and the OSG
5.3. Notices to the petitioner, adjoining owners, creditors, et. al.
5.4. Sheriff’s certificate of posting
5.5. Proofs of notice of initial hearing addressed to concerned govt agencies: CENRO, PENRO, DENR Reg. Off., OSG, LRA, RD, et. al.
5.6. Two certificates/affids. of publication (Off. Gaz. and a national newspaper). With orig. copies of the printed issue/s.
5.7. Others (see the Record of the case and mark all notices/orders related to the initial hearing, as well as all proofs of service thereof).
Order of initial hearing must be issued within 5 days from filing of petition (after raffle to the court branch).
Two copies of order of initial hearing are served on the LRA within 15 days from issuance thereof. LRA shall arrange for its publication in the Off. Gaz. and in a national newspaper (once only). Petitioner must pay publication fee to LRA docket section cashier. Get OR.
Fees – see Sec. 111, PD 1529. To be collected by RTC OCC. Based on assessed value of land and improvements, per Tax Dec. or per joint affid. of 3 disinterested person as to its market value. Get OR. (See also new Rule 141, Legal Fees; and Rule 142, Costs of Suit).
Cost of publications. – To be paid to the LRA, approx. P1, 000 (Off. Gazz.). Fees of national newspaper vary. Go to LRA docket section with certif. copy of order of initial hearing, with court case/docket number, for ref. of LRA cashier.
Upon gen. default, petitioner may move for ex parte presentation of evid. before the BCC as commissioner. (Rule 32, Rules of Court).
The court’s LRC Case No. (court docket no.) is different from the LRA’s Rec. No. The LRA Rec. No. is set by LRA, not by the court.
After trial, the final steps are:
1. Decision. Get certified copies.
2. Get Certificate of Finality of Judgment from the court staff.
3. File a motion for issuance of decree of reg. Attach certificate of finality of judg. Notice of hearing.
4. Follow up the order granting the motion.
5. Follow up the Decree of Reg. (to be issued by the LRA). Get certif. copy of the Decree from LRA.
6. LRA forwards orig. of the Decree to local RD concerned. Follow up status. Get certif. copy of Decree from RD (optional).
7. Follow up with RD the issuance of OCT. Pay the RD reg. fees.
8. Get owner’s duplic. copy of OCT from the RD.
Legend:
BCC – Branch Clerk of Court
BIR - Bureau of Internal Revenue
CA – Commonwealth Act
CENRO – Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
DENR – Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Geod. Engr. – Geodetic Engineer
LRA – Land Registration Authority
LRC – Land Registration Commission (old name of LRA)
Off. Gaz. – Official Gazette
OCC – Office of the Clerk of Court
OCT – Original Certificate of Title
OR – Official Receipt
OSG – Office of the Solicitor General
PD – Presidential Decree
PENRO – Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
RTC – Regional Trial Court
RD – Register of Deeds
Reg. Exec. Dir. – Regional Executive Director
Reg. Tech. Dir. – Regional Technical Director
Reg. Off. _ Regional Office
Tax Dec. – Tax Declaration
Prepared by:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Managing Partner, Laserna Cueva Mercader Law
Offices (LCM Law)
Founder and Board Consultant, Las Pinas City Bar
Association (LPBA), Inc.
Prof. of Law, FEU, Manila (ret.)
lcmlaw@gmail.com
http://attylaserna.blogspot.com
http://lcmlaw.multiply.com
Original Land Registration (ordinary and cadastral);
Simplified Procedures.
Ref.:
1. 2002 Rev. Manual for Clerks of Court; see Appendix “B” (LRA Manual of Instructions [for clerks of courts]);
2. PD 1529, Sec. 14, et. seq. (Prop. Reg. Decree of 1978 [Orig. Reg.]);
3. Act 2259 (Cadastral Act);
4. CA No. 141 (Public Land Act).
Format of application/petition: read Sec. 15, PD 1529.
Attachments to the petition (3 copies of petition to be filed with RTC OCC):
1. Orig. plan in tracing cloth or diazo polyester film duly approved by the DENR Reg. Tech. Dir.
2. In lieu thereof, a true copy of the said orig. plan attested and certified correct by the Reg. Tech. Dir. or his duly authorized official.
3. Two white or blue print copies of the plan.
4. Orig. And two copies of the technical descriptions certified by the Reg. Tech. Dir. or his authorized official. Not merely signed by the Geod. Engr.
5. Orig. and two copies of the Geod. Engr.’s certificate. In lieu thereof, a certification (orig. and two copies) from the Reg. Tech. Dir. as to its non-availability.
6. Tax Dec. or in lieu thereof, an affid. of 3 disinterested person as to the market value of the land (Jud. Form 81).
7. All orig. muniments of title of the petitioner which prove his ownership of the land. Not mandatory as along as the docs can be produced before the court during the trial.
Work to do before filing petition (secure orig. copies of the attachments to the petition):
1. Work out with the ofc. of the DENR Reg. Tech. Dir. All the approved plans, tech. descrip., certif.. of non-availability of Geod. Engr.’s certificate.
2. Work out with priv. Geod. Engr. the orig. copy of his Certif.
3. Work out with the local Assessor the orig. copy of the Tax Dec.
4. Gather all proofs of ownership – deeds, contracts, special powers of attorney, etc.
5. Gather all proofs of payments of taxes - local real estate and transfer taxes and all BIR/national revenue taxes involving the land and all related transactions.
6. Others.
The petitioner must submit proof of service of a copy of the petition and its annexes on the Reg. Exec. Dir. of the DENR (by way of Copy Furnished). Allege in the petition. Attach affid. of service. (Sec. 17, Pd 1529).
Court docket and filing fees – pay to RTC OCC.
