Deed of donation; acceptance by donee; defective notarial acknowledgment.

[G.R. No. 132681.  December 3, 2001]

RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner, vs. GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE REYES, respondents.

x x x.

Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to be valid,[7] specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.  As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee,[8] and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,[9] provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation.  Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,[10] and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.[11] The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.[12] It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,[13] and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.[14]

In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well as the technical description as the real property donated.  It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the “love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity.”[15] This was sufficient cause for a donation.  Indeed, donation is legally defined as “an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.”[16]

The donee’s acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which reads:

That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR.[17]

Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signature.  However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala.  Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta’s failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument.  We disagree.

The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:

Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of public instruments shall be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing the same in the presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or persons executing the same before a notary public or other public officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment.  Where the instrument so acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page where the signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument, shall be signed on the left margin thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses, and all the pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment.  Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment.” (underscoring ours).

As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right-hand margin.  Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute.  The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties.  The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties.  Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.

Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory.  The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate the document.  The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.

In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not 

also render the donation null and void.  The instrument should be treated in its entirety.  It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part.  The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument.  The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment.  To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act.  In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only.  Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.

It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not make a determination of whether Violeta was the daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta.  These issues should be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings affecting the respective estates of Catalina and Violeta.  Suffice it to state that the donation, which we declare herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771,[18] in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code.  Moreover, property donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the donor’s death,[19] whether the donation was made to a compulsory heir or a stranger,[20] unless there is an express prohibition if that had been the donor’s intention.[21]

x x x.

[1] Rollo, p. 94.

[2] Ibid., p. 95.

[3] CA Rollo, pp. 33-34; penned by Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr.

[4] Penned by Associate Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion, concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus M. Elbinias and Ramon A. Barcelona; CA Rollo, pp. 175-178.

[5] Penned by Associate Jesus M. Justice Elbinias, concurred in by Associate Justices Minerva G. Reyes and Ramon A. Barcelona; CA Rollo, p. 196.

[6] Rollo, p. 25.

[7] Duque v. Domingo, 80 SCRA 654 [1977].

[8] Civil Code, Article 712.

[9] Civil Code, Article 734.

[10] Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 489 [1990]. The exceptions to irrevocability are: officiousness, failure of the donee to comply with charges, and ingratitude.

[11] Tanpingco v. IAC, 207 SCRA 652 [1992]; Quijada v. CA, 299 SCRA 695 [1998].

[12] Civil Code, Article 746.

[13] Civil Code, Article 749, second par.

[14] Abellera v. Balanag, 37 Phil. 865 [1918]; Alejandro v. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 295 [1977].

[15] Rollo, p. 94.

[16] Civil Code, Article 725.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Donations which in accordance with the provisions of Article 752, are inofficious, bearing in mind, the estimated net value of the donor’s property at the time of his death, shall be reduced with regard to the excess; but this reduction shall not prevent the donations from taking effect during the life of the donor, nor shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits.

            For the reduction of donations the provisions of this Chapter and of Articles 911 and 912 of this Code shall govern.

[19] Civil Code, Book III, Title IV, Chapter 4, Section 5.

[20] Vda.  de Tupas v. Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, 144 SCRA 622 [1986].

[21] De Roma v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 205 [1987].

Back to Metro Manila law practice

As the founder of Las Pinas City Bar Assn Inc. (LPBA), as a 2005-07 vice pres of IBP PPLM Ch. (southern Metro Manila district), and as a retired FEU law professor (1985-2006), I have resumed and re-focused my active law practice back to Las Pinas City and Metro Manila as a whole after a year of unproductive experimental law practice in Tacloban City in the Eastern Visayas Region (where I re-married last year). I thank the local bar leaders of Las Pinas City and other cities in the southern district of Metro Manila for welcoming me back.

 

 

March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

April 26, 2011
Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected March 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.

Constitutional Law

COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidate’s election and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.

