Thursday, April 16, 2015

Administrative cases vs. lawyers; withdrawal of complaints.

Read -

A.C. No. 9317 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3615), June 04, 2014, ADELIA V. QUIACHON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR A. RAMOS, RESPONDENT.




From: THE LAWYER'S POST.


"x x x.
This Court finds this to be an opportune time to remind the investigating commissioners and the members of the Board of Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.[1]

In the present case, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case against respondent, even after finding that the latter had been negligent. On the basis of this finding, the latter was declared to have “been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being handled by him in behalf of complainant.”[2] Still, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case, because “without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability.”[3]   The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the recommendation.

The IBP Board of Governors should not have supported Almeyda’s stance.

The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.[4] There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.[5] Public interest is the primary objective. We explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos[6], viz.:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges x x x.

In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, it should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.

The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel.[7]

In Abay v. Montesino[8], the respondent-lawyer and his client disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed case. The lawyer therein strongly advised the client to abandon the appeal and to consider the other available remedies. The client, on the other hand, wanted to pursue it. Without obtaining the assent of his client, the respondent-lawyer deemed it wise to abandon the appeal without informing the former. In finding the respondent-lawyer guilty of negligence, the Court explained:

Not filing an appellant's brief is prejudicial because, as happened in this case, such failure could result in the dismissal of the appeal. The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latter's cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if respondent was "honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.[9]

In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of the case, but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote the client’s cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.

All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause.[10] Regardless of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.[11] Whenever lawyers take on  their clients’ cause/s, they covenant that they will exercise due diligence in protecting the client’s rights; their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their client/s and make them answerable to the client, the courts and society.[12]

In Pilapil v. Carillo[13], this Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP to suspend a lawyer from the practice of law for six months after finding that he had failed to file a petition for certiorari of the adverse decision rendered in the case of his client despite the latter’s repeated follow-ups.

x x x."


An acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because “the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of error.

See  -  The Practice Of Requiring Convicts To Appear Before The Trial Courts For Promulgation Of The Affirmance Or Modification By the Supreme Court Or The CA Of Judgments Of Conviction In Criminal Cases Is No Longer Allowed... - The Lawyer's Post





       "x x x.

In People v. Court of Appeals[5], this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal by the CA as it was made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because “the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of error[6].” Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused, respondents herein, guilty of the crime charged based on the evidence on record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and 305 of the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law to overturn the decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of the promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of error, from the decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The 
appeal of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the penalty imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate court can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned, found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the trial court on its merits.They questioned their conviction and the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It behooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course and granting it.
       x x x."

Read - 

EN BANC, G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013, EFREN S. ALMUETE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

The Practice Of Requiring Convicts To Appear Before The Trial Courts For Promulgation Of The Affirmance Or Modification By the Supreme Court Or The CA Of Judgments Of Conviction In Criminal Cases Is No Longer Allowed... - The Lawyer's Post

See - The Practice Of Requiring Convicts To Appear Before The Trial Courts For Promulgation Of The Affirmance Or Modification By the Supreme Court Or The CA Of Judgments Of Conviction In Criminal Cases Is No Longer Allowed... - The Lawyer's Post





"x x x.

Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, provides that:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS OF JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial courts in criminal cases after their judgments of conviction shall have been affirmed or modified by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, attention is invited to the decisional and statutory guidelines set out hereunder.
1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in criminal cases, differs from that prescribed for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals where promulgation is effected by filing the signed copy of the judgment with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies thereof to be served upon the parties. The procedural consequence of this distinction was reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of Prisons, to wit:
By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution.
In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it was explained that “the certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court under section 9 of rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of the judgment against him,” it “not being necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney had already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51),” and that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of the court of first instance is necessary to that end.
2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for “promulgation” of the judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage entailing unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the convict was already under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the convict is under detention, the trial court should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the prisoner may be considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison facility for confinement and service of sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately order the bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals[1].
      x x x."


Read - 

EN BANC, G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013, EFREN S. ALMUETE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS





"x x x.

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE SERVED PERSONALLY WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THAT A SUBSTITUTED SERVICE MAY BE MADE. 

IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT SERVICE SHOULD BE SHOWN BY STATING THE EFFORTS MADE TO FIND THE DEFENDANT PERSONALLY AND THE FACT THAT SUCH EFFORTS FAILED. 

THIS STATEMENT SHOULD BE MADE IN THE PROOF OF SERVICE. 

The requisites of a valid substituted service: 
(1) service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant; 
(3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; 
(4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendants place of residence; and 
(5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of service.

x x x."



Bigamy: Right Of The Offended Party Thru Counsel To Participate In The Case…

See  -  Bigamy: Right Of The Offended Party Thru Counsel To Participate In The Case…
From: THE LAWYER'S POST.


"x x x.

“Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the respondent.  The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners.  Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent’s certiorari petition before the CA should have been dismissed outright because it failed to implead the “People of the Philippines” as a party-respondent.
The respondent’s failure to implead the “People of the Philippines” as a party-respondent is not a fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA because: (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions alleged to have acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) the petition for certiorari  and prohibition filed by the respondent is a special civil action separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the petitioners.  For these reasons, the “People of the Philippines” need not be impleaded as a party in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.”
       x x x."
See - 
G.R. No. 196508, September 24, 2014, LEONARDO A. VILLALON AND ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON, PETITIONERS, VS. AMELIA CHAN, RESPONDENT.

Friday, April 10, 2015

When Rule 108 inapplicable in marriage and paternity and filiation petitions

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/181174.htm


"x x x.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.  Citing Cariño v. Cariño,[11]  Lee v. Court of Appeals[12]and Republic v. Kho,[13] they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.[14]

          The petition fails.  In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

    Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code[15] charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected.  The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.  A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.  Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.[16]

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. 

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records[17] and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie.  Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171[18] of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo
   
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced. 

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband.  Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled   on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.  

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng.  That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with “Tiu Chuan” who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is “Filipino,” not Chinese,  because their parents were never legally married.  Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.
 x x x."

Supreme Court Decisions for January 2015

See - Supreme Court of the Philippines





JURISPRUDENCE JANUARY 2015

Supreme Court Decisions for February 2015

See - Supreme Court of the Philippines





JURISPRUDENCE FEBRUARY 2015