Publication fees (notice of initial hearing) – pay to LRA docket section. Bring certified copy of the order. The initial hearing is set not earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the issuance of the order. (Sec. 23, PD 1529).
Initial hearing:
1. Follow up the order of initial hearing.
2. Follow up the publications of the order.
3. During the initial hearing, move for general default
4. Later on, get copy of the order of gen. default.
5. During the initial hearing in open court, mark the proofs of juris. facts (see the Record of the case), to wit:
5.1. Order of initial hearing
5.2. Letter of RTC BCC forwarding the case to the LRA and the OSG
5.3. Notices to the petitioner, adjoining owners, creditors, et. al.
5.4. Sheriff’s certificate of posting
5.5. Proofs of notice of initial hearing addressed to concerned govt agencies: CENRO, PENRO, DENR Reg. Off., OSG, LRA, RD, et. al.
5.6. Two certificates/affids. of publication (Off. Gaz. and a national newspaper). With orig. copies of the printed issue/s.
5.7. Others (see the Record of the case and mark all notices/orders related to the initial hearing, as well as all proofs of service thereof).
Order of initial hearing must be issued within 5 days from filing of petition (after raffle to the court branch).
Two copies of order of initial hearing are served on the LRA within 15 days from issuance thereof. LRA shall arrange for its publication in the Off. Gaz. and in a national newspaper (once only). Petitioner must pay publication fee to LRA docket section cashier. Get OR.
Fees – see Sec. 111, PD 1529. To be collected by RTC OCC. Based on assessed value of land and improvements, per Tax Dec. or per joint affid. of 3 disinterested person as to its market value. Get OR. (See also new Rule 141, Legal Fees; and Rule 142, Costs of Suit).
Cost of publications. – To be paid to the LRA, approx. P1, 000 (Off. Gazz.). Fees of national newspaper vary. Go to LRA docket section with certif. copy of order of initial hearing, with court case/docket number, for ref. of LRA cashier.
Upon gen. default, petitioner may move for ex parte presentation of evid. before the BCC as commissioner. (Rule 32, Rules of Court).
The court’s LRC Case No. (court docket no.) is different from the LRA’s Rec. No. The LRA Rec. No. is set by LRA, not by the court.
After trial, the final steps are:
1. Decision. Get certified copies.
2. Get Certificate of Finality of Judgment from the court staff.
3. File a motion for issuance of decree of reg. Attach certificate of finality of judg. Notice of hearing.
4. Follow up the order granting the motion.
5. Follow up the Decree of Reg. (to be issued by the LRA). Get certif. copy of the Decree from LRA.
6. LRA forwards orig. of the Decree to local RD concerned. Follow up status. Get certif. copy of Decree from RD (optional).
7. Follow up with RD the issuance of OCT. Pay the RD reg. fees.
8. Get owner’s duplic. copy of OCT from the RD.
Legend:
BCC – Branch Clerk of Court
BIR - Bureau of Internal Revenue
CA – Commonwealth Act
CENRO – Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
DENR – Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Geod. Engr. – Geodetic Engineer
LRA – Land Registration Authority
LRC – Land Registration Commission (old name of LRA)
Off. Gaz. – Official Gazette
OCC – Office of the Clerk of Court
OCT – Original Certificate of Title
OR – Official Receipt
OSG – Office of the Solicitor General
PD – Presidential Decree
PENRO – Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
RTC – Regional Trial Court
RD – Register of Deeds
Reg. Exec. Dir. – Regional Executive Director
Reg. Tech. Dir. – Regional Technical Director
Reg. Off. _ Regional Office
Tax Dec. – Tax Declaration
Prepared by:
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Managing Partner, Laserna Cueva Mercader Law
Offices (LCM Law)
Founder and Board Consultant, Las Pinas City Bar
Association (LPBA), Inc.
Prof. of Law, FEU, Manila (ret.)
lcmlaw@gmail.com
http://attylaserna.blogspot.com
http://lcmlaw.multiply.com
Saturday, August 15, 2009
Incomplete IBP board
New IBP Officials Take Oath
Posted: August 11, 2009
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph.
By
Jay B. Rempillo
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno today administered the oath of office to six of the new Regional Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines at the SC Dignitaries Lounge.
The new IBP Regional Governors are Atty. Ma. Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa (Northern Luzon), Atty. Ferdinand Y. Miclat (Central Luzon), Atty. Amador Tolentino, Jr. (Southern Luzon), Atty. Jose V. Cabrera (Bicolandia), Atty. Roland B. Inting (Eastern Visayas), and Atty. Roan I. Libarios (Eastern Mindanao). All six were among those elected during the IBP election held on April 25, 2009 and their election was without any controversy.
The occupants of the other IBP regional governorship, however, have yet to be determined pending the resolution of AM No. 09-5-2-SC (In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines) and AC No. 8292 (Magsino v. Vinluan).
See:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2009/08/08110901.php
SEE MY PREVIOUS BLOG:
As I have repeatedly stated in my past blogs, internal politics and power-play continue to poison and destroy the top power structures of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in the process causing grave demoralization among Filipino lawyers and debilitating the delivery of its legal and civic services to the poverty-stricken and disunity-infected Philippine society, as shown by news items published in Philippine dailies some months ago. Here is an example:
CONTROVERSY ROCKS INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES OVER POLL RESULTS
by Manila Standard Today
15 May 2009
The incumbent head of the primary organization of lawyers has voided the election conducted by a breakaway group of regional governors for the post of executive vice president over allegations of violations of rules and regulations.
In a memorandum to the Supreme Court, IBP national president Felidano Bautista clarified that it was Roan Libarios who was duly elected as the new executive vice president of their organization and not lawyer Elpidio Soriano III who earlier claimed to have bagged the post in an election.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which is under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court, has an estimated 48,000 members in 83 chapters nationwide.