Equal Protection. The main issue in this case is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337. The Supreme Court held that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has been effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCOR’s exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was PAGCOR’s own request to be exempted. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.

Impeachment; Initiation. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling that the term “initiate” as used in Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action on said complaint. The initial action of the House of Representatives on the complaint is the referral of the same to the Committee on Justice. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011.

Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules. When the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011.

Non-impairment Clause. Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case, states that the private parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which inure to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for their decision to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that the withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions of private parties with it; thus, the amendatory provision is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The SC held that a franchise partakes of the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.

Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process. The SC did not agree. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, according to the SC, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body. The SC did not agree with this. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that “all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges.” However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Senate; Publication of Rules. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. The SC held that the Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. . Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors. Price is considered “excessive” if it is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item bought and the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. In determining whether or not the price is excessive, the following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand forces in the market; (b) government price quotations; (c) warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of products. In this case, the issue was whether the computer units bought by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) from Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while the respondents found nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of the bids, the technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final technical evaluation report was apparently manipulated to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand as against Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a lower price. The SC concluded that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS were overpriced by almost 50%. This comparison was based on the initial purchase of 23 PC units with the bid price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC units, 1 unit 386 Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-12-2399. There was an additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for Php929,649.00 (same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit UPS for Php86,000.00. The total contract price obtained by Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA disallowed the amount of Php881,819.00 representing the overprice per the auditor’s findings. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.

Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers. The SC held the petitioner liable personally and solidarily for the disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application because the Cooperative Development Authority is not a private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.

Administrative Law

Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that the Supreme Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The SC held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Agrarian Law

Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary: (1) Landless; (2) Filipino citizen; (3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and (4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive. The SC found that petitioner Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless. According to the records, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo was awarded by the DAR with a home lot consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under the CARP. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.

Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the Philippines. In this case, the issue was whether the Land Bank of the Philippines has the personality to file a petition for determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court. The SC held that LBP did. The LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform Code and Section 64 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In the previous case of Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the SC held that LBP is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just compensation, but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. It is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, if appropriate. Davao Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 181566 & 181570. March 9, 2011.

Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land. It is clear from Section 27 of RA 6657 that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In this case, petitioner Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from respondent Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim. In other words, waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.

Election Law

Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing Petition. Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a candidate’s COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to in said section. As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, the Court in a previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed before the elections is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive period to be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition to cancel COC on the ground of false representation therein regarding a candidate’s qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the prescribed period of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding age, residence and citizenship which may be raised in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated by the COMELEC – allowing a petition to cancel COC based on the candidate’s non-compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements for elective office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period provided in Section 78 – was simply to remedy a perceived “procedural gap” though not expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous case, had already rejected such justification. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.

AM No. 11-3-6-SC; new rule on service of summons on foreign juridical entities.

AM. No. 11-3-6-SC

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 •
OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON
FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read
as follows:

"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. —
When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made
on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in
the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave
of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the
following means:

a) B y personal service coursed through the
appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;

b) B y publication once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country where the defendant may be
found and by serving a copy of the summons and the
court order by-registered mail at the last known address
of the defendant;

c) B y facsimile or any recognized electronic
means that could generate proof of service; or

d) B y such other means as the court may in its
discretion direct."

This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

March 15, 2011

RAPE; alibi; civil liability; youthful offender; juvenile justice system.

G.R. No. 182239

In the very recent CASE this month OF "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMIE M. JACINTO", G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011, A RAPE CASE INVOLVING A 5-YEAR OLD GIRL AND A JUVENILE ACCUSED, THE SUPREME3 COURT AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court REMANDED the case to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 (juvenile justice system). The salient doctrinal pronouncements of the Court are extensively quoted below, thus:

x x x.

Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[1] For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[2]

Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.”

x x x.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched principles:

(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[97]

Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused.[98] More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.[99]

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime,[100] except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[101]

I

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.[102]

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

x x x.

The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all – she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape was committed.[104] Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.[105]

Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo[106] revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could have been “the result of the repeated battering of the object;” and that such object could have been an erect male organ.[107]

The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.[108]

II

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are now in dispute.