Libarios, a former congressman and the IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao region, obtained five votes when the nine IBP regional governors held an official and legitimate election on May 9 which was witnessed by Judge Amelia Manalastas, the SC’s appointed observer.
Soriano, who claimed to represent the Greater Manila Region, even issued a press release declaring that he has been elected as the incoming EVP of the IBP, according to Libarios’ camp.
Soriano belongs to the faction that included incumbent EVP Rogelio Vinluan who is set to replace Bautista as IBP national president on July 1.
Soriano ran for the EVP post even though there are still legal questions surrounding his claim to be the Greater Manila regional governor.
Under the IBP rules, only duly elected regional governors are qualified to run as EVP.
In the same memorandum, Bautista effectively nullified the election of Soriano when he declared that “whatever actions or correspondences made by the EVP and four of the incumbent governors [affiliated with Vinluan] are deemed illegal and have no effect.”
Bautista also asked the SC to immediately calendar and preside in the oath taking of Libarios and the nine elected regional governors including the incoming president.
Source: http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:4Z7oPBoRvdUJ:www.manilastandardtoday.com/%3Fpage%3Dpolitics5_may15_2009+new+IBP+governors+take+oath+2009&cd=10&hl=tl&ct=clnk&gl=ph
Posted: August 11, 2009
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph.
By
Jay B. Rempillo
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno today administered the oath of office to six of the new Regional Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines at the SC Dignitaries Lounge.
The new IBP Regional Governors are Atty. Ma. Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa (Northern Luzon), Atty. Ferdinand Y. Miclat (Central Luzon), Atty. Amador Tolentino, Jr. (Southern Luzon), Atty. Jose V. Cabrera (Bicolandia), Atty. Roland B. Inting (Eastern Visayas), and Atty. Roan I. Libarios (Eastern Mindanao). All six were among those elected during the IBP election held on April 25, 2009 and their election was without any controversy.
The occupants of the other IBP regional governorship, however, have yet to be determined pending the resolution of AM No. 09-5-2-SC (In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines) and AC No. 8292 (Magsino v. Vinluan).
See:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2009/08/08110901.php
SEE MY PREVIOUS BLOG:
As I have repeatedly stated in my past blogs, internal politics and power-play continue to poison and destroy the top power structures of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in the process causing grave demoralization among Filipino lawyers and debilitating the delivery of its legal and civic services to the poverty-stricken and disunity-infected Philippine society, as shown by news items published in Philippine dailies some months ago. Here is an example:
CONTROVERSY ROCKS INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES OVER POLL RESULTS
by Manila Standard Today
15 May 2009
The incumbent head of the primary organization of lawyers has voided the election conducted by a breakaway group of regional governors for the post of executive vice president over allegations of violations of rules and regulations.
In a memorandum to the Supreme Court, IBP national president Felidano Bautista clarified that it was Roan Libarios who was duly elected as the new executive vice president of their organization and not lawyer Elpidio Soriano III who earlier claimed to have bagged the post in an election.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which is under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court, has an estimated 48,000 members in 83 chapters nationwide.
Libarios, a former congressman and the IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao region, obtained five votes when the nine IBP regional governors held an official and legitimate election on May 9 which was witnessed by Judge Amelia Manalastas, the SC’s appointed observer.
Soriano, who claimed to represent the Greater Manila Region, even issued a press release declaring that he has been elected as the incoming EVP of the IBP, according to Libarios’ camp.
Soriano belongs to the faction that included incumbent EVP Rogelio Vinluan who is set to replace Bautista as IBP national president on July 1.
Soriano ran for the EVP post even though there are still legal questions surrounding his claim to be the Greater Manila regional governor.
Under the IBP rules, only duly elected regional governors are qualified to run as EVP.
In the same memorandum, Bautista effectively nullified the election of Soriano when he declared that “whatever actions or correspondences made by the EVP and four of the incumbent governors [affiliated with Vinluan] are deemed illegal and have no effect.”
Bautista also asked the SC to immediately calendar and preside in the oath taking of Libarios and the nine elected regional governors including the incoming president.
Source: http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:4Z7oPBoRvdUJ:www.manilastandardtoday.com/%3Fpage%3Dpolitics5_may15_2009+new+IBP+governors+take+oath+2009&cd=10&hl=tl&ct=clnk&gl=ph
ACDC syndrome
A famous Filipino lawyer-mediaman-politician has been suspended (for the second time) by the Philippine Supreme Court, again, on issues involving money.
It is risky to combine the three professions in one person (although, it is admitted that knowledge of law is of great service to mediamen and politicians).
There is always the danger of suffering from the mediaman’s ACDC syndrome (“attack and collect; defend and collect”).
If you are a trial lawyer, focus and concentrate on it. And be honest in your dealings and simple and modest in your lifestyle.
Let me reproduce the Supreme Court news item on the second suspension of Atty. Melanio Mauricio Jr.
SC Suspends “Batas Mauricio”
Posted: July 24, 2009
By Jay B. Rempillo
After recently dismissing three trial court judges and suspending three court personnel, the Supreme Court has also cracked down against erring members of the Bar and in less than three weeks, suspended lawyer-tri-media personality Atty. Melanio “Batas Mauricio” Mauricio, Jr. from the practice of law for three years.
Mauricio wrote columns in tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO, and HATAW!, as well as hosted the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS aired over UNTV and radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB.
In a 14-page penned by Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Supreme Court en banc unanimously suspended Atty. Mauricio for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Mauricio was warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
Mauricio’s suspension stemmed from the disbarment case filed against him by Foodsphere, Inc., manufacturer and distributor of CDO canned goods and grocery products. Mauricio continuously attacked Foodsphere in his columns and radio and television programs following an incident in June 2004, when one Alberto Cordero complained of the quality of the CDO Liver Spread, despite the matter being settled already by the parties concerned and the temporary restraining order (TRO) issued against him by the Valenzuela City Regional Trial Court.
Mauricio, in the guise of helping Cordero and family, previously threatened to publish the articles unless Foodsphere pays PhP150,000 to the Corderos. Later, Mauricio proposed Foodsphere to settle the matter by paying PhP15,000 to the Corderos and PhP35,000 to his BATAS Foundation and placing paid advertisements in the tabloids and his television program. Eventually, the Corderos forged a KASUNDUAN (settlement) with Foodsphere to withdraw their complaint filed earlier before the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD), which eventually dismissed the complaint. Mauricio, who was a signatory to the settlement as a witness, subsequently sent Foodsphere an advertising contract asking it to advertise in the tabloids for which he writes and his television program. However, Mauricio was disappointed with Foodsphere’s response and eventually proceeded to attacked Foodsphere in his columns and programs.
“The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated…On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant….To the Court, suspension of respondent from the malpractice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient,” said the Court.
It was the second suspension for Mauricio who had been suspended for six months in 2005 in Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr. for malpractice and gross misconduct for violating Canons 17, 18, Rule 18.03 and 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath for charging a client exorbitant fees despite failing to make any action in the said client’s case.
The Court held that charging complainant Valeriana U. Dalisay PhP56,000 for his services was improper since Mauricio did not take any step in assisting Dalisay in her case. While giving legal advice and opinion on complainant Dalisay’s problems and those of her family constitutes legal service, the Court stressed that the attorney’s fee must be reasonable. (AC No. 7199, Foodsphere, Inc. v. Mauricio, www.sc.judiciary.gov.ph).
(Note: Atty. Mauricio was a senatorial candidate in 2004 under the presidential line-up of the late Senator Raul Roco. I was one of the volunteer lawyers of Sen. Roco in 2004. I was a co-convenor of the Lawyers for Reform Movement and the Lawyers for Roco Movement).
It is risky to combine the three professions in one person (although, it is admitted that knowledge of law is of great service to mediamen and politicians).
There is always the danger of suffering from the mediaman’s ACDC syndrome (“attack and collect; defend and collect”).
If you are a trial lawyer, focus and concentrate on it. And be honest in your dealings and simple and modest in your lifestyle.
Let me reproduce the Supreme Court news item on the second suspension of Atty. Melanio Mauricio Jr.
SC Suspends “Batas Mauricio”
Posted: July 24, 2009
By Jay B. Rempillo
After recently dismissing three trial court judges and suspending three court personnel, the Supreme Court has also cracked down against erring members of the Bar and in less than three weeks, suspended lawyer-tri-media personality Atty. Melanio “Batas Mauricio” Mauricio, Jr. from the practice of law for three years.
Mauricio wrote columns in tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO, and HATAW!, as well as hosted the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS aired over UNTV and radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB.
In a 14-page penned by Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Supreme Court en banc unanimously suspended Atty. Mauricio for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Mauricio was warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
Mauricio’s suspension stemmed from the disbarment case filed against him by Foodsphere, Inc., manufacturer and distributor of CDO canned goods and grocery products. Mauricio continuously attacked Foodsphere in his columns and radio and television programs following an incident in June 2004, when one Alberto Cordero complained of the quality of the CDO Liver Spread, despite the matter being settled already by the parties concerned and the temporary restraining order (TRO) issued against him by the Valenzuela City Regional Trial Court.
Mauricio, in the guise of helping Cordero and family, previously threatened to publish the articles unless Foodsphere pays PhP150,000 to the Corderos. Later, Mauricio proposed Foodsphere to settle the matter by paying PhP15,000 to the Corderos and PhP35,000 to his BATAS Foundation and placing paid advertisements in the tabloids and his television program. Eventually, the Corderos forged a KASUNDUAN (settlement) with Foodsphere to withdraw their complaint filed earlier before the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD), which eventually dismissed the complaint. Mauricio, who was a signatory to the settlement as a witness, subsequently sent Foodsphere an advertising contract asking it to advertise in the tabloids for which he writes and his television program. However, Mauricio was disappointed with Foodsphere’s response and eventually proceeded to attacked Foodsphere in his columns and programs.
“The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated…On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant….To the Court, suspension of respondent from the malpractice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient,” said the Court.
It was the second suspension for Mauricio who had been suspended for six months in 2005 in Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr. for malpractice and gross misconduct for violating Canons 17, 18, Rule 18.03 and 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath for charging a client exorbitant fees despite failing to make any action in the said client’s case.
The Court held that charging complainant Valeriana U. Dalisay PhP56,000 for his services was improper since Mauricio did not take any step in assisting Dalisay in her case. While giving legal advice and opinion on complainant Dalisay’s problems and those of her family constitutes legal service, the Court stressed that the attorney’s fee must be reasonable. (AC No. 7199, Foodsphere, Inc. v. Mauricio, www.sc.judiciary.gov.ph).
(Note: Atty. Mauricio was a senatorial candidate in 2004 under the presidential line-up of the late Senator Raul Roco. I was one of the volunteer lawyers of Sen. Roco in 2004. I was a co-convenor of the Lawyers for Reform Movement and the Lawyers for Roco Movement).
Foreign lawyers' ads
At long last, the Philippine Supreme Court has taken initial steps, though very much delayed, on my three-year old 2006 letter-petition addressed to former Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban to create a special or ad hoc Supreme Court committee to conduct clinical studies and make recommendations on the ethical (and practical) issue of LAWYER ADVERTISING, in light of the proliferation in Philippine major newspapers of various advertisements placed by foreign lawyers doing business in the Philippines as alleged immigration and labor consultants, a good pretext to indirectly violate existing rules of the Philippine Supreme Court prohibiting lawyer advertising and solicitation.