The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when the crime was committed.[109]

We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.[110] AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus[111] that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.

The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called “kuya” and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.[112]

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has “the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their oath,”[113] unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been “ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted.”[114]

Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:

xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him “What is this incident, Pare?”, thus corroborating the latter’s testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child.”[115]

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s very testimony.

Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.

This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at work.[116] He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the second time and boxed appellant.[117] It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay.[118] Further, the drinking session started only after the appellant’s errand to the store.[119]

Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.

Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria’s statement that her husband was at work.

Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.

Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in order. Thus:

xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki said.[120]

Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, “they being related or were one way or another linked to each other.”[121]

Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.

We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[122]

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[123]

In People v. Paraiso,[124] the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.[125] Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout.[126]

In People v. Antivola,[127] the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:

Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape occurred, was a stone’s throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.[128] (Emphasis supplied.)

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle’s house.[129] Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.[130]

Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place of the commission of the crime.

All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

III

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:[131]

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344][132] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.[133] (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, “the appropriate proceedings” in accordance with the Act shall be observed.[134]

We determine discernment in this wise:

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.[135] Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.[136]

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.[137] Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.[138]

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: “(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense” are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.[139]

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

The birth certificate of AAA[140] shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old[141] applies.

The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;[142] and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.[143]

Relying on People v. Bon,[144] the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.[145] Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.[146]

We differ.

In a more recent case,[147] the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.[148] (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Civil Liability

We have consistently ruled that:

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[149]

Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family.[150] The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.[151]

Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,[152] the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of Sentence

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

x x x x

Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,[154] the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[155]

Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,[156] overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.[157]

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations[158] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)[159]

On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which reflected the same position.[160]

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[161] Section 40[162] of the law and Section 48[163] of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.[164]

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,[165] the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.

---

[1] People v. Antivola, G.R. No. 139236, 3 February 2004, 421 SCRA 587, 598; People v. Nogar, G.R. No. 133946, 27 September 2000, 341 SCRA 206, 217.

[2] People v. Trayco, G.R. No. 171313, 14 August 2009, 596 SCRA 233, 253; People v. Paraiso, G.R. No. 131823, 17 January 2001, 349 SCRA 335, 350-351.

[3] To maintain the confidentiality of information on child abuse cases, and consistent with the application in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419) of: (1) the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) and its implementing rules; (2) Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004) and its implementing rules; and (3) this Court’s Resolution dated 19 October 2004 in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children), the real name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members are withheld.

[4] Records, pp. 64-69. Decision dated 26 March 2004 of the Regional Trial Court penned by Judge Ma. Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca; Id. at 77. Order dated 6 April 2004 of the Regional Trial Court penned by Judge Penaco-Sitaca; CA rollo pp. 134-159. Decision dated 29 August 2007 penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez concurring.

[5] Records, p. 2.

[6] The docket no. indicated in the covering of the trial court’s record of the case and the majority of the Orders and other court processes, including the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, is Criminal Case No. 1679-13-1411.

[7] Records, p. 2. Information dated 20 March 2003.

[8] Id. at 22. Order dated 15 July 2003.

[9] Id at 25. Pre-Trial Order dated 4 August 2003.

[10] TSNs, 13 October 2003 and 18 February 2004.

[11] TSN, 16 September 2003.

[12] TSN, 1 March 2004.

[13] TSN, 16 September 2003, pp. 5 and 12.

[14] TSN, 13 October 2003, pp. 4-5.

[15] TSN, 16 September 2003, pp. 2-3.

[16] TSN, 1 March 2004, p. 2.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 8-9.

[19] Id. at 3.

[20] Id.

In its decision, the trial court translated the testimony in the following manner: “xxx leaving the store at the same time, he saw Hermie holding the child by the hand and proceeding downward while he proceeded upward to the house of Lita Lingkay to watch TV.” Records, p. 67. Decision dated 26 March 2004.

[21] TSN, 13 October 2003, p. 18.