Quoted in full below is the recent resolution, dated June 23, 2009, issued by the Supreme Court which I received this week.
The matter is officially docketed as A.M. No. 06-10-20-SC (Re: Proliferation of Mass Media Advertisements of Foreign Lawyers Doing Business in the Philippines).
The resolution ordered the Supreme Court Chief Attorney to submit his Comment thereon within 30 days, for further study by the Supreme Court.
It will be noted that in my 2000 Ll. M. thesis (as a graduate studies fellow of the Far Eastern University Educational Foundation at the Graduate School of the University of Santo Tomas, Manila), major parts of which I had posted on this blog two years ago, I had extensively discussed and compared existing US jurisprudence on lawyer advertising in relation to the constitutional concept of the “freedom of commercial speech”, a legal principle that is very much accepted and respected in USA.
My personal position is that, subject to certain restrictions by the Philippine Supreme Court in consultation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Philippine Bar Association, the Las Pinas City Bar Association (which I founded in 2001), and other major local voluntary bar association in the Philippines, pursuant to the concept of the “freedom of commercial speech”, the current prohibition on lawyer advertising in the mass media should be liberalized to allow such advertising at least in national and local newspapers and in professional, sectoral, business, and civic journals, so long as the content and presentation of such advertising are truthful, accurate, decent, and dignified, the contours of which should be well defined in the specific rules and regulations to be issued by the Philippine Supreme Court on the matter.
As of now, Philippine ethical rules for Filipino lawyers allow only business cards, listings in lawyers’ directories in the yellow pages of phonebooks, law association journals, and the like, and complimentary greetings in business and non-business souvenir programs as very limited forms of lawyer advertising.
I think it is time for the Filipino public to be granted a more comprehensive and open access to verifiable and reliable consumer information and data about the legal services sector, e.g., identities, experience, accreditations, and professional pricings or fees of excellent, competent, skilled, ethical and accessible lawyers and providers of legal services in the Philippines to the Filipino public in making sound and economic decisions as consumers of legal services and legal products for the protection of their life, liberty and property.
I am aware, though, that many old and conservative justices in the Supreme Court and many senior and tradition-conscious members of the Philippine Bar will absolutely and vehemently oppose any form of lawyer advertising in any and all mass media on the theory that would reduce and debase the noble legal profession into an ordinary commercial and profit-oriented sector. Such a fear is baseless and unfounded if we study and consider deeply the American experience on the mater, as discussed in my 2000 masteral studies.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 23, 2009
“A.M. No. 06-10-20-SC (Re: proliferation of Mass Media Advertisements of Foreign Lawyers Doing Business in the Philippines). The Court Resolved to REFER the following documents to the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ATTORNEY for comment thereon within thirty (30) days from notice hereof:
(a) 1st Endorsement dated October 12, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, referring the letter dated September 27, 2006 of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., director, Las Pinas City Bar Association, Inc.; and
(b) Aforesaid Letter of Atty. Laserna, Jr., requesting for the creation of an ad hoc committee to address the proliferation of mass media advertisements of foreign lawyers in the Philippines, for the reasons stated in his letter.” Carpio Morales, J., on leave (44)
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
LAS PINAS CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (LPBA), INC.
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Avenue
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1743, Philippines
Tel/Fax: (632) 8725443 & 8742539; Mobile: (0 63 920) 326 8824
Email: lcmlaw@gmail.com,
Website: http://groups.msn.com/laspinascitybarassociation
September 27, 2006
Personal Delivery
Hon. ARTEMIO PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Philippine Supreme Court
Manila
RE : LAWYER ADVERTISING BY FOREIGN LAWYERS
DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES
M A B U H A Y :
I am writing as an officer of the Las Pinas City Bar Association (LPBA), Inc. and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Pasay Paranaque Las Pinas Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter, and as a private legal practitioner, Filipino citizen, and professor of law (FEU).
This refers to the proliferation of lawyer advertising by foreign lawyers doing business in the Philippines either as so-called “visa consultants” on US and Canadian migrations and/or as “private practising immigration lawyers” for immigration cases of Filipinos who wish to migrate to USA and Canada or of Filipinos now based in USA, Canada and elsewhere with pending or potential visa and immigration-related cases in such countries.
Attached, as examples, are two (2) such lawyer advertisements which appeared on the same Page A10 of the Philippine Daily Inquirer today, September 27, 2006, i.e., Reeves and Associates (USA) and The Law Offices of Ted Laguatan and Associates (USA), a copy of which is attached, for your perusal and reference.
Filipino lawyers who are duly licensed to practise law in the Philippines, as members in good standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), are prohibited by the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility and existing Legal Ethics-related jurisprudence from engaging in any form of direct and indirect or public and private lawyer advertising of any form and hue whatsoever in and via the mass media (except for the routine business/calling cards and routine law lists in reputable law journals).
Yet foreign lawyers who aggressively engage in the business of providing immigration and visa-related legal and semi-legal consultations and allied services to Filipinos here and abroad freely and openly place mass media advertisements, directly and publicly selling their legal, semi-legal and paralegal services to their Filipino markets, in the process, creating the discriminatory and scandalous impression that such foreign lawyers (some, if not most, of whom are of Filipino descent), are a privileged class of lawyers and are beyond the ambit, control, supervision, direction and disciplinary powers of the Philippine Supreme Court in re: lawyer advertising violations.
I find the situation to be seriously and morally anomalous, irregular and unacceptable.
The Philippine Supreme Court should adopt its official stand on the matter and should publicly declare its collective position and ruling thereon after the conducting necessary legal, sociological, technical, and clinical studies on the matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully pray that this issue be referred by your good self to the Supreme Court En Banc and that the Supreme Court En Banc create a special or ad hoc committee (composed of representatives from the Supreme Court, the Law Academe, the IBP, the voluntary local Bar Associations, the law-related NGOs, and the Mass Media Sector) to investigate the aforecited situation, conduct clinical and legal studies related thereto, and submit its official report and recommendations to the Supreme Court En Banc, copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Las Pinas City Bar Association (LPBA), Inc., and other voluntary local Bar Associations in the Philippines, preferably within six (6) months from the commencement of its formal committee meetings.
May your day be blessed, happy, and liberated. Thank you.
Sincerely.
Atty. MANUEL J. LASERNA JR., AB, LLB, LLM
Founding Pres. LPBA, 2001-03
Director, LPBA, 2005-07
Vice Pres., IBP PPLM Chapter, 2005-07
Prof. Of Law, FEU, June 1985-Oct. 2006
Cc: IBP National Office (fax)
IBP PPLM Chapter Office (fax)
LPBA Board (fax)
File
Quoted in full below is the recent resolution, dated June 23, 2009, issued by the Supreme Court which I received this week.
The matter is officially docketed as A.M. No. 06-10-20-SC (Re: Proliferation of Mass Media Advertisements of Foreign Lawyers Doing Business in the Philippines).
The resolution ordered the Supreme Court Chief Attorney to submit his Comment thereon within 30 days, for further study by the Supreme Court.
It will be noted that in my 2000 Ll. M. thesis (as a graduate studies fellow of the Far Eastern University Educational Foundation at the Graduate School of the University of Santo Tomas, Manila), major parts of which I had posted on this blog two years ago, I had extensively discussed and compared existing US jurisprudence on lawyer advertising in relation to the constitutional concept of the “freedom of commercial speech”, a legal principle that is very much accepted and respected in USA.
My personal position is that, subject to certain restrictions by the Philippine Supreme Court in consultation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Philippine Bar Association, the Las Pinas City Bar Association (which I founded in 2001), and other major local voluntary bar association in the Philippines, pursuant to the concept of the “freedom of commercial speech”, the current prohibition on lawyer advertising in the mass media should be liberalized to allow such advertising at least in national and local newspapers and in professional, sectoral, business, and civic journals, so long as the content and presentation of such advertising are truthful, accurate, decent, and dignified, the contours of which should be well defined in the specific rules and regulations to be issued by the Philippine Supreme Court on the matter.
As of now, Philippine ethical rules for Filipino lawyers allow only business cards, listings in lawyers’ directories in the yellow pages of phonebooks, law association journals, and the like, and complimentary greetings in business and non-business souvenir programs as very limited forms of lawyer advertising.
I think it is time for the Filipino public to be granted a more comprehensive and open access to verifiable and reliable consumer information and data about the legal services sector, e.g., identities, experience, accreditations, and professional pricings or fees of excellent, competent, skilled, ethical and accessible lawyers and providers of legal services in the Philippines to the Filipino public in making sound and economic decisions as consumers of legal services and legal products for the protection of their life, liberty and property.
I am aware, though, that many old and conservative justices in the Supreme Court and many senior and tradition-conscious members of the Philippine Bar will absolutely and vehemently oppose any form of lawyer advertising in any and all mass media on the theory that would reduce and debase the noble legal profession into an ordinary commercial and profit-oriented sector. Such a fear is baseless and unfounded if we study and consider deeply the American experience on the mater, as discussed in my 2000 masteral studies.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 23, 2009
“A.M. No. 06-10-20-SC (Re: proliferation of Mass Media Advertisements of Foreign Lawyers Doing Business in the Philippines). The Court Resolved to REFER the following documents to the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ATTORNEY for comment thereon within thirty (30) days from notice hereof:
(a) 1st Endorsement dated October 12, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, referring the letter dated September 27, 2006 of Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., director, Las Pinas City Bar Association, Inc.; and
(b) Aforesaid Letter of Atty. Laserna, Jr., requesting for the creation of an ad hoc committee to address the proliferation of mass media advertisements of foreign lawyers in the Philippines, for the reasons stated in his letter.” Carpio Morales, J., on leave (44)
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
LAS PINAS CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (LPBA), INC.
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Avenue
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1743, Philippines
Tel/Fax: (632) 8725443 & 8742539; Mobile: (0 63 920) 326 8824
Email: lcmlaw@gmail.com,
Website: http://groups.msn.com/laspinascitybarassociation
September 27, 2006
Personal Delivery
Hon. ARTEMIO PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Philippine Supreme Court
Manila
RE : LAWYER ADVERTISING BY FOREIGN LAWYERS
DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES
M A B U H A Y :
I am writing as an officer of the Las Pinas City Bar Association (LPBA), Inc. and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Pasay Paranaque Las Pinas Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter, and as a private legal practitioner, Filipino citizen, and professor of law (FEU).
This refers to the proliferation of lawyer advertising by foreign lawyers doing business in the Philippines either as so-called “visa consultants” on US and Canadian migrations and/or as “private practising immigration lawyers” for immigration cases of Filipinos who wish to migrate to USA and Canada or of Filipinos now based in USA, Canada and elsewhere with pending or potential visa and immigration-related cases in such countries.
Attached, as examples, are two (2) such lawyer advertisements which appeared on the same Page A10 of the Philippine Daily Inquirer today, September 27, 2006, i.e., Reeves and Associates (USA) and The Law Offices of Ted Laguatan and Associates (USA), a copy of which is attached, for your perusal and reference.
Filipino lawyers who are duly licensed to practise law in the Philippines, as members in good standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), are prohibited by the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility and existing Legal Ethics-related jurisprudence from engaging in any form of direct and indirect or public and private lawyer advertising of any form and hue whatsoever in and via the mass media (except for the routine business/calling cards and routine law lists in reputable law journals).