[22] Id. at 7 and 14.

[23] Id. at 16 and 18.

[24] Id. at 6-7.

[25] Id. at 16.

[26] Id. at 7-8.

[27] Id. at 8.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 9.

[30] TSN, 16 September 2003, p. 4.

[31] Id.

[32] Id. at 6.

[33] Id. at 4.

[34] Id. at 6.

[35] Id. at 4 and 6.

[36] Id. at 15.

[37] Id. at 4 and 15.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. at 5.

[40] Id. at 6.

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Id.

[44] Id. at 7.

[45] Id. at 17.

[46] TSN, 1 March 2004, pp. 10-11.

[47] Id. at 10.

[48] Id. at 3.

[49] Id.

[50] Id. at 4.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] Id. at 5.

[54] TSN, 16 September 2003, p. 7.

[55] Id. at 7-8.

[56] Records, p. 9. Medico-legal Certificate issued on 29 January 2003 by the Municipal Health Office.

[57] Id.

[58] Id. at 12. Medico Legal Certificate issued on 29 January 2003 by the provincial hospital.

[59] Id.

[60] TSN, 8 January 2004, p. 9; TSN, 9 February 2004, pp. 3-4.

[61] Id. at 8.

[62] TSN, 22 March 2004, p. 5.

[63] Id. at 3.

[64] TSN, 2 February 2004, p. 7.

[65] Id. at 8.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] Id. at 2-4.

[69] TSN, 9 February 2004, pp. 3-4.

[70] TSN, 8 January 2004, p. 7.

[71] Id at 6 and 9.

[72] Id. at 7.

[73] Id. at 8.

[74] Id.

[75] Id.

[76] Id. at 9.

[77] Id. at 11.

[78] Id. at 10.

[79] Id.

[80] Id. at 9.

[81] Id. at 10.

[82] Id. at 11.

[83] Id. at 11-12.

[84] TSN, 22 March 2004, pp. 2-4.

[85] TSN, 2 February 2004, p. 5.

[86] Records, pp. 64-69.

[87] Id. at 69.

[88] Id. at 71-72. Motion to Re-open Trial for Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence of Minority on the Part of the Accused dated 1 April 2004.

[89] Id. at 77. Order dated 6 April 2004.

[90] CA Rollo, pp. 32-33. Resolution of the Supreme Court Third Division, 8 September 2004, G.R. No. 163715.

[91] CA rollo, p. 158. Decision dated 29 August 2007.

[92] Id. at 169. Resolution of the Court of Appeals 22^nd Division, 19 November 2007, CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213.

[93] Rollo, p. 36. Resolution of the Supreme Court 2^nd Division, 25 June 2008, G.R. No. 182239.

[94] Id. at 37-40. Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) of the Accused-Appellant dated 12 August 2008; Id. at 41-44. Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) of the People of the Philippines dated 22 August 2008.

[95] CA rollo, p. 92. Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated 25 January 2006.

[96] Id. at 95 citing People v. Lagramada, G.R. Nos. 146357 & 148170, 29 August 2002.

[97] People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 814 citing People v. Glivano, G.R. No. 177565, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 656, 662 further citing People v. Malones, 425 SCRA 318, 329 (2004).

[98] People v. Cadap, G. R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010 citing People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 435, 444.

[99] People v. Leonardo, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010; People v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 186494, 15 September 2010.

[100] People v. Antivola, supra note 1; People v. Nogar, supra note 1.

[101] People v. Trayco, supra note 2.

[102] Art. 266-A paragraph 1(d), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 2 of The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

[103] TSN, 13 October 2003, pp. 7-8.

[104] People v. Amatorio, G.R. No. 175837, 8 August 2010.

[105] People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 435, 448.

[106] TSN, 8 January 2004, pp. 2-4,

[107] Id. at 3.

[108] People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 186533, 9 August 2010, citing People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 325-326 (2004).

[109] CA rollo, p. 93. Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated 25 January 2006.