Yet foreign lawyers who aggressively engage in the business of providing immigration and visa-related legal and semi-legal consultations and allied services to Filipinos here and abroad freely and openly place mass media advertisements, directly and publicly selling their legal, semi-legal and paralegal services to their Filipino markets, in the process, creating the discriminatory and scandalous impression that such foreign lawyers (some, if not most, of whom are of Filipino descent), are a privileged class of lawyers and are beyond the ambit, control, supervision, direction and disciplinary powers of the Philippine Supreme Court in re: lawyer advertising violations.
I find the situation to be seriously and morally anomalous, irregular and unacceptable.
The Philippine Supreme Court should adopt its official stand on the matter and should publicly declare its collective position and ruling thereon after the conducting necessary legal, sociological, technical, and clinical studies on the matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully pray that this issue be referred by your good self to the Supreme Court En Banc and that the Supreme Court En Banc create a special or ad hoc committee (composed of representatives from the Supreme Court, the Law Academe, the IBP, the voluntary local Bar Associations, the law-related NGOs, and the Mass Media Sector) to investigate the aforecited situation, conduct clinical and legal studies related thereto, and submit its official report and recommendations to the Supreme Court En Banc, copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Las Pinas City Bar Association (LPBA), Inc., and other voluntary local Bar Associations in the Philippines, preferably within six (6) months from the commencement of its formal committee meetings.
May your day be blessed, happy, and liberated. Thank you.
Sincerely.
Atty. MANUEL J. LASERNA JR., AB, LLB, LLM
Founding Pres. LPBA, 2001-03
Director, LPBA, 2005-07
Vice Pres., IBP PPLM Chapter, 2005-07
Prof. Of Law, FEU, June 1985-Oct. 2006
Cc: IBP National Office (fax)
IBP PPLM Chapter Office (fax)
LPBA Board (fax)
File
Cory Aquino
May I share a recent item from the column of my good friend Manuel L. Caballero, of New Jersey and New York, USA, on the recent death of former Philippine President Corazon C. Aquino, a global symbol of non-violent struggle for freedom, truth, justice, and democracy.
The Filipino Reporter (New Jersey/New York)
Column: ON MY WATCH (August 7, 2009)
Mrs. Aquino aspired for holy life;
was a faithful creation of God who trusted and obeyed
By
Manuel L. Caballero
These are sad and mournful days for a thankful nation and a grateful people. The Filipinos lost a servant leader. They lost a fierce believer in God, a devoted mother, and a kind and prayerful individual. They lost former President Corazon Aquino or Tita (Auntie) Cory to many.
Even as they mourn their loss, the Filipino people have good reasons to celebrate the inspiring and courageous life that Mrs. Aquino led. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked on television upon learning of the former president’s death, “She (Mrs. Aquino) is an inspiration not only to the Philippines, but to people everywhere who believe in right values and positive future.”
She was a leader who led by example. While president, she reportedly instructed her driver to stop on red lights. Towards the end of her presidency, she refused to run in a winnable election and instead, instructed her justice secretary to concentrate
all efforts to effect an orderly and peaceful succession of power.
According to her executive secretary, Mrs. Aquino made that decision in order to demonstrate to her people and to the world that democracy worked in her country after twenty years of authoritarian rule.
The late Filipina leader was, in fact, referred to as “icon of democracy” because she was the one, who, despite limited knowledge on the intimate workings of a democratic type of government, restored democracy and democratic institutions in the Philippines after Marcos’ downfall in 1986.
Christians say during difficult and challenging times that God is testing us or giving us trials. And that He doesn’t give us test that we couldn’t pass or trial that we couldn’t overcome.
The second half of President Aquino’s life was filled with such tests and trials. All indications show she passed them all. Those trials included seven years of incarceration of her martyred husband Ninoy during Martial law years, seven attempts by the military to unseat her during her presidency, fearless campaign for honesty and transparency in government, and the latest, her 14-month cancer ordeal.
Of course, after the trials, the rewards. To us, her installation to the office of president of the Philippines after the People Power Revolution in 1986 was her biggest reward. Although to her, it was another form of sacrifice. Her only son is a senator. Her youngest daughter is a popular and admired television personality.
Mrs. Aquino was Time Magazine’s 1986 Woman of the Year. She was recipient of more than 20 prestigious international awards, including Martin Luther King, Jr Nonviolent Peace Prize and the United Nations Development Fund for Women Award for Political Leadership.
As a strong advocate of freedom and democracy, President Aquino was conferred honorary degrees by 14 academic institutions, including the University of the Philippines, Boston University and Fordham University.
Above all, perhaps, the most significant reward this leader reaps is the love and respect of the world. Virtually, all the major newspapers and radio and television networks around the globe prominently mentioned her death and her life. Leaders of many countries lauded her principled values.
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in a television statement from New York City where she was visiting after a meeting with President Obama in Washington D.C., said the Filipinos lost a national treasure. She also said, “She restored the rule of law and democracy when our country was in turmoil.”
President Barack Obama praised Mrs. Aquino’s role in restoring democracy in the Philippines as well as her moral and courageous leadership.
Pope Benedict XVI has extended his heartfelt condolence to the Aquino family. He recalled Mrs. Aquino’s “courageous commitment to the freedom of the Filipino people, her firm rejection of violence and intolerance, and her contribution to the rebuilding of a just and cohesive political order in her beloved homeland.”
Now that the matriarch of the Aquino family is gone, what or who is next? Watch out for Kris, the youngest daughter of Ninoy and Cory Aquino. I can foresee that she is next in line.
* * *
When news spread that President Aquino could no longer tolerate solid food intake and that her family had decided to stop her chemo treatment, I wrote the following and left it with my Editor before I left for vacation in California two weeks ago. I’d like to share it with our readers:
The loyal and faithful wife of Ninoy Aquino has joined her martyred husband in Heaven. Fittingly, I would describe the story of this extraordinary couple as conjugal martyrdom.