[110] People v. Antivola, supra note 1 at 597-598.

[111] TSN, 13 October 2003, pp. 7 and 14-16.

[112] Records, p. 68. Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 26 March 2004.

[113] People v. Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, 15 December 2010 citing People v. Fernandez, 426 Phil. 169, 173 (2002).

[114] People v. Ayade, G.R. No. 188561, 15 January 2010, 610 SCRA 246, 253.

[115] Records, p. 68. Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 26 March 2004.

[116] TSN, 9 February 2004, p. 8.

[117] Id. at 6 and 8.

[118] Id. at 7.

[119] Id. at 7-8.

[120] Records, pp. 68-69. Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 26 March 2004.

[121] People v. Antivola, supra note 1.

[122] People v. Paraiso, supra note 2.

[123] People v. Trayco, supra note 2 at 253 citing People v. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 597.

[124] Supra note 2.

[125] People v. Trayco, supra note 2 at 351 citing People v. Arlee, G.R. No. 113518, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 201; People vs. Cañete, 287 SCRA 490 (1998); People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997).

[126] Id.

[127] People v. Antivola, supra note 1.

[128] Id. at 598-599.

[129] CA rollo, p. 148.

[130] Id. at 149.

[131] G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009, 599 SCRA 20.

[132] Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Servicing Sentence. – Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

[133] People v. Sarcia, supra note 131 at 48.

[134] SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - xxx

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

x x x x

[135] Madali v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180380, 4 August 2009, 595 SCRA 274, 296 citing the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law

[136] Id. at 296-297.

[137] Remiendo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184874, 9 October 2009, 603 SCRA 274, 289.

[138] Id. citing Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, 26 April 2006, 488 SCRA 376.

[139] CA rollo, p. 151.

[140] Records, pp. 73-74. Certificate of Live Birth and Certification from the Municipal Office of the Civil Registrar issued on 30 March 2004.

[141] Paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 5, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

[142] Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines).

[143] ART. 68 Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. xxx

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen yeras of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

[144] G.R. No. 166401, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 168.

[145] Id. at 215.

Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 71. Graduated scales. - In the cases in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.

x x x x

The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO. 1

1. Death,

2. Reclusion perpetua,

3. Reclusion temporal,

4. Prision mayor,

5. Prision correccional,

6. Arresto mayor,

7. Destierro,

8. Arresto menor,

9. Public censure,

10. Fine.

x x x x

[146] CA rollo, p. 154.

[147] People v. Sarcia, supra note 131.

[148] Id. at 41.

[149] Id. at 45.

[150] Id. at 43.

[151] Id. at 46.

[152] Id. citing People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, 31 March 2009, 582 SCRA 738.

[153] G.R. No. 159208, 18 August 2006, 499 SCRA 341.

[154] Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him, the ocurt, shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training institution or responsible person under whose care he has been committed.

Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the Department of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over the offender and his family.

The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or government training institution as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.

The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. (Emphasis supplied.)

[155] CA rollo, pp. 155-156.

[156] People v. Sarcia, supra note 131.

[157] Id. at 49-50.

[158] Id. at 50 citing Senate Bill No. 1402 on Second Reading by the 13th Congress, 2nd Regular Session, No. 35, held on 9 November 2005, amendments by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago.

[159] Id.

[160] Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. – If the child is found guilty of the offense charged, the court, instead of executing the judgment of conviction, shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Suspension of sentence can be availed of even if the child is already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above twenty-one (21) years old, at the time of the pronouncement of guilt, without prejudice to the child’s availing of other benefits such as probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in the interest of justice.

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, but shall nonetheless apply to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. (Emphasis supplied.)

[161] People v. Sarcia, supra note 131at 50.

[162] Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – xxx

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis supplied.)

[163] Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. –

x x x x

If the child in conflict with the law reaches eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, or to extend the suspended sentence for a maximum period of up to the time the child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age, or to order service of sentence. (Emphasis supplied.)

[164] People v. Sarcia, supra note 131at 51.

[165] Id. at 52.