There are two reasons why I won’t forget President Cory Aquino. She restored democracy in the native country after almost 20 years of political vacuum during the Marcos years.
She did that without fear despite her limited knowledge of what and how democratic institutions work and operate. She knew the Filipinos wanted no other form of government but democracy.
The other reason why I won’t forget everybody’s Tita Cory is personal. During the late president’s visit to New York in the mid 80s, specifically to Fordham University in the Bronx, my picture was published on the front page of the New York Times, only because I was at the right place at the right time.
I was with thousands of Filipinos who went to Fordham to witness the conferment of an honorary degree to then President Aquino when, unknowingly, a photographer of the New York Times took a picture of us in a small group carrying welcome placards. The photo was published on NYT’s front page the next day.
Above those two reasons, Mrs. Aquino will be remembered because she aspired to lead a holy life and she was a faithful creation of God who trusted and obeyed.
The Filipino Reporter (New Jersey/New York)
Column: ON MY WATCH (August 7, 2009)
Mrs. Aquino aspired for holy life;
was a faithful creation of God who trusted and obeyed
By
Manuel L. Caballero
These are sad and mournful days for a thankful nation and a grateful people. The Filipinos lost a servant leader. They lost a fierce believer in God, a devoted mother, and a kind and prayerful individual. They lost former President Corazon Aquino or Tita (Auntie) Cory to many.
Even as they mourn their loss, the Filipino people have good reasons to celebrate the inspiring and courageous life that Mrs. Aquino led. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked on television upon learning of the former president’s death, “She (Mrs. Aquino) is an inspiration not only to the Philippines, but to people everywhere who believe in right values and positive future.”
She was a leader who led by example. While president, she reportedly instructed her driver to stop on red lights. Towards the end of her presidency, she refused to run in a winnable election and instead, instructed her justice secretary to concentrate
all efforts to effect an orderly and peaceful succession of power.
According to her executive secretary, Mrs. Aquino made that decision in order to demonstrate to her people and to the world that democracy worked in her country after twenty years of authoritarian rule.
The late Filipina leader was, in fact, referred to as “icon of democracy” because she was the one, who, despite limited knowledge on the intimate workings of a democratic type of government, restored democracy and democratic institutions in the Philippines after Marcos’ downfall in 1986.
Christians say during difficult and challenging times that God is testing us or giving us trials. And that He doesn’t give us test that we couldn’t pass or trial that we couldn’t overcome.
The second half of President Aquino’s life was filled with such tests and trials. All indications show she passed them all. Those trials included seven years of incarceration of her martyred husband Ninoy during Martial law years, seven attempts by the military to unseat her during her presidency, fearless campaign for honesty and transparency in government, and the latest, her 14-month cancer ordeal.
Of course, after the trials, the rewards. To us, her installation to the office of president of the Philippines after the People Power Revolution in 1986 was her biggest reward. Although to her, it was another form of sacrifice. Her only son is a senator. Her youngest daughter is a popular and admired television personality.
Mrs. Aquino was Time Magazine’s 1986 Woman of the Year. She was recipient of more than 20 prestigious international awards, including Martin Luther King, Jr Nonviolent Peace Prize and the United Nations Development Fund for Women Award for Political Leadership.
As a strong advocate of freedom and democracy, President Aquino was conferred honorary degrees by 14 academic institutions, including the University of the Philippines, Boston University and Fordham University.
Above all, perhaps, the most significant reward this leader reaps is the love and respect of the world. Virtually, all the major newspapers and radio and television networks around the globe prominently mentioned her death and her life. Leaders of many countries lauded her principled values.
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in a television statement from New York City where she was visiting after a meeting with President Obama in Washington D.C., said the Filipinos lost a national treasure. She also said, “She restored the rule of law and democracy when our country was in turmoil.”
President Barack Obama praised Mrs. Aquino’s role in restoring democracy in the Philippines as well as her moral and courageous leadership.
Pope Benedict XVI has extended his heartfelt condolence to the Aquino family. He recalled Mrs. Aquino’s “courageous commitment to the freedom of the Filipino people, her firm rejection of violence and intolerance, and her contribution to the rebuilding of a just and cohesive political order in her beloved homeland.”
Now that the matriarch of the Aquino family is gone, what or who is next? Watch out for Kris, the youngest daughter of Ninoy and Cory Aquino. I can foresee that she is next in line.
* * *
When news spread that President Aquino could no longer tolerate solid food intake and that her family had decided to stop her chemo treatment, I wrote the following and left it with my Editor before I left for vacation in California two weeks ago. I’d like to share it with our readers:
The loyal and faithful wife of Ninoy Aquino has joined her martyred husband in Heaven. Fittingly, I would describe the story of this extraordinary couple as conjugal martyrdom.
There are two reasons why I won’t forget President Cory Aquino. She restored democracy in the native country after almost 20 years of political vacuum during the Marcos years.
She did that without fear despite her limited knowledge of what and how democratic institutions work and operate. She knew the Filipinos wanted no other form of government but democracy.
The other reason why I won’t forget everybody’s Tita Cory is personal. During the late president’s visit to New York in the mid 80s, specifically to Fordham University in the Bronx, my picture was published on the front page of the New York Times, only because I was at the right place at the right time.
I was with thousands of Filipinos who went to Fordham to witness the conferment of an honorary degree to then President Aquino when, unknowingly, a photographer of the New York Times took a picture of us in a small group carrying welcome placards. The photo was published on NYT’s front page the next day.
Above those two reasons, Mrs. Aquino will be remembered because she aspired to lead a holy life and she was a faithful creation of God who trusted and obeyed.